Thinking and policy on ‘development’ and ‘security’ have undergone paradigmatic shifts in recent decades. The well-known merger of development and security into a ‘development-security nexus’ is now shifting towards an increasingly institutionalised securitisation. Security is everywhere, and development is security. A new discourse and practice is arising as the meaning of these concepts shift and the referents and objects of development and security are changing. Gradually we are moving beyond the development-security nexus into the reign of continuous global disaster management. These new articulations of the development-security nexus and global disaster management have served to legitimise a more radical interventionist agenda – first and foremost carried out by the West in the Global South.

With thought-provoking contributions by leading authorities in this burgeoning field, this volume makes sense of the aforementioned paradigmatic shift. The articles explore the rationale and forces behind the institutionalisation of interventionism and intrusive disaster management as well as the consequences thereof in a number of policy domains and cases.

Edited by Jens Stilhoff Sörensen and Fredrik Söderbaum

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This volume is the result of ongoing collaboration between a group of Swedish and British scholars, all of whom are interested in rethinking the development-security nexus and concerned with the disastrous affects of the current radicalisation of external intervention and disaster management. The majority of contributors have met on various occasions over the last two years to exchange views within the International Development and Security Network (INDESENT), which is hosted by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm. Contributions from participants at the workshops of the network are gratefully acknowledged. We also wish to thank colleagues of the nascent research group on ‘Reconstruction and Intervention’ at the School of Global Studies (SGS), University of Gothenburg, for constructive comments on some of the draft papers.

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Jens Stilhoff Sörensen & Fredrik Söderbaum

Contributors

David Chandler
Professor of International Relations
University of Westminster

Mark Duffield
Professor of Development Politics and Director of the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol

Stephen Graham
Professor of Cities and Society
School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape
Newcastle University

Linnéa Gelot
Post-doctoral fellow at Gothenburg Centre of Globalization and Development and the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg

Alexandra Kent
Associate Professor in Social Anthropology
School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg

Vanessa Pupavac
Lecturer in International Relations
School of Politics and International Relations
University of Nottingham

Julian Reid
Professor of International Relations
University of Lapland, Finland

Michael Schulz
Associate Professor in
Peace and Development Studies
School of Global Studies,
University of Gothenburg

Giorgio Shani
Associate Professor of International Development and Peacebuilding, Department of Politics and International Relations, International Christian University, Tokyo.

Fredrik Söderbaum
Associate Professor in
Peace and Development Studies
School of Global Studies,
University of Gothenburg

Jens Stilhoff Sörensen
Research Fellow in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, and Lecturer in Peace and Development Studies
School of Global Studies,
University of Gothenburg

Edited by Jens Stilhoff Sörensen and Fredrik Söderbaum

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Preface

Henning Melber

Civilians, and in particular women and children, are the principal victims of warfare and other emergencies that put lives at risk and result in large-scale human suffering. The scale and dimensions of such challenges, demanding a collective response to provide relief, have reached proportions that affect more than ever before both global governance institutions and public awareness. Responses have taken new forms and have changed in quality. Disaster relief has to a large extent been replaced by a broader notion of humanitarian intervention, dealing with many more forms of assistance to alleviate the plight of people in need. The most recent cases of Libya and Syria, in which efforts to reduce the suffering through humanitarian relief measures in situations of civil war were made in parallel with other forms of intervention to influence and change internal dynamics, are prominent cases in point.

Since the late 20th century the hitherto isolated approaches of humanitarian relief missions have been gradually replaced by a new logic of combined interventions, in which development assistance and humanitarian aid go hand in hand with other action – at times even with military intervention. As a result, the institutionalised orders and forms, as well as the concept of humanitarianism, are in flux. Those acting on the basis of normative frameworks – guided by principles such as humanity, impartiality and non-military means – to protect civilians no longer share a common doctrine as they did before.

Forms and instruments of coordinated humanitarianism have changed, resulting in shifting roles for different actors such as the state, the international community and international NGOs. The translation of the core principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and non-violence into practical measures is giving rise to a process of re-definition, which introduces new understandings. Humanitarian missions increasingly serve as entry points for intervention from the outside to contribute to social if not political change. Humanitarian intervention is not necessarily confined any longer to relief missions. Not surprisingly, practitioners and scholars alike are re-thinking and debating the fundamentals of humanitarian intervention and its role (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Barnett 2011). A new logic of interventionism has gained currency in response not only to so-called natural disasters but also to political conflict, resulting in a combination of military initiatives with
other forms of intervention both as humanitarian emergency relief measures and forms of development assistance. As the contributions to Fassin and Pandolfi (2010) make clear, these interventions combine military action and humanitarian aid, conflate moral imperatives and political arguments, and confuse the concepts of legitimacy and legality.

