Human Scale Development

Editorial 1

Human Scale Development: An Option for the Future
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The symbol on the back cover, which is the symbol of CEPAUR, the Development Alternatives Centre founded in 1981 by Manfred Max-Neef, is taken from a Viking rune stone (6 UR 937) located in Uppsala's University Park in Sweden. Designed one thousand years ago—or perhaps earlier—it transmits such a serene and simple beauty in its representation of a perfectly harmonious, balanced and indissoluble trinity, that it appeared as an ideal symbolic synthesis of CEPAUR's philosophy; that is, the striving for similar conditions that should, hopefully, prevail some day between the essential components of our world's survival trinity: Nature. Humanity and Technology.

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Subscribers are kindly requested to inform the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre of any changes of address or subscription cancellations.
The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has since the publication of the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report, *What Now: Another Development*, concentrated heavily on the sectoral aspects of the alternative development strategies advocated in this seminal document. As readers of *Development Dialogue* are well aware, a long series of seminars has been organized under the Foundation’s auspices or in cooperation with like-minded organizations to test the applicability of the ideas of *Another Development*—need-oriented, self-reliant, endogenous, ecologically sound and based on structural transformations—in areas such as rural development, health, education, science and technology (especially plant genetic resources and biotechnology), international monetary policy, information and communication, and participation.

An interesting and unusual example of this is the Latin American project on Human Scale Development, whose objective was to lay a foundation for future action programmes by analysing the concepts of human needs, scale, and efficiency and by focusing on unemployment and local development financing, i.e. concepts and problems that had not been penetrated in depth in *What Now*. This project was undertaken in 1985 and 1986; it was organized by the Development Alternatives Centre (CEPAUR) in Chile and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, and was directed by Manfred Max-Neef.

Ever since the results of the project were published in a Spanish edition of *Development Dialogue* in 1986, under the title *Desarrollo a Escala Humana: una opción para el futuro*, the project report has attracted wide attention in Latin America. And it is probably not an exaggeration to say that it belongs to the most photocopied documents of its kind, having found its way to the most unexpected and remote places. According to records kept at CEPAUR, close to fifty seminars, symposia and workshops have been held on the basis of the report in different parts of the continent, many of them spontaneously organized by interested bodies without assistance from CEPAUR. Thus, Human Scale Development has become an important topic of the development discussion in South and Central America.

But there are also more concrete examples of the impact of the report on policymakers at the national and local levels. Governmental bodies in Colombia, Venezuela and Argentina have taken a keen interest in the ideas advanced. In Argentina, for instance, the National Mental Health Programme is being adapted to accord with the ideas set out in the report, and in the Argentine province of Mendoza, communities, schools and hospitals
are applying the principles and methodology of Human Scale Development in their work.

More significant, however, is the extent to which social movements and grassroots organizations have been inspired by the report, and this despite its in part highly theoretical character—it has, in fact, been popularized by grassroots organizations through posters and even through comic book style publications aimed at non-academic readers. Further evidence of this interest are the hundreds and hundreds of letters received by CEPAUR and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, requesting not only additional copies of the report and copies of the project papers but also assistance in the organization of seminars and workshops, and practical and financial assistance in the implementation of Human Scale Development programmes.

One can speculate about the reasons for this unexpectedly positive response, but one of them is probably that Human Scale Development, with its strong emphasis on the role of human creativity in development, has provided a conceptual framework which seems to show a way out of the sterile confrontation between traditional developmentalism and neo-liberal monetarism. Based on the principle that 'the purpose of the economy is to serve the people, and not the people to serve the economy' and on a sophisticated but unavoidably controversial in-depth analysis of the nature of human needs, it is a challenging new contribution to development philosophy.

The English translation of the project report, which is published in this issue of Development Dialogue, should therefore merit the attention of the international development community as should the action programmes now being worked out by different grassroots organizations and by CEPAUR. Many of them, including CEPAUR, also deserve being financially assisted. It is therefore sad to note that so far almost no such support has been forthcoming; development agencies still seem to prefer to lose their money in conventional failures rather than having to justify its use in unconventional successes.

It is, however, not only in Latin America that the ideas of Another Development or Human Scale Development are gaining ground. A similar trend can be noted in Africa and especially in Southern Africa, where the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation has been co-sponsoring three major seminars on national and sectoral development alternatives over the last three years. In reviewing the experiences and publications arising from these seminars, one can safely say that they all testify to the relevance and vitality
Another Development and the Crisis in Latin America and Africa

For more than three decades now, the ruthless racial policies of South Africa have met strong opposition in the United Nations, and in forming this international policy, the Nordic countries have played a significant role—as Olof Palme showed in his last public speech, 'South Africa and the Nordic Countries' (Development Dialogue 1987:1).

In pursuing this international policy and in implementing it at the bilateral level, the Nordic governments have over the years maintained a firm and consistent policy of support for the African liberation movements and, especially in the case of Sweden, in support of SWAPO of Namibia. It is therefore much to be regretted that SWAPO, which for such a long time has been considered the legitimate representative of a majority of the people of Namibia, has been virtually left out of the independence process in the name of 'the doctrine of impartiality' and subjected to what sometimes appears as a well-organized international campaign against the movement. One could have hoped that this situation might have been improved had the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, the Swedish diplomat Bernt Carlsson, been allowed to pursue his policies and not fallen victim to the sabotage against the PAN AM plane over Scotland in December. As things now are, we can only pay tribute to his untiring efforts to inform the world community about the situation in Namibia by publishing in this issue of Development Dialogue a portrait of this 'very private public servant'.

But if the situation in Namibia is inadequately covered by the world media, and the sinister role of the Republic of South Africa in its affairs seldom fully understood, this is equally true of the tragic situation in Mozambique, which, after a long and tortuous liberation struggle, has been ravaged by externally induced civil strife for more than a decade of its existence as an independent country. We are therefore proud to carry in this issue of Development Dialogue the full text of a carefully researched and documented report on the operations of the Mozambican guerilla group Renamo (The Mozambican National Resistance) and its linkages to the South African Defence Force. Together with the Gersony report, this study, undertaken with the support of the Ford Foundation and the Swedish International Development Authority by a highly respected American scholar, William Minter, provides a frightening factual account of the inner workings of this conflict and its severe implications for the future of Southern Africa. With this information at hand, it can hardly be maintained that
insufficient or faulty information prevents the governments of the world from taking action on this issue.

But although 'the Minter Report' has been available for almost three months prior to its publication in Development Dialogue, it has, as far as we know, been given very limited coverage by the world media—in the US, for instance, only by The Atlanta Constitution and Amsterdam News and in Europe by Facts and Reports. This partly reflects the declining interest in African affairs in the US and Europe, but it is in any case an ominous sign for the future.

The 'war' in Mozambique is going on as before and the security situation in parts of the country has deteriorated further rather than having been improved. But it is also admittedly difficult to report on what is going on since it is neither a civil war nor an east-west conflict and no clearly defined battle lines. It is a conflict of a different kind, which requires not a military but a political solution, i.e., that the major powers, Washington, London and Bonn, put pressure on South Africa to end its shipments of military supplies to Renamo as described with meticulous care in William Minter's report.

Our era is marked by the proliferation of Human Rights organizations all over the world. Would it not be a worthy objective if a number of them came together to set up an International Commission to look into this scandalous situation and to urge the governments of the world to act responsibly and forcefully in this matter?
This document crystallizes the work, essentially transdisciplinary in nature, carried out in various countries in Latin America by a team of researchers. It was prepared over a period of eighteen months with the collaboration of professionals from Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Canada and Sweden. Their expertise covered academic disciplines such as economics, sociology, psychiatry, philosophy, political science, geography, anthropology, journalism, engineering and law. The participants constituted a stable core group that guaranteed continuity in the processes of collective investigation and reflection inherent in the project. From the beginning, close working relations were established, thus nurturing an intense intellectual exchange. The participants gathered together in three workshops during the project, which was conducive to a profound reflection on various aspects of the development problematique. In addition, special guests were invited to each of the three workshops and enriched the quality of the debate.

The proceedings of each of the workshops and the working papers produced by the participants form the basis of this document. The final compiling and editing was the responsibility of the CEPAUR staff whose challenge was to integrate in a coherent manner the diverse inputs rather than just reflect the particular opinion of each of the participants. The document produced on the basis of the three workshops was then discussed at a final evaluation seminar at the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre in Uppsala.*

The conception presented in this document is a contribution to development philosophy. As such it offer suggestions, while remaining open to further elaboration.

This project was the result of the joint efforts of the Development Alternatives Centre (CEPAUR) in Chile and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. It grew out of the need to place the Dag Hammarskjöld Report of 1975, entitled What Now: Another Development, in the Latin American context, giving special consideration to the myriad changes that have occurred in the last decade. The text that follows aspires to have as interlocutors persons involved in regional and local development, planning, politics, academic disciplines concerned with development and, most important, those dedicated to the humanization of a world in crisis. Thus, the conception presented here is an attempt to integrate lines of research, reflection and action that substantially contribute to the construction of a new paradigm of development, less mechanistic and more humane.

An original version of this document was published in Spanish as a special issue of Development Dialogue in 1986 under the title Desarrollo a Escala Humana: una opción para el futuro.

This translation into English, to which has been added a new chapter, 'A
Participants in the final evaluation seminar in Uppsala

Note on Methodology’, has been undertaken by Joey Edwardh and Manfred Max-Neef.

The Development Alternatives Centre, CEPAUR, is a non-governmental organization of international scope, dedicated, through research of a transdisciplinary nature and action projects, to the reorientation of development by stimulating forms of local self-reliance, satisfying fundamental human needs and, in a more general sense, promoting human scale development.

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* The project team wishes to express its gratitude to the functionaries and academics of the University of La Serena in Chile, the Federal University of Pernambuco, Brazil, and the Foundation for Development of the XII Region, Chile, for their enthusiastic support for and efficient execution of the various regional seminars held throughout the duration of this project. Without the intellectual and material support of these institutions, the successful completion of this project would not have been possible.
Nowadays, it is almost commonplace to state that Latin America is in a state of crisis. The descriptions and interpretations of this crisis are many: hence, the diagnosis of the disease is seemingly complete. Due to the complexity of the symptoms that we are faced with, no consensus as to the treatment has been generated. Perplexity, the outcome of a situation for which we cannot recognize a precedent, has kept us in a dead-end alley and barred the road to imaginative, novel and bold solutions. However, intuition suggests that the conventional and traditional prescriptions, regardless of whoever may have proposed them, will not work. Nonetheless, there is a kind of paralysing fear inhibiting the design of radically different approaches that could eventually emancipate us from this state of confusion.

This fear is quite understandable. It is not easy to put aside theoretical and ideological constructions along with their corresponding strategies for action which over the years have been the basis not only of beliefs, explanations and hopes but also of passions. But the fact is that the extent of this crisis seems to go far beyond our capacity to assimilate it fully, understand it and, hence, internalize it. This crisis is not just economic, nor just social, cultural or political. On the contrary, it is the convergence of all these, which, added together, become an entirety exceeding the sum of its parts.

At a political level, the crisis becomes very acute owing to the inefficiency of the existing representative political mechanisms in coping with: the actions of the financial power elite; the increasing internationalization of political decisions; and the lack of control of the citizenry over public bureaucracies. The increase in technological control over society, the arms race, and the lack of a deep-rooted democratic culture in Latin American societies also contributes to the configuration of a political universe which does not have an ethical foundation.

At a social level, the increasing fragmentation of socio-cultural identities. the lack of integration and communication between social movements, the increasing impoverishment and marginalization of the masses have made the conflicts within the societies unmanageable, as well as rendering constructive responses to such conflicts impossible.

At an economic level, the system of domination is undergoing widespread changes as a result of the following processes: the internationalization of the economy; the boom of financial capital with its enormous power of concentration: the crisis of the welfare state: the increasing participation of the military complex in the economic life of the countries: and the multiple
effects of successive technological changes on the patterns of production and consumption.

These complex and interacting forces place Third World countries in a position of enormous disadvantage. They are forced, with the complicity of government and the ruling classes, to demand tremendous sacrifices at great social costs in order to 'heal' their financial systems and meet their well-known debt servicing obligations to the creditor countries of the industrialized world. In the face of this uncertain combination of circumstances, which is more awesome than gratifying, the answers and quests for alternatives to authoritarianism, to neo-liberalism, to developmentalism* and to populism become bogged down in ill-considered reactions and short term programmes.

We have dubbed this situation the 'crisis of Utopia', because, in our opinion, its most serious manifestation seems to lie in the fact that we are losing—if we have not lost already—our capacity to dream. We are struggling in an exhausting insomnia which impairs the lucidity so desperately needed to cope with our problems forcefully and imaginatively. Instead, we have become drowsy managers of a crisis which we feel is impossible to solve by our own means. This drowsiness, a product of the crisis of Utopia, takes many forms: a sense of defeat, a loss of will, an over-excessive individualism, fear, anxiety, cynicism and demobilization.

The issues and causes of the past, where we fought—successfully or unsuccessfully—for something in which we believed, seem, today, to be covered by mist. Our reasons become diffuse, and those of us who still retain a will to struggle, end up, without realizing it, fighting causes that do not correspond to the real development issues at stake. Thus, our first desperate effort is to come to terms with ourselves and in so doing persuade ourselves that the best development that we can expect—over and above any of the conventional indicators, which often instilled an inferiority complex in us—would be the development of countries and cultures capable of being coherent with themselves.

The proposal contained in this document does not purport to be a solution to our crisis. It is, nonetheless, an option. It is an alternative stemming from a long process of collective thinking by a group of Latin Americans who

* We have chosen 'developmentalism' as the best translation for the Spanish 'desarrollismo'. It refers to the development philosophy promoted mainly by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) during the fifties and sixties.
were supported in their reflections by a handful of friends from Sweden and Canada. In this document, we share our revitalized capacity to dream.

If we restrict our analysis to the economic components of the crisis and observe their historical behaviour in the economic and development policies implemented in Latin America over the last four decades, we observe a clear pendular process. The periods of expansion eventually generate financial and monetary imbalances resulting in stabilizing responses which, in turn, ultimately bring about high social costs leading to further expansion.

In this pendular tendency, we can identify clearly the two great economic factions which have been predominant in the Latin American context: developmentalism and neo-liberal monetarism. For different reasons, neither orientation accomplished its original objectives. However, not everything is negative in a failure so it is well worth devoting some careful thought to the manner in which each of these two perspectives have marked the economic and socio-political history of the region.

Developmentalism was a deeply mobilizing experience. It was a generator of ideas and of currents of thought. During its period of predominance a number of important institutions were created: the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Andean Pact, and important regional initiatives such as the Alliance for Progress. Within the different nation states many initiatives were encouraged such as planning agencies, various kinds of development organizations, policies which nurtured industrialization, banking reforms, improvement of statistical systems, people's movements and varied attempts at structural reforms. Also, during this period emerged the first strong arguments and theses advocating the need to protect our exports affected by an ongoing deterioration of the terms of trade.

Finally, it was those Latin American economists, ascribing to developmentalism, who became the determinant actors in the setting up of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

During the fifties and sixties it made perfect sense to speak of an ECLA current of thought or of a philosophy of the IDB. A creative effervescence dominated these times. The positions of these organizations generated de-
bate and, for the first time, the centres of power in the North argued back but on the defensive. In the decade of the 1970s, this creative energy was slowly contained. The Latin American international agencies began to lose their original identity. Neo-liberal monetarism, which had already made its sporadic incursions—without managing to impose its character beyond the periods of stability in the economic cycle—began to break forth with all its vigour.

Obviously, the failure of developmentalism cannot be ascribed either to a lack of ideas or to a dirth of creativity. Much to the contrary, its contributions in creating a rich and diversified economic structure have been colossal. Its failure was due to: its inability to control monetary and financial imbalances; the productive structure—in particular industry—that it generated which placed a great emphasis on the concentration of resources; and the fact that its approach to development was predominantly economic, thus neglecting other social and political processes that emerged with increasing strength and relevance especially after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution.

The history of monetarist neo-liberalism is quite different. *If developmentalism was a generator of thought, monetarism has been a concocter of prescriptions;* at least this is true of the way in which it has manifested itself in our countries. Within our context, it is not possible to detect, in a clear-cut way, a neo-liberal thought or philosophy as such. This is not because this current of thought lacks foundations. It is only necessary to read the Austrian economists to understand this. The problem arises from praxis where this perspective has been applied dogmatically and without sensitivity to the Latin American context. Unlike developmentalism, monetarist neo-liberalism has had calamitous results over a shorter time period. In Latin America it has been sustained by dictatorial or pseudo-democratic regimes. It is evidence enough that the pressure generated by the social costs of this model can only be kept under control by repression. Monetarist neo-liberalism resembles a Phoenician collapse that leaves nothing after it but a tremendous void, the positive appearance (in some cases like Chile) of conventional economic indicators notwithstanding.

Nonetheless, assuming that monetarist neo-liberalism should have been applied more congruently with the wealth of thought of its creators, in particular the Austrians, its failure in the Latin American context would have been equally unavoidable. This is so for at least three reasons. First, it is able to encourage economic growth, but it is not a generator of *development* in the widest sense of the word. Secondly, its assumptions of economic ra-
tionality are profoundly mechanistic and, therefore, cannot be adapted to the conditions of poor countries where it is impossible to uproot poverty through the liberalization of a market from which the poor are excluded. Thirdly, in restricted and oligopolistic markets, where the economic power groups are not confronted with forces able to check their behaviour, economic activity is very speculative, resulting in a concentration of resources that is socially unbearable.

We must stress, finally, that both schools of economic thought share some elements, though with different intensity. Both have been affected by mechanistic tendencies and have generated economies based on concentration. From the point of view of neo-liberalism, growth is an end in itself and concentration is accepted as a natural consequence.

As for developmentalism, growth is an economic condition which will bring about development. Both assume that concentration encourages growth—an ascertainable fact in statistical terms. However, neo-liberalism does not see any need whatsoever to check growth while developmentalism acknowledges that there are limitations to growth but fails to control it. The dénouement of this story spanning forty years brings us, finally, to the situation of perplexity in which we live today.

There are different reactions to the current situation. There are those, for instance, who hold that the disaster has not taken place after all. They make their point by stating that over the last two and a half decades income levels have more than doubled, that there has been a remarkable economic growth in most of the region and exports have multiplied. All of this is true. There are, however, those who unveil the other face of reality: that poverty is increasing in the popular sectors; that more than one third of the economically active population struggles between unemployment and underemployment; that social deficits such as inadequate housing have escalated; and, finally, that the existence of a foreign debt which, regardless of ethical considerations as to its solution, is clearly unpayable and may increase our poverty and deplete our resources to structurally irreversible limits.

There are those who envisage the possibility of revitalizing schemes which were attractive in the past by amending some mistakes. Others, including the authors of this document, perceive an immense void where there is room to design radical alternatives. The second position is based not only on the perception of a worn-out historical experience, but also on an awareness that serious errors could be made if conventional solutions are applied to overcome this crisis.
In creating the future, there is either the risk of making errors of perception, or of making errors of action. Concerning perception, two serious mistakes are often made. The first is to believe that the Latin American crisis can be ascribed principally to an external crisis. The second, stemming from the first, is to assume that our depression is just a passing historical circumstance. Although it is true that external conditions do considerably influence dependent and vulnerable economies like ours, it is, nonetheless, also probable that a recovery of the capitalistic economy in the North will not affect significantly our own recovery. As the following paragraphs illustrate, the reason lies in our possible errors of action.

It would be a delusion to base a strategy for future development on the expansion of exports of primary products. Very simply, indicators suggest that the bulk of primary products will be affected, for different reasons, by unfavourable terms of trade. Moreover, others are already being replaced by more efficient substitutes. Another strategy based on the diversification of exports, that is, of manufactured goods, would inevitably come up against the protectionist policies of the powers in the North. Also, to assume a type of development which is nurtured by external contributions of capital is ruled out altogether on account of the serious and insoluble condition of indebtedness in which we are forced to live.

From what has been argued, it follows that our situation is not the result of a historical accident. In our opinion, the future lies in mustering all our energy to design imaginative but viable alternatives. The conditions for these alternatives seem to be quite clear. If the two schools of economic thought which have prevailed in the Latin American setting have not been able to satisfy the legitimate needs of the Latin American masses, a new perspective is called for which aims at an adequate satisfaction of human needs. Furthermore, if future development cannot be sustained through the expansion of exports or through substantial injections of foreign capital, an alternative development must generate a capacity for greater self-reliance.

This document proposes an orientation which would enable us to create conditions for a new praxis based on Human Scale Development. Such development is focused and based on the satisfaction of fundamental human needs, on the generation of growing levels of self-reliance, and on the construction of organic articulations of people with nature and technology, of global processes with local activity, of the personal with the social, of planning with autonomy, and of civil society with the state.*
Human needs, self-reliance, and organic articulations are the pillars which support Human Scale Development. However, these pillars must be sustained on a solid foundation which is the creation of those conditions where people are the protagonists in their future. If people are to be the main actors in Human Scale Development both the diversity as well as the autonomy of the spaces in which they act must be respected. Attaining the transformation of an object-person into a subject-person in the process of development is, among other things, a problem of scale. There is no possibility for the active participation of people in gigantic systems which are hierarchically organized and where decisions flow from the top down to the bottom.

Human Scale Development assumes a direct and participatory democracy. This form of democracy nurtures those conditions which will help to transform the traditional, semi-paternalistic role of the Latin American State into a role of encouraging creative solutions flowing from the bottom upwards. This is more consistent with the real expectations of the people.

Although we do not claim to offer a historical and sociological analysis of the models of the states in the region, it seems, however, important to point out the historical inability of these states to create spaces for popular participation. The conditions that led to independence and the creation of national states in Latin America were followed by development processes which were promoted and controlled by the national oligarchies. In the realm of the political, these new states appeared as liberal democracies, while in the realm of the economic, their aim was capitalist development and integration into foreign markets. These democracies excluded the popular masses from political life, hence, depriving them of channels for social participation and access to political power.

The crisis of the oligarchic state was triggered by the restricted character of the spaces for participation and the limited access of the majority to social benefits. This situation generated populist regimes whose purpose was to combine increased popular participation with the formulation of homogeneous national projects geared to rapid yet secure modernization. The policies of populism paved the way for new forms of political representation—universal suffrage—and mechanisms for sectoral representation. As a form of government, the main contribution of populism was to recognize social groups which, until then, had been excluded from political activity.

* By 'articulation' we mean the construction of coherent and consistent relations of balanced interdependence among given elements.
Since the state itself assumed responsibility for the integration of new actors in development, this resulted in a considerable increase in its regulating function. Greater political participation of sectors incorporated into the socio-political life involved redistributive policies managed by the state.

The populist state was strong enough to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the traditional oligarchy. However, it was compelled to consolidate homogeneous national projects under pressure from internal forces such as powerful economic interest groups and from external forces such as imperialist policies imposed by the rich countries. These homogeneous projects were unable to reflect the heterogeneous nature of the sectors and communities which make up civil society. Hence, social participation and popular action were undermined by the authoritarianism inherent in the 'single project', and by bureaucratic and paternalistic mechanisms which strengthened vertical social relations and the concentration of power.

The tension between homogeneous national projects and the diversity of social actors demanding a role as protagonists in their future is repeated in the number of progressive regimes to be found in the region. These regimes did not seek legitimacy through political democracy—which makes them different from the populism constituted by universal suffrage—but via popular support obtained through the expansion of social benefits and through making corporate-type trade unions believe that they were in control of many of the functions of the state.

In the last two decades, regimes based on authoritarianism and neo-liberal monetarism have dominated the Southern Cone of Latin America. In these states, political power is buttressed by the physical and psychological repression of the civil populations. Moreover, the policies implemented have meant the systematic decimation of the socio-economic benefits which wide sectors had attained under the protection of the populist or progressive regimes. It is in these repressive regimes that those processes of social participation and popular protagonism have been arrested. It is precisely within these regimes and in conjunction with the acute economic crisis that the democratic opposition is reassessing the need to establish an order based on political democracy with real social participation.

We wish to emphasize at this point the democratic nature of the alternative proposed. Instead of relying on stereotyped ideological options, this document advocates the need to: develop processes of economic and political decentralization; strengthen genuine democratic institutions; and encourage increasing autonomy in the emerging social movements.
The creation of a political order which can represent the needs and interests of a heterogeneous people is a challenge to both the state and civil society. The most pressing question, not only for a democratic state, but also for a society based on a democratic culture, is how to respect and encourage diversity rather than control it. In this regard, development must nurture local spaces, facilitate micro-organizations and support the multiplicity of cultural matrixes comprising civil society. This type of development must rediscover, consolidate and integrate the diverse collective identities that make up the social body.

Processes which nurture diversity and increase social participation and control over the environment are decisive in the articulation of projects to expand national autonomy and distribute the fruits of economic development more equitably. Hence, it is essential to prevent the increasing atomization of social movements, cultural identities and communities. To articulate these movements, identities, strategies and social demands in global proposals is not possible through the programmes of homogenization which have characterized the Latin American political tradition. It requires, on the part of the state, new institutional mechanisms capable of reconciling participation with heterogeneity. It also requires more active forms of representation, and greater translucency in the practices of the public sector.

It is not the purpose of this document to propose a state model that promotes Human Scale Development. Rather, our emphasis is on empowering civil society to nurture this form of development. This is not to minimize the importance of the state but to develop further the potential role of social actors, of social participation and of local communities. Our preoccupation is a 'social democracy' or rather a 'democracy of day-to-day living' which does not imply a lack of concern for 'political democracy' but a firm belief that only by rediscovering the 'molecular' composition of the social fabric (micro-organizations, local spaces, human scale relations) is a political order founded on a democratic culture made possible. We believe that in order to avoid the atomization and the exclusion of people—be it in political, social, or cultural terms—it is absolutely necessary to generate new ways of conceiving and practising politics. Thus, this document attempts to open up a space for critical reflection on the way we live and, more importantly, on the urgent need to develop a new political praxis.

Beyond the limited synthesis provided in the preceding sections, our shared thinking has enabled us to reach some conclusions about the pressing need to modify substantially our concepts and approaches to development.
We live and work within a history which ignores the sub-history that makes it possible. Hence, on a day-to-day basis we observe the serious discrepancies that exist between the rhetoric and actions of political leaders and the expectations and ambitions of the popular sectors. We seek to justify our actions in the thoughts ascribed to the defunct hero of the day, without even realizing the wisdom of the men and the women who raise the corn and, sharing it with those who share their misery, manage to survive, not because of what we have done, but despite of what we have not done.

We live and work within models of society that overlook the growing complexity of the real society in which we are immersed. Therefore, we watch the feverish and obsessive doings of the technocrats who design solutions before having identified where the real problems lie. We seek the justification of the models in the models themselves, so that when the solutions fail, it is not due to a failure of the model, but due to snares set up by reality. That reality, whose presence is strongly felt, is not perceived as a challenge to be faced, but rather as a problem to be brought under control by re-applying the model with greater tenacity.

We live and work according to the tenets of our formally acquired knowledge. Thus, we see in so many leaders a pathological fear of people's action and of freedom. The people are to be helped and guided by those who arrogantly ignore what the people need and want. Thus, programmes are designed to develop 'awareness', because for some odd reason it is assumed that those who suffer are not aware of the reasons for their suffering.

We live and work to construct an order, without understanding what can be ordered or what we are putting in order. We constantly witness an obsession with form, which allows us to conceal our unconscious fear about the uncertainties underlying the problems at stake. We confuse law with justice and regulations with efficiency. We identify generosity with charity and participation with favours granted from the top. We use words without living up to their content and we eventually come up with caricatures instead of consistent contexts within which to sustain the construction of our individual and collective life projects.

Taking into account what has been stated, the proposal we have developed is not a model. It is an open option which is justified only to the extent that we understand it, internalize it and implement it through a praxis that is in itself a process in constant motion. There is nothing in it that advocates a final solution, since we are fully aware that human beings and their surroundings are part of a permanent flow which cannot be arrested by rigid and static models.
The literature on human needs is vast and in many cases has contributed substantially to our understanding of this issue. It has influenced the fields of philosophy and psychology and has become a focus of attention in the political, economic and social disciplines in general. In recent years international agencies, concerned with promoting development, have adopted as their criterion for action the satisfaction of so-called basic needs. In 1975, the Dag Hammarskjöld Report *What Now: Another Development* established such an aim as one of the pillars of a new type of development to be established urgently in order to overcome the degrading state of impoverishment which holds the majority of the inhabitants of the Third World in its clutches. Nowadays, it is accepted almost as commonplace that development and human needs are irreducible components of a single equation. However, within this perspective there is still much to be done.