The processes of re-orientation were reflected in the shift of emphasis towards a ‘culture of protection’ that permeated the UN structure and discourses after Kofi Annan assumed office as Secretary-General. A series of reforms underlined the prominence of the issue. The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was established in 1998 as the coordinating body for humanitarian action in collaboration with national and international agencies and actors to alleviate suffering, advocate rights for people in need, take preventative action, facilitate relief and explore other solutions. OCHA seeks to lay the foundations upon which ‘a truly inclusive humanitarian response system’ can be built to meet the challenges (OCHA undated: 2). Peacebuilding and humanitarian relief measures are increasingly linked (Holt and Taylor 2009; OCHA 2011). But results have been mixed. At times, humanitarian interventions do more harm than good. In this, they have similarities with the dilemma accompanying the practices of a Responsibility to Protect, which has been shaped and applied in parallel since the turn of the century.

Humanitarian space – or rather, the arena for humanitarian interventions – underwent a re-demarcation after the end of the bi-polar world and even more so after 9/11 and the emerging ‘war against terror’. The nature of interventions shifted considerably, as did the role of the military and international agencies. Pringle and Lambrechts (2011: 59) observe, like many others, an ‘increasingly explicit linkage of the security/military agenda and the humanitarian agenda’. Along with this comes increased exposure of international agencies to risk and insecurity as well as the militarisation of civilian relief measures: ‘the blurring of the distinction between combatants and civilians and the active targeting of civilians that characterises contemporary conflict zones means that international agencies, as supporters of the victims of conflicts, are no longer regarded as neutral parties’ (ibid.). Not surprisingly, the last decade saw a shrinking of humanitarian space and, in parallel, the further politicisation and militarisation of aid. Not that humanitarian intervention had ever been entirely non-political. But the overlapping nature of emergency and disaster relief as well as other humanitarian interventions made within a predominantly political-
military environment have assumed hitherto unknown dimensions and seem to be increasingly linked to a new concept.

This volume explores the paradigm shifts and practical modifications of a humanitarian–development-security nexus from a variety of differing but similarly critical perspectives. It is the result of earlier scholarly exchanges in which the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation had been indirectly involved. We appreciate the opportunity to be the forum for publishing the results of these reflections, which aim to sharpen our analytical awareness with regard to ongoing processes. Through this, the editors and authors contribute to our current thematic focus on the security-development nexus, which guides our work programme for the years to come as an important arena of reflections in search of constructive approaches.

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Introduction
– The End of the Development-Security Nexus?

Jens Stilhoff Sörensen and Fredrik Söderbaum

International development has reached an impasse. Over the past two decades development and security have undergone a paradigmatic shift. While paradigm shifts may be perceived as rapid they are usually part of processes of gradual change that lead to a fundamentally redefined imaginary, a sudden new reality. The new landscape of development and security that has emerged in the 21st century is reflected in concepts such as ‘the development-security nexus’, referring to the merger of development and security and indicating that development has become integral to security; ‘failed’ and ‘fragile states’, emphasising the lack of state capacity to uphold order and implement policy; ‘human security’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’, both indicating a shifting referent of security from ‘state’ to ‘population’. These concepts all reflect a more radical interventionist approach since the early 1990s and a new condition in international relations, between centre and periphery.

Development and security constitute the world’s largest business, which, while purportedly aiming to dismantle itself, is continuously growing. Development is an ever-elusive horizon and security an expanding notion with remarkable plasticity. Western liberal states are permanently engaged in a war on terror, the contours of which are blurred and constantly shifting. In the name of security NATO and Western liberal states are locked into long-term overseas engagements and peace-building and state-building missions from Afghanistan and Iraq to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, while at the same time refining and imposing new techniques of surveillance and control domestically, over their own cities and citizens. Security abroad and security at home are now linked, as are development abroad and security at home. The war on terror is fought as much through the surveillance of populations, and targeting of individuals and radical networks, in London, Hamburg and Los Angeles as it is in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen. Security has in a sense become borderless, globalised and individualised. In taking human life and populations as its referent, rather than states, development/security is *biopolitical* as
much as it is geopolitical. New biometric techniques and racial profiling are emerging in the centre, the Western liberal democracies, with an increasingly penetrating surveillance not just of airports or public events, but also of Internet and cellular phones, city centres and workspaces, across a wider spectrum of public and private space. And in the periphery, international outlets of a development-security industry retreat behind fortified UN and aid agency compounds, enabling a physical separation between aid workers and benefactors, accompanying a trend towards guarded or walled-off city quarters and settlements. Cities, not just in the Third World but also in the West, have increasingly become sites of security and surveillance, and there is a growing social, spatial and architectural separation and segregation, dividing secure space from dangerous space and the rich from the poor.

While poverty is perceived as dangerous, the division and social gap between poor and rich has continued to grow over the past decades. This trend unfolds both within countries and between the richest and poorest countries (Graham 2009: 6; Reich 2010). Globally, increasing numbers of people are living in slums. Half of the world’s 7 billion people live in urban areas and over 1 billion live in slums or informal settlements, a figure that continues to grow (Davis 2006). While many people experience
improved social and material conditions (a statistical trend which outside the Western core is largely a reflection of China’s economic expansion), there is an ever-growing ‘human dump’ of people living in absolute poverty. Among these are the ‘bottom billion’, who live on less than one dollar per day, and the one quarter of the world’s slum population, who live in ‘barely imaginable’ conditions of absolute poverty (Davis 2006: 25). Most of the world’s mega-slums have developed and grown since the 1960s largely as a result of market forces and speculation on land, accelerating a reshaping of societies (cf. Davis 2006). These people are neither consumers nor producers but the victims of neoliberal globalisation. They are ‘globalisation outcasts’, the waste product of the global market economy. Accompanying them in misery is a growing population of forcibly displaced persons, either internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees. Their number today has reached about 43 million, out of which 15 million are refugees and 27 million IDPs (UNHCR 2009).

Even if the refugee crisis peaked during the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s, the number of refugees has increased over the past decade, reaffirming a trend over the past three decades. About 80 per cent of these refugees are in developing countries and many refugee camps have themselves developed into slum cities. Slum cities are often walled off under an increasingly militarised surveillance and control apparatus, as for example in Gaza, perhaps the world’s largest slum, where two thirds of the population live on two dollars per day (Davis 2006: 48). Behind these walls is a surplus population that lives at the mercy of a security apparatus, reduced to ‘bare life’. The Israeli security model, walling off settlements and populations, is replicated elsewhere, for example by the US Army in Baghdad as part of the ‘surge’ (Gregory 2008). A segment above, there is an increasing number of economic migrants, now constituting over 200 million people, who are forced to work abroad in order to support families or relatives in their home country (IOM 2011). This in turn generates further impetus for increased control and surveillance, such as the EU-supported border police along the Greek-Turkish border, and for building new barriers, such as the fence along the US-Mexican border.

The return of interventionism: re-articulations of the development-security nexus

Controlling and fortifying the border, and finding ways to intervene beyond it, is nothing new in international affairs. The way the West has dealt with the South has moved in a cycle during the past century. At one end we have colonialism, which epitomises international intervention and interventionism in its most radical form. The end of colonialism relaxed interventionism in favour of a ‘liberalism of restraint’,
which was based on the autonomy of the sovereign state and its right to freedom from intervention (Sørensen 2006). The rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s increased interventionary practices, and the developments following the end of the Cold War led to the ‘liberalism of imposition’ and an institutionalisation of new forms of intervention (ibid.).

During colonialism investment in infrastructure and governing structures was typically geared towards serving the colonial economy, which spurred infrastructural and institutional ‘development’ of urban centres and connected strategic areas, while simultaneously leading to the destruction of inherent domestic social and economic networks and livelihoods and generating underdevelopment and famine in many areas.

International development as a project emerged after the Second World War, and it focused primarily on building nation-states from the former colonies through modernisation and economic transformation. The ‘Third World’ could moreover be integrated into a global economic order where the industrialised West had more or less monopolised the production of goods. International development was from its very inception connected to security (Duffield 2010; Pupavac 2010). But, while the ‘development–security nexus’ has a long genealogy, one that is intertwined with the idea of development, the referent of development and security has changed. In the bipolar world order development was an instrument to prevent the newly independent states from falling under the control of the communist bloc (or, from Moscow’s perspective, to fall under the influence of Washington). The bipolar order thereby
implied a new balancing act in external intervention, a form of geopolitical competition in client-state relationships with a formal adherence to international rules of sovereignty, however ‘hypocritical’ in nature (Krasner 1999). Under bipolarism the Third World state thereby had a manoeuvring space between the models and protection offered by East and those of the West. This enabled actual state-led development gains in many countries although it was a picture tainted by corruption, repression and the emergence of development dictatorships.