First, this new approach, interweaving development and human needs, must go far beyond a simple makeshift rehashing of a paradigm in a state of crisis. From the very outset, it involves creating conditions for a new way of conceptualizing development. It means a substantial modification of the prevailing perceptions about strategies for development. For instance, no New International Economic Order can be relevant if it is not supported by the structural reformulation of a compact network of New Local Economic Orders.

Likewise, it means acknowledging that the social and economic theories, which have sustained and directed the processes of development, are not only incomplete but also inadequate. It entails becoming aware that new and more disquieting frustrations will dominate our increasingly heterogeneous and interdependent world if development models based on mechanistic theories and misleading aggregate indicators, are applied.

Human Scale Development, geared to meeting human needs, requires a new approach to understanding reality. It compels us to perceive and assess the world, that is, people and their processes in a manner which differs completely from the conventional one. Likewise, a theory of human needs for development must be understood precisely in those terms: as a theory for development.*

In much the same way that a geologist, in examining a stone, will see attributes other than those perceived by an architect, human needs are discerned differently according to the ideological and disciplinary lens of the

* We use here the notion of theory as a deductive process evolving from a set of postulates.
viewer. This is not to suggest that we should come up with new forms of reductionism; on the contrary, the different perceptions and understandings are interwoven facets of the human needs issue. What is at stake here is a question of form and of emphasis. The challenge to all of us is to internalize an approach to development based on human needs which, once understood, will guide our actions and expectations.

The purpose of this section is to make a theory of human needs understandable and operational for development. This effort is not grounded in any particular field of study, as the new reality and the new challenges inevitably compel us to adopt transdisciplinary approaches.* Evidence for this orientation is provided by the fact that we are rarely analysing a specific problem but instead a web of complex issues that cannot be resolved through the application of conventional policies founded upon reductionist disciplines.

The need for transdisciplinary approaches

In much the same way that a disease is a medical problem, and that the same disease having become an epidemic transcends the field of medicine, our present challenge lies not only in how to deal with problems, but also, in how to cope with the tremendous magnitude of the problems. Their growing magnitude and complexity is transforming problems with distinct disciplinary contours into problem complexes of a diffuse transdisciplinary character. In the throes of the terror of the French Revolution, Marquis de Sade uttered in dismay: 'There is no longer any beautiful individual death'. In an analogous way, in the midst of the present reality which overpowers us we can exclaim: 'There is no longer any beautiful specific problem'.

Only a transdisciplinary approach allows us to understand, for instance, how politics, economics and health have converged. Thus, we discover an increasing number of cases where poor health is the outcome of unsound politics and bad economics. If economic policies designed by economists, affect, which they do, the whole of society, economists can no longer claim that they are solely concerned with the economic field. Such a stance would be unethical since it would mean avoiding the moral responsibility for the consequences of an action.

* Transdisciplinarity is an approach that, in an attempt to gain greater understanding, reaches beyond the fields outlined by strict disciplines. While the language of one discipline may suffice to describe something (an isolated element, for instance) an interdisciplinary effort may be necessary to explain something (a relation between elements). By the same token, to understand something (a system as interpreted from another system of higher complexity) requires a personal involvement that surpasses disciplinary frontiers, thus making it a transdisciplinary experience.
We face bewildering situations where we understand less and less. If we do not devote considerably more energy and imagination to designing significant and consistent transdisciplinary approaches, our societies will continue to disintegrate. We live in a period of transition which means that paradigm shifts are not only necessary but indispensable.

Three postulates and some propositions

Development is about people and not about objects. This is the basic postulate of Human Scale Development.

The acceptance of this postulate—whether on intuitive, ethical or rational grounds—leads to the following fundamental question: How can we determine whether one development process is better than another? In the traditional paradigm we have indicators such as the gross national product (GNP) which is, in a way, an indicator of the quantitative growth of objects. Now we need an indicator about the qualitative growth of people. What should that be? Let us answer the question thus: The best development process will be that, which allows the greatest improvement in people's quality of life. The next question is: What determines people's quality of life? Quality of life depends on the possibilities people have to adequately satisfy their fundamental human needs. A third question therefore arises: What are those fundamental human needs, and/or who decides what they are? These questions need to be examined before any answers can be suggested.

Needs and satisfiers

It is traditionally believed that human needs tend to be infinite, that they change all the time, that they are different in each culture or environment, and that they are different in each historical period. It is suggested here that such assumptions are inaccurate, since they are the product of a conceptual shortcoming.

A prevalent shortcoming in the existing literature and discussions about human needs is that the fundamental difference between needs and satisfiers of those needs is either not made explicit or is overlooked altogether. A clear distinction between both concepts is necessary, as will be shown later, for epistemological as well as methodological reasons.

Human needs must be understood as a system: that is, all human needs are inter-related and interactive. With the sole exception of the need of subsistence, that is, to remain alive, no hierarchies exist within the system. On the contrary, simultaneities, complementarities and trade-offs are characteristics of the process of needs satisfaction.
As the literature in this area demonstrates, human needs can be classified according to many criteria. We have organized human needs into two categories: existential and axiological, which we have combined and displayed in a matrix. (See chapter IV, page 33.) This allows us to demonstrate the interaction of, on the one hand, the needs of Being, Having, Doing, and Interacting; and, on the other hand, the needs of Subsistence, Protection, Affection, Understanding, Participation, Idleness, Creation, Identity and Freedom.*

From the classification proposed it follows that, for instance, food and shelter must not be seen as needs, but as satisfiers of the fundamental need for Subsistence. In much the same way, education (either formal or informal), study, investigation, early stimulation and meditation are satisfiers of the need for Understanding. The curative systems, preventive systems and health schemes in general are satisfiers of the need for Protection.

There is no one-to-one correspondence between needs and satisfiers. A satisfier may contribute simultaneously to the satisfaction of different needs, or conversely, a need may require various satisfiers in order to be met. Not even these relations are fixed. They may vary according to time, place and circumstance. For example, a mother breast-feeding her baby is simultaneously satisfying the infant's needs for Subsistence, Protection, Affection and Identity. The situation is obviously different if the baby is fed in a more mechanical fashion.

Having established a difference between the concepts of needs and satisfiers it is possible to state two additional postulates. First: **Fundamental human needs are finite, few, and classifiable.** Second: **Fundamental human needs (such as those contained in the system proposed) are the same in all cultures and in all historical periods. What changes, both over time and through cultures, is the way or the means by which the needs are satisfied.** (See chapter III, pages 26—30.)

Each economic, social and political system adopts different methods for the satisfaction of the same fundamental human needs. In every system they are satisfied (or not satisfied) through the generation (or non-generation) of different types of satisfiers. We may go as far as to say that one of the

* Although in Judeo-Christian culture we have been told that 'idleness is the mother of all vices', we strongly believe that it carries many virtues. In fact, idleness and creation seem to be inseparable if the former is understood as 'the state of mind and spirit that is inviting to the muses'. A brilliant argumentation about the subject may be found in Bertrand Russel's *In Praise of Idleness*. In any case, idleness is not laziness.
aspects that define a culture is its choice of satisfiers. Whether a person belongs to a consumerist or to an ascetic society, his/her fundamental human needs are the same. What changes is his/her choice of the quantity and quality of satisfiers. In short: *What is culturally determined are not the fundamental human needs, but the satisfiers for those needs.* Cultural change is, among other things, the consequence of dropping traditional satisfiers for the purpose of adopting new or different ones.

It must be added that each need can be satisfied at different levels and with different intensities. Furthermore, needs are satisfied within three contexts: (a) with regard to oneself (*Eigenwelt*); (b) with regard to the social group (*Mitwelt*); and (c) with regard to the environment (*Umwelt*). The quality and intensity, not only of the levels, but also of contexts will depend on time, place and circumstances.

The proposed perspective allows for a re-interpretation of the concept of poverty. The traditional concept of poverty is limited and restricted, since it refers exclusively to the predicaments of people who may be classified below a certain income threshold. This concept is strictly economistic. It is suggested here that we should speak not of poverty, but of poverties. In fact, any fundamental human need that is not adequately satisfied, reveals a human poverty. Some examples are: poverty of subsistence (due to insufficient income, food, shelter, etc.), of protection (due to bad health systems, violence, arms race, etc.), of affection (due to authoritarianism, oppression, exploitative relations with the natural environment, etc.), of understanding (due to poor quality of education), of participation (due to marginalization and discrimination of women, children and minorities), of identity (due to imposition of alien values upon local and regional cultures, forced migration, political exile, etc.). But poverties are not only poverties. Much more than that, *each poverty generates pathologies.* This is the crux of our discourse.

**Economics and pathologies**

The great majority of economic analysts would agree that rising unemployment everywhere and Third World international indebtedness rank as the two most important economic problems of today's world. In the case of Latin America, hyperinflation should be added.

**Unemployment**

Although unemployment is a problem that has always existed in industrial civilization to a greater or lesser degree, everything seems to indicate that we are now facing a new type of unemployment that is here to stay, because it has become a structural component of the world economic system as we
know it. It is known that a person suffering from extended unemployment goes through an emotional 'roller-coaster experience' which involves at least four phases: (a) shock, (b) optimism, (c) pessimism, (d) fatalism. The last phase represents the transition from frustration to stagnation, and from there to a final state of apathy, where the person reaches his/her lowest level of self-esteem. It is quite evident that extended unemployment will totally upset a person's fundamental needs system. Due to subsistence problems, the person will feel increasingly unprotected, crisis in the family and guilt feelings may destroy affections, lack of participation will give way to feelings of isolation and marginalization, and declining self-esteem may very well generate an identity crisis.

Extended unemployment generates pathologies. But, given the present circumstances of generalized economic crisis, we must no longer think of pathologies as affecting individuals. We must necessarily recognize the existence of collective pathologies of frustration, for which traditional treatments have been inefficient.

Although unemployment is caused by economic processes, once it has reached critical proportions, both in quantity and duration, there is no economic treatment capable of solving the problem. It has become an issue of transdisciplinary proportions that still remains to be understood and constructed. This, in terms of a programme for the future, represents the first challenge.

External debt

The external debt of the Third World is also responsible for another set of collective pathologies. Very simply, the soundness of the international banking system is maintained at the expense of the health and well-being of Third World peoples. As John Gummer, President of the British Conservative Party, commented in 1985: 'The United States imports the savings of the rest of the world and exports inflation. This is a serious problem'. Due to prevailing circumstances the debtor countries must initiate an era based on the politics of hardship so as to maximize their revenues through exports. This occurs unavoidably at the expense of the irreversible depredation of many natural resources and the increasing impoverishment of people. This process of impoverishment does not vary with the ups and downs of the market for it is structural in nature. To ascertain the nature of the terrible collective pathologies which are arising in the poor countries as a consequence of this aberrant situation is the second challenge.

Hyperinflation

The Latin American experience demonstrates that hyperinflation is a phenomenon that goes far beyond the economic field and affects all aspects of
society. During the last few years, countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and Peru have been devastated psychologically and socially by a currency in which their users have little confidence. Over and above the economic consequences of daily devaluation (financial speculation, a chronic decrease in productive investments and a systematic deterioration of real wages), constant inflation, with annual rates of three or even four digits, erodes a people's faith in their country, and gives rise to a deep uncertainty about the future. Concern for the 'health' of a currency generates collective feelings of growing pessimism in relation to the country, the State and the future of each individual. This acute deterioration in confidence, along with a sense of uncertainty and scepticism create a phenomenon which is difficult to reverse and an environment where innovative alternatives capable of overcoming an inflationary crisis are almost impossible to generate.

The issue of hyperinflation has economic, social and psychological components. The new concept of inertial inflation acknowledges that inflation, in part, feeds on itself. That is to say, inflationary expectations condition the behaviour of individuals in such a way that the inflationary spiral is accelerated, thus becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Hence, the only effective way to cope with this issue is through a consistent transdisciplinary strategy.

Only three examples have been given here. However, there are many other economic processes which, when conceived and designed in a technocratic manner and within a reductionist perspective, can generate collective pathologies. All economists, should exercise the necessary self-criticism in order to recognize these maladies and anticipate their detection. This implies, of course, the willingness to adjust to a principle which is almost always forgotten: the purpose of the economy is to serve the people, and not the people to serve the economy.

Persecutions that arise from political, religious and other forms of intolerance are as old as humanity. However, the 'achievement' of our times is the tendency of the political leaders to direct their actions according to such incredibly schizophrenic generalizations about 'the enemy' that we are heading straight towards omnicide, that is, the destruction of us all.

Such political schizophrenia is not only to be found at the level of global confrontations between the big powers; it also has its counterparts (mirror images) at many national levels. They are all accountable for the great increase in collective pathologies of fear.
We suggest four categories of collective pathologies of fear organized according to their origin: (a) those caused by semantic confusions due to ideological manipulation; (b) those that spring from violence; (c) those caused by isolation, exile or marginalization; and (d) those that come from the frustration of life projects. Most certainly, there are others but these seem to be enough by way of example.

**Euphemisms**

The discourses of power are full of euphemisms. Words no longer fit with facts. Annihilators are called nuclear arms, as if they were simply a more powerful version of conventional arms. We call ‘the free world’ a world full of examples of the most obscene inequities and violations of human rights. In the name of the people, systems are created where people must simply comply obediently with the dictums of an ‘almighty state’. Peaceful protest marchers are severely punished and imprisoned for public disorder and subversion, while state terrorism is accepted as law and order. Examples could fill many pages. The end result is that people cease to understand and, as a consequence, either turn into cynics or melt into impotent, perplexed and alienated masses.

**Violence, marginalization and exile**

Violence directly upsets the need for Protection, thus inducing intense anxiety. Isolation, marginalization and political exile destroy people’s identity and break up families, destroying natural affection and creating guilt feelings which are often accompanied by suicidal fantasies or attempts. The frustration of life projects by political intolerance systematically erodes the creative capacity of people, leading them slowly from active resentment into apathy and loss of self-esteem.

Our third challenge consists of recognizing and assessing those collective pathologies generated by diverse socio-political systems. Every system creates in its own way obstacles to the satisfaction of one or more needs such as Understanding, Protection, Identity, Affection, Creation and Freedom.

**Summary**

The main conclusions we can draw are:
1. Any fundamental human need not adequately satisfied generates a pathology.
2. Up to the present we have developed treatments for individual and small group pathologies.
3. Today we are faced with a dramatic increase in collective pathologies for which treatments have proved inefficacious.
4. The understanding of these collective pathologies requires transdisciplinary research and action.

The fourth challenge is to develop a fruitful dialogue in pursuit of a constructive interpretation of the issues and solutions raised in this document. New collective pathologies will be generated within the short and long term if we maintain traditional and orthodox approaches. There is no sense in healing an individual who is then expected to go back and live in a sick environment.

Every discipline, in becoming increasingly reductionist and technocratic, has given way to a process of dehumanization. To humanize ourselves again from within our own disciplines, is the great challenge. Only such an effort can build the foundations for a fruitful transdisciplinary endeavour that may truly contribute to the solution of the real problematique affecting our world today.

A sense of responsibility for the future of humanity along with transdisciplinary action are crucial. This may be our only defence. If we do not take up the challenges, we will all be accomplices in creating and maintaining sick societies.
A development policy aimed at the satisfaction of fundamental human needs goes beyond the conventional economic rationale because it applies to the human being as a whole. The relations which are established between needs and their satisfiers make it possible to develop a philosophy and a policy for development which are genuinely humanistic.

The very essence of human beings is expressed palpably through needs in their twofold character: as deprivation and as potential. Understood as much more than mere survival, needs bring out the constant tension between deprivation and potential which is so peculiar to human beings.

Needs, narrowly conceived as deprivation, are often restricted to that which is merely physiological and as such the sensation that 'something which is lacking is acutely felt'. However, to the degree that needs engage, motivate and mobilize people, they are a potential and eventually may become a resource. The need to participate is a potential for participation, just as the need for affection is a potential for affection.

To approach the human being through needs enables us to build a bridge between a philosophical anthropology and a political option: this appears to have been the motivation behind the intellectual efforts of, for example, Karl Marx and Abraham Maslow. To understand human beings in terms of needs, that is, conceived as deprivation and potential, will prevent any reduction of the human being into a category of a restricted existence. Moreover, if needs are conceptualized in this way, it is inappropriate to speak of their being 'satisfied' or 'fulfilled'. They reflect a dialectic process in as much as they are in constant movement. Hence, it may be better to speak of realizing, experiencing or actualizing needs, through time and space.

If we wish to define and assess an environment in the light of human needs, it is not sufficient to understand the opportunities that exist for groups or individuals to actualize their needs. It is necessary to analyse to what extent the environment represses, tolerates or stimulates opportunities. How accessible, creative or flexible is that environment? The most important question is how far people are able to influence the structures that affect their opportunities.

It is the satisfiers which define the prevailing mode that a culture or a society ascribes to needs. *Satisfiers are not the available economic goods*. They are related, instead, to everything which, by virtue of representing forms of Being, Having, Doing, and Interacting, contributes to the actualization of
human needs. (See chapter 4, page 31.) Satisfiers may include, among other things, forms of organization, political structures, social practices, subjective conditions, values and norms, spaces, contexts, modes, types of behaviour and attitudes, all of which are in a permanent state of tension between consolidation and change.

For example, food is a satisfier of the need for Protection in much the same way that a family structure might be. Likewise, a political order may be a satisfier of the need for Participation. The same satisfier can actualize different needs in different cultures and in different time periods.

The reason that a satisfier may have diverse effects in various contexts is due to the following: the breadth of the goods generated; how they are generated; and, how consumption is organized. Understood as objects or artifacts which make it possible to increase or decrease the efficiency of a satisfier, goods have become determinant elements within industrial civilization. In industrial capitalism, the production of economic goods along with the system of allocating them has conditioned the type of satisfiers that predominate.

While a satisfier is in an ultimate sense the way in which a need is expressed, goods are in a strict sense the means by which individuals will empower the satisfiers to meet their needs. When, however, the form of production and consumption of goods makes goods an end in themselves, then the alleged satisfaction of a need impairs its capacity to create potential. This creates the conditions for entrenching an alienated society engaged in a productivity race lacking any sense at all. Life, then, is placed at the service of artifacts, rather than artifacts at the service of life. The question of the quality of life is overshadowed by our obsession to increase productivity.

Within this perspective, the construction of a human economy poses an important theoretical challenge, namely, to understand fully the dialectic between needs, satisfiers and economic goods. This is necessary in order to conceive forms of economic organization in which goods empower satisfiers to meet fully and consistently fundamental human needs.

This situation compels us to rethink the social context of human needs in a radically different way from the manner in which it has been approached by social planners and designers of policies for development. It is not only a question of having to relate needs to goods and services, but also, to relate them to social practices, forms of organization, political models and values. All of these have an impact on the ways in which needs are expressed.
In a critical theory of society, it is not sufficient to specify the predominant satisfiers and economic goods produced within that society. They must be understood as products which are the result of historical factors, and, consequently, liable to change. Thus, it is necessary to retrace the process of reflection and creation that conditions the interaction between needs, satisfiers and economic goods.

To assume a direct relation between needs and economic goods has allowed us to develop a discipline of economics that presumes itself to be objective. This could be seen as a mechanistic discipline in which the central tenet implies that needs manifest themselves through demand which, in turn, is determined by individual preferences for the goods produced. To include satisfiers within the framework of economic analysis involves vindicating the world of the 'subjective', over and above mere preferences for objects and artifacts.

We can explain how needs are met: our own and those of others in our milieu, family, friends, members of the community, cultural groups, the economic system, the socio-political system, the nation, etc. We can try to understand how satisfiers and predominant economic goods are related in our environment to the manner in which we emotionally express our needs. We can detect how satisfiers and the availability of goods constrain, distort or enhance the quality of our lives. On this basis, we can think of viable ways to organize and distribute the satisfiers and goods so that they nurture the process of actualizing needs and reduce the possibilities of frustration.

The ways in which we experience our needs, hence the quality of our lives is, ultimately, subjective. It would seem, then, that only universalizing judgement could be deemed arbitrary. An objection to this statement could well arise from the ranks of positivism. The identification which positivism establishes between the subjective and the particular, though it reveals the historical failure of absolute idealism, is a sword of Damocles for the social sciences. When the object of study is the relation between human beings and society, the universality of the subjective cannot be ignored.

Any attempt to observe the life of human beings must recognize the social character of subjectivity. It is not impossible to advance judgements about the subjective. Yet there is a great fear of the consequences of such a reflection. Economic theory is a clear example of this. From the neo-classical economists to the monetarists, the notion of preferences is used to avoid the issue of needs. This perspective reveals an acute reluctance to discuss
the subjective-universal. This is particularly true if it is a question of taking a stand in favour of a free market economy. Preferences belong to the realm of the subjective-particular and, therefore, are not a threat to the assumptions that underlie the rationale of the market. Whereas to speak of fundamental human needs compels us to focus our attention from the outset on the subjective-universal, which renders any mechanistic approach sterile.

The way in which needs are expressed through satisfiers varies according to historical period and culture. The social and economic relations, defined by historical and cultural circumstances, are concerned both with the subjective and the objective. Hence, satisfiers are what render needs historical and cultural, and economic goods are their material manifestation.

**Human needs: time and rhythms**

Owing to the dirth of empirical evidence, it is impossible to state with absolute certainty that the fundamental human needs are historically and culturally constant. However, there is nothing that prevents us from speaking of their socio-universal character because people everywhere want to satisfy their needs. In reflecting on the nine fundamental needs proposed in this document, common sense, along with some socio-cultural sensitivity, surely points to the fact that the needs for Subsistence, Protection, Affection, Understanding, Participation, Idleness and Creation have existed since the origins of 'homo habilis' and, undoubtedly, since the appearance of 'homo sapiens'.

Probably at a later stage of evolution the need for Identity appeared and, at a much later date, the need for Freedom. In much the same way, it is likely that in the future the need for Transcendence, which is not included in our proposal, as we do not yet consider it universal, will become as universal as the other needs. It seems legitimate, then, to assume that fundamental human needs change with the pace of human evolution. That is to say, at a very slow rate. Therefore, fundamental human needs are not only universal but are also entwined with the evolution of the species. They follow a single track.

Satisfiers behave in two ways: they are modified according to the rhythm of history and vary according to culture and circumstance.

Economic goods (artifacts, technologies) behave in three different ways: they are modified according to episodic rhythms (vogues, fashions) and diversify according to cultures and, within those cultures, according to social strata.
In summary, perhaps we may say that fundamental human needs are essential attributes related to human evolution: satisfiers are forms of being, having, doing, and interacting, related to structures; and economic goods are objects related to particular historical moments.

Evolutionary, structural and episodic changes take place at different paces and in different rhythms. The movement of history places the human being in an increasingly unrhymical and unsynchronized domain in which human concerns are neglected more and more. In the present moment, this situation has become extreme.

The speed of production and the diversification of objects have become ends in themselves and as such are no longer able to satisfy any need whatsoever. People have grown more dependent on this system of production but, at the same time, more alienated from it.

It is only in some of the regions marginalized by the crisis and in those groups which defy the prevailing styles of development, that autonomous processes are generated in which satisfiers and economic goods become subordinated once again to the actualization of human needs. It is in these sectors that we can find examples of synergic types of behaviour which offer a potential response to the crisis which looms over us. These autonomous processes, which are well worth studying and understanding, are discussed in the third part of this document.
We have emphasized in this document that what we require is a needs theory for development. This poses the problem of constructing a taxonomy of fundamental human needs which may serve as an instrument for both policy and action. Undoubtedly, there are many ways in which needs may be classified. Hence, any categorization must be regarded as provisional and subject to modification as new evidence arises and calls for changes. For the purposes of development, a multidimensional taxonomy which establishes a clear-cut difference between needs and satisfiers is a useful and feasible tool. Unfortunately, in formulating such a classification, we lay ourselves open to the charge of arbitrariness. But, considering that the task is absolutely necessary, we can minimize the risks if we abide by the following conditions:

1. *The classification must be understandable:* the needs listed must be readily recognizable and identifiable as one's own.
2. *The classification must combine scope with specificity:* it must arrive at a limited number of needs which can be clearly yet simply labelled but, at the same time, be comprehensive enough to incorporate any fundamental felt need.
3. *The classification must be operational:* for every existing or conceivable satisfier, one or more of the needs stated must appear as a target-need of the satisfier; the classification should allow for an analysis of the relationship between needs and the ways in which they are satisfied.
4. *The classification must be critical:* it is not sufficient for the categorization to relate satisfiers to needs. It is essential to detect needs for which no desirable satisfier exists. Also, it is crucial to identify and restrain those satisfiers which inhibit the actualization of needs.
5. *The classification must be prepositional:* to the extent that it is critical and capable of detecting inadequacies in the relation between the existing satisfiers and the fulfilment of needs, this classification should serve as a trigger mechanism to work out an alternative order capable of generating and encouraging satisfiers for the needs of every man and woman as integral beings. It should also replace non-inclusive satisfiers by others of a more comprehensive nature, thus attempting to actualize several needs.

The categorization suggested represents one option. It is related to development and we consider it operational for development. Nonetheless it must be regarded as an open proposal on which improvements must be made.

We have already stated that, within the context of our proposal, needs not only indicate deprivations, but also, and at the same time, individual and
collective human potential. On the other hand, satisfiers are individual or collective forms of being, having, doing and interacting, in order to actualize needs. Finally, economic goods are objects or artifacts which affect the efficiency of a satisfier, thus altering the threshold of actualization of a need, either in a positive or negative sense.

A matrix of needs and satisfiers

The interrelationship between needs, satisfiers and economic goods is permanent and dynamic. A dialectic relationship exists among them. If economic goods are capable of affecting the efficiency of the satisfiers, the latter will be determinant in generating and creating the former. Through this reciprocal causation, they become both part and definition of a culture which, in turn, delimits the style of development.

As Table 1 (opposite) indicates, satisfiers can be organized within the grids of a matrix which, on the one hand, classifies needs according to the existential categories of Being, Having, Doing, and Interacting, and, on the other hand, according to the axiological categories of Subsistence, Protection, Affection, Understanding, Participation, Idleness, Creation, Identity and Freedom. This matrix is neither normative nor conclusive. It merely gives an example of possible types of satisfiers. In fact, this matrix of satisfiers, if completed by individuals or groups from diverse cultures and in different historical moments, might vary considerably.

An examination of the different squares in the matrix with their possible satisfiers demonstrates clearly that many of the satisfiers can give rise to different economic goods. If we take, for instance, square 15, showing different ways of Doing to actualize the need for Understanding, we see that it includes satisfiers such as investigating, studying, experimenting, educating, analysing, meditating and interpreting. These satisfiers give rise to economic goods, depending on the culture and the resources, such as books, laboratory instruments, tools, computers and other artifacts. The function of these goods is to empower the Doing of Understanding.

Examples of satisfiers and their attributes

The matrix presented is only an example and, in no way, exhausts the number of possible satisfiers. Because satisfiers have various characteristics, we suggest for analytical purposes five types that may be identified, namely: (a) violators or destroyers, (b) pseudo-satisfiers, (c) inhibiting satisfiers, (d) singular satisfiers, and (e) synergic satisfiers (see Tables 2 through 6).

Destroyers

Violators or destroyers are elements of a paradoxical nature. When applied with the intention of satisfying a given need, not only do they annihilate
Table 1 Matrix of needs and satisfiers*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs according to existential categories</th>
<th>Being</th>
<th>Having</th>
<th>Doing</th>
<th>Interacting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Needs according to axiological categories</td>
<td>1/ Physical health, mental health, equilibrium, sense of humour, adaptability</td>
<td>2/ Food, shelter, work</td>
<td>3/ Feed/procreate, rest/work</td>
<td>4/ Living environment, social setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>5/ Care, adaptability, autonomy, equilibrium, solidarity</td>
<td>6/ Insurance systems, savings, social security, health systems, rights, family, work</td>
<td>7/ Cooperate, prevent, plan, take care of, cure, help</td>
<td>8/ Living space, social environment, dwelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>9/ Self-esteem, solidarity, respect, tolerance, generosity, receptiveness, passion, determination, sensitivity, sense of humour</td>
<td>10/ Friendships, family, partnerships, relationships with nature</td>
<td>11/ Make love, care, express emotions, share, take care of, cultivate, appreciate</td>
<td>12/ Privacy, intimacy, home, spaces of togetherness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affection</td>
<td>13/ Critical conscience, receptiveness, curiosity, astonishment, discipline, intuition, rationality</td>
<td>14/ Literature, teachers, method, educational policies, communication policies</td>
<td>15/ Investigate, study, experiment, educate, analyse, meditate</td>
<td>16/ Settings of formative interaction, schools, universities, academies, groups, communities, family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>17/ Adaptability, receptiveness, willingness, determination, dedication, respect, passion, sense of humour</td>
<td>18/ Rights, responsibilities, duties, privileges, work</td>
<td>19/ Become affiliated, cooperate, propose, share, dissent, obey, interact, agree on, express opinions</td>
<td>20/ Settings of participative interaction, parties, associations, churches, communities, neighbourhoods, family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>21/ Curiosity, receptiveness, imagination, recklessness, sense of humour, tranquility, sensuality</td>
<td>22/ Games, spectacles, clubs, parties, peace of mind</td>
<td>23/ Day-dream, brood, dream, recall old times, give way to fantasies, remember, relax, have fun, play</td>
<td>24/ Privacy, intimacy, spaces of closure, free time, surroundings, landscapes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idleness</td>
<td>25/ Passion, determination, intuition, imagination, boldness, rationality, autonomy, inventiveness, curiosity</td>
<td>26/ Abilities, skills, method, work</td>
<td>27/ Work, invent, build, design, compose, interpret</td>
<td>28/ Productive and feedback settings, workshops, cultural groups, audiences, spaces for expression, temporal freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>29/ Sense of belonging, consistency, differentiation, self-esteem, assertiveness</td>
<td>30/ Symbols, language, religion, habits, customs, reference groups, sexuality, values, norms, historical memory, work</td>
<td>31/ Commit oneself, integrate oneself, confront, decide on, get to know oneself, recognize oneself, actualize oneself, grow</td>
<td>32/ Social rhythms, everyday settings, settings which one belongs to, maturation stages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>33/ Autonomy, self-esteem, determination, passion, assertiveness, openness-mindedness, boldness, rebelliousness, tolerance</td>
<td>34/ Equal rights</td>
<td>35/ Dissent, choose, be different from, run risks, develop awareness, commit oneself, disobey</td>
<td>36/ Temporal/spatial plasticity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The column of BEING registers attributes, personal or collective, that are expressed as nouns. The column of HAVING registers institutions, norms, mechanisms, tools (not in a material sense), laws, etc. that can be expressed in one or more words. The column of DOING registers actions, personal or collective, that can be expressed as verbs. The column of INTERACTING registers locations and milieus (as times and spaces). It stands for the Spanish ESTAR or the German BEFINDEN, in the sense of time and space. Since there is no corresponding word in English, INTERACTING was chosen 'a faut de mieux'.
Table 2  Violators or destructors*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supposed satisfier</th>
<th>Need to be supposedly satisfied</th>
<th>Needs whose satisfaction it impairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Arms race</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Subsistence, Affection, Participation, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Exile</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Affection, Participation, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Bureaucracy</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Understanding, Affection, Participation, Creation, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Affection, Understanding, Participation, Creation, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Violators or destructors are elements of a paradoxical effect. Applied under the pretext of satisfying a given need, they not only annihilate the possibility of its satisfaction, but they also render the adequate satisfaction of other needs impossible. They seem to be especially related to the need for protection.

Inhibiting satisfiers

Pseudo-satisfiers are elements which generate a false sense of satisfaction of a given need. Though not endowed with the aggressiveness of violators or destroyers they may on occasion annul, in the not too long term, the possibility of satisfying the need they were originally aimed at fulfilling. Their main attribute is that they are generally induced through propaganda, advertising or other means of persuasion. (Table 3.)

Inhibiting satisfiers

Inhibiting satisfiers are those that generally over-satisfy a given need, therefore, seriously curtailing the possibility of satisfying other needs. With some exception, they share the attribute of originating in deep-rooted customs, habits and rituals. (Table 4.)
Table 3  Pseudo-satisfiers*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfier</th>
<th>Need which it seemingly satisfies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mechanistic medicine: ‘A pill for every ill’</td>
<td>Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Over-exploitation of natural resources</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chauvinistic nationalism</td>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Formal democracy</td>
<td>Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Stereotypes</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Aggregate economic indicators</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Cultural control</td>
<td>Creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Prostitution</td>
<td>Affection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Status symbols</td>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Obsessive productivity with a bias to efficiency</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Indoctrination</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Charity</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Fashions and fads</td>
<td>Identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Pseudo-satisfiers are elements which stimulate a false sensation of satisfying a given need. Though they lack the aggressiveness of violators, they may, on occasion, annul, in the medium term, the possibility of satisfying the need they were originally aimed at.

Table 4  Inhibiting satisfiers*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfier</th>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Needs, whose satisfaction is inhibited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Paternalism</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Understanding, Participation, Freedom, Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Over-protective family</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Affection, Understanding, Participation, Leisure, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Taylorist-type of production</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Understanding, Participation, Creation, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Authoritarian classroom</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Participation, Creation, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Messianisms (Milinarisms)</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Protection, Understanding, Participation, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Unlimited permissiveness</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Protection, Affection, Identity, Participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Commercial television</td>
<td>Leisure</td>
<td>Understanding, Creation, Identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Inhibiting satisfiers are those which by the way in which they satisfy (generally over-satisfy) a given need seriously impair the possibility of satisfying other needs.
Singular satisfiers are those which satisfy one particular need. As regards the satisfaction of other needs, they are neutral. They are characteristic of plans and programmes of assistance, cooperation and development. These satisfiers share the characteristic of being institutionalized; that is, their origins are in institutions of the State, of the private sector, or of the voluntary or non-governmental sector. (Table 5.)

Synergic satisfiers are those which satisfy a given need and, simultaneously, stimulate and contribute to the fulfilment of other needs. They share the attribute of being anti-authoritarian in the sense that they constitute a reversal of predominant values such as competition and coerciveness. (Table 6.)

Exogenous and endogenous satisfiers

The first four categories of satisfiers are exogenous to civil society as they are usually imposed, induced, ritualized or institutionalized. In this sense, they are satisfiers which have been traditionally generated at the top and advocated for all. On the other hand endogenous satisfiers derive from liberating processes which are the outcome of acts of volition generated by the community at the grass roots level. It is this that makes them anti-authoritarian, even though in some cases they may originate in processes promoted by the state.

One of the important aims of Human Scale Development is to affect change in the nature of the Latin American State. It should move from its traditional role as a generator of satisfiers which are exogenous to civil society, to a stimulator and creator of processes arising from the bottom upwards. Particularly, given the tremendously restrictive conditions which the current
Table 6    Synergic satisfiers*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfier</th>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Needs, whose satisfaction it stimulates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Breast-feeding</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Protection, Affection, Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Self-managed production</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td>Understanding, Participation, Creation, Identity, Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Popular education</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Protection, Participation,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Democratic community organizations</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Barefoot medicine</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Barefoot banking</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Democratic trade unions</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Direct democracy</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Educational games</td>
<td>Leisure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Self-managed house-building programmes</td>
<td>Subsistence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Preventive medicine</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Understanding, Participation, Subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Meditation</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
<td>Leisure, Creation, Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Cultural television</td>
<td>Leisure</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Synergic satisfiers are those which, by the way in which they satisfy a given need, stimulate and contribute to the simultaneous satisfaction of other needs.

The crisis imposes on us, an increase in the levels of local, regional, and national self-reliance should be deemed a priority. This objective can be met through the generation of synergic processes at all levels of society. The third part of this document is concerned with how such processes can be unleashed.

The fact that several of the satisfiers offered as examples do not appear in the matrix is due to the fact that the tables are more specific. It must be borne in mind that the matrix is merely illustrative and not normative.

Applications of the matrix

The schema proposed can be used for purposes of diagnosis, planning, assessment and evaluation. The matrix of needs and satisfiers may serve, at a preliminary stage, as a participative exercise of self-diagnosis for groups...
located within a local space. Through a process of regular dialogue—preferably with the presence of a facilitator acting as a catalysing element—the group may gradually begin to characterize itself by filling in the corresponding squares.

The outcome of the exercise will enable the group to become aware of both its deprivations and potentialities. After diagnosing its current reality, it may repeat the exercise in prepositional terms: that is, identifying which satisfiers would be required to fully meet the fundamental needs of the group. As the satisfiers are selected with increasing levels of specificity, they should be discussed critically by the group in terms of their characteristics and attributes, in order to determine if they are—or should be—generated exogenously or endogenously; that is, by the community itself. Such an analysis will demonstrate the potential capacity for local self-reliance. The same analysis of proposed satisfiers will enable the group to assess not only whether their positive effects are singular or synergic, but also whether the negative effects are violators, inhibiting satisfiers, or pseudo-satisfiers. The next stage of reflection of the group is to determine whether access exists to the necessary economic goods and material resources.

The proposed exercise has a twofold value. First, it makes it possible to identify at a local level a strategy for development aimed at the actualization of human needs. Second, it is an educational, creative and participatory exercise that brings about a state of deep critical awareness: that is to say, the method is, in itself, a generator of synergic effects. (More about this in the following chapter.)

The technique described is not restricted only to an analysis of local spaces. It is likewise applicable at regional and national levels. In local spaces it can be a broad based participation process where those representing the interest of the economic, political and social domains of the community may express their ideas.

At a regional level the exercise should be undertaken by a carefully chosen team which not only represents the different domains of endeavour, but also, by virtue of its representative nature, combines both public and private interests. At the national level it is essential that the task should be approached in a transdisciplinary manner because of the complexity of the issues.

In this way, an alternative process moving from the local to the regional and to the national makes it imperative to develop suitable methodologies which
allow us to reconcile harmoniously the views, expectations and proposals arising from the different spaces. In the third part of this document, proposals are made to this end.

Development geared to the satisfaction of fundamental human needs cannot, by definition, be structured from the top downwards. It cannot be imposed either by law or by decree. It can only emanate directly from the actions, expectations and creative and critical awareness of the protagonists themselves. Instead of being the traditional objects of development, people must take a leading role in development. The anti-authoritarian nature of Human Scale Development does not involve making the conflict between state and civil society more acute. On the contrary, it attempts to prove, through the method proposed, that the state can assume a role which encourages synergic processes at the local, regional and national levels.

We believe that regaining diversity is the best way to encourage the creative and synergic potential which exists in every society. Therefore it seems advisable and consistent to accept the coexistence of different styles of regional development within the same country, instead of insisting that 'national styles' should prevail, when these have so far proved to be instrumental in increasing the affluence of some regions at the expense of the impoverishment of others. These national styles are conceived mostly in order to strengthen or preserve national unity. We should not blind ourselves, however, to the fact that unity does not mean uniformity. There may exist a sounder foundation for real unity when a wealth of cultural potential arises freely and creatively, nurtured by opportunities, the technical back-up and the support for their development.
V  A Note on Methodology

The effort to understand

Since the publication, in 1986, of the Spanish version of this document, considerable experience has been accumulated about the utilization of the matrix, for analytical purposes, with diverse groups in different countries. The methodology developed so far has shown that it allows for the achievement of in-depth insight into key problems that impede the actualization of fundamental human needs in the society, community or institution being studied.

We know how to describe, and we have learned how to explain. However, what we often overlook is the fact that describing and explaining do not amount to understanding. It is our impression that the methodology developed so far, allows for that additional step into greater awareness.

For a simple yet comprehensive presentation of the methodology, we shall follow the steps of an imaginary two-day workshop attended by 50 people. The purpose of the exercise is to allow participants to reflect on the reality of their society in the light of Human Scale Development theory, in order to design solutions for the most important problems detected.

Phase one

The group is divided into five sub-groups of 10 people. (Experience has shown that 10 seems to be an optimal size for the purpose.) The proposed task, for each group, is to construct the matrix containing the destructive elements (satisfiers) affecting their society. That is, all those 'destroyers' that impede the actualization of the fundamental human needs. For the purpose, all groups receive 36 self-adhesive pads, numbered from 1 to 36, each representing a blank grid of the matrix, to be filled in.

The groups are requested to concentrate, for the first two hours, in filling in the grids corresponding to the column of Being; that is, grids 1, 5, 9, 13, 17, 21, 25, 29 and 33. Each point entered in the grid must be the result of group discussion. It is stressed by the seminar coordinator, that the column headed Being registers attributes, personal or collective (negative, in this case), that are expressed as nouns. For example, in grid 17, Participation, negative elements could be: authoritarianism, discrimination, indifference, etc.

Once the two hours are completed, all pads are collected and pinned on the wall, thus representing five columns of Being, at a sufficient distance from one another to allow space for the other three columns to be produced in order to complete five matrixes.

Phase two

The next two hours are devoted to filling in the grids of the column Having.
Participants are reminded that the column *Having* registers *institutions, norms, mechanisms, tools* (not in a material sense), *laws*, etc., that can be expressed in one or more words. Again, examples that have shown up are: national security doctrine, repressive institutions, discriminatory education laws, etc. Once the time is completed, the pads are again collected and placed on the wall next to each of the corresponding previous five columns.

A break of three hours is taken, and the participants gather again in the afternoon. A long break is important because, if properly carried out, the exercise is very intense and demanding.

The next two hours are devoted, in an analogous manner, to the column *Doing*. It is stressed that the column *Doing* registers *actions*, personal or collective, that are expressed as verbs. As a mere illustration, examples could be: discriminate, oppress, impose, censure.

During the final two hours, the column *Interacting* must be completed. It is explained to the participants that *Interacting* refers to *locations or milieus* in the sense of times and spaces.

The day finishes with five negative matrixes—matrixes of destruction—placed on the wall.

**Phase three**

A group of volunteers is requested to consolidate, during the evening, the five matrixes into one. The practical way of doing this is to take all five number 1 grids, eliminate all repetitions and synonyms, and produce only one grid representative of the whole. The same is done with all the other grids, until a single matrix is produced, representing the perceptions of all 50 participants. The matrix is drawn on a large chart (say 120x80 cms) and placed on the wall, so that on the following morning it can be examined by the participants.

**Phase four**

In the next session, the participants are divided into nine groups; one for each fundamental human need. The matrix is cut with scissors, into nine strips so that each group receives one part. It should be clear that each strip represents one need with its four grids filled in with the negative satisfiers.

The group is asked to start a discussion in order to select, from each of the four grids, the one element they consider to be the most important and decisive. In other words, that destroyer must be selected that carries the greatest weight in the lot. In exceptional cases two can be selected from a
grid. The selection must in each case be a consensus reached through debate and discussion. This phase should take as long as it requires.

**Phase five**

Each group delivers the list of the four to eight destroyers selected. The list—now regardless of the needs to which each destroyer corresponds—is written on a board. Repetitions and synonyms are once again eliminated. The remainder of the list becomes the subject of discussion in a plenary session, so that a final pruning of the less important components is carried out. The final list represents the picture of the most negative elements affecting that society, community or institution in as much as the actualization of fundamental human needs is concerned. It represents the most fundamental problems that must be tackled.

**The new awareness**

Early in 1987, a seminar like the one described was carried out in Bogotá, Colombia, with 50 high-ranking university officials and academics from all over the country as participants. After reflecting on the destructive elements affecting Colombian society, and going through the successive phases previously described, they produced a final list as follows:

Aggressiveness, Indifference, Obedience, Censorship, Acceptance, Apathy, Dependence, Alienation, Neutrality (internal), Up-rooting, Ideological manipulation, and Repressive institutions.

This list determined the following analysis and conclusions. If one asks for a description of Colombian society, the reply may well give an image of a society suffering from a high degree of violence. If one asks for explanations, one may be given a profile of all the different groups that are in conflict and, hence, determine that violence. But, if we look at the above list, which is the product of an intense process of introspective analysis, we perceive something quite interesting and, probably, unexpected. There is violence—a great deal of violence—in Colombian society, but the deep underlying problem, as revealed by the list, was deemed to be Fear. Whether that fear is the result of violence or its cause (or both) is difficult—perhaps impossible—to say. But in any case, what appears to be probable, is that the ‘disease’ the patient is suffering from is fear. Therefore, if the remedies prescribed concentrate exclusively on the attempt to cure violence, one may be applying an inadequate or incomplete prescription for the wrong ‘disease’. The result may be that the patient gets worse.

The final assessment of the participants was that the methodology—regardless of whether it did or did not reveal new truths—allowed for the discovery
of unexpected facets of a problem, thus increasing awareness about what was relevant.

And what then? When working in a community, that is, in a place where the coordinator is able to establish a long-term relationship with the people, a second exercise is highly advisable.

Employing the same procedure as for the negative matrix describing their community, the participants are later asked to produce the matrix of their Utopia. At least one month should elapse between the two exercises. If both experiences are carried out, the two final lists produced will allow for the design of 'bridges' to go from an undesirable situation to a desirable one.

When discussing the bridging, the community will inevitably be selecting new satisfiers. At that stage, each satisfier proposed or suggested, must be jointly analysed in order to establish its characteristics: is it endogenous or must it come from outside the community; is it singular, synergic or destructive? Such a participatory discussion and analysis will in itself be an experience with synergetic effects.
Fundamental human needs must be understood as a system, the dynamics of which does not obey hierarchical linearities. This means that, on the one hand, no need is *per se* more important than any other; and, on the other hand, that there is no fixed order of precedence in the actualization of needs (that need B, for instance, can only be met after need A has been satisfied). Simultaneities, complementarities and trade-offs are characteristic of the system’s behaviour. There are, however, limits to this generalization. A pre-systemic threshold must be recognized, below which the feeling of a certain deprivation may be so severe, that the urge to satisfy the given need may paralyse and overshadow any other impulse or alternative.

The case of subsistence may serve to illustrate this clearly. When the possibilities of satisfying this need are severely impaired, all other needs remain blocked and a single and intense drive prevails. But such a situation does not hold true only in the case of subsistence. It is equally relevant in the case of other needs. Suffice it to say, that total lack of affection, or the loss of identity, may lead people to extremes of self-destruction.

*Whether to follow the assumptions of linearity or the systemic assumptions is such an important choice that it will determine the resulting style of development.*

If linearity is favoured, the development strategy will most probably establish its priorities according to the observed poverty of subsistence. Programmes of social assistance will be implemented as a means of tackling poverty as it is conventionally understood. Needs will be interpreted exclusively as deprivations and, at best, the satisfiers that the system may generate will correspond to those identified in this document as singular. Last, but not least, linear assumptions will stimulate accumulation regardless of people’s human development. Paradoxically this option results in a circular cumulative causation (in the sense of Myrdal) and, thus, the poor remain poor inasmuch as their dependence on exogenously generated satisfiers increases.

If one opts for the systemic assumptions, the development strategy will favour endogenously generated synergic satisfiers. Needs will be understood simultaneously as deprivations and potentials, thus allowing for the elimination of the vicious circle of poverty.

It follows from the above that the way in which needs are understood, and
the role and attributes ascribed to the possible satisfiers, are absolutely definitive, in determining a development strategy.

To interpret development as here proposed, implies a change in the prevailing economic rationale. It compels us, among other things, to undertake a critical and rigorous revision of the concept of efficiency. This concept is often associated with notions such as the maximization of productivity and of profits, the ambiguity of both terms notwithstanding. If we stretch economic criteria to the most alienated extreme of instrumental reasoning, productivity appears quite inefficient. In fact, by overemphasizing the need for Subsistence, it sacrifices other needs and so ends up threatening Subsistence itself.

The dominant development discourses also associate efficiency with the conversion of labour into capital, with the formalization of economic activities, with the indiscriminate absorption of the newest technologies and, of course, with the maximization of growth rates. In the eyes of many, development consists of achieving the material living standards of the most industrialized countries, in order for people to have access to a growing array of goods (artifacts) which become increasingly more diversified.

It may be asked to what extent such attempts at emulation make any sense at all. First, there is no evidence that people in those countries experience their needs in an integrated manner. Second, in the rich countries, the abundance of goods and economic resources has not proved to be a sufficient condition for solving the problem of alienation.

Human Scale Development does not exclude conventional goals such as economic growth, so that all persons may have access to required goods and services. However, the difference with respect to the prevailing development styles lies in considering the aims of development not only as points of arrival, but as components of the process itself. In other words, fundamental human needs can and must be realized from the outset and throughout the entire process of development. In this manner the realization of needs becomes, instead of a goal, the motor of development itself. This is possible only inasmuch as the development strategy proves to be capable of stimulating the permanent generation of synergic satisfiers.

To integrate the harmonious realization of human needs into the process of development gives everyone the possibility of experiencing that development
from its very outset. This may give origin to a healthy, self-reliant and participative development, capable of creating the foundations for a social order within which economic growth, solidarity and the growth of all men and women as whole persons can be reconciled.

Development capable of combining synergy with efficiency may not be enough to fully attain that which is desired, but it is surely sufficient to prevent people from perceiving that which is not desired as unavoidable.
The efforts to establish a New International Economic Order and a new international division of labour have been unable, up to the present, to alleviate the economic, financial, technological, and cultural relationships of dependence of Third World countries on industrialized nations. The increasing power wielded by financial capital has restricted further the capacity and the right of debtor countries to determine their own destiny. In this regard, the adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund on Latin American governments applying for loans to maintain their disproportionate debt service payments, reflects the power of the international banking system to undermine the sovereignty of poor countries.

The patterns of consumption, exported by the affluent countries and imposed upon Third World countries, subject the latter to relationships of exchange that make dependence more acute, perpetuate their internal imbalances, and threaten their cultural identity. It is the industrial countries which not only control a substantial part of global industrial production but also produce and market the new 'breakthrough' technologies. They are also responsible for propagating the message that such technologies along with their accompanying products are absolutely essential for any society seeking to improve the welfare of its members.

The dependence on such patterns of consumption is encouraged from within Third World countries by power groups which reap the benefits derived from marketing them. This has contributed significantly to the indebtedness of Latin American countries. According to estimates made by the economist Jacobo Schatan, between 1978 and 1981 the amount of non-essential imports rose to 14 billion dollars in Mexico, to 10 billion dollars in Brazil, and to 5 billion dollars in Chile. For example, luxury imports accounted for a per capita expenditure of 79 dollars in Brazil, 200 dollars in Mexico, and soared to 513 dollars in Chile. India, however, only imported luxury goods to the value of five dollars per capita, and it is no mere coincidence that its foreign debt is much lower than that of Latin American countries.

To break away from imitative consumption patterns not only trees us from the spell of cultural dependence but also creates the conditions for a more efficient use of the resources generated in the periphery. It also lessens the negative impact of protectionist policies that industrial countries put into practice to shelter their own products. The various forms of dependence reinforce one another. The different domains of dependence—economic, financial, technological, cultural and political—cannot be viewed in isolation from one another, since the power of one is derived from the support it receives from the other domains.
It is because of these multiple dependencies that development geared towards self-reliance and the satisfaction of human needs is inhibited. The satisfaction of fundamental human needs such as Subsistence, Protection, Participation, Creation, Identity, and Freedom is restricted by the demands which the international centres of power, either explicitly or implicitly, impose upon the countries in the periphery. This is apparent in matters of political models, guidelines for economic growth, cultural patterns, incorporation of technologies, options for consumption, exchange relationships, and ways of solving social conflicts. The acceptance of such demands not only nurtures dependencies, but also reinforces them. We are caught in a vicious circle within which little or nothing can be accomplished in terms of satisfying the most vital needs of the great masses in Third World countries. Under such conditions, it would be more accurate to speak of ‘anti-development’ countries, rather than of developing countries.

The political issue of Human Scale Development does not consist of seeking spaces which the New International Economic Order might open up for the economies of the periphery. On the contrary, it is a question of defining a self-reliant development strategy and, from this perspective, look for possible support from the New International Economic Order, which can help to promote these objectives. For example, it is not a question of maximizing exports in terms of the demands from the centre, and then wondering how to utilize export revenues. Instead, we should begin by regulating the flow of exports and decreasing the flow of imports, as is consistent with more endogenous and self-reliant development.

In much the same way as we have coped with an interrelationship of domains of dependence (financial, technological, cultural and political), we are paralysed by an accumulation of spaces of dependence: local, regional, national and international. Economic concentration along with the centralization of political decisions generate and reinforce dependencies among these different levels: poor countries are subjected to the will of the rich countries; and within poor countries the same pattern exists, where local and regional realities seem doomed to subordinate their development to the decisions of centralized political and economic interests.
only by generating self-reliance, where people assume a leading role in different domains and spaces, that it is possible to promote development processes with synergic effects that satisfy fundamental human needs.

We understand self-reliance in terms of a horizontal interdependence and, in no way, as an isolationist tendency on the part of nations, regions, local communities or cultures. Interdependence without authoritarian relationships is able to combine the objectives of economic growth, social justice, personal development and freedom in much the same way that a harmonious combination of such objectives can achieve both the collective and individual satisfaction of the different fundamental human needs.

Understood as a process capable of promoting participation in decision-making, social creativity, political self-determination, a fair distribution of wealth, and tolerance for the diversity of identities, self-reliance becomes a turning point in the articulation of human beings with nature and technology, of the personal with the social, of the micro with the macro, of autonomy with planning, and of civil society with the state.

The behaviour generated by an anthropocentric cosmology, that places human beings above nature, is consistent with the traditional styles of development. Hence, the economistic view of development, measured by means of aggregate indicators such as the GNP, undiscriminatingly regards as positive any processes where market transactions take place, regardless of whether they are productive, unproductive or destructive. It is in this way that, for instance, the indiscriminate depredation of natural resources makes the GNP grow, just as a sick population does when it increases its consumption of Pharmaceuticals or use of hospital facilities.

Seemingly modern technologies may often be deceptive. A remarkable example is that of the North American farming system, acknowledged for its great efficiency. Highly mechanized and benefiting from subsidized petroleum, it is an extraordinarily inefficient system when measured in terms of the amount of energy used to yield a set amount of kilo/calories. Nonetheless, when measured in monetary terms, it contributes to the growth of the GNP. These examples also hold true for the countries of the Third World, very much under the 'spell' of the latest technologies. In Mexico, according to information provided by the Xochicalli Foundation, it is estimated that 19,000k/cal. are used in order to put 2,200k/cal. of food on the table. Furthermore, the amount of energy consumed in transporting
foodstuffs in Mexico is almost equal to the total energy required by the primary sector for food production. The fact that such situations are considered to be positive is, undoubtedly, a conceptual aberration.

Since Human Scale Development is concerned mainly with the fulfilment of fundamental human needs of present as well as future generations, it advocates a concept of development which is essentially ecological. This implies, on the one hand, creating indicators capable of discriminating between what is positive and what is negative, and, on the other hand, designing and using technologies that can be adapted to a truly eco-humanist process of development and, thus, ensure the conservation of natural resources for the future.

The prevailing political models and development styles have been unable to make compatible personal development and social development. The exercise of power, especially when inspired by restrictive ideologies, tends to either lose sight of the person in the archetype of the masses or to sacrifice the masses to the archetype of the individual. There are many models, in fact, that postpone social development in the name of consumer sovereignty, while overlooking the fact that reducing a person to the mere category of a consumer also impairs the possibilities of personal development.

Social and personal development are inseparable. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect that one of them may automatically be the consequence of the other. A healthy society should, advocate above all the development of every person and of the whole person.

Traditionally, it has been thought that owing to scarce resources, we are obliged to choose between personal and social development strategies rather than to adopt comprehensive policies. Undoubtedly, such thinking arises from a conventional conception of efficiency. If, however, we consider conventional resources along with non-conventional resources with their synergic potential (See Chapter X), we realize that comprehensive policies are viable, and that only by combining personal and social development is it possible to achieve a healthy society comprised of healthy individuals.

The articulation between the personal and social dimensions of development may be achieved through increasing levels of self-reliance. At a personal level, self-reliance stimulates our sense of identity, our creative capacity, our self-confidence, and our need for freedom. At the social level, self-reliance strengthens the capacity for subsistence, provides protection
against exogenous hazards, enhances endogenous cultural identity and
develops the capacity to generate greater spaces of collective freedom. The
necessary combination of both the personal and the social in Human Scale
Development compels us, then, to encourage self-reliance at the different
levels: individual, local, regional and national.

Relationships of dependence flow from the top downwards: from the macro
to the micro, from the international level to the local level, from the social
domain to the individual domain. Relationships of self-reliance, on the
contrary, have greater synergic and multiplying effects when they flow from
the bottom upwards; that is to say, to the extent that local self-reliance stimu-
lates regional self-reliance, which, in turn, fosters national self-reliance.
This does not mean that policies at the macro level are intrinsically unable
to communicate self-reliance to micro-social levels, but it does imply that
two challenges must be met. The first involves minimizing the risk of repro-
ducing vertical relationships in the name of regional and local self-reliance.
The second means self-reliant processes originating from micro-spaces
should be less bureaucratic, more democratic and more efficient in combin-
ing personal growth with social development. It is precisely these social and
physical spaces—family, group, community and local spaces—which have
a distinct human scale dimension; that is, a scale where the social does not
annul the individual but, on the contrary, the individual may empower the
social. In Human Scale Development, these spaces are fundamental to the
generation of synergic satisfiers.

It is not our intention to suggest that self-reliance is achieved simply by
social and economic interaction in small physical spaces. Such an assump-
tion would do nothing but replicate a mechanistic perception which has al-
ready been very harmful in terms of development policies. If self-reliant
processes at the global and local levels do not complement each other, the
most likely consequence will be the co-opting of the micro by the macro.
Complementary relationships between the macro and the micro, and among
the various micro-spaces, may facilitate the mutual empowering of pro-
cesses of socio-cultural identity, political autonomy, and economic self-
reliance. (See Chapter XII.)

To achieve increasing levels of political autonomy and economic self-
reliance in local spaces it is necessary to promote processes with such
objectives. This poses a central challenge for Human Scale Development:
to reconcile external promotion with internal initiatives. The spontaneous
activity of local groups or of isolated individuals cannot have any real impact
if it is not nurtured and empowered through the action of planners and
politicians. What is needed is global planning for greater local autonomy. This planning should be capable of mobilizing existing groups and communities, to transform their survival strategies into life options, organically articulated as political and social projects throughout the national space.

Articulation between the state and civil society

To transform dependence into autonomy requires deep structural changes in the relationship between the state and civil society. These changes aim not only to create and reinforce self-reliance but also to solve the conflicts and contradictions which may arise in the process of generating increasing self-reliance. The interconnection between multiple dependencies (from the international to the local, from the technological to the sociocultural) can only be confronted through social mobilization geared to the consolidation of self-reliance and through a deep respect for the diversity of cultures, forms of organization and uses of local space. Furthermore, self-reliance increases critical awareness. This means that more people will assume their role as social protagonists and, as such, this increasing participation must be harmonized within an organic whole.

As long as economic and social organizations remains framed within a pyramidal political logic, it will be extremely difficult to allocate and diversify resources in a way that comes to terms with the structural heterogeneity of the Latin American population. For this reason it is necessary to counterbalance the state's logic of power with the demands for political autonomy that arise from civil society; that is to say, from the people and their organizations. It is through effective experiences of self-reliance that it will be possible to overcome the prejudice that efficiency necessarily goes hand in hand with centralized decision-making.

To deny the role of the state and of public policies in the execution of planning and resource allocation is not realistic. On the other hand, the surrender of social and productive organizations, generated by civil society, to a ‘macrocephalic’ state would corrupt the process of developing self-reliance.

Encouraging self-reliance in many spaces means considering development not as an expression of a predominant class or of a single political project controlled by the state, but as the outcome of a diversity of individual and collective projects capable of empowering one another. In order to guarantee such processes the state must assume the critical role of opening up spaces for the participation of different social actors. In this manner, the reproduction of mechanisms of exploitation and coercion are controlled, thus guarding against the consolidation of harmful projects acting to inhibit the diversity that needs to be strengthened and reinforced.
Empowering groups and social actors

In contrast with the prevailing economic rationale, Human Scale Development—focused on encouraging self-reliance within the different spaces and domains—does not consider accumulation as an end in itself, or as a panacea which cures all the ills of Third World countries. Although it in no sense minimizes the importance of generating surpluses, its emphasis is on the consolidation of groups, communities, and organizations capable of forging self-reliance. Through its expansion and articulation, from the micro-spaces to national settings, economic accumulation can eventually help to progressively satisfy the fundamental human needs of people. The capacity of the different groups and individuals to decide how to use and allocate their own resources will ensure a use of surpluses that is neither discriminatory nor restrictive.

Spaces and actors

In local spaces, which are more human in scale, it is easier to generate initiatives in self-reliance, which could be potential alternatives to pyramidal structures of power. It is in human scale spaces that personal and social development can reinforce each other. Therefore, there is no dependence which can be done away with effectively, until we rediscover and, then, nurture the initiatives of social organizations at the grass roots level. The role of the State and of public policies is to identify these embryonic initiatives, reinforce them and help them to multiply. Besides, it is within local spaces that people act to satisfy their fundamental human needs.

Alternative policies central to Human Scale Development are needed in order to empower social actors to initiate autonomous, self-sustaining and harmonious development in the different domains. This does not imply, of course, that Human Scale Development is solely concerned with small social and physical spaces. The impact of the international recession on Latin American countries and the structural imbalances of peripheral capitalism, make it obvious that development in local spaces is inadequate unless it is complemented by global policies to alleviate the precarious conditions of the dispossessed masses. However, such policies must include in their agenda the allocation of resources capable of stimulating self-reliance within local spaces.

Self-reliance versus instrumentalization

Self-reliance presents a contrast to the uniformity of behaviour among social sectors and actors that is conventionally expected. People are no longer just instruments for the efficient accumulation of capital. In the Third World, the price paid for capital accumulation and efficiency is dependence. Yet, dependence inhibits the satisfaction of fundamental human needs and, therefore, is a price which should not be tolerated. It means that the dispossessed masses are manipulated in relation to the demands made by the great
centres of economic power and that heterogeneous forms of culture, production and organization are considered mere stumbling blocks to growth.

An economic rationale is needed that does not ascribe importance to indiscriminate accumulation nor to the mere improvement of conventional economic indicators irrelevant to the well-being of people, nor to principles of efficiency unrelated to the satisfaction of human needs. This rationale is aimed at enhancing people's quality of life and is sustained by respect for diversity along with a refusal to turn some people into instruments of others and some countries into instruments of others.

The logic of economics versus the ethics of well-being

It is necessary to counter a logic of economics, which has inherited the instrumental reasoning that permeates modern culture, with an ethics of well-being. The fetishism of numbers must be replaced by the development of people. The state's vertical management and the exploitation of some groups by others must give way to a social will encouraging participation, autonomy and the equitable distribution of resources.

It is absolutely necessary to do away with 'a priori' categories and assumptions which, thus far, have not been questioned at the levels of macro-economics and macro-politics. A commitment to Human Scale Development makes it necessary to encourage individuals to assume responsibility for a development alternative based on self-reliance. In this respect the central question for Human Scale Development is: What resources are to be generated, and how should they be used in order to nurture self-reliance in individuals and in micro-spaces.

Self-reliance involves a kind of regeneration or revitalization emanating from one's own efforts, capabilities and resources. Strategically, it means that what can be produced (or worked out) at local levels is what should be produced (or worked out) at local levels. The same principle holds true at the regional and national levels.

Opting for self-reliance

Self-reliance changes the way in which people perceive their own potential and capabilities. Often their sense of value and self-worth has been denigrated as a result of centre-periphery relations. The reduction of economic dependence, one of the objectives of self-reliant development, is not expected to be a substitute for trade or exchange. These will always be necessary as certain goods or services cannot be generated or provided at a local, regional or national level. Thus, self-reliance must of necessity acquire a collective nature. It must become a process of interdependence among equal partners so that forms of solidarity prevail over blind competition.
Self-reliant development permits a more complete and harmonious satisfaction of the system of fundamental human needs. By lessening economic dependence, subsistence is safeguarded, since economic fluctuations (recessions, depressions) cause greater damage when a centre-periphery structure prevails. Furthermore, it fosters participation and creativity. It stimulates and reinforces cultural identity through an increase in self-confidence. Finally, communities achieve a better understanding of technologies and productive processes when they are capable of self-management.
It is not our intention to present the invisible sectors or the micro-organizations as absolute sustainers of a structural transformation of society or as redeemers of contemporary history. If we have devoted an important part of this document to these protagonists, it has been with the purpose of emphasizing what is ignored in a great part of the literature on development, namely: all the 'sub-history' of everyday life where productive practices are linked closely to collective survival strategies, cultural identities and popular memory. Fully aware of all the economic and cultural limitations of the invisible world, we think, however, that such a world contains and generates connections between economic practices, social organizations and cultural features which cannot be disregarded in any discussion concerned with endogenous development. Finally, our emphasis on the invisible world and its micro-organizations also conforms to the need to complement other perspectives emphasizing development from the bottom upwards in order to acknowledge as relevant what traditionally has been seen as marginal. Moreover, we are interested in efforts to understand the dynamics of other emerging protagonists such as youth groups, women's organizations, trade unions, entrepreneurs, indigenous groups, etc. We do not wish to contribute to an idealization of the popular sectors. We simply intend to recognize their value and potential as social actors who can help create a participatory and decentralized form of democracy, that is, the practice of democracy at a human scale.

The economic crisis dominating Latin America expresses itself in many different ways. One of the most significant manifestations of this situation has been the sustained expansion of the invisible sectors over the last few years. In countries with high unemployment levels, the contingent of the active population that holds non-salaried jobs is of such a magnitude that there is no longer any sense in considering it as a residual sector of society. By a strange kind of dialectic, these sectors manifest themselves both as an extreme expression of the crisis and as a possible means of emerging from it. Because they lack opportunities in the formal market, unemployed workers and their families generate alternative forms of productive organization and of work in general, thus giving rise to an extraordinary diversity of survival strategies. The invisible sectors are marked by precarious living and working conditions, the consequences of a permanent lack of security imposed by the competitive market which creates disadvantages for these sectors where productivity is low. All this is aggravated by the fact that the invisible world becomes very useful to a capitalism which is unable to generate sufficient jobs in the formal economy.
As a potential means of solving the crisis, the invisible world creates, through survival strategies, a myriad of community organizations as well as productive micro-organizations. In this sub-world, the ethics of solidarity that have evolved from within are an indispensable resource for survival in the milieu where a dominant logic of competition prevails. In this way, an endogenous force of solidarity confronts permanently the exogenous forces of competition. In this confrontation there are two diametrically opposed perspectives: (1) that the exogenous pressures may weaken these organizations to the point where they will be dissolved through ‘inertia’ or incorporated into the competitive rationale of the dominant system; or (2) that these organizations will gain strength, thus attaining increasing degrees of self-reliance and ultimately transferring the vitality of their solidarity to other sectors of society. For the latter to happen, it will be necessary to decentralize decisions, to increase access to resources and to promote popular participation.

This does not mean that a self-reliant development policy should concern itself exclusively with the internal reinforcement of the invisible sectors. Such a thesis would be partial and reductionist. What is at stake is to liberate the wealth of social creativity, of solidarity and of self-managing initiatives which the invisible world has spawned in order to survive in a restrictive environment. These initiatives, through more generally applied policies, will challenge the logic of indiscriminate competition and dependence.

The invisible actors should organize horizontal networks, undertake mutually supportive action, articulate individual and group practices, and thus develop shared projects. In this way, they will be able to do away with the fragmentation which presently threatens their existence. National projects that include these sectors in decision-making and planning, can minimize the effects of exogenous pressures and strengthen the endogenous potential.

An unmistakable feature of Latin America’s development is the inability of the formal economic sector to absorb the steady increase in the economically active population. It generates a surplus labour force comprised of the unemployed and the underemployed who insert themselves in the labour market through a variety of low income generating self-employment schemes, that is, survival trades. This heterogeneous sector of society has spawned a multiplicity of organizations where the non-institutionalized productive unit is predominant. All these heterogeneous activities take place outside the formal productive sector.
Individuals and families, organized in small economic units that fill the empty spaces of the system and undertake economic activities spurned by the modern capitalistic sector, make up a significant part of the labour force in almost all Latin American countries. The participation of this structural surplus has grown with the economic crisis which has been affecting the countries of the region since 1981. In this manner, a problem which was already chronic was made all the more acute.

Studies carried out in different countries show both a substantial increase in unemployment as well as an intensification of underemployment. The main alternative to unemployment for many members of the labour force was to insert themselves in non-organized markets and in non-institutionalized activities. Fairly conservative estimates show that in Brazil, between 1981 and 1983, the urban informal sectors grew at a yearly rate of 6.6 per cent and significantly increased their participation in non-agricultural employment. These sectors have played a major role in the adjustment of the labour markets, absorbing the social impact of unemployment during the crisis, and increasing the total number of people occupied in the survival trades.

Statistical omissions

The non-organized and non-institutionalized sectors of the labour force, generically called 'informal' sectors, do not exhaust the concept of 'invisible world', but, on the contrary, are incorporated in this concept. Systems of statistical information, available in most countries of the region, are incomplete and therefore fail to convey adequately the size, structure and dynamics of the informal sectors. Obviously, statistics relating to the other invisible sectors are practically non-existent and only crop up in isolated surveys and research projects of a local nature.

In contrast to the shortcomings of research in this area, the invisible world, seen as a whole, has a significant importance in the countries of the region, since they develop strategies for survival that are an alternative to those already existing in the formal labour market. An evaluation of their significance goes beyond the capacity of the current information system, which once again demonstrates that, from an analytical point of view, such systems seem only to grant importance to that which can be measured. Because of the inadequate theoretical base from which to address these subjects, demographic records on the labour force and on national accounts are not orientated towards producing the information that would be relevant.

The need for new methods and concepts

The aforementioned statistical and theoretical shortcomings make it difficult to classify the invisible world. Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of
these sectors, a classification system would not only help to clarify what those sectors do or do not do, but would also divide the multiplicity of ‘invisible’ occupations and activities into groupings that might enable us to detect their common elements. Such a task is essential if we are to understand the reasons why a vast number of people occupy the empty spaces of the modern market, why they develop alternatives in matters of productive and social organization which are essential to their individual and collective survival.

New methods and concepts are required to expand the concept of work beyond the conventional notion of employment. The latter is limited to a salaried relationship subordinated to capital. In Latin American societies, the invisible world displays, on account of its own heterogeneity, a diversity of forms of work which do not fall within the conventional concept of employment. This work may assume an individual character as is the case of so-called self-employed individuals, or a collective character exemplified by family workshops, associations, small community organizations, micro-enterprises, etc. Not always is work in a survival trade motivated solely by economics, although in most cases it arises from the need to generate income. Work also can be solidary, a mobilizer of social energies, participatory, geared towards improving the social infrastructure or devoted to achieving development gains such as the generation of greater autonomy and self-reliance in community decisions. This makes it necessary to overcome the reduction of work to a mere factor of production. These are conventional categories applied to the concept of employment and they are of very little use in understanding work as a complex phenomenon governed by different rationales or motivations. A comprehensive development perspective must include an all-embracing concept of work, including its role as a generator of income (salaries or other forms) as well as something that affects the quality of people’s lives, through its role as a satisfier of human needs and, as such, a catalyst of social energies.

A programme for creating just and more participatory societies in Latin America must include an evaluation of the historical and present meaning of the different forms of work generated in the invisible world whether organized on an individual or a social basis. Although, these organizations are embryonic in character, it is necessary to investigate and to verify if they genuinely represent alternative forms pertinent to a new style of development. Such an evaluation would involve studying the multiplicity of rationales that underlie these organizations. But, if theoretical investigation is to be translated into political change, it is also necessary to identify those new social protagonists who are emerging from within the invisible world
and who are potential agents of change. A comprehensive study of both rationales and of social protagonists would help to pave the way for new forms of organization capable of changing social reality.

This investigation would in no way diminish the historical role of capital as the major instrument of economic modernization in the region, nor the role of the state as an instigator of capitalist initiatives. Capital and the state are far too important in our countries to be overlooked. To ignore them may lead to serious errors of analysis and the implementation of erroneous development policies and actions.

**Self-reliance and production of knowledge**

Human Scale Development calls for a restructuring of the way we pursue knowledge in order to create critical awareness throughout society. The cognitive instruments needed to counteract the multiple forms of dependence must be made accessible to all. Such a task requires that the new ideas confront the dominant ones in the spaces where public policies are constructed. Therefore, it is necessary to coordinate action in order to guarantee that ideas are understood and discussed in all those domains and settings promoting people-centered development.

We require research leading to the creation of data bases capable of measuring and evaluating what is relevant to Human Scale Development. It is, therefore, advisable to modify the statistical and qualitative systems of information in such a way that they reflect the structural heterogeneity and psycho-cultural specificities of the different regions and, above all, the potential that underlies this diversity.

It is necessary to encourage popular participation in the production of relevant information. This will require, on the one hand, redesigning our research methodologies and practices in such a way that they not only make information available to the people, but also, that it is relevant to their interests. This type of data must be generated through participatory practices and widely accepted community self-diagnosis techniques.

It might be appropriate to encourage the creation of idea banks at national levels and, then, interconnect them throughout the Latin American region. These banks would gather information on grassroots initiatives aimed at local self-reliance. They would also collect information on the use of non-conventional resources (see Chapter X), and on technologies and public policies conducive to the promotion of the ideas of Human Scale Development.
It is advisable to modify the educational curricula in the centres of higher learning so that they systematically consider development alternatives, especially their epistemological, propositional, and methodological aspects. The training of researchers is essential, not only to generate information crucial to Human Scale Development, but also to counteract the tyranny of reductionist ideologies and the unilaterally adopted views on the topic of development.

It is important to improve the quality of adult education as well as the work of development promoters and activists, so that it may be consistent with the objectives of community participation, self-reliance, and the satisfaction of fundamental human needs. Moreover, post-graduate programmes in teaching and research should be encouraged to emphasize the systematization of the problems that arise in connection with the quest for development alternatives in our countries. Finally, it is advisable to organize a network of closely-linked research and training centres in order to create a system of permanent feedback that may contribute to the design of a new development paradigm.
IX  On Micro-organizations

**Micro-organizations in the invisible sectors**

One of the most remarkable manifestations of the invisible world is the wide spectrum of micro-enterprises and other small economic organizations which operate in the empty spaces left by the capitalist market. The rationale that characterizes these micro-organizations may be determined by factors such as: the need to survive in a situation of acute crisis; the lack of opportunities offered by the modern market economy; or a conscious decision to adopt an alternative to employment in the formal sector of the economy which is governed by its own internal discipline, hierarchy and tradition. The rationale governing micro-organizations is based only partially on the capitalist principle of accumulation through profit.

**Heterogeneity of micro-organizations**

Often these economic micro-organizations are subordinated to modern capitalism. Nonetheless, their diversity, together with their alternative rationale, distinguishes them from the enterprises of the modern sector that operates on capitalist principles in increasingly oligopolistic markets. Some studies have indicated that the structures through which these micro-organizations operate, generate low productivity and low incomes. This renders the jobs performed in such non-institutionalized sectors unattractive except to the poorly qualified and to those who for other reasons (handicapped, migrants, women, etc.) have limited access to the formal labour market. There are instances, however, where micro-organizations have emerged as deliberate alternatives to salaried employment, or as a defence mechanism against an environment that is socially and politically hostile. In such cases, the prevailing motivation might be solidarity expressed through a new social experience; that is, work as a creative endeavour and not just as a survival strategy. The heterogeneity of the sector is multidimensional: there is a great diversity of activities performed, of methods of marketing goods and services and of ways of organizing work (individual micro-units, cooperatives, family enterprises and so on).

**Lack of stability of micro-organizations**

Another feature of micro-organizations is their instability, demonstrated by their high birth and death rates. Such organizations face serious difficulties in surviving due to factors such as: the size of the market, location, structure of costs, opportunities for entering into a competitive market, the potential for diversifying sources of inputs and raw materials, the capacity to avoid dependence on a few buyers (especially middle-men), access to credit and so on. These constraints, which determine whether micro-organizations are able to reproduce themselves, may be overcome with the help of assistance programmes sponsored by public or private agencies. A new concept of economic and social resource management (see Chapter X, page 66), along with an alternative view of the process of development, makes it possible to minimize the dependent, unstable and random character of the micro-
organizations of societies which, like those of Latin America, show a great structural heterogeneity.

In the absence of a new vision, the life span of most of the economic micro-organizations will be short and they will be characterized by limited periods of accumulation followed by frustrated attempts at growth. Although it seems paradoxical, these experiences, inherent in the invisible world, represent a potential alternative to the scourge of unemployment. Since the modern sectors of the economy will not be able to solve the negative effects of the crisis by themselves, the need to support and stimulate these micro-organizations becomes obvious.

In order to secure the development and the continuity of these organizations, the role of the state becomes fundamental. The state can undermine their existence either by neglect or by the repression of social movements which, originating within the micro-organizations, tend to form alliances with other sectors of civil society in the struggle to regain the power concentrated in the state. Therefore, to promote micro-organizations, emphasis must be given to structural changes and to an organic articulation between the micro and macro levels of society. The socio-political and economic impact of the micro-organizations comprising the invisible world will depend on their capacity to relate to the whole of the society. Furthermore, their eventual influence will also depend on whether they limit themselves to organizing survival strategies or, whether, in addition, and by means of these strategies, they become the embryos of an alternative form of development.

It would be absurd to identify Human Scale Development, in its broader sense, with only the invisible world, and, even more so, with a sub-division of these, which we call economic micro-organizations. We should, however, try to identify within these units the embryos of different forms of social organization of production and work, which could be incorporated into new styles of development.

One of the manifestations of the economic and social crisis affecting the countries of the region is the problematique of the invisible world. Hence, they play a critical role in the search for policies and programmes to overcome the crisis. Even though alternatives to the existing order may have their origins in some micro-social spaces of the invisible world (anti-authoritarian spaces which combine an economy, a culture, and a political will), their transformation into viable alternatives affecting the global situation
Human Scale Development: An Option for the Future

Self-reliance as a socio-economic process

The degree of self-reliance that popular organizations may reach in their operation and management is directly determined by the way in which such organizations insert themselves and participate in the market. We must acknowledge, however, that absolute self-reliance is Utopian. What is both desirable and possible is the achievement of increasing degrees of self-reliance. In other words, self-reliance will be determined by the way in which the micro-organizations relate to other social actors and organizations. Since self-reliance is forged through these connections, it must be understood as a process defined by a system of relationships. If, as a consequence of the crisis, many popular economic organizations attempt to construct practices of self-management, this constitutes an important step, not only towards self-reliance but also towards greater autonomy. It indicates that groups and communities have the will to exert control over their own conditions of life. It is in this sense that these micro-organizations are the embryos of Human Scale Development. They represent a potential for the transformation of economic and social relationships basic to the construction of a democratic culture.

Challenges for the state

A permanent threat to micro-organizations wishing to attain greater levels of self-reliance and autonomy are the cooptive strategies of the state, political parties and other institutions which operate according to a logic of power. Economic micro-organizations and social movements in general, are

will depend on the identification of, and support for, those protagonists and those social organizations capable of putting their vision into practice. Therefore, the question of invisibility has to be included in the problematic of the transition to new forms of social organization. In this regard, we must not overlook the fact that certain experiences associated with the invisible world, are proving to be perfectly capable of surviving the crisis from which they originated in the first place.

Whatever the structure that defines the invisible world, the political bearing of these on the rest of society will also depend on the creativity of the persons involved. In other words, in order to foster structural changes, it is necessary to separate, within the invisible world, the mere mechanisms of resistance to the crisis from mechanisms which are motivated by a search for greater autonomy. The latter may eventually contribute to a more lasting structure and inspire the creation of new development strategies.

The degree of self-reliance that popular organizations may reach in their operation and management is directly determined by the way in which such organizations insert themselves and participate in the market. We must acknowledge, however, that absolute self-reliance is Utopian. What is both desirable and possible is the achievement of increasing degrees of self-reliance. In other words, self-reliance will be determined by the way in which the micro-organizations relate to other social actors and organizations. Since self-reliance is forged through these connections, it must be understood as a process defined by a system of relationships. If, as a consequence of the crisis, many popular economic organizations attempt to construct practices of self-management, this constitutes an important step, not only towards self-reliance but also towards greater autonomy. It indicates that groups and communities have the will to exert control over their own conditions of life. It is in this sense that these micro-organizations are the embryos of Human Scale Development. They represent a potential for the transformation of economic and social relationships basic to the construction of a democratic culture.

All this must, of course, go hand in hand with the availability of resources that lead to the generation of economic surpluses and thus allow for the reproduction and growth of these organizations.

A permanent threat to micro-organizations wishing to attain greater levels of self-reliance and autonomy are the cooptive strategies of the state, political parties and other institutions which operate according to a logic of power. Economic micro-organizations and social movements in general, are
frequently neutralized by a political landscape dominated by pyramidal structures in which struggles for hegemony are constantly taking place.

The problem of cooptation is critical in shaping the articulations between local organizations and global processes. Cooptation is achieved through the identification and political manipulation of the social actors. This invariably leads, not only, to a loss of their identity, but also, to actions that ultimately defeat their endogenous objectives. Within these dynamics, the system of relations established between the micro-organizations and the macro-structures of power eventually result in micro-organizations losing control over their own resources and their own destiny.

The direction of these articulations depends to a great extent on the ideology of the state. Within the context of authoritarian and anti-democratic political processes, public resources are distributed with strings attached. They are aimed at inducing the recipient communities to adopt particular types of behaviour or perform actions which the state considers convenient for the established social and political order. In the case of a merely representative democracy, the allocation of public resources occurs within policies of social reform integral to an ideological perspective which also conditions the functioning of micro-organizations and of social movements, thus undermining their capacity for autonomy and self-reliance. However, it is obvious that a representative democracy presents more favourable conditions for the co-existence of multiple socio-cultural identities than authoritarianism does. In any case, democratic political activity, together with an economic system which allocates resources according to the real needs of the different social groups, is an indispensable requirement for the propagation of Human Scale Development.
In implementing concrete policies aimed at Human Scale Development in Latin America, a decisive step is the strengthening of local organizations that operate with an anti-authoritarian rationale (solidary, synergic, participatory) and increasing self-reliance. If such ‘organizational embryos’ can be strengthened, it will be possible to lessen the risk of cooptation of the micro by the macro, and increase the permeability of the macro by the micro. A policy that promotes resources for local development (which implies decentralization and participation) and from the local organizations, is the cornerstone of structural transformation 'from the bottom upwards'.

To this end it is necessary to examine the problem of resources within small economic organizations, to evaluate critically the conventional concepts of resources, to seek alternative ways of mobilizing financial resources, and above all, to consider the importance of non-conventional resources for local development and, in particular, for the development of small economic organizations.

When analysing a productive unit in order to evaluate its efficiency and its method of organization, the orthodox paradigm of economic theory, based on the concept of production functions, advocates that the flow of production, during a given period of time, depends (among other things) on the stock of capital and on the use of a certain amount of work, both combined in a given proportion. From this it follows that both work and capital are mere factors of production: that is to say, inputs for the productive process. Within such a perspective nothing, in a formal sense, makes a machine different from human work. which is purchased in the market just as other goods are, since it has a price (wages) and is subject to the free play of supply and demand.

Economic theory's primitive interpretation of work and capital as homogeneous, was superceded by the so-called 'Controversy of Capital' or 'Cambridge Controversy'. The idea of homogeneity was transcended by the 'Theory of Human Capital'. Yet, in the new version, human work appears restricted to the process of accruing capital through investments in education and training. Apart from being objectionable on ethical grounds, this theory contains a conceptual sophism by virtue of which the workers appear, to a certain extent, as capitalists.

Over and above this reductionism, these notions omit a set of resources that are work-related and which historical experience compels us to consider. Work constitutes much more than a factor of production: it fosters cre-
Activity, mobilizes social energy, preserves communal identity, deploys solidarity, and utilizes organizational experience and popular knowledge for the satisfaction of individual and collective needs. Work has, then, a qualitative dimension which cannot be accounted for either by instrumental models of analysis or by economic manipulations of production functions.

Within the framework of the current crisis the qualitative dimension of work becomes all the more evident in those activities which are undertaken by many micro-organizations. They are intangible elements which are not measurable or definable in units comparable with those used for the conventional factors of production. Linked to a broader concept of work, these resources have a decisive role in compensating the scarcity of capital with qualitative elements for the increase of productivity. Understood as a force which mobilizes social potentialities, work, more than just a resource, is a generator of resources.

A reconceptualization of resources—work included—is both necessary and viable. It enables us to overcome one-dimensional views which tend to subordinate development to the exclusive logic of capital.

The new concepts, to which we have made reference, and the choice of alternatives for generating resources, require two fundamental aspects to be considered. Both will be examined in the following sections. The first is related to non-conventional resources, and, the second, to financial alternatives for local development.

Non-conventional resources

Non-conventional resources are important not only for the survival of micro-organizations, but also for the constitution and development of social movements in different countries of Latin America. We find examples in the Popular Economic Organizations in Chile (PEO), in the grass-roots Christian communities of Brazil, in the organizations of squatter settlements in Peru, in youth and women’s movements, native peoples associations, ecological groups and so forth.

Analogous organizations exist in all the countries of the region, and are made up of people who have decided to muster their energies to share the task of satisfying their fundamental needs through the construction of collective life projects.

There are many cases of micro-organizations, that are created not only to overcome the absence of work opportunities in the more modern sectors
of the economy, but also to come up with deliberate alternatives both to alienation and to the hierarchical organization of work, dictated by capitalism, in factories, offices and in other organized services. A good number of these organizations not only devote themselves to economic activities which guarantee their self-reproduction, but also promote social, cultural and recreational activities. Production and marketing of goods and services is complemented with activities such as communal house-building projects, organic farming in small family plots, cooking community meals in 'common pots', collective purchasing, popular theatre, and others.

### Beyond economic resources

The resources that such movements and organizations avail themselves of is not limited to those which are conventionally understood as economic resources. While the latter are restricted to work, with its different characteristics, and capital, other possible resources are:

1. Social awareness;
2. Organizational know-how and managerial ability;
3. Popular creativity;
4. Solidarity and ability to provide mutual aid;
5. Expertise and training provided by supporting agencies;
6. Dedication and commitment from internal and external agents.

It is necessary to stress a very special peculiarity which distinguishes conventional from non-conventional resources. While the former are depleted when used, the latter are lost only to the extent to which they are not used. For instance, power which is relinquished is power that is lost, money that is given is money we no longer have, whereas solidarity which is shared with others is solidarity that grows, knowledge that is transmitted is knowledge that expands itself.

Non-conventional resources enable development to take place that goes far beyond the notion of accumulation (while including it), since it is also based on the acquisition of practical knowledge generated by the community itself. Such an accumulation of knowledge expands, in turn, the potentiality of the resources themselves. Another distinctive trait of these resources, and one which reverses the usual economistic perspectives, is that unlike conventional economic resources which are characterized by scarcity, non-conventional resources are plentiful. They also have a tremendous capacity to preserve and transform social energy for processes of deep change.
The use of non-conventional resources, such as those listed above, not only stimulate self-reliance but also ensure a better performance of conventional resources, especially of capital. This is illustrated by the experience of many local projects undertaken in Latin America with the support of international organizations. Unfortunately, a great number of projects which have all the necessary financial support, vanish into thin air because of their inability to motivate people and to arouse the endogeneous potential of the groups that they intend to benefit. Hence, any conventional resource which is not supported in the community by a 'will to be' and a 'will to do'—that is to say, by the emergence of non-conventional resources which the community decides to mobilize—will end up collapsing.

This reconceptualization of resources not only widens the options that are possible in matters of policies and planning, but it also underlines the fact that the main agent of transformation is the capacity of the human being to activate his or her sensitivity, imagination, volition and intellectual talent in an effort that extends itself from personal development to social development, and, thereby, generates a process of integration of the individual and the collective. It is precisely this synergetic capacity of non-conventional resources which make them indispensable for Human Scale Development. And it is because of their historical and cultural dimension that a policy of using non-conventional resources is much more than an economic policy.

These resources will be important instruments for transformation, when they are rooted in the communities and 'stored' in their historical and cultural tradition. It is the community which can enhance these resources and make the use of them viable because they are inherent in it. Thus, the strengthening of non-conventional resources also involves the strengthening of community participation and of self-reliance.

To the non-conventional resources mentioned we may add other analogous ones which flow from historical-anthropological contexts as well as the social structures, which includes social networks, collective memory, cultural identity and world views.

Any alternative that aims to achieve Human Scale Development will necessarily entail a policy of activating non-conventional resources. This forces us to meet a great ideological challenge, namely, to advance along the lines of:

1. Identifying and making use of favourable historical circumstances in order to multiply the initiatives which civil society creates to manage the available resources in a new way.
2. Identifying and broadening those social spaces which contain a greater potential in terms of non-conventional resources.
3. Identifying and motivating social actors capable of using these resources for structural changes conducive to Human Scale Development.

Alternatives for local financing

The conventional financial system has neither adjusted itself to promote local development, nor provided any support to alternative experiences of economic organization. This is part of a political context which needs to be critically reviewed. This review is all the more important when we become aware of the economic crisis which the countries of the region are undergoing. Stabilization policies aimed at solving the problems of internal imbalances and external indebtedness were undermined by irresponsible lending by the international system of private finance, by the powerful economic groups and the state. Far from helping our countries to develop, these processes precipitated a profound economic and social crisis which has no precedent in the history of Latin America. A fact that should not be overlooked is that channelling huge funds to both the powerful economic groups and the state reinforced a crisis which further impoverished all those sectors which have traditionally been excluded, in social, economic, and political terms, from the historical process of economic expansion.

One of the main problems in relation to local financing is the abnormal enlargement and centralization of the state in Latin America. More resources would be available to promote self-reliance of local spaces, in many countries of the region, if tax, monetary and financial reforms were undertaken. This would allow public and private resources to be related more directly to local needs and to the less favoured groups in the population. The discussion about decentralization versus centralization acquires, then, great significance for Human Scale Development. In this manner, the role of the state is redefined as an allocator of resources to favour development geared to strengthening local spaces.

The financial institutions that may be concerned with local financing of Human Scale Development must state goals and forms of operation going far beyond conventional principles. In the first place these institutions must promote local creativity and support community initiatives which are organized through solidary, horizontal and equitable relationships. Secondly, they must encourage the greatest possible circulation of money at the local level. This means attracting locally generated surpluses and making them circulate as many times as possible within the local space, thus increasing
the multiplier effect of a given level of deposits and savings. Thirdly, these institutions must adjust themselves so that the savers, or the generators of surpluses, may decide on the use of their resources, thus allowing for a greater transparency in the relationship between saver and investor, that may, in turn, promote greater participation in activities devoted to making development alternatives in the local space more viable. Fourthly, these financial institutions must be managed in a cooperative way by people in the community itself, which means that the management should also be local in origin. Finally, if the local financial institution is to gain credibility it must be protected against any potential liquidity crisis. This protection could be provided by an organization such as a Central Bank or any other sound public banking agency.

In terms of the above, it is necessary that the banking system in Latin America should adopt a new orientation which may broaden its concept of funding. In this way, it could overcome restrictive practices, doing away with the conservative barriers which demand guarantees in property or collateral as an indispensable condition of any loans granted.

Without reducing their autonomy, local banks should also be related to the national and international financial systems. With regard to the latter, one could think of creating a Latin American regional bank, the primary function of which would be to support local financing. Such a bank, regional in character, could be conceived as a cooperative institution composed of local banks.

Another form of local financing, is so-called barefoot banking. This is a mechanism which is generally connected with some official financial institution. Its objective is that of allocating resources to activities undertaken by local groups which, otherwise, would have no access to funding from any other banking institution, either public or private. The system has many variations but, in general, it operates through the identification of investment opportunities, carried out by specially trained people who live within the community. Such agents choose activities according to their suitability to local conditions and their potential for development. In these cases, support is adapted to the real possibilities of the local project, instead of the project having to adapt itself to exigencies of the financial market.

Local financing also requires that the funding institution itself (or any other public or private agency) should provide, if necessary, technical support to organize and undertake projects which will avail themselves of the econ-
omic opportunities to be found in the local space. This requirement should not be understood as a formal one, but as an instrument to enable the viability of the effort to be assessed and to improve external support.

In the case of the Grameen Bank Project in Bangladesh, the loans generated savings, which is fairly unusual. What usually happens is the opposite, namely, that savings generate credit. The relation between savings and loans has been the subject of new proposals in recent reports. It has been advocated—in the light of the problems faced by the poorer communities seeking alternative forms of development—that the mobilization of savings, combined with loans at the local level, is one of the most important means to promote the development of the community. On the other hand, there are experiences that show that the informal sector has a great potential for generating savings and that this potential has scarcely been explored.

The savings institutions in the local spaces emerge, then, as important agencies for the support of alternative experiences, particularly if they are cooperative and restrict themselves to small geographical spaces, thus taking up the role of popular banks. In order to give greater consistency to local development, these institutions must also: (i) have a decentralized structure; (ii) relate, in the closest possible way, the generation of savings to local credit needs; and (iii) overcome or find alternative ways of meeting the usual demands of guarantees for granting credit.

**Autonomy and macro-policies**

It is essential to design policies to support the development of the invisible sectors by means of training programmes, credit and technical assistance to small producers, favouring in particular those micro-organizations which are capable of deciding on and managing their projects by themselves in a collective and solidary manner.

Likewise, training programmes, credit and technical assistance must have the fundamental objective of increasing the capacity of micro-organizations and community groups to exercise control over the goods and services required to reduce poverty, enhance the quality of life and improve habitat and environment, thus stimulating self-reliance in the communities, municipalities and regions.

It would also be appropriate to encourage the application of development strategies which acknowledge and respect the diversity of realities and of forms of organization which characterize Latin America at the local, regional and national levels and, thus, transform diversity into a promotor of
development. This must involve a systematic effort to deconcentrate political power so that it can be exercised in a more egalitarian way in the different domains of society, thus ensuring adequate consideration of local and regional interests.

Finally, there is an urgent need to research ways of fundamentally restructuring the financial and banking systems within our countries, in such a way that they contribute to development not only in global terms, but also specifically in the regional, municipal and community spaces, giving special emphasis to the potential for self-reliance in local organizations. In this connection, we must consider the creation of local banks (not branches of national banks) that stimulate community savings and the circulation of surpluses inside the communities which generate them.
XI The Unresolved Problem of Micro-macro Articulation

**Seeking solutions**

The problem of micro-macro articulation remains to be resolved within economic theory, and in development policies as well. Indeed, a satisfactory solution is still a long way off. It is, therefore, legitimate to wonder whether it is in fact a real problem and, if so, whether it has a solution. In considering this question, it is important to be aware that the history of economic theory has itself been a history of options rather than solutions.

**The ebb and flow of economic theory**

The first 'world view' of economics as a discipline as such, mercantilism, was a macro-economic view. The aftermath of the crisis of mercantilism determined that the three ensuing economic revolutions represented in succession by the physiocrats, the classical school and the neo-classical school should correspond to micro-economic views, the differences among them being, in the main, determined by diverging criteria as to the notion of value.* The fourth revolution, Keynesianism, again envisaged economics as macro-economics, and gave rise, among many other contributions which are difficult to discard, to the notion of aggregate indicators.

Post-Keynesians, neo-Keynesians and present-day monetarists, no matter how much they endeavour to rid themselves of their immediate past, are still dwelling in the macro-economic abode that Keynes erected. But the very crisis itself once again restates the dilemma: Is economics mainly micro-economics or macro-economics? In all likelihood an answer does not exist. It is quite possible that after nearly 400 years we may well conclude that the problem lies not in the fact that we have not found an answer, but that we have been unable to pose the question properly.

The theories, policies, strategies and development styles which sprouted in the aftermath of the Second World War have been influenced or even determined by the prevailing economic theory. If it has been macro-economic in scope, development has also been understood as macro-development, and the preferred indicators for development have been the aggregate indicators of Keynesian macro-economics. The problem of micro-macro articulation, unresolved by economic theory, has therefore not met with a visible solution in development processes either.

**The problem of aggregation**

The bewilderment which characterizes the current situation becomes overt in the somewhat extreme debates and stands taken on the different approaches. On the one hand, the economists from the neo-Austrian school,

* The neo-classicists work with macro concepts which, however, are based on rather naive postulates.
committed to 'methodological individualism', hold that every type of behaviour can only be understood in individual terms and that, consequently, there are no collective entities such as communities, societies and governments whose attributes are different from those of individuals. With the revival of 'homo economicus', who acts rationally by resorting to the most efficient means to attain his goals, it is concluded that the new economic theory should restrict itself specifically to the only real and concrete level, that is, the micro-economic level.

On the other hand, we come upon arguments that warrant the existence of both levels as real entities. Such arguments stem from paradoxical findings sustained both in empirical evidence as well as in mathematical demonstrations. In this sense, examples are offered to show that what each individual pursues as the best for himself can, at the aggregate level, result in a situation that nobody desires. From such evidence it is concluded that individual decisions cannot be aggregated with the purpose of constructing a meaningful totality. Over and beyond a given critical threshold, the aggregate consequences may eventually fully negate the individual intentions.

Without purporting to come up with an eclectic solution, it is necessary to acknowledge, in our opinion, that there exist sound and persuasive elements in the two arguments that we have chosen as extreme examples. It seems sensible to admit, on the one hand, that observable and understandable behaviour does in fact occur at the level of the individual, that is to say, at the micro level. In much the same way we would have to accept the factual existence of macro situations, which does not mean, however, that it is possible to speak of macro behaviour.

A more suitable approach might be to suggest a dialectic interaction between macro states and individual behaviours, in such a way that, even though they exert a reciprocal influence on each other, neither can be predicted mechanically merely by observing its counterpart. In other words, what we advocate is that a given macro state (political, economic, environmental, etc.) should exert an influence on individual behaviour, and that the latter, in turn, should bring about changes in macro states. Since human systems are not mechanical, the non-linear interactions between the micro elements of a system may give rise to various macro states which reflect the interactions at the micro level.

The impossibility of making mechanical predictions about human systems compels us to devote energy to dealing with such notions as instability, chance, uncertainty, choice, thresholds of different types, and catastrophes.
From all that has been suggested it is only possible to arrive at the conclusion that, even though there exists between the micro and the macro an indissoluble relation, it is none the less true that it in no way involves an articulation.* Thus we are confronted with two fundamental questions, namely: (1) what would the micro-macro articulation in itself be? and (2) is it really possible to achieve it?

**Micro-macro articulation**

By articulation we mean, in this case, that global processes and self-reliant micro-spatial processes complement each other effectively *without there being a cooptation of the micro by the macro*. This vertical complementarity is also seen in conjunction with a horizontal complementarity between the various micro spaces so that processes of socio-cultural identity, political autonomy and economic self-reliance are enabled to empower and reinforce each other.

The above is by no means a definition. We are fully aware that it is, rather, a picture of 'what ought to be'. In this sense, it does not represent the situation of observable Latin American reality. Furthermore, on the basis of accumulated evidence, we can only conclude that true micro-macro articulation is not possible within the economic systems that currently predominate in our countries. This conclusion is somewhat drastic, but we consider it very difficult to confute.

Any possible articulation goes far beyond the causalities and mechanistic assumptions underlying both economic theory and the development strategies applied so far. It necessarily and inevitably involves a deep transformation in the modes of social behaviour and interaction. It requires, in practice, the transformation of the person-object into a person-subject and, in theoretical terms that the competitive rationale of maximizing be replaced by the solidary rationale of optimizing. In other words, that the 'homo economicus' be replaced by the 'homo synergicus'.

**Articulation, protagonists and flexibility**

An articulated society does not arise mechanically; it is constructed. It can only be constructed when people act as protagonists, and this can only take place in human scale spaces, where the person has a real presence and is not reduced to a statistical abstraction. The process must be organized from the bottom upwards, but promoted by people who have made the conscious decision to act synergically. The programme is not simple, but however complex it may be, we envisage no alternative.

* Every articulation among elements is a relation, but not every relation is an articulation. See footnote in Chapter I, page 13.
What has been suggested becomes possible when a social system capable of developing its capacity for adaptation is constructed: a system in which innovation, novelty and qualitative change are organic, even though these may be unforeseeable and unpredictable. In this sense it is necessary to keep in mind that the capacity for adaptation of a system is inversely proportional to the degree of rigidity of its structure. These rigidities should be understood either as fossilized hierarchies, marked social inequalities, authoritarianism or inert bureaucracies. Therefore, real 'protagonism' and interdependence, built from the grass-roots upwards to its superstructure, represent the only possibility of preserving a flexible structure, capable of adapting itself.

The Latin American panorama reveals a set of deeply disarticulated societies. Even in past periods, in which countries displayed and sustained high rates of growth of their GNP, the disarticulation remained unsolved. However, the most sustained of all rates of growth, is the poverties (as defined within this document) in which the great majorities on this continent struggle.

Many reasons have been offered to account for this dramatic contradiction. It is not our aim to refute any of those arguments. We only wish to add another argument, which has so far received very little attention. We state it in terms of a hypothesis: every a priori direction imposed upon a disarticulated socio-economic system, further inhibits its possibilities of articulation. Stated in other words: it is not the imposed direction which will achieve articulation, but, on the contrary, it will be articulation that determines the most desirable direction.

If the current conditions are taken into account, there is hardly any sense in 'forcing' the direction of a system. The priority is clear. What is required is to channel all efforts into bringing the parts of the system together into a coherent articulated whole. Only an articulated system can aspire to be a healthy system. And only a healthy system can aspire to self-reliance, to meeting the needs and fulfilling the potential of people.
Challenges and alternatives

Human Scale Development, geared to the satisfaction of human needs, attains through self-reliance its true and irreducible value. At a practical level, opting for this kind of development requires, as an initial impulse, a policy for mobilizing civil society. In order to promote structural changes, the mobilization must meet two challenges: firstly, it must stimulate the use of non-conventional resources in setting up collective life projects aimed at achieving self-reliance and the actualization of human needs; secondly, it must support and strengthen local development initiatives so that their influence overcomes spatial limitations and contributes to the construction of a new hegemony in the national domain. If the different local micro-spatial practices are to become a new social reality, they must be articulated within a project that calls for global development. Hence, the decisive political importance of the micro-macro articulation. The fundamental issue is to enable people from their many small and heterogeneous spaces, to set up, sustain and develop their own projects.

The existing political structures are faced with the challenge of recognizing and regaining the wealth of dynamism contained in the social movements of the invisible world, in order to integrate them as significant, rather than residual, protagonists in a new project for society. In the present circumstances, owing to factors such as economic and social marginalization and the inefficiency of conventional political practices, we witness with increasing frequency responses of social struggle which do not match the traditional patterns of political activity. A willingness to set up groups and organizations with informal non-bureaucratic structures, to participate in collective forms of decision-making and to be pragmatic rather than ideological in setting objectives, are traits which political institutions seeking to redefine themselves should take into account. Such a redefinition compels these institutions to develop mechanisms for sharing in decision-making, to combine ideological and strategical requirements with those of a more practical and ethical nature and to engage in a revitalized dialogue expressed in terms of needs felt and mobilized by the communities themselves.

Articulation without cooption

A critical problem is that of the size of an organization, since this is not unrelated to the system of values which can be generated within it. Smaller organizations have the scope to develop internal horizontal relationships of greater solidarity and less constrained by ideology. However, they lack the capacity to promote global alternatives. Within this context, the central problem for the development alternative we seek, is how to build up the movement but avoid bureaucratization or, to put it another way, how to achieve articulation without cooption. This challenge is unresolved, and can only be solved through the interaction between social theory and praxis.
If the problem is not dealt with, Human Scale Development will be restricted to a mechanism that favours people in the micro-social spaces, thus perpetuating in the larger spaces an order that excludes the mass of the people and, eventually, reduces this alternative to a mere idea which cannot be put into practice more widely.

Only a development style that aims to satisfy human needs can take up the postponed challenge to stimulate the growth of all men and women, and of their entire personalities. Only increasing self-reliance in the different spaces and domains can give root to such development on the Latin American continent. Only absolute respect for the diversity of the many worlds that make up the wide world of Latin America, will ensure that autonomous development is not restricted to the realm of utopia. Only the articulation of these diversities in a democratic project, committed to deconcentration and decentralization of political power can release the combined energies needed to bring about development which is truly designed for human beings.

Annex

Project management and participants

*Permanent project management:* Manfred Max-Neef, project director; Antonio Eli-zalde, assistant director; Martín Hopenhayn, principal researcher; Felipe Herrera, principal adviser.

*Coordinators of workshops and final seminar:* Hugo Zemelman, first workshop, Viçuña, Chile; Jorge Jatobá, second workshop, Garanhuns, Brazil; Luis Weinstein, third workshop, Punta Arenas, Chile; Sven Hamrcll and Olle Nordberg, final evaluation seminar, Uppsala, Sweden.

*Permanent participants in the workshops:* Jorge Dandler, Bolivia; Rocío Grediaga, Mexico; Sven Hamrell, Sweden; Claudio Herrera, Chile; Jesús Martínez, Colombia; Luis Razeto, Chile.

*First workshop:* 'Work, Unemployment and the Invisible Sectors', Viçuña, Chile, April 23–May 1, 1985, organized in cooperation with the University of La Serena. Specially invited for this workshop were Gastón Guzman and, as representatives of the University, Geraldo Brown, Eduardo Stavelot, Guillermo Urrutia and Patricio Vergara.

*Second workshop:* 'Alternative Generation of Resources for Local Development', Garanhuns, Brazil, July 30–August 5, 1985, organized in cooperation with the Federal University of Pernambuco. Specially invited were Dom Helder Camara, Arch-
third workshop: 'Human Needs, Scale and Efficiency', Punta Arenas, Chile, October 29–November 5, 1985, organized in cooperation with the Foundation for Development of the Twelfth Region (FIDE XII). Specially invited were Christian Bay, Gonzalo de Freitas, Cecilia Paredes, Ricardo Troncoso and Ingrid Viviani and, as representatives of FIDE XII, Pedro Hernández, Roberto Mayorga, Carlos Mladinic, Manuel Rodriguez and Enrique Zamora.

Final evaluation seminar: 'Human Scale Development', Uppsala, Sweden, June 26–28, 1986 at the Dag Hammarskjöld Centre. Specially invited were: Fernando Calderón, CLACSO (Argentina), Pedro Demo (Brazil), Emilio de la Fuente, ICI (Spain), Franz Hinkelammert (Costa Rica), Weine Karlsson (Sweden), Ernst Michanek (Sweden), Daniel Moore (Sweden), Stina Mossberg, SIDA (Sweden), Alexandrina de Moura (Brazil), Alberto Palacios-Hardy, CIDA (Canada), Elmer Römpczyk, Friedrich Ebert Foundation (West Germany), Francisco de Roux (Colombia), Reiulf Steen (Norway), Inez Vargas (Norway), Humberto Vega (Chile).

No less than 34 papers were prepared by different contributors as inputs to the project. They are only available in Spanish and a list of authors and titles can be obtained from CEPAUR, Casilla 27.001, Santiago 27, Chile. It should, however, be added that a report by Professor Jorge Jatobá on the discussions at the Garanhuns workshop was published in Development Dialogue (1987:1) under the title 'Alternative Resources for Grassroots Development'.

bishop Emeritus of Olinda and Recife, Carlos Aveline and Ricardo Infante and, as representatives of the University, Tarcisio Araújo, Frederico Katz, Carlos Osorio and Aldemir Souza. In addition, Mauricio Camurca represented the United Nations and Walter Piedade Denser the Brazilian 'Fundo de Desenvolvimento de Programas Cooperativos ou Comunitarios de Infraestructuras Rurais' (FUNDEC).
DESEARROLLO A ESCALA HUMANA
una opción para el futuro

Cepaur
Fundación Dag Hammarskjöld
A Very Private Public Servant

By Robin V. Sears

Bernt Carlsson, Assistant-Secretary-General of the United Nations and UN Commissioner for Namibia since 1987, was one of the 259 victims when the Pan Am Boeing 747 was exploded by an ingenious terrorist device over the village of Lockerbie in Scotland on December 21, 1988. At the age of fifty, he was on his way to participate in the signing of the agreement launching the independence process for Namibia. For Bernt Carlsson, the ceremony would have marked the achievement of a goal for which he had fought since his student days at the University of Stockholm.

For well over twenty years prior to his death, Bernt Carlsson had worked closely with Olof Palme, Sten Andersson and Pierre Schori in the Swedish Social Democratic Party, serving inter alia as its International Secretary from 1970 to 1976. In the latter year, he became Secretary-General of the Socialist International and editor of its journal Socialist Affairs. He remained in this position up to 1983 and it brought him into contact with European socialist leaders like Willy Brandt, Francois Mitterand, Bruno Kreisky and Felipe Gonzalez. These were important years for the Socialist International. It was greatly strengthened by Bernt Carlsson’s constant efforts to interest socialist parties and movements in Africa, the Arab world, Asia and Latin America in its work and by his untriring efforts to assist and channel funds to, for instance, the democratic movements in Central America and the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

It was therefore only natural that Bernt Carlsson should accept the offer to become United Nations Commissioner for Namibia in 1987, having served from 1983 to 1985 as an ambassador in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and as Under-Secretary of State for Nordic Affairs from 1985 to 1987.

As a tribute to Bernt Carlsson as a man who served the United Nations in the tradition of Folke Bernadotte, Dag Hammarskjöld and Olof Palme, we are publishing this appreciation of him as ‘A Very Private Public Servant’ by his Canadian colleague in the Secretariat of the Socialist International, Robin V. Sears, who is now Principal Secretary to the Leader of the Official Opposition in Toronto.

They sat in a large flashy bar in a European capital, full of diplomats and their retinues. A friend, an innocent from a less complicated world, had just returned to his own table, from a delightful encounter with a charming young ‘lawyer’ in a quiet corner of the room. But before he could finish regaling his friend with his glowing report of the encounter, he was interrupted.

‘But you know who she is don’t you? A secret representative of the Tupamaro guerrillas in Europe, and an employee of those people’, pointing
to some local retainers of a large intelligence agency. Then he roared with raucous laughter at the shocked dismay and embarrassment he had caused.

That was part of the Bernt Carlsson that was usually well hidden. Others have paid more formal homage to his important political and diplomatic achievements. But as a fascinating and complex human being he was little known. These thoughts are an attempt to reveal some of the joys of knowing Bernt Carlsson.

We stood on the beach outside the Tel Aviv Hilton watching the teenagers at play, having just returned by helicopter from the devastated battle zones in Lebanon. More in wonder than in anger he said, 'How can they be so unaffected by the horrors. It's only a few minutes from there. 'The contradictions of political life didn't sit easily with him.

He had just come back from overseeing the despatch to burial in another country of his friend Isam Sartawi, assassinated the day before—ashen and grey with grief and anger. 'And they will never pay...', he muttered.

Sitting in the umpteenth airport departure lounge that month, he whispered breathlessly about the break-in at the squalid little apartment he rarely saw. 'They messed things up and pawed through my papers. Then just to make sure I knew it wasn't a simple burglary they piled my money in the centre of the living-room rug.' South African goons were active in London at the
time, and some had a bizarre sense of humour. 'But don't talk about it, and I'm not going to report it. That would just give the bastards their little victory.'

He was a silent and serious, cool, almost secretive man in public. He was a talkative, funny and sardonic man in private. Behind the façade of a grey Swedish bureaucrat, who could sit stonefaced for hours of interminable committee and congress speeches, there was an emotional, sensuous, almost libertarian spirit.

Bernt Carlsson was one of those incredible Nordic Social Democrats, who have given so much to the world—including their lives—on behalf of those without voice, or power, or privilege and with little public recognition. He would work for forty or fifty days without pause and then have time and energy to laugh and celebrate a friend's release from prison, or a blow to some enemy.

He was a cliché—driving those around him hard, and himself harder; repressing his needs and emotions and indulging those of colleagues; furious frequently, unpredictable sometimes, disorganized often, and irrepressible always. But what the world could do with a few more such clichés.

From a modest family background and one with firm moral and philosophic disciplines, he doggedly moved up first the Swedish and then the international political and diplomatic ladder. His tortoise’s demeanour surprised some of the hares around him, as he emerged at the finish line unruffled and with the hint of a smile.

His father taught him to revere the French revolution as the beginning of modern social progress—a view which horrified the family he billeted with during a year at college in America. His mother, and her father, taught him to work for the preservation of the planet and everything on it.

He was tough and courageous, in that quiet way that embarrasses Swedes to have discussed, but is a beacon for others. Reviewing security measures, he coolly assessed risks and then most often ignored them.

Passing through another sloppy search at an airport Bernt would snap, 'Chaos, total chaos'—an English word he invented and loved, used to describe the chaotic people in his life. Then he would return to a regular subject—the likelihood of his dying in a plane. 'I spend most of my life in them, so it makes sense, doesn't it.'
Bernt had hundreds of political contacts and acquaintances he kept in touch with—remembering their political likes and dislikes, lovers and enemies, with sardonic irreverence. He had many friends in many places, but their names and positions were often sensitive, so they were friendships conducted in private and sporadically.

A late night phone call, followed by a taxi’s emergence from the dark, was often the only warning one had of his arrival from some obscure corner of the world. ‘Those idiots who say the world is getting smaller are wrong, it’s still huge and impossible to visit or understand in all its variety in one life’, he would tell everyone—and then charge off to visit another small part of it, constantly in motion.

He was no ascetic, but his private life was private. When queried as to what the hell he was doing in Kuala Lumpur—or a similar unscheduled stop—he would respond curtly that he was ‘visiting a friend’. These brief, infrequent, encounters were all that sustained his relationships. One learned not to inquire about the addition of prominent women activists to the mailing list.

Life offers few occasions finer than an elegant meal, with heated debate among fascinating friends, far away from one’s own world. While others drank, Bernt would inhale course after course of haute cuisine with the same enthusiasm as he attacked airplane food.

The Swedish Social Democratic Party, the Socialist International—both its member parties and the labour movement it was part of—and the family of United Nations organizations: these were the institutions to which he devoted his life, though he was a tough private critic of the inadequacies of each of them. Southern Africa, Central America, and the Middle East were the places and their people he worked hardest for. Environmental salvation and ‘the nuclear weapons stupidity’ were his private crusades.

He loved Canada and was a frequent visitor, commenting on how similar the challenges facing his own country and Canada were—from a new multi-ethnic society, to preserving a distinctive identity in the face of larger neighbours, to maintaining employment growth without further damaging the environment. He knew the trade union movement and parties of Canada and the United States intimately—attending conventions of the Steelworkers, the Autoworkers, Canadian New Democrats, and American Democrats frequently.

For the six years as International Secretary of his party, seven years as
Secretary-General of the SI, and then as the senior UN official responsible for Namibia, he worked quietly through the years on channelling money and political support to the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa. He would meet with officials and activists of the liberation movements and take their demands and messages to friends and contacts in the governments of the United States, the European Community, the Soviet Union and the Third World.

For many years it seemed a quixotic commitment—marginal people fighting a hopeless cause in the face of huge armies. For long periods, even in the progressive circles in which he moved, it was not a fashionable cause. Friends disappeared, movements were becalmed, internal divisions caused great pain, but Bernt was rarely depressed, and never pessimistic about who would win. He shared the optimism and determination of Palme, Mandela and Brandt, of Toivo and Tambo and Nujoma.

A little test offered to new acquaintances was the question, casually placed, almost a non sequitur, 'So, what do you think about the situation in Southern Africa?' Those who shared his vision in their answers went on a special mental list.

By professional discipline he had often to defend, uncomfortably, institutional orthodoxy, but he was about many things a private heretic. He chaffed at the posturing and stalemate on nuclear disarmament for the long cold years; reading, writing and maintaining contacts at Foggy Bottom, in academe and in the Soviet military.

To editors he would nervously submit articles offering the most startlingly radical prescriptions for arms reduction and abolition. But even here he was an iconoclast—pointing out that a world free of nuclear weapons was not certainly a safer world or one automatically blessed with slashed arms budgets. No soldiers would be retired, and no new schools would be built, he would hammer didactically, unless tools to deal with the causes of military spending were found.

He searched in vain for a new and positive challenge as powerfully seductive to scientists as strategic defense weaponry. He believed that if none were found the tens of thousands of careers built on meeting tough scientific challenges would inevitably plunge into Star Wars madness.

Long before the Ortegas were known to the world, before White House staffers knew where precisely San Salvador was, and when it was still
conventional wisdom that Cuba’s was the last revolution in Latin America, Bernt was introducing the political activists of those struggles to political friends in Europe. Early on he offended some by helping to push the Sandinistas and the FDR and others on to the world political stage; later he offended others with his criticism of the paths pursued by his friends in Central America. But no one challenged his integrity.

Respectful of science and in awe of many scientific achievements, he was caustic about the irresponsible use of many of its works. No one could believe he was serious when he stormed around an enormous Madrid congress hall demanding that the staff stop using dozens of spray deodorant cans to fumigate the room, and giving them a heated lecture on fluorocarbons and ozone—but he was.

Thanks to acquaintance with an obscure British scientist more than six years ago he began to campaign quietly with friends about the risk of the earth becoming a giant greenhouse—to the bemusement of skeptical friends.

He spent many months, hundreds of hours, over many hundreds of heavily sugared cups of coffee, pursuing the labyrinthine paths of middle eastern politics. He loved to confound neighbours in a departure lounge with the mysteries of Druse religious ritual, or ask international specialists what importance they granted Pashtooni national aspirations.

Behind a mask of diplomatic indifference there was a powerful intellect, a prodigious memory and an enthusiastic curiosity. His office was that of a human magpie, piled high with paper and ephemera from all over the world, carefully annotated with indecipherable scratchings in heavy black ink. Memos would arrive, apropos of nothing one could recall having discussed, demanding action.

A parcel would arrive containing a baffling mélange of minutes and speech excerpts, and news commentaries and a compliments slip. No letter, no explanation and no obvious thread connecting the bits and pieces. But slowly, following careful inspection, a picture of a bureaucratic war waged and won, or an enemy knocked down a few pegs, would emerge. For all of his carelessness about personal security, he was manic about document and project security.

History will not record his work for democratic activists in Eastern Europe long before Solidarity, the sums he quietly funnelled to offices in Lusaka, and Dar and Harare, the political legitimacy and protection he helped
extend to Palestinian moderates, the prisoners who escaped their torturers following a deluge of hundreds of Bernt’s telexes over months and years, the men and women he charged with a sense of mission and optimism about his struggles and vision.

But the legacy is real and the achievements important. He loved to be a part of those battles and sacrificed opportunities of family and wealth to stay close to them. He fought to stay on a stage where he could effectively challenge oppression. Though he railed against the 'river of words pouring into a desert of inaction' that often poured from that stage.

Bernt spent much of his life quietly reading one of his collection of a dozen newspapers in several languages, plucked from a shopping bag full at his feet as jet engines droned in his ear, sipping the latest of several glasses of orange juice and cups of coffee.

He always ordered the same thing, on planes and in restaurants, saying with what he thought was great wit, 'Together… but not mixed, please', to the bemused waiter or flight attendant.

One can imagine him peering into the recesses of one of his collection of enormous battered briefcases arrayed around him on aeroplane seats, then extracting a pile of obscure UN sub-committee minutes or an unknown policy journal, planning to read for hours.

Bernt was on his way to participate in the signing ceremony launching the beginning of liberation in Namibia in New York the next day. It was the culmination of years of work and in some ways a personal vindication.

But Flight 103 was to be different. Just minutes after take-off a saboteur's bomb exploded in the hold.

He died instantly, along with 258 others.
The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-participants

By William Minter

This report, based on recent interviews with 32 ex-participants in the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo), describes the operations of this guerrilla group and its linkages with the South African Defence Force. The interviews provide compelling new evidence for two major conclusions: (1) A high proportion of the Renamo rank-and-file combatants, probably in excess of 90 percent, is recruited by force, and kept in the Renamo ranks by control mechanisms including threats of execution for attempted desertion. (2) The professionally competent Renamo military operations are sustained by regular supplies from South Africa as well as by a centralized system of command, control and communications (C 3) and a coordinated programme of basic and advanced military training.

During a seven-week research trip in November and December 1988, William Minter carried out the interviews individually, out of hearing and sight of officials. Half of those interviewed had accepted the amnesty offer of the Mozambican government, the other half were prisoners captured in battle. Of the 32 interviews, nine were in Maputo, ten in Chimoio in central Mozambique, and thirteen in Zambezia province, ensuring representation of Mozambique’s three major geographical zones. The interviews averaged 45 minutes to an hour. All but two were in Portuguese. The respondents clearly distinguished their own direct observations, what they had heard from other Renamo combatants, and questions that they lacked information to answer.

The average age of the interviewees was 27, their average level of education between third and fourth grade. The earliest participant in Renamo was abducted in December 1978, and the latest in August 1987. On average they had spent 37 months in the Renamo forces. They included three with more than eight years experience, and 19 whose stay extended into 1988. Without exception, all 27 who had been directly involved in combat inside Mozambique said they had originally been abducted at gunpoint. Moreover, they said that all or almost all of those who trained with them had also been forcibly abducted.

Most said the standard penalty for trying to escape was execution. They described the supply operation for munitions as a strict need-to-know system in which only some soldiers had direct access to the deliveries. Almost all made reference to captured arms, but none said these were their major source.
Outlying bases received supplies from central bases in each province by head porterage. Bases in southern Mozambique received some supplies overland from South Africa, but elsewhere the pattern was of periodic landings of DC-3s, parachute drops, or sea landings.

A given area normally received supplies only once or twice a year in quantities sufficient to last that long. The last specific delivery cited in the interviews was a plane landing in Zambezia province in April 1988, mentioned by a combatant who escaped in June 1988. Another ex-Renamo member, speaking to journalists in Manica province in late November, said she had carried supplies from South African planes which landed in the Gorongosa area in October 1988.

South African involvement was also cited in an interview by a recent defector from Renamo’s Lisbon office. He said that in October, when he left, they were still receiving Renamo military communiques from the same South African officers who had always handled the communications. The interviewees also described a highly centralized system of command, control and communications, with its apex the communications link between the Renamo headquarters in central Mozambique and South African special forces. The military training they described ranged from basic training and special courses in bases in Mozambique to long-term instruction for selected soldiers in South Africa.

The author is a writer on southern Africa. His most recent books are King Solomon’s Mines Revisited (1986) and Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier (1988). He holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Wisconsin (Madison), and is fluent in Portuguese. He is currently associated with the African Studies Programme, Georgetown University, as a visiting researcher, and is a contributing editor for Africa News Service. This Research Report was submitted to the Ford Foundation and the Swedish International Development Authority in March 1989.

**Introduction**

For over a decade the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo or MNR) has been the principal agent of a destructive war against independent Mozambique. The origin of the group as a creation of the Rhodesian government in the mid-1970s is well-documented, as is the transfer of
sponsorship to the South African government after white Rhodesia gave way to independent Zimbabwe in 1980.

The results of the war have attracted increasing attention from the international community in recent years. In April 1988, the report written by consultant Robert Gersony for the US State Department's Bureau of Refugee Affairs documented, on the basis of interviews with refugees and displaced persons, a systematic pattern of human rights abuses, overwhelm-
ingly attributed to Renamo. International agencies, governments and non-
governmental organizations in a wide variety of countries have given in-
creasing support to the relief and recovery efforts of Mozambique.

Renamo itself, however, has remained an enigma. Its president Afonso
Dhlakama has rarely met journalists. The exiles and non-Mozambicans
who represent Renamo in Lisbon, Washington and other capitals seem to
have little direct contact with the situation on the ground in Mozambique.
The motives of the Renamo fighters, and the extent of South African
involvement in recent years, have been shrouded in mystery and specula-
tion.

As part of a larger research project on insurgency in post-colonial Mozam-
bique and Angola, funded by the Ford Foundation and the Swedish Inter-
national Development Authority, the author undertook a research trip to
Mozambique in November and December 1988, with the objective of
interviewing ex-participants in Renamo. This task was made feasible be-
cause a large number of Renamo combatants had accepted the Mozambi-
can government’s unconditional amnesty in 1988. It was facilitated by the
government’s increasing openness to independent investigation, and by the
precedent of the methodologically sound research strategy of the Gersony
report.

Methodology

The interview subjects included both amnestied ex-participants (amnis-
tiados) and combatants who had been captured in battle. Most amnistiados
were dispersed with their families, but others were located in transit centres
administered by the Mozambican Red Cross. Since the author had obtained
prior approval at the top levels of the ruling Frelimo Party, local party and
government officials helped locate amnestied ex-participants and gave
access to prisoners. Selection was on the basis of the criteria the author
presented: those who had spent more time as Renamo soldiers, including
commanders, people with some education if possible, adults rather than
children. In a number of cases, the author asked for specific individuals by
name, previously identified from the Mozambican press or other sources.
In no case were any of these refused, although a couple were not geographi-
cally accessible.

Each interview was carried out individually, out of hearing and sight of
officials. All of the interviews were in Portuguese, except for one in English
and one with Shona translation provided by an employee of the Norwegian
Save the Children Fund. Although those with little education spoke un-
grammatical Portuguese, and might ask for a question to be repeated, they
were quite understandable. The author started each interview by explaining that he was not working for the Mozambican or any other government, and that the names and raw notes from the interviews would not be made public (except in the few cases where the interviewee had already spoken extensively with the press).

The author also made clear that he was not inquiring about their personal guilt or innocence, and would ask questions about what they saw and heard, not what they did. In the course of the generally chronological account from each respondent, the interviewer refrained from the use of loaded terms such as 'bandits' (negative) or 'Renamo' (positive) until the respondent himself used a word.

Almost all spoke freely and fluently. They clearly distinguished between their own direct observation, what they had heard from other Renamo combatants, and questions that they lacked information to answer. Their willingness to answer questions with 'No', 'I don't know', or 'I heard about that, but didn't see it myself, gave confidence that the information they provided was genuine.

Interviews were carried out in three separate regions of Mozambique: in Maputo in the south, in Chimoio in the centre, and in Quelimane and Mocuba north of the Zambezi River. The geographical spread allowed investigation of regional variation and stronger verification of information found independently in separate regions. Chimoio, in Manica province, was chosen because Manica was the location of the earliest Renamo actions and because it was the province with the largest number of amnistiados. Quelimane, in Zambezia province, was chosen because Zambezia is the most populous province. It was partially occupied by Renamo in 1986-1987, and it also had a large number of amnistiados.

Of a total of 32 interviews, nine were conducted in Maputo, ten in Chimoio, twelve in Quelimane and one in Mocuba.

The average length of the interviews was 45 minutes to an hour, with several running over an hour and a half. The author did not use a tape recorder but took extensive notes. While a few were taciturn, most interviewees seemed eager to share their experiences.

The material in this report derives directly from the author's own interviews, except where other sources are explicitly cited. The author had access to several other detailed interviews, including several given by
amnistiadós Paulo Oliveira and Chivaca João to Mozambican and foreign journalists, and over three hours of raw television footage of an interview by Mozambican journalists with Colopes Sitoi, an amnistiado who served as a military intelligence officer for Renamo in Gaza province, and was interviewed in Xai-Xai shortly after he fled Renamo in November 1988. The author also had access to documents captured when major Renamo bases were overrun in 1981 and 1985, to reports from amnistiadós appearing in the Mozambican press, and to notes from several interviews by US diplomats and by Mozambican journalists.

The author also benefited from discussions on this topic in 1988 and 1989 with many Mozambicans, and others knowledgeable about Mozambique, in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Portugal, Sweden, England and the United States.

In this analysis the author sought to gain a comprehensive understanding of the pattern of Renamo operations over the years, rather than simply seeking the most recent 'smoking gun' details. Current intelligence can only be evaluated in a responsible way on the basis of the historical background pattern, particularly in the case of a covert operation which includes at its core the effort to conceal current operations.

**Terminology**

The Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance) is the name used by the organization itself. The Portuguese-language acronym, Renamo, was adopted by the organization in 1983, and is now more widely used than the English-language acronym MNR. The Mozambican government, and Mozambicans when speaking Portuguese, generally refer to the group as *bandidos armados* (armed bandits), *bandidos*, or, sometimes, *bandos armados* (armed bands). This is often abbreviated in popular speech to 'BA's'. The most common term used in local languages, and often in Portuguese as well, is *matsangas*, after the first Renamo commander, André Matsangaiza.

This report for convenience uses the term Renamo, although *matsanga* and *bandidos* were the terms occurring most frequently in the interviews.

**Interviewees**

The 32 interviewees were all male, with an average age of 27 at the time of the interview. The youngest was 18 and the oldest was 47 years old. Fourteen grew up in northern Mozambique (Zambezia), seven in central Mozambique (Manica and Sofala) and eight in southern Mozambique (Maputo city, Maputo province, Gaza and Inhambane). Twenty-eight were
Mozambican, one Zimbabwean, one Angolan and one Australian. One was Portuguese, whose parents moved to southern Mozambique when he was four years old. Twenty-seven of the Mozambicans were black, and one was of mixed race.

The languages spoken in their parents' homes by the respondents included English (1), Portuguese (3), Shona (6), Sena (5), Sena and Changana (1), Changana (2), Changana and Zulu (1), Chitswa (2), Chitswa and Bitonga (1), Lomue (4), Macua (4) and Chuabo (2).

Twenty-five said they were married, and all but three of these had at least one child. Fifteen were peasants or farmworkers, with four of these having previously worked as miners in South Africa. One was a fisherman, six unskilled manual workers, five office workers and two students. One was a journalist, one a professional soldier and one a missionary. Their parents' occupations included peasants (20), unskilled manual workers (6) and six others.

The average level of education was between third and fourth grade of primary school. Five had no formal education at all, and only four (including the two whites) had more than eight years of schooling.

The earliest participation in Renamo dated to December 1978, and the latest entered in August 1987. Twelve were involved in Renamo operations both before and after the Nkomati Accord in March 1984. Eighteen became involved subsequent to the Accord. Two were in the Renamo ranks until 1983-1984, five until 1985-1986, six until 1987, and nineteen until 1988. Eight were in Renamo until the second half of 1988, three of those until November. On average the respondents had spent 37 months in the Renamo forces.

Sixteen of those interviewed were prisoners, and sixteen amnistiados.

Two had been involved in Renamo's external operations in Portugal. Three had spent time with Renamo operations in South Africa. Seven had been involved with operations in southern Mozambique. Fifteen had spent some time with Renamo in central Mozambique, and 15 in northern Mozambique. (The numbers add to more than 32 because several spent time in different areas.)

Four of the interviewees were new recruits (i.e., they had not yet been given weapons when they escaped or were captured), and 12 were rank-and-file
soldiers. Two were first-aid orderlies, and one a male nurse with the status of leader (chefe) in the health sector. One was assigned to administrative duties in a base, and two were madjiba (collaborators), one of them responsible for a whole village. Two were chefes de grupo or secção (small military units), one a company commander, and two sector commanders (sector being a subdivision of a province). One, the Australian, acted as a courier for Renamo between Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. One Mozambican translated for South African military intelligence officers interviewing Mozambicans in South Africa. The Angolan was a professional soldier in the South African special forces. Two were members of Renamo's Lisbon delegation, including Paulo Oliveira, who directed Renamo's radio in South Africa before becoming the principal information officer in Lisbon after March 1984.

The interviewees were not a random sample, nor should they be taken as precisely representative of the Renamo force as a whole. Since the author asked to interview adults and particularly those with greater experience in Renamo, the interviewees are probably older than the average Renamo soldier. Since the author requested interviewees who could understand Portuguese, the sample is probably better educated than the average Renamo soldier (although the 1980 census figures show that over half of Mozambican males in this age range are able to speak Portuguese). Finally, the battle-hardened and most loyal core of the Renamo force are less likely to accept amnesty or be captured in battle, and are therefore probably underrepresented in the sample.

The sample contained significant diversity, however, in terms of geography, social background, previous experience with the Mozambican government and time and place of their experience within Renamo. Their statements provide a coherent picture of Renamo, with variations in details logically consistent with their different access to information.

The author's generalizations about Renamo from the interviews are not based on taking the sample as representative, but on their statements, which refer not only to the interviewees themselves, but also to their observations while in the Renamo ranks.

Before undertaking the interviews, the author's working hypothesis was that there would be considerable variety in the recruitment to Renamo, including forced recruitment, ideological motives and, in large measure, material incentives for a young population with large numbers of people
marginalized by the successive traumas of economic collapse, drought and war. The interviews revealed a far more consistent pattern than expected, with forced recruitment overwhelmingly dominant.

Of the 32 interviewees, there were three whose motives could be considered ideological. Ian Grey, a conservative young Australian missionary, was persuaded to become a courier for Renamo after meeting in Israel a member of the fundamentalist Shekinah Ministries sect who told him that Christians were being persecuted in Marxist Mozambique. Paulo Oliveira, of Portuguese origin, who left Mozambique in 1979 and joined Renamo in Lisbon in 1981, was ideologically opposed to the Mozambican government and close to other Portuguese settlers who had fled after independence. Chivaca João left the Mozambican security services in 1983 to study in Portugal, joining a support group for Renamo shortly afterwards and later working in the Lisbon office. From Beira, Chivaca João sympathized with Renamo’s claims that the central part of the country was underrepresented in the government.

Two other special cases were a Mozambican who was recruited in South Africa, and an Angolan who joined the South African army while in Namibia, later being assigned to the Reconnaissance Commandos (South African special forces). The Mozambican was working as an illegal immigrant at an auto body shop in the Transvaal, when he was arrested, interrogated and given the option of working for 370 rand a month as an interpreter for South African Military Intelligence interrogating Mozambican refugees. The Angolan had been a teenager in a refugee camp in northern Namibia in 1976, when he (and other young males in the camp) were told by South African authorities that they had to join either UNITA or the South African army.

All the other 27 interviewees, that is all those who had joined Renamo inside Mozambique and were combatants in the Renamo army, said that they had entered the Renamo forces after being recruited by force. The word most often used was raptado, meaning ‘abducted’ or ‘kidnapped’.

The author was prepared to be skeptical about such claims, given the possibility that the interviewees could be trying to minimize their responsibility to please the interviewer or the Mozambican authorities. The circumstantial detail given in the interviews, along with the fact that the interviewees described the forced recruitment of others in matter-of-fact terms as part of the Renamo military routine, gave grounds to believe that they were telling the truth.
One clue came in one of the early interviews, with Paulo Oliveira. Himself originally an ideological convert to Renamo, he volunteered his estimate that of the approximately 80 Mozambicans who served with him in the Renamo headquarters base in South Africa in 1983-1984, only three had not been forcibly recruited. The staff for the radio, which he directed, for headquarters office operations, communications officers and other similar positions, was made up of Mozambicans, many of whom had been students at one secondary school in Inhambane who were abducted en masse.

The interviewees speaking of their own experiences gave similar details. After getting basic biographical details from each, the author then asked, 'And how did you come to be there in the bush with the matsangas?' The replies were almost all very specific, almost all mentioning a specific month and many the day, most frequently saying 'I was raptado' (kidnapped or abducted).

Three, for example, said that they had been abducted (in December 1978, January 1979, and August 1979 respectively) near the Rhodesian border. They were marched on foot to Rhodesia, and then taken by truck to Odzi, the Renamo training base in eastern Rhodesia. Two of these, a Zimbabwean refugee and a Mozambican peasant, said they were captured at night, in their homes. Another was on the way to visit his grandparents, riding a bicycle. Each had arrived at the Odzi base with other captives, 40 in December 1978, 70 in January 1979 and 15 in August 1979. Each said they were taken at gunpoint by groups of armed soldiers. One, in the group of 70, said they were tied to each other during the day of walking to the Rhodesian border.

The same pattern, with minor variations, appeared in the rest of the interviews, with the exception that the captured recruits were marched to training bases inside Mozambique instead of to Rhodesia. Some had first been forced to carry goods for Renamo soldiers or to serve as guides in their home areas before being informed they could not return and would have to undergo military training. Some were abducted alone or with only a few other people, in their fields, while on the way to visit relatives, or at home. One was returning home from a bar in Namaacha, near the South African and Swaziland borders, when three armed men forced him to carry their knapsacks to the base five hours march away.

Others were captured in large groups, during attacks on schools, villages, plantations, or small towns. One peasant in Nicoadala district in Zambezia, for example, was taken with 200 other villagers to carry food to the Renamo
base in 1985. They took everything from the village, he said, all the food, all the clothing, chickens, doves, rabbits. They burned his house down. All the men were selected for military training.

Another was a worker at Sena Sugar in August 1985 when 182 workers were abducted. They walked for three days before reaching the base, after which 80 of the workers, including him, were forced to begin military training. Another, a school administrator, was abducted during an attack on the school by 150 Renamo soldiers, on Christmas Eve 1985, along with 18 others, including several teachers and students.

After the testimony about their own experience of military training, the author asked each interviewee who had served as a combatant about those who had trained with him. The author asked whether they also had been 'abducted like you', or whether they had joined the Renamo ranks voluntarily. While the interviewee might have some motive to conceal his own voluntary recruitment, the same possible bias would not apply to the same degree to his description of others. In fact, one might expect a bias in the opposite direction, for him to distinguish himself more sharply and appear in a better light. In fact their responses to this question seemed matter of fact, and varied primarily in their degree of confidence in their answers.

Twelve unhesitatingly said that all those who trained with them had also been abducted. One, who had been in Renamo since August 1979, added, 'The matsanga take you, you can't say no'. Another, in Renamo from June 1982 until February 1987, said, 'In general, all the regular soldiers (soldados simples) were abducted'. Another dryly commented that he never heard much talk about voluntary recruitment. Another, with Renamo in Zambezia province from April 1984 through July 1987, said that in Zambezia even the commanders had originally been abducted, but that he didn't know about (Renamo president) Dhlakama himself.

Three others said 'almost all' had been abducted, one who had been with Renamo only briefly before escaping said he did not know. Twelve others were more hesitant about summary judgements, making comments like 'I didn't have a chance to count', or 'I really didn't talk to everybody'. In follow-up questions the author asked whether those abducted were 'many' or 'a few', and they uniformly answered 'many'. The author then asked if those who joined voluntarily were 'many' or 'a few'; their answers ranged from 'a few' to 'very few'.

The highest estimate of voluntary recruitment came from a Zimbabwean
who served as a Renamo sector commander in the Mavonde area. From his zone he sent 70 to 90 recruits each six months to the central base for training, he said. As many as 15 to 20 might be volunteers rather than forced recruits, he estimated.

Additional evidence for this pattern of forced recruitment is the fact that the interviewees when describing military operations systematically included 'kidnapping people' (raptar pessoas) as one of the tasks which might be assigned to a military unit.

Another aspect supporting the validity of the interviewees' description of forced recruitment is that as a group they did not show a common attitude towards the Mozambican government, or towards Renamo. Prior to their recruitment to Renamo, some had been affiliated with the Frelimo party at a local level. Others had specific complaints about the government: one had not received pay he said he was promised as a member of the militia in Maputo, another had been arrested on a vague suspicion while he was a government soldier. Some described their period in Renamo bitterly and with a sense of indignation and horror, and several had made repeated attempts to escape. Others seem to have accepted their situation with little resistance.

Their present attitudes differed with their positions, as prisoners or as amnisteados. Most of those who were prisoners when interviewed complained that they did not know when the government would release them. Several who had been imprisoned for more than one year said they had been tortured after being captured, although they said this did not happen any more. Several prisoners felt they also should be amnestied, claiming they had turned themselves in voluntarily rather than being captured. Others, who admitted being captured in battle, nevertheless wondered whether the amnesty would apply to them.

Several of those who were amnestied were impatient to be given agricultural tools and seeds they had not yet received, and several were still awaiting transport to their home areas or news of their families. Several who had been reunited with their families were optimistic, speaking of new fields planted and one of them of a church he was helping build.

But the dominant stance—with respect both to their past involvement and their present situation—seemed to be fatalism, as if the idea of choice was not particularly relevant. And in fact the only common factor which seems to have determined their entry into Renamo was the bad fortune of being in
The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) recruitment by means other than kidnapping presumably takes place. One interviewee said that in Morrumbala he had talked to some of the early recruits who said they had been seeking jobs in Malawi when offered employment by whites who took them to Rhodesia. Only after arriving at the Odzi camp did they find out what the employment was.

Other sources as well cite specific credible examples. In 1985 an amnistiado in Inhambane province told Mozambique's Tempo magazine (December 29, 1985) that he had been recruited in 1982 while unemployed, on the promise of being paid 2500 meticais a month (about 4 US dollars at early 1988 exchange rates; close to $60 at the inflated pre-1986 official exchange rate). In 1988 an amnistiado in Tete province said he had deserted Renamo after not being paid the 300 meticais (about 70 US cents) a day he had been promised (Africa News, April 18, 1988). Both the South African and Mozambican press have reported specific incidents of illegal Mozambican immigrants in South Africa being offered 'employment' by Renamo while in police custody (Weekly Mail [South Africa], August 19-25, 1988; Mozambique Information Office News Review, January 19, 1989).

Recruitment for the Renamo external offices is also apparently a special case, as is the top military leadership of the movement inside Mozambique. (Each of these will be discussed in later sections.) But the pattern revealed in the interviews, fully consistent with numerous other word-of-mouth reports, interviews by US diplomats, State Department researcher Robert Gersony, and Mozambican and foreign journalists, makes it probable that at least 90 per cent of the Renamo rank-and-file are recruited by force.

The interviews did not deal systematically with the additional question of the recruitment of children, since that has already been extensively reported (see Washington Post, January 5, 1988; US News & World Report, January 16, 1989) and is being investigated by psychiatrists and other specialists. But the interviews did contain some relevant information. Those who were captured in large groups said that of those captured the males were selected for military training; the age range mentioned was generally from 12 to 30 or 40. Several said that those too old or young for actual combat were used for other tasks, such as porterage, servants for the officers, or messengers. Several interviewees, particularly those who had spent many years in Renamo in central Mozambique, stressed that children
were rarely used in combat. Most of those in Zambezia made the same point. Others, however, including ones who had been in Morrumbala, Caia, Inhaminga and particularly in Gaza and Maputo provinces in the south, referred to significant numbers of boys of the age of 15 and under being given arms and sent into combat.

The most detailed information about the use of children came from the interview with Colopes Sitoi, who was with Renamo in Gaza province from August 1987 through early November 1988, acting most of that period as a Renamo military intelligence officer. He said that in his area there was a systematic preference for getting children because it was easier to keep them from running away than to control adults. Children as young as 10 were used, he said, and more than half of the armed soldiers were children (roughly 15 or under). This is consistent with some eyewitness reports of attacks in recent years in southern Mozambique, which have cited the presence of significant numbers of children in Renamo attack units.

Although it would require more systematic data to verify the hypothesis, it seems probable that the differences in reports reflect actual differences between time periods and geographical areas. In most areas of Zambezia, for example, which has little tradition of migratory labour, there is no shortage of adult men. In much of southern Mozambique, in contrast, a century-old pattern of migrant labour to South Africa has resulted in a scarcity of adult men in the countryside, a situation which has intensified under war conditions. Since adult men are less likely to be present, and more likely to succeed in escaping, Renamo might be more inclined to use children to reinforce its ranks.

Another issue which the author was not able to investigate in detail was the presence of women soldiers in the Renamo ranks. Several reports the author heard in Maputo suggested that women soldiers had been seen in attacking Renamo units. The interviews do not confirm this, although it could certainly happen in some areas without being known to the interviewees. Most said women were not given military training or incorporated in the Renamo military structure, but were part of the civilian ‘population’, a clearly distinct category who were not allowed to enter the military bases. Several, who had spent time in the Gorongosa headquarters area, did refer to small numbers of trained women soldiers, but said their duties were mainly in the bases, not in combat.

On November 30, 1988, 19-year-old Isabel Jorge told a Radio Mozambique journalist that she had been a soldier in Renamo’s women’s section, in the
Gondola district, before her escape the week before. She had been abducted in 1982, given military training at Gorongosa by South African instructors in 1983, and eventually rose to become a commander, she said. She said the women's detachment's tasks included cooking, tending the wounded, having involuntary sex and carrying military equipment.

In the Garagua documents captured in December 1981, minutes of a meeting between Renamo and South African officers say the South African officers suggested that in order to discourage the soldiers from leaving there should be a women’s detachment in the Renamo training camp in South Africa in order to 'entertain them'.

Control mechanisms

It is on first thought difficult to understand how an army composed primarily of forced recruits can function. It is true there are historical precedents such as press-gangs for the British Navy. Some recruits in any guerrilla army probably join under some level of coercion. And conscription, as practiced by most governments in the twentieth century, is in essence a legalized and bureaucratized form of forced recruitment. In the Renamo case, however, the interviews reveal what seems to be an extraordinarily high level of involuntary recruitment. Accordingly, the question of how the recruits are prevented from escaping or rebelling is a critical one.

From the interviews it appeared that one of the most important controls is the threat of execution or other severe punishment. Thirteen of the interviewees said they had personal knowledge of executions of soldiers who tried to escape, that their commanders had threatened them with execution, and that they believed this was the normal penalty they could expect. Six others said that the ordinary punishment was not so severe, mentioning such measures as 90 days 'in prison' (in a hut or hole in the ground, sometimes tied up, sometimes deprived of food), beatings, floggings or 'torture'.

Second-hand reports in Maputo often refer to executions for demonstration purposes among abducted Renamo recruits, to discourage the others from resisting. None of the 32 interviewees gave specific examples of this. Colopes Sitoi, however, describing his abduction with some 200 others from ManjacaZe on August 10, 1987, said several who could not keep up the pace were killed during the first night, and sixteen Muslims who protested that they wanted to return to the town were executed the next day.

Another threat used, but mentioned by only one of the interviewees, was
the threat of violence against the recruit’s family. He accompanied two Renamo commanders, in civilian clothes with false documents, on a regular plane flight from Maputo to Quelimane. He said he was told that if he said anything, his family would be killed.

The other reason for not escaping given most frequently was the soldiers were told by their commanders that if they did succeed in escaping, the government would kill them. Several reported speeches by Renamo President Dhlakama in 1988 saying that the government’s amnesty programme was a lie, and that if they turned themselves in they would first be interviewed on the radio and then shot.

One, a prisoner, said that he knew of Renamo soldiers who had fled and then been killed by government forces. Mozambican government officials confirmed to the author that, particularly in earlier years, there had been a number of cases of mob violence against Renamo soldiers or summary executions by local commanders. Government and non-government sources unanimously asserted that these incidents had become much less frequent with the amnesty programme widely publicized by the government in 1988, and continuing in 1989.

Within Renamo ranks, however, the access to radios or other sources of information is limited, and it is likely that a large number do believe that they might be killed if they turn themselves in. The rank-and-file Renamo soldier is then faced with a difficult choice: if he tries to escape and fails, he may well be executed, and, as far as he knows, if he succeeds in escaping he might be killed by the government. One of those the author interviewed said he had debated with himself for months which side was most likely to be lying before he finally decided to try to escape from Renamo. Given this fear, most observers believe that a significant proportion of escapees from Renamo simply blend in with the local population or flee as refugees to neighbouring countries, rather than present themselves directly to the amnesty programme.

The final form of control is a systematic process of transferring recruits away from their home areas. While a few may be kept in their area of origin to serve as local guides, almost all described marches of at least two days from the point of capture to the training base. Most reported being transferred to other bases immediately after training, or sometimes before. With very few exceptions, they were posted as soldiers in districts other than their home districts, and some to other provinces. They all described their military units as very mixed in origin, and said they were not with people
who they had known at home or who had been trained with them. One commander in Manica province specifically said that they had a policy of transferring soldiers in order to make it harder for them to run away.

This strategy seems to have been particularly effective in areas such as Zambezia province, where there is little tradition of migration, many peasants have never left their home districts, and language differences may make it difficult to communicate even 100 km away from home. Having to learn both the geography and local language before making an escape effort is a major obstacle. One who was abducted in Nicoadala district, Zambezia province, a peasant who had never left his village before, was sent to Niassa province for over a year. After being retransferred to the Zambezia central base, he heard one day of a company of soldiers being sent to Nicoadala and surreptitiously mixed himself in with the group. As soon as he reached his home district, he escaped and turned himself in to local authorities.

This kind of obstacle is less significant in the southern part of the country, where the migratory tradition and communality of languages have generated a broad cultural unity and familiarity with a wider range of territory.

Most transfers appeared to be within the same region of the country (the southern provinces of Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane; the central provinces of Manica and Sofala; the northern provinces of Zambezia and Nampula, for example). But the interviewees in each region also reported the presence of significant numbers of soldiers from other regions, with the Gorongosa headquarters area bringing recruits from all over the country.

It is important to stress that despite such obstacles large numbers of recruits do manage to escape. The 3,000 who formally accepted the government amnesty in 1988 probably is a minimum figure for that year. No total estimates for earlier years are available. But radio message diaries, captured in 1984 from Paulo Sitole, a Renamo sector commander in Maputo province (and published in Tempo, April 28, 1985) referred to 69 desertions from his forces in the period September 1983 through April 1984, out of an estimated February 1984 strength of 425 men.

Sitole also referred to the difficulties in recruitment in a message sent on November 17, 1983: ‘Recruitment here in Region Number 1 is very difficult because in the zones we operate in there are no young men, they have fled to [work in] South Africa. The other reason is that when they hear we are in the zone they flee to the bush, one doesn’t get anyone at home. because they have the bad habit of beating the drums when they hear us coming. But
we will try to recruit.' In different messages he referred to the execution of at least six recruits for attempted escape.

Training, political mobilization and rewards

The pattern of training described by the interviewees was quite consistent. The three who had been trained in Rhodesia said the course took six months. They said some of the instructors were Mozambicans, but that there were also Portuguese and other whites who spoke English. They could not specify whether these other whites were Rhodesian, South African or American. The published house history of the Rhodesian Special Air Service (Barbara Cole, The Elite, Durban: Three Knights, 1984) makes it clear that these trainers included Rhodesians as well as an American mercenary who was an officer in the SAS, Robert McKenzie (aka McKenna, aka Jordan). McKenzie is currently associated with Soldier of Fortune magazine and with a Renamo support group called Freedom, Inc.

For those trained later in Mozambique the standard basic training was two to three months. Only four cited shorter time periods, and two longer periods. The content of the training was mostly weapons-handling, and on completion of the course they were given an AK-47. Some received additional training, one in artillery, one in anti-aircraft, one in communications and three in first-aid. Because of his educational qualifications, Colopes Sitoi was given military intelligence training, principally map-reading and report-writing. He said the detailed maps used were South African, not Mozambican.

With few exceptions the instructors in the courses inside Mozambique were Mozambicans, identified by the interviewees as 'veterans' with greater experience. The exceptions, each mentioned in more than one interview, were the presence at times of white and black South Africans in the Gorongosa headquarters camp (the dates were not specified) and the presence of both black and white South African instructors in Zambezia during the period of the 1986 Renamo offensive. One of the soldiers trained in first-aid also said a Mozambican doctor came from Europe to give a special course at the hospital base near the Gorongosa headquarters.

None of the Mozambicans the author interviewed had received additional training in South Africa, but almost all said they had seen or heard of other Renamo soldiers who had. One specifically referred to a group of 20 to 25 Renamo soldiers trained as paratroopers who passed through the base he was at in Manhiça district, Maputo province, in November 1983. Another spoke of groups leaving Gorongosa to be trained in 1982 and 1983, when he
was there. In November 1988 a recently arrived *amnistiado* told journalists in Manica (in a taped interview made available to the author) that he had been trained for nine months at the Phalaborwa special forces base in South Africa in 1982, along with 97 others.

An Angolan who was in the South African special forces at that time provided additional details. The first large group taken to South Africa for training was in 1982, he said, a total intake of 230 men selected from different areas in Mozambique. Ninety of them were sent to Namibia for paratroop training. In late 1982 and early 1983 they were reinfiltated into Mozambique, some by sea on the coast north of Beira, others by parachute. According to this source, in 1983 there were 400 of them, some of whom were given specialized sabotage training, others trained as paratroopers, and others as officers. The standard pattern was one group a year, but he had no details on subsequent training in South Africa since he was transferred to another commando unit assigned to actions against exiles of the African National Congress.

Notes in the Gorongosa diaries, for December 1983, also suggest this pattern. They mention 'soldiers to be evacuated from the interior to take Conventional Forces course . . . 100 from the North, 250 from the Center. 250 from the South ... with at least second grade, from 15 to 30 years old'. And the radio message diaries of Paulo Sitole refer to the arrival in Maputo province on March 6, 1984 (ten days before the Nkomati Accord) of '64 paratrooper specialists'.

None of the interviewees referred to regular political meetings, discussions or courses, and they were clear that they regarded themselves as part of an army, not a political movement. Only two said there were regular political meetings with the civilian population. Colopes Sitoi, however, cited the presence of José Fumane, a distant relative of his, who had the title of Renamo political commissar in the area where he was. Fumane, who as a Portuguese secret police agent had infiltrated Frelimo in the 1960s and was imprisoned after independence, had voluntarily joined Renamo after being released from prison. Fumane had personal conflicts with the Renamo military commander, Sitoi said.

The nine interviewees who did refer to political meetings said these were occasional gatherings of the soldiers to hear speeches. Two referred to visits to their base by President Dhlakama, and one said they were gathered in front of a radio to hear Dhlakama over a loudspeaker. All said Dhlakama, as well as other commanders who occasionally spoke, stressed themes such
as ‘we are against communism, we are against socialism, we are for capitalism, we are against (communal) villages and want to live individually in the bush’. They also said they were promised that the war would be over soon and they would go to live in the city. In 1988, several mentioned, the speeches stressed that Frelimo’s amnesty programme was a lie. Several said that they didn’t know whether others believed the speeches or not, but said they listened because they were expected to listen. ‘They didn’t explain anything, they only gave orders’, one said.

At the rank-and-file level the question of ethnicity did not seem to be of major importance. All stressed that the soldiers came from all parts of Mozambique, and that men from any ethnic group had a chance to move up the command ladder. They uniformly said that the majority of the commanders were Shona-speakers, but said that the language spoken in any particular unit depended on the ratio of different groups. (Interviewees from central Mozambique distinguished between different Shona dialects, such as Ndau and Manica, but those from elsewhere in the country referred to all Shona-speakers as Ndau.) It may be that longer questioning on this point would have revealed different results, but it is notable that both Shona-speakers and non-Shona-speakers made similar comments about participation from a variety of ethnic groups. At the leadership level (to be discussed later), the ethnic issue seems to have taken on greater salience.

The interviewees provided no clear evidence one way or another with respect to rural support for or alienation from the Frelimo government. Lack of support for Renamo or for Frelimo does not mean support for the other, because there is the third alternative of passivity or of support for neither. What did emerge from the interviews was an apparent variation in the level of passivity with which the recruits confronted their situation in Renamo. Some were clearly hostile to their commanders and had actively sought opportunities to escape. Others seem to have accepted the situation as something that happened to them, which they adapted to without much consideration of the possibilities for resistance.

The rewards for Renamo soldiers were also quite limited, although access to food, loot and a gun might well be considered privilege in the context of much of rural Mozambique. Commanders in some areas, particularly the border with Malawi, were said to profit from the sale across the border of goods looted from attacked villagers, towns and cars. lan Grey commented that the Renamo personnel he met in Malawi seemed well supplied with South African currency.
Mozambicans from Renamo being trained in South Africa received regular salaries as members of the South African Defence Force, one amnistiado told journalists in Manica in November 1988. Associates of Roland Hunter, a South African draftee who was assigned to the Mozambique operation and is now serving a prison term in South Africa for passing information to the African National Congress, said he paid monthly salary checks in 1982-1983 of 500 to 750 Rand to Renamo officials in South Africa. Constantino Reis, a Mozambican student who joined Renamo voluntarily in September 1982 and served as a radio announcer in South Africa, told Mozambican journalists in 1985 after deserting that he had received 400 Rand a month, while President Dhlakama got 800 Rand a month and Renamo Secretary-General Orlando Cristina 1500 Rand a month.

Another benefit for the soldiers was what seems to be a relatively well organized system of first aid. Each military unit had one or more first-aid orderlies, and there was a central hospital in Gorongosa.

For several reasons, the author collected only limited data on the relationship of Renamo to the civilian population. Given the previous reports of large-scale atrocities against civilians, the author did not think that the combatants themselves would be likely to speak frankly about this within the scope of a short interview, and that pressing these questions would make it unlikely that they would talk freely about other less sensitive subjects. The author therefore refrained from asking questions about human rights violations by Renamo soldiers.

For such data interviews with civilians themselves, such as those described in the State Department report, are likely to be more reliable. In-depth understanding of the complex interaction between Renamo, Frelimo and the civilian population would require longer-term studies in particular local areas.

The information in the interviews, however, was fully consistent with that cited in the State Department report and with the observations of others familiar with rural Mozambique. All of the interviewees agreed that there was a strict separation between the Renamo military structure and the civilian population, and that very rarely was anyone from the civilian population permitted closer to a Renamo base than a control point 100 to 200 metres distant. They described the primary relationship with civilians as...
centered around obtaining and transporting food for the Renamo soldiers, and on transporting goods looted in attacks on villagers and vehicles.

In some areas—apparently the same that were labelled 'tax areas' by Robert Gersony in the State Department report—the soldiers were sent out in groups to collect food, or the people organized by madjiba (collaborators, often directed by a village chief or elder) to bring food to the control point near the base. Some mentioned that groups of women or old men were specifically assigned to cultivate fields for the base. The interviewees differed over the degree of force involved. The three who had been in Renamo since 1979 said that the people had enough food and gave voluntarily from their excess. Another who was with Renamo from June 1984 through November 1988 said the people gave voluntarily at first, but not later. All four who mentioned these voluntary contributions were from Manica province or Zimbabwe, including three Shona-speakers and one Sena-speaker.

The majority, however, described the food contributions as involuntary. One said, 'There was a team to go ask for food from the people. They arrive, ask for it; if the people refuse they take it by force, maybe all their food.' Others explicitly said they stole the food from the people. In attacks on villages or cars, several said, the local people would be used as porters to carry food and other goods back to the Renamo base.

Most said the food situation in the bases was adequate but not good, and many said the commanders ate the same food they did. Several complained that the commanders got better food, canned goods brought from Malawi or South Africa, or beef from slaughtered cattle. One volunteered that they ate 'only the skins' of cattle, while the commanders ate beef. One, who apparently was located in an area where local peasants owned many cattle, said there was never a problem. They would send out a group every few days to kill a cow, and there was always meat on the grill for everyone. But that was apparently a rare situation. Others talked of food shortages for both soldiers and civilians, particularly in recent years.

In conversation with local government officials in Zambezia province, the author was told that in some areas local people had at first welcomed Renamo, disillusioned with the economic and political policies of the government. But, within a few months, they said, the same people were criticizing Renamo as no more than thieves and murderers. The interviewees generally described a situation in which some local chiefs, whether traditional authorities or Portuguese-appointed, as well as traditional heal-
ers (curandeiros) and magicians (feiticeiros), cooperated with Renamo. A variety of reports have suggested that such leaders, deprived of power by the Frelimo government, provided significant support to Renamo in some areas of Mozambique.

The interviewees were clear, however, that neither chiefs nor healers were part of the Renamo structure, but part of the subject civilian population. Several said that the Renamo soldiers 'went to the healers' for treatment just as the civilians did. And several commented that most of the chiefs had no choice about collaborating when Renamo came into an area. One of the interviewees, who had been a prominent farmer and elder in his village, had been appointed by Renamo to direct the village as chief mudjiba (collaborator). He said he was forced to do this while they occupied his house, sleeping on the veranda, several times tying up his wife when she objected to giving them food, and killing his brother-in-law after an escape attempt.

A few interviewees, particularly those with some experience in the Gorgosa area, said the Renamo male nurses and first-aid orderlies sometimes treated civilians as well as soldiers. One said the women soldiers 'went to school'. One said that material from South African parachutes was given to people for clothes, and another that clothes captured in raids were distributed to people living under Renamo control as well as to the soldiers. But there was virtually no other reference to benefits for Mozambican civilians.

Reports from journalists and others who have visited Renamo under Renamo sponsorship have occasionally mentioned Christian churches in Renamo areas. But only a few of the interviewees made any comment about religion. One had been abducted by Renamo while on the way home from church. Another said that Bibles were brought in from Malawi. One, who said he was a member of the African Assembly of God, said there was a pastor of this church among the Renamo-controlled population near his base. But that the commanders and the pastor had nothing to do with each other. Resettled in Nicoadala since escaping in July 1987, he was building a church. 'Thanks be to God that I escaped', he said.

Arms, ammunition and medicines

The interviewees described a coherent pattern of supply of arms, ammunition and medicines. What they actually witnessed varied with the specific geographical area and time period they were in the Renamo forces. All of those who served in combat areas made some reference to captured materiel, but none claimed that such materiel was the basic source of supplies.
The overall pattern included deliveries over land borders, by parachute drop, by landings of Dakota DC-3 aircraft, and by sea, as well as extensive transport by head porterage within and even between provinces.

Two interviewees, who were in the Renamo forces less than six months each, simply said that they got the arms ‘from the warehouse’ in the base. Those who spent longer times in subsidiary bases (other than the principal base in each province) said that arms came with columns of porters from the provincial base. They said that when supplies were running low, the base commander would radio the information to the provincial base, and carriers would be arranged among the soldiers to make the trip. In contrast to the expeditions for food, civilians were not normally used for weapons transport. Interviewees who had not spent time in a provincial base consistently said they were uncertain how the weapons arrived there, but that they had been told by other combatants that they came from South Africa.

Those with more time in the Renamo forces, or who had been stationed in provincial bases or near the Renamo headquarters in the Gorongosa area, had more information. But even they described a strict need-to-know system in which only elite groups of soldiers met airplanes or ships. Several who had been involved both before and after the March 1984 Nkomati Accord said secrecy intensified after the agreement. After the Accord, said a commander who spent nine years in Renamo forces in central Mozambique, the Dakota aircraft came only at night, to sites kept secret from most of the soldiers.

The pattern of deliveries differed significantly by area of the country. One interviewee who spent from early 1984 to mid-1988 in a base in Maputo province near the Mozambique, Swaziland and South African borders said that some material came over land from South Africa, by head porterage. He added that South African helicopters also regularly visited the base, sometimes bringing small quantities of supplies, sometimes doctors, instructors for special courses, or other visitors. He estimated the frequency of the flights as roughly once every two months during the four years he was there.

In the period August 1987 - November 1988, according to Colopes Sitoi, the bases in Gaza province received their supplies not by air drop but by sending porters to the base in Maputo province. Columns of porters were sent four times a year, he said. He did not know from personal knowledge how the material arrived in Maputo province, but said another soldier told
him of having witnessed three parachute drops in February 1988 at 11 p.m. to dropzones marked with fires.

One interviewee, who was a Renamo first-aid orderly in Maputo and Gaza provinces from April 1983 through April 1988, said that before the Nkomati Accord arms and medicines arrived by parachute drop in Magude district, in the northern part of Maputo province. After Nkomati he was transferred to Gaza, and only knew that they sent porters to Magude for supplies. He did not know whether the supplies arrived in Magude by air or by land.

Almost all the interviewees who had been in central Mozambique referred to parachute drops or airplane landings, particularly in the area around Gorongosa and most frequently in Maringue district immediately north of Gorongosa, both before and after the Nkomati Accord. One interviewee, who served in the Espungabera area (south of the Beira corridor on the Zimbabwe border) from 1979 to 1982, said the planes arrived there once every three months and made two drops in the same night. Afterwards, as a commander in the Mavonde area (north of the Beira corridor near the Zimbabwe border) from 1982 until late 1988, he normally received supplies by parachute drop once a year. The quantity was generally sufficient for one year, and he was also expected to maintain the arms he captured as a reserve supply. One year, 1987, the expected shipment did not arrive, he said.

Others described the same pattern of a shipment once a year, or sometimes more often. Without more comprehensive data one cannot estimate how large an area each shipment would be intended for, but central Mozambique at least received shipments in several different areas. One interviewee, who was in Zambezia and across the river in Sofala from December 1985 through February 1987, said that during this time carriers went to the airstrip at Maringue twice, and twice ‘to the beach’ in the Maganja da Costa area north of Quelimane. Another, who spent most of 1987 in the coastal area north of Beira, said that on one occasion arms were taken from a ship, which he heard came from South Africa. Civilians as well as soldiers had to help carry the materiel, and it took more than a week to get it all to the base, he said.

In Zambezia, the interviewees referred to porterage expeditions across the river to Gorongosa to get supplies, as well as to air landings. One who spent December 1986 to June 1988 in the provincial base at Alfazema in Zambezia said an English aeroplane landed twice during this period, once in April 1987 and once in April 1988. He did not see it, since it was at night, but he
heard the noise and he saw the special unit of troops sent out to get the materiel.

The same pattern was described by another, who was in the Maringue area (in Sofala south of the Zambezi River) in 1985 and 1986. He helped prepare fires to mark the airstrip, but only a special unit of 60 soldiers, who carried pistols but not other weapons, went to meet the aeroplane. The same interviewee, who was transferred to a company-level base in another area for 1987 to 1988, said 40 to 60 porters were sent back to Maringue each year to get supplies.

Two who were in Lugela and Morrumbala districts of Zambezia during the 1985 to 1987 period referred to helicopter landings. One referred to a landing in June 1987; the other, less clear about dates but apparently referring to the period of the Renamo offensive in 1986, said that helicopters landed once every two months.

With the exception of a few, who referred to Dakotas, the interviewees were not able to be specific about types of plane. Two who had been present in the Renamo bases in South Africa before Nkomati referred to the use of DC-3’s (Dakota) and to C-130’s. Fernando Machia, who was in the Renamo forces from February 1981 through September 1988, told a Mozambican journalist in October 1988 that he had seen four-engine Dakotas (DC-4’s) drop supplies in Gorongosa.

This multifaceted supply system is fully consistent with documents captured by government forces when the Renamo central base at Garagua in southern Manica province was taken in December 1981, and when its successor in the Gorongosa area was overrun in August 1985. Minutes from a meeting in late 1980 between Renamo representatives and South African officers in South Africa noted the difficulties in maintaining a high level of supplies by parachute drop, and indicated that ‘the South Africans showed willingness to send monthly supplies as from 1981 but by sea’. In another meeting with a Renamo delegation on 28 November 1980, Colonel Charles van Niekerk ‘spoke of the difficulty of restocks as the aircraft cannot carry too much weight’. He also recommended that they indicate ‘two places where they can make the supply because it cannot be always made at the same place’.

The documents captured at Gorongosa, from the period December 1983 through September 1984, provide more detail for the period immediately preceding and following the Nkomati Accord. The most revealing are entries from the diary of the secretary to Renamo President Dhlakama,
which were later confirmed as genuine in remarks in parliament by South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha (Hansard, February 6, 1986). Botha, who the diaries imply was not informed by the military at the time (1984), specifically noted that 'the information tallies with the flights undertaken by the air force'.

An entry on January 16, 1984 notes that 'because of the commitment which the South Africans will make to Machel, the resupply for the first six months of 1984 will all be delivered in the first few months: 500 pallets in 25 flights in addition to the resupply for January 1984'. A marginal note indicated 5 drop zones in the south, 7 in the center, and 3 in the north. The schedule for seven drops to specific areas are noted in an entry for January 25. An entry on February 11 lists nine others, including one with two aeroplanes on February 23. A list of contents in the February 11 entry includes 1,730 AK-47's and 4,279 boxes of AK-47 ammunition. A February 13 entry lists 900 AK-47's and 500 boxes of AK-47 ammunition destined for Zambezia. It also says 'Colonel Charlie guarantees to Renamo that even if an agreement is signed with Machel, they will still continue to send aeroplanes now and then'. On February 20 there is a reference to 'resupply sea route on the coast between Chinde and Beira at Culaima Bay on February 9, 1984'.

On June 16, 1984, Renamo President Dhlakama wrote in a letter to 'Friend Commander Charles' that 'we no longer have war material, mainly in the central and southern areas of our country. We appreciate that we received that last consignment but as soon as we unloaded we had to relieve all the regions in the central area. ... So we want to remind our friends of the pledge they gave us of keeping up support to us clandestinely.' In a reply on June 20 Colonel van Niekerk asked Renamo to conserve material and promised to consult his superiors. A month later he sent a radio message promising the delivery of 26 tons beginning August 1 in 'the drop zone to the east of Inhaiminga'.

According to the diary, a Renamo delegation was extracted by sea and taken to South Africa on August 9, 1984, where they discussed the supply situation and other issues with South African officials, including Minister of Defense Magnus Malan, Military Intelligence Chief van der Westhuizen, Brigadier van Tonder and Colonel van Niekerk. They were told that a total of 14 air deliveries had been made from May to July, but the South Africans added that 'at this moment we have transport difficulties because we can't now use the C-130's, which are controlled by the Air Force, and we can't use the Navy because the information might leak'. They suggested that Renamo prepare airstrips in order for civilian aircraft to land. A diary entry for
August 29 gives a schedule of six air deliveries from August 31 through October 25, 1984.

In a meeting on September 6, 1984, with General Viljoen, the Chief of Staff of the South African Defence Force, as well as General van der Westhuizen, Brigadier van Tonder and Colonel van Niekerk, General Viljoen promised to supply Renamo with 'humanitarian aid' using Air Force C-130s.

The use of C-130's before Nkomati was cited in the author's interviews both by Paulo Oliveira and by a member of South Africa’s special forces involved in training Renamo. But the specific references were to parachute drops of Mozambicans who had been trained as paratroopers in the months just before Nkomati, not to supply drops. Despite General Viljoen’s promise, no specific evidence on the extent of use of C-130's in supply deliveries subsequent to March 1984 surfaced in the author's interviews.

The general patterns which emerged from the interviews and available documentary evidence suggest that Mozambican eyewitness accounts which occasionally appear in the Mozambican press are more significant than they are generally considered by foreign observers. From conversations with several Mozambican journalists who have been interviewing amnistiados in 1988, the author concluded that the information from their interviews—most often for radio—only rarely appeared in adequate detail in the print media. In any case, few foreign analysts regularly follow the Mozambican press. Nor does the Mozambican government compile this information in a systematic way for public presentation. The following is an incomplete compilation of such reports in the last year, which make specific reference to arms deliveries.

- Horácio Taimo and Alberto Rendição, who had been bodyguards for Renamo President Dhlakama until transferred to another area at the end of 1986, told Filemão Saveca, a radio journalist in Manica province, in June 1988, that the supply planes to Gorongosa brought uniforms as well as arms, and that the planes returned to South Africa with ivory and precious hardwood. (*Noticias*, July 23, 1988.)

- Anuário Macume told a Mozambican journalist in Inhambane province, in August 1988, that he had taken part in a column carrying arms from the coast of Inhambane near Vilanculo in mid-1987. He said he was told they came from South Africa. (*Noticias*, August 30, 1988.)
• Fernando Tepo told Swedish journalist Anders Nilsson in March 1988 in Beira that he had taken part in carrying a consignment of arms and ammunition from a beach site between Beira and the mouth of the Zambezi River in late December 1987 and early January 1988. It took three days and three nights to carry the materiel, he said, including ammunition, AK-47’s, mines, shells for 60 mm and 81 mm mortars, medicines and blankets. (Radio Mozambique, March 15, 1988, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 18, 1988.)

• Julieta Jhone told Karl Maier of the London Independent in July that she and other porters had carried dark green ammunition boxes about 2 feet wide from the coast to the Inhaminga area in March 1988. (Independent, July 26, 1988.)

• Local administrator Eta Companhia, of Casa Banana in Gorongosa district, said in early June 1988 that local peasants fleeing Renamo areas the previous week had spoken of parachute drops by two Dakota aircraft in May at the Safrique base (a former game hunting camp). (Noticias, June 11, 1988.)

• Isabel Jorge told Radio Mozambique in Manica on November 30 that she had last unloaded military supplies, uniforms and combat rations from a South African plane in Gorongosa in October 1988, the month before she escaped. (Mozambique Information Agency, November 30, 1988.)

• Moises Macaxaze told Radio Mozambique in Manica in February that he had last seen a South African plane resupplying Renamo on November 12, 1988, in Chibuto district in Gaza province. (Mozambique Information Agency, February 20, 1989.)

If the pattern of secrecy indicated by these diverse sources is accurate, it is probable that a regular flow of munitions could be successfully concealed, with only occasional embarrassments such as the documents captured in August 1985 and scattered reports from Mozambican eyewitnesses. Mozambique’s coastline of some 2500 kilometres (1540 miles) is approximately equivalent to that from Port Arthur in east Texas to Jacksonville on Florida’s Atlantic Coast. And Mozambique’s area of some 790,000 square kilometres (309,000 square miles) is equivalent to the total area of six southern states (South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana). In European terms, Mozambique is approximately the size of France plus the German Federal Republic; its coastline is about as long as that of Western Europe from Denmark to Spain. By comparison, given the
considerable numbers of small aircraft and ships that escape detection or capture by the US drug enforcement agencies, it is likely that a smaller number of deliveries could elude the poorly equipped Mozambican authorities.

Organization and operations

According to the interviewees, Rename is not, as often portrayed, a loose collection of warlords and roving bands, but rather an army with a clear hierarchical structure and good command, control and communications (C3). The reports were consistent from interviewees from different parts of the country, and from rank-and-file soldiers as well as those with command experience.

The interviews indicate that the basic operational unit is the company, composed of approximately 100 to 150 men, generally grouped in one main base with smaller attached bases for special functions such as security and reconnaissance. Each company, with apparently few exceptions, is equipped with radio-transmission facilities and a communications officer who is in regular touch with the provincial base and indirectly with the Gorongosa headquarters base. Two or three companies make up a battalion, with some 450 men at full strength. A provincial base may have two or more battalions in its immediate vicinity, sometimes dispersed in several bases within a few hours’ march of each other. Each province is divided into two or more sectors. Recruits are kept in separate training bases attached to but not integrated with operational bases. A company is divided into platoons and sections, as well as ‘groups’ selected for specific operations.

This pattern, if extrapolated to the national level, would give a total of approximately 20,000 Rename soldiers, close to the estimate generally given in published sources.

One interviewee who spent nine years in Rename said that until 1981 the highest rank in Rename was battalion commander, except for President Andre Matsangaiza (until his death in October 1979) and President Afonso Dhlakama. Provincial commanders were appointed in 1982; provincial commanders and some others were given the rank of generals in 1983.

Paulo Oliveira said that the headquarters staff was located in South Africa until December 1983. He had lived in the base at the time. According to Oliveira, the general lines of strategy were planned by South African officials in conjunction with Rename Secretary-General Orlando Cristina until his death in April 1983. The day-to-day command was in the hands of
Lt. Johan Hurter, an aide to Colonel Charles van Niekerk. Cristina's successor Evo Fernandes played a less direct role in military strategy, Oliveira said. President Dhlakama, who spent some of his time in South Africa and some at Gorongosa, also participated in the planning, but generally deferred to the South African officers.

In preparation for the Nkomati Accord, Oliveira said, the headquarters staff was divided into three regions (south, centre and north) and sent into Mozambique. HQ south and north were mobile, while HQ centre, at Gorongosa, also served as national headquarters. Six Renamo communications officers remained in South Africa to handle communications between Gorongosa and the South African special forces in Phalaborwa. An entry in the Gorongosa diaries for February 24, 1984 says that 'two Renamo men will be trained in ultra-secret communications between Renamo and Pretoria'.

Efficient radio communications seem to be critical for Renamo's capacity to organize its attacks over the wide expanse of rural Mozambique. Of the interviewees, only the two sector commanders and one who had been a communications officer had any information beyond noting whether or not their unit had a radio. One had been a sector communications officer in 1982-1983, with responsibility for the area between the Save and Buzi rivers, overlapping Manica and Sofala provinces. He was later demoted, but said that as far as he could tell, this pattern continued until June 1986 when he left Renamo. He was responsible for 21 radios in his sector, with orders to check in with each five times a day. The messages might be very brief, or include detailed reports of combat, with dates, location, dead and wounded, captured and other relevant information. He was then responsible for transmitting a summary to the central base in Gorongosa over a separate radio link. Messages were spelled out in Portuguese, with a simple word-letter-substitution code.

The practice of requiring detailed regular reports is also confirmed by the radio message diaries of Paulo Sitole (Tempo, April 28, 1985) and by Colopes Sitoi, who said that as intelligence officer he had to compile detailed reports of military operations.

The author spoke to no one with direct knowledge of the Gorongosa - South Africa radio link in recent years. But sources in Harare said that it was an advanced rapid frequency-hopping system which neither Mozambique nor Zimbabwe was able to monitor. The continued functioning of the link can be deduced from the up-to-date military communiques reaching the Lisbon
office through South Africa. Paulo Oliveira said that until early 1988 the communications between Lisbon and Renamo were handled by the same Portuguese-speaking officers in the South African Defence Force he had known in South Africa in 1983-1984. Chivaca João also asserted that these same communications links were operative as late as October 1988.

One interviewee, who had been in a Renamo group occupying Caia in early 1987, said they had received advanced notice by radio that Zimbabwean and Mozambican troops were to attack the town. Renamo headquarters then instructed them to burn it down. This would seem to indicate sophisticated radio-monitoring capability on Renamo’s part, and would be consistent with the statement of Paulo Oliveira that South Africa monitored Mozambican radio communications and passed useful information on to the Renamo headquarters.

The interviewees described a variety of military operations, although the author did not press for details. These included attacks on government military outposts, on villages and on towns, as well as ambushes on roads and railways, sabotage and missions specifically to abduct designated individuals or new recruits.

The officer corps of Renamo, according to the interviewees, included men from all areas of Mozambique. A few, in Zambezia province, said almost all the officers in their unit (counting platoon and section chiefs) were also from Zambezia. In general, however, the interviewees from all areas of the country said that the large majority (80 to 90 per cent) of the commanders were Shona-speaking ‘veterans’, many from the initial groups trained in Rhodesia before 1980.

Among these commanders, at least, a common Shona ethnicity seems to have contributed to the coherence of the group. Beira and its Shona-speaking hinterland is the second major region in Mozambique, after Maputo, the capital in the south. The historical political economy of Mozambique, with Maputo and the south oriented to South Africa and Beira oriented to Rhodesia, creates a possible basis for rivalry. And there is no doubt that the most prominent figures in the history of Frelimo’s liberation struggle and of the post-independence government have been from the south rather than the centre. Chivaca João, in explaining his adherence to Renamo in Lisbon, cited the rivalry, and several of Renamo’s exile leaders repeatedly stress this point. The regional disparities of economic development, moreover, are a major subject of internal discussion within the Mozambican government.
In late 1987 former Renamo commander Gimo Phiri split with Dhlakama, forming a new organization (UNAMO) based in Malawi. Both Paulo Oliveira and Chivaca João said non-Shona Phiri’s resentment of the circle around Dhlakama contributed to the split.

This should not be simplisticly understood as ‘tribal’ conflict, however. The rank-and-file and leadership of both Renamo and the Mozambican government contain Mozambicans of all ethnic groups. And the differences in composition can be in large part explained by geographical and chronological circumstances. Shona prominence among the Renamo commanders can be explained by the fact that Rhodesia only targeted central Mozambique: the first several years of recruits, both voluntary and forced, therefore came from Shona areas. As a result of seniority, they became the ‘veterans’.

Another group among the 'veterans', mentioned by the three long-term Renamo soldiers as well as two other interviewees, consisted of former prisoners who were released by Renamo from government prison camps. They included, apparently, a mix of common criminals and men who had deserted from the Frelimo army over the period 1968 to 1976 (that is, both before and after independence), as well as others imprisoned, rightly or wrongly, for breaches of military discipline or corruption. Andre Matsangaiza and Afonso Dhlakama both fall into this category, having been imprisoned for alleged embezzlement of military stores.

This group, according to these interviewees, included former Frelimo soldiers who spoke Macua, Makonde and other languages as well as Shona. According to Cole’s history of the Special Air Service (SAS), as many as 300 were taken from one camp, at Sacuze near Gorongosa, by Andre Matsangaiza. He had escaped from the camp in 1976 and later returned with Rhodesian assistance. One of the interviewees who had been in the training camp with these men said most were glad to be out of prison, but really didn’t want to be in Renamo either. It was like being transferred from one prison to another, he said. Several interviewees, however, said this group was motivated by real bitterness and a desire for vengeance against Frelimo.

While almost all of the commanders were ‘veterans’ from before 1980, not all the veterans were commanders. Others were dispersed among the other combatants, or, in Maputo and Zambezia at least, grouped in special shock battalions. Several interviewees made special reference to so-called Grupos Limpa (‘Clean-up Squads’) of these battle-hardened veterans, who they said were responsible for most of the massacres and for internal executions within the Renamo forces. One of the interviewees who was in southern
Mozambique, as well as Colopes Sitoi, said that in that area 'veterans' in each battle unit were responsible for monitoring other Renamo soldiers, with orders to kill if someone showed signs of deserting or hesitation in battle.

The presence of South African troops or advisers with Renamo was episodic rather than constant, according to the interviews. Most had heard of the presence of 'Boers' but only a few had seen them personally. The member of the South African special forces whom the author interviewed said that in 1982 to 1984 (before he was transferred to another unit), the standard pattern was to send in a five-man group for two to three months, for special training courses, intelligence gathering or participation in specific actions. This group would normally be composed of two Afrikaners (the commander and a doctor) and three Africans in the special forces, one of Angolan origin, one of Zimbabwean origin and one of Mozambican origin. A diary entry in the Gorongosa documents for January 16, 1984, fits this pattern, speaking of a 'team' of South Africans to go to Zambezia at the end of January for training 100 instructors and 200 infantrymen.

One interviewee, in Maputo province, spoke of regular arrival of South African 'visitors' by helicopter in the base until he escaped in mid-1988. The other most detailed reference in the interviews was to the period of the 1986 Renamo offensive in the Zambezi Valley. One interviewee said he was in a base in Zambezia in 1985-1986 where there were black Malawian and South African as well as white South African instructors. He said the black instructors spoke Chichewa (a Malawian language), English and South African languages; some of the whites spoke Portuguese and others English. There were separate sections of the base for the whites, for the black South Africans, for the Malawians and for the Renamo troops themselves. He also said there was a battalion of black South African soldiers with a commander named Kinyama. A man with no formal education, the interviewee was not able to be precise about dates or numbers, but was very clear that the languages were not Mozambican and that these non-Mozambicans were present in large number.

Scattered interviews by Radio Mozambique indicate the continuing presence of at least small numbers of South African advisers. In March 1988, Abilio Jangane told Radio Mozambique that eight black South Africans had been in a base near Furancungo in Tete province until late 1987. He escaped from the base shortly after they left, he said. In February 1988 former Renamo intelligence officer Luis Tomas told Radio Mozambique that four South African soldiers and one Malawian had been helping to
construct an airfield at the Chadora base in Manica province, and were evacuated by helicopter shortly before government forces took the base at the end of 1987.

In November 1988 Julião Muianga told Radio Mozambique that when he left a base near Catandica in Manica province in January, six Boers who had been in the base as instructors were still there. And Isabel Jorge, referring to a base near Gorongosa, said there were 17 South Africans in the base when she left in mid-November. In Zambezia a displaced peasant recently arrived from Renamo areas in Lugela district told the author in December that there were ten black soldiers in the Renamo base who only spoke English among themselves; he did not know where they were from but was sure they were not Mozambicans.

Only two interviewees, Paulo Oliveira and Chivaca João, were able to give any details about Renamo’s external leadership and operations. Their statements at press conferences in Maputo are already on the public record, and overlap extensively with their comments to the author. The general lines of the historical record are available in published articles. And the proliferation of rumour, intrigue and disinformation in exile circles, with the involvement of private right-wing networks and intelligence agencies of three continents, provides ample reason for caution in conclusions about details. For all these reasons the author decided not to include extensive detail on this topic in this report.

Nevertheless, this account would be incomplete without a general picture of this level of Renamo.

Regardless of the accuracy of the details concerning exile intrigue, the two interviews, combined with the lack of awareness among the other interviewees of any Renamo leadership other than President Dhlakama, confirm a wide gap between this exile milieu and the military operations inside Mozambique.

The initiative taken by the Rhodesian regime in pulling together the Mozambicans who became Renamo is well documented (See Johnson and Martin, Fauvet, Flowers and Cole), although accounts differ on some of the details of the relationships among the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), Rhodesian military units and the Portuguese and Mozambican exiles involved in Renamo’s early years.
The intelligence operations by Ken Flowers of the Rhodesian CIO apparently began as early as 1969, and were stepped up after Mozambican independence in 1975. Renamo's second secretary-general Evo Fernandes, in an 1984 interview (Johnson and Martin, *Destructive Engagement*, p. 6), said that the organization was named at a May 1977 meeting in Salisbury, Rhodesia, attended by himself, Orlando Cristina, Dhlakama, Matsangaiza, Armando Khembo dos Santos and Leo Milas. Both dos Santos and Milas are Kenyan residents, dos Santos of Mozambican origin, Milas a black American who passed himself off as a Mozambican and infiltrated Frelimo in the early 1960s.

Both Orlando Cristina, of Portuguese origin, and Evo Fernandes, of Indian origin, were associated prior to independence with the Beira enterprises of industrialist Jorge Jardim. The role of Jardim himself, who was involved with the colonial counter-insurgency commandos and ran a quasi-official secret police group, remains obscure. He died in Gabon in 1982.

The linkage between South Africa and Renamo's external offices was controlled principally by successive Renamo strongmen Orlando Cristina and Evo Fernandes, who coordinated their actions with South African Colonel Cornelius (Charles) van Niekerk. Colonel van Niekerk, promoted to brigadier some time after 1985, was South African military attaché in Nampula in the early 1970s, monitoring the limited involvement of South Africa in Portugal's counter-insurgency campaign. According to Chivaca João, van Niekerk speaks both Portuguese and Macua. After Fernandes' death in April 1988, the Lisbon coordination with South Africa was handled by Asencio Gomes de Freitas, Chivaca João said. Gomes de Freitas, of Portuguese origin, was manager of the Boror plantations in Zambezia before independence.

Renamo also had, from 1982, a National Council composed of both political and military leaders. This council met in South Africa in mid-1983, when—to take on example—Cristina's death (allegedly at South African instigation) required the appointment of a new secretary-general. According to Oliveira, who attended the meeting, there was considerable rivalry but Evo Fernandes was chosen because he had the support of Dhlakama and of the South Africans.

The National Council has met on an irregular basis since then, most recently in October 1988 in Heidelberg in the German Federal Republic. Apart from Dhlakama and a few of his commanders, whose transport out of Mozambique for the meetings was arranged by the South Africans, all the
members of this council are Mozambicans who have been in exile since the
sixties or early 1970s, living in Malawi, Kenya, Portugal, the German
Federal Republic and the United States. According to Oliveira and Chivaca
João, only a few of them ever visited Renamo areas inside Mozambique.

The relationship of these exiles to right-wing circles and intelligence agen-
cies in their countries of exile has led to a complex pattern of competition
and cooperation between these sources of support and South African
military intelligence. Oliveira and Chivaca João, as well as articles in the
London-based *Africa Confidential*, said that it was such rivalries that led to
the killings of Evo Fernandes and of several Renamo members in Malawi.
The delivery of communications equipment to Renamo from US right-wing
groups, they said, was an effort to establish communications links between
Dhlakama and outside supporters other than the channel controlled by
South Africa (see also *Washington Post*, July 31, 1988). But South Africa
was unwilling to give up its monopoly, they said.

In so far as other international efforts do not challenge its control, South
Africa probably welcomes them. They can provide a plausible context for
official South African denials. But none of the interviewees made any
reference to military supplies or cooperation except that with the South
African Defence Force and (in the context of the 1986 offensive) with
Malawi. The interviews provide no substantiation for reports in the interna-
tional press alleging that South African support for Renamo has been
replaced by private right-wing networks in South Africa or elsewhere.

The interviewees were not in a position to observe at what level in the South
African government the decisions concerning this operation were taken.
Judgements about the plausibility of private operations, rogue operations
by soldiers or ex-soldiers acting out of the chain of command, or disagree-
ments within the South African state must rely on other data and analysis.

It is clear from the interviews, however, that there was no dramatic change
in the pattern of supplies, command or communications at any time from

The Nkomati Accord of 1984 was described by combatants present before
and after the Accord as producing a greater emphasis on secrecy, and
slightly less regularity of supplies, but no basic change in the pattern of
relationships. Continued South African involvement through late 1984, in
violation of the Accord, was irrefutably documented by the Gorongosa
documents.
Some observers now argue that South African assertions of non-support for Renamo should be believed because no recent 'smoking gun' evidence has been uncovered. The author's interviews and Mozambican eyewitness reports, together with South Africa's well-documented past record of deception, make it hard to accept such an argument as credible.
Appendix 1
Interviewees

Interviewed in Maputo, November, 1988


Angolan, 30 years old, recruited to South African Defence Force while a refugee in Namibia in 1976. Became commando, served in 5 Recce (unit training Renamo) in 1985, later transferred to special unit operations against ANC. Captured in Mozambique while planting a bomb.

Ian Grey—Australian missionary, 22 years old. Says he was deceived into serving as a courier for Renamo. Arrested in Mozambique in 1987, serving prison term.

Mozambican, auto mechanic, born in Cape Verde, 39 years old. Abducted by Renamo in bordertown when returning drunk from a bar at 1 am, in 1984. Almost killed, then treated by South African doctor. Three months military training, 4 years in base near Swazi/South African border, escaped in 1988.


Zimbabwean, born in Inyanga near Mozambican border, 31 years old. Was in Mozambique as refugee near border in 1978 (24 December). Abducted, taken to Odzi camp in Rhodesia, 6 months training. Most of war in Mavonde district, eventually a sector commander, captured in 1988.

Mozambican, born in Manica province. 25 years old, 3rd grade education. Abducted in 1984, he was at home, his brother also abducted. Taken to Gorongosa for training, later trained in first aid. Escaped in 1988.

Modesto Sixpence—Mozambican, born in Manica province, 27 years old, 4th grade education. Was visiting grandparents near Barue in January 1979 when he was abducted. Tied up and marched to base with 70 others, by car to Odzi in Rhodesia, spent most time in Manica & Sofala, including Gorongosa. In 1988 turned himself in at Catandica.

Mozambican, born in Manica, 34 years old. Was in Frelimo army briefly just before independence, then a farmer. Matsanga arrived in the zone in 1982, occupied his house. He was appointed head mudhiba, later taken to another area. In 1988 he organized flight of 177 people. His brother-in-law and six other people

Note: Those identified by name are those who had already given extensive prior interviews to journalists, in which they were cited by name.

Interviewed in Chimoio, central Mozambique, November 1988

Mozambican, 33 years old, born in Zambezia. Worked as tractor driver in Sofala. Abducted and forced into military training with 80 other plantation workers in August 1985. Was at headquarters base in Gorongosa, in unit guarding hospital. Turned himself in in August, waiting for transport to Zambezia.


Zimbabwean, born in Inyanga near Mozambican border, 31 years old. Was in Mozambique as refugee near border in 1978 (24 December). Abducted, taken to Odzi camp in Rhodesia, 6 months training. Most of war in Mavonde district, eventually a sector commander, captured in 1988.

Mozambican, born in Manica province. 25 years old, 3rd grade education. Abducted in 1984, he was at home, his brother also abducted. Taken to Gorongosa for training, later trained in first aid. Escaped in 1988.

Modesto Sixpence—Mozambican, born in Manica province, 27 years old, 4th grade education. Was visiting grandparents near Barue in January 1979 when he was abducted. Tied up and marched to base with 70 others, by car to Odzi in Rhodesia, spent most time in Manica & Sofala, including Gorongosa. In 1988 turned himself in at Catandica.

Mozambican, born in Manica, 34 years old. Was in Frelimo army briefly just before independence, then a farmer. Matsanga arrived in the zone in 1982, occupied his house. He was appointed head mudhiba, later taken to another area. In 1988 he organized flight of 177 people. His brother-in-law and six other people
were killed for trying to escape in December 1987.

Mozambican, born in Manica, 38 years old. 7th grade education. Worked in Maputo, returned to Manica, became a farmer. Abducted with 15 other persons on August 3, 1979. Taken to Odzi; in 1983 was regional communications officer, with 21 radios under his command. Demoted because of internal rivalries. Captured by Zimbabwean troops in 1986.

Mozambican, born in Gaza, 38 years old, 2nd grade education. Worked in mines in South Africa. In 1978 returned to farming in Gaza; was abducted in December 1982 while on the way to father-in-law’s house. Transferred to Sofala province after 15 days of training. Captured Sept. 3, 1985.

Mozambican, born in Sofala, 29 years old, 2nd grade education. Abducted September, 1981, while sleeping at home. Taken with 9 other persons from the village; wounded and captured in 1988.

Interviewed in Zambezia province, northern Mozambique, December 1988


Mozambican, born Ile, Zambezia, 26 years old, 2nd grade education. In July 1983, matsangas came to house, took food, made him show way to next village. Then refused to allow him to return home. Captured by Frelimo in September 1983.

Mozambican, born Alto Molocue, Zambezia, 24 years old, 4th grade education. Recruited August 1985; soldiers arrived at home at night, forced him to come along. In January 1986 captured by Frelimo in attack on Morrua.

Mozambican, born Lugela, Zambezia, doesn’t know age, no formal education. Abducted in 1985. They burned his house down, let old men return home, others trained. Captured after a year in the bush.

Mozambican, born Milange, Zambezia, 32 years old, 6th grade education. Worked in tea factory as clerk. Abducted when Milange was attacked in September 1986. Escaped to Malawi, but Malawi immigration handed him over to Renamo. Assigned office work in Renamo camp. Escaped in June 1988 and turned himself in in Milange.


Mozambican, born Morrumbala, Zambezia, 28 years old, 6th grade education. Abducted April 13, 1984, while at uncle’s house. Forced to carry wood and food to the base. Five months training, then first aid training in Gorongosa; 50 in his course, all had been abducted from Zambezia. Escaped and handed himself in at Caia, on September 24, 1987; now with family in Nicoadala.

Mozambican, born Morrumbala, Zambezia, 20 years old, 3rd grade education. Abducted while in field in 1986, sent to Gorongosa. Succeeded in fleeing to Caia, now at Nicoadala.

Mozambican, born Morrumbala, Zambezia, 25 years old. No formal education, a peasant. Abducted August 26, 1987, at home 8 a.m., forced to carry knapsacks. Tied up, trained. Escaped during attack in March 1988, went home, got family, and turned himself in at Frelimo post.

Mozambican, born Gile, Zambezia, 18 years old, no formal education. Captured in August, 1987, at home at night. Trained for 9 months. Didn’t finish. was sent Gorongosa, on way escaped, turned himself in.

Mozambican, born Namarroi, Zambezia, 24 years old, 6th grade education. 24 December 1985 abducted while at work in school at Nicoadala, along with 18 others. After 5 escaped the rest were threatened with execution, but spared; instead separated and sent to different prison camps, he in Caia district with 3 others. Succeeded in escaping in February 1987; story not believed at first, finally released in April 1988, back at work in school.

Mozambican, born Nicoadala, Zambezia, 22 years old, 3rd grade education. Abducted in January, 1985,
taken to Niassa after two month training. Anti-air-
craft training there. Returned to Zambezia end 1986.
In September 1988 succeeded in hiding in group going
to Nicaodala, then escaped.

Mozambican, born Pebane, Zambezia, 25 years
old. Less than 1st grade education. Fisherman.
Abducted when going home from church in Novem-
ber 1986. Trained and fought in Morrumbala,
Milange. Fleed in mid-1988, walked two months in
bush alone. Now in Mocuba with wife and family.

Interviewed in Maputo, December 1988

Chivaca João—Mozambican, born Sofala, 24 years
old, studied through high school (5 years in Cuba). In
Left to go to Portugal to study in March 1983. Linked
up with Renamo supporters in Lisbon, became part of
leadership. Accepted Mozambican amnesty and re-

Mozambican, born in Maputo, 31 years old, 11th
grade education. Abducted in April 1986, when he
and brother were going to visit uncle in Moamba;
brother killed. Escaped after several days and went to
authorities, but they didn't believe him.

Mozambican, born in Inhambane, 43 years old, 4th
grade education. Was in Portuguese colonial troops;
worked as miner in South Africa. Abducted while
going to father’s funeral, near Homoine, in October
1983. Taken to Zambezia by plane (false documents)
with two Renamo commanders, who threatened to
have his family killed if he resisted. Escaped in Jan-
uary 1984, turned himself in, story not believed.

Appendix 2

Excerpts from Sample Interview from Mozambican Press

Fernando Machia: Tale of crimes under Pretoria’s instructions

By Filemão Saveca

Fernando Machia, bachelor, 23 years old, born in
Chibavava, in Sofala province, entered armed ban-
ditry on February 14, 1981, in Muchungue, after
being abducted from his residence with his older
brother Jaime Machie, who died at the Sambamahure
base when he tried to escape.

In his revelations Machia, who benefited from the
Amnesty Law, now living in Manica, stressed that
there are serious contradictions among the leaders of
the armed bandits.

'People are killed like chickens, arbitrary imprison-
ment is common, when one doesn’t obey the orders of
the chiefs. There is lack of clothing. They kill off
many elephants and other animals, trading the ivory
and skins to South Africa and other neighbouring
countries.'

After being forced to join the ranks of the armed
bandits, Fernando Machia trained for two months
inside Mozambique, after which he received a gun,
and was sent to Jambe, Funhalouro district, in the
Chissolane area in Inhambane. From there he went to
Manjacaze, in Gaza, in 1982.

He recalls that in February 1983, there arrived a
group of six whites from South Africa, who selected
290 men, to specialize in the navy, 'to travel after-
wards by submarine'.

After he arrived in South Africa, these men were
housed in Palaborwa for nine months. Fernando
Machia was chosen to take the paratrooper course.
After nine months, he returned to Mozambique and,
he said, 'when I came to a mountaintop in Gorongo-
sa, called Casa Banana, I was selected for the
Matenge base, Macanga district. Tete province,
where we carried out sabotage on the railway and on
the Tete-Malawi road. In March 1985 I returned to the same large base in Gorongosa.'

Continuing, our interviewee said, 'On April 23, 1985, I went to Zambezia. Here, we attacked Luabo, Mopeia, Morrumbala and Chimuala, where we carried out destruction, robberies and killings. From Zambezia we carried out other attacks on the districts of Marromeu, Caia and Maringue, in Sofala province.'

In particular this bandit, now a beneficiary of the Amnesty Law, revealed that he had taken part in the second attack on Caia in Sofala, in which, according to him, he accompanied a group of whites who were taking films. He presumed they were journalists. 'One of them was killed by the Mozambican Armed Forces', he concluded.

He underlined having seen four-engine Dakota airplanes which arrived at the base at night or early morning, to leave materiel. 'The airstrip', he said, 'was marked with piles of firewood, six on each side, with a lamp in the middle. After the airplanes identified the spot, they dropped boxes of materiel. Also ships arrived in the Nhamatope area, near Beira, also bringing materiel for the interior of Mozambique'.

Noticias (Maputo), October 17, 1988

Appendix 3

Sample Amnesty Flier, Manica province

You mozambican who are involved in armed banditry

Stop killing your parents, children and brothers for nothing.

Don't continue destroying your country which cost so much sacrifice and blood of the best sons of the land to free from foreign occupation.

Don't be deceived by those who live off your useless suffering in the bush and who wish to see your country drowned in poverty and you yourself in misery, without clothing, food, or shoes and far from your family.

Don't forget that you were forced to join the bandits.

Now is the time to give up crime.

Take this opportunity.

Do like your companions Francisco, José, Joaquim, Mario, Alberto and so many others who decided to give up crime, hunger and misery, coming to hand themselves in to the FRELIMO authorities. They were well received, well treated and they are already with their families building the progress of free and independent Mozambique.

[Photo of Dinis Sabonete Macuena.]

'I, Dinis Sabonete Macuena, was with the bandits for seven years and when I heard about the Amnesty Law I decided to escape and I came to present myself to Frelimo here in Gondola. I was well received and well treated. Do like me, present yourself to Frelimo. Don't continue to sow terror, mourning and misery.'

LONG LIVE PEACE!
Appendix 4

Selected Bibliography of Major Articles and Books Containing Information on Renamo

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Stokke, Olav, *Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden*, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1989, in cooperation with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Norwegian Foreign Policy Studies No. 64), 355 pp, price SEK 220 (inside Sweden), SEK 180 (outside Sweden), USD 30 (air mail postage included), ISBN 9171062858.


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