The liberal project of ‘development’ as conceptualised under modernism was, however, short-lived and began by the 1970s and especially in the 1980s to be challenged and to give way to neoliberalism and a non-material sustainable development philosophy (Pupavac 2010; Sörensen 2010). Coming from different ideological and philosophical strands, neoliberalism and sustainable development shared a critique not only of state-centred concepts of development but also of the modernist conception of the state. Although sustainable development seemed to offer a new and quite separate critique of economistic development, it became part of the neoliberal attack on state-led modernisation. The critique, launched by the proponents of sustainable development, of grand-scale state-engineered industrialisation and modernisation, with their ecological and social alienation, had a direct parallel in the neoliberal concern with the state’s intrusion on the market. This does not mean that sustainable development is a mere neoliberal proxy. As Julian Reid argues in this issue, the relationship is more complex, and while sustainable development deploys ecological reason in advocating the need to secure the biosphere, neoliberalism conceives of the economy as the means to security. Thus, in neoliberalism economic reason is conceived of as a servant to ecological reason and thereby it can project its own governmental rationalities as both addressing and being the solution to the very same issue.

Neoliberal reform packages, in the form of structural adjustment programmes, hit the Third World like a shockwave in the 1980s, followed by ‘good governance’ and ‘comprehensive development’ in the 1990s, and with similar prescriptions imposed on Eastern Europe. Across the African continent privatisation and trade liberalisation forced many countries to focus on primary commodity production for export, while industries could be taken over by foreign companies (Hoogvelt 1997: 88, 138). This resulted in deepening poverty, increasing unemployment and widening social polarisation, and in some parts even de-industrialisation (Abrahamsen 2000: 10; Bush 2007; Hoogvelt 1997: 170–71; Shafaeddin 2006). In Eastern Europe the number of people living in poverty and deep insecurity exploded from between 3 million and 14

The collapse of the Soviet Union, and its patronage in the developing world, enabled a more assertive liberal global agenda. Western development policy became more interventionist and there was a rapid expansion of the aid industry, particularly in the form of subcontracted NGOs. If ‘development’ had become a lost concept owing to the onslaught of neoliberalism and sustainable development, the development industry could now reinvent itself in relation to conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Beginning in the 1990s the debate over the role of humanitarian aid in conflict areas rearticulated the connection between development and security. Because international aid, whether humanitarian or developmental, was about bringing resources into a conflict area, it had the capacity both to prolong and prevent or mitigate conflict. Aid agencies and NGOs became engaged in conflict management, prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. The new articulation of the ‘development–security nexus’ served to legitimise the more radical interventionist agenda. If development was a security issue and security
was to be understood in terms of ‘human security’, then ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ or even rogue states constituted a global security concern that legitimised intervention on purely humanitarian grounds.

In the context of increasing normalisation of intervention and interventionism, the nature of the state and its institutions have been awarded increasing attention. Support to institutions and ‘good governance’ – and ‘state-building’ in post-conflict areas – have become an instrument of security. However, although the ‘state’ has in this manner been brought back into the development-security nexus, it is with a radically different conception from all previous understandings. As argued by Jens Stilhoff Sörensen in this issue, it is a conception of the state that is firmly embedded in the neoliberal paradigm, focusing on institutional reshaping to enable the implementation of market reforms and society’s capacity to absorb them. In this global edifice of ‘liberal market-shaping’ the instruments of state-building, sustainable development and self-reliance are adopted as population management strategies for the marginalised.

**Beyond the nexus**

Western liberal interventionism has been increasingly radicalised since the 1990s, and especially over the past decade. Security is everywhere. Development *is* security, a security strategy, or so we have become accustomed to believe. Several of the authors in this issue have made groundbreaking contributions to this field of study. Thus, for example, Mark Duffield’s work has been seminal in elucidating the ‘securitisation of development’ and analysing its changing rationalities, while Vanessa Pupavac has approached the development-security nexus from the vantage point of the ‘developmentalisation of security’. Gradually, many scholars are now moving beyond the development-security nexus. It is not only that we see cracks in the nexus, an increasingly totalised securitisation of development and a growing track record of failure in terms of delivering on politically stated norms and goals, as demonstrated in particular in the first part of this issue. There is both a conceptual drift and a discursive shift, moving us into a new terrain in which the ‘nexus’ has been abandoned altogether. Development has become non-material ‘sustainable development’ and security is losing ground to resilience. Neoliberalism entails a break with the modernist project and a new relation to ‘uncertainty’. Essentially, where the modernist project aspired to security, neoliberalism embraces uncertainty and risk as a creative opportunity, being necessary to capitalism, and to freedom itself (cf. O’Malley 2009). Modernity’s ambition of achieving security through material development and through the idea of protection is replaced by a politics focusing on resilience and continuous global disaster management in which intervention is a normalised practice. Although global disaster
management operates in the name of security, it is in itself the expression of a changing relation to security. As Julian Reid argues in this issue, liberalism’s longstanding correlation with security is changing and moving to new discursive foundations, principally that of ‘resilience’. Increasingly, the arguments for sustainable development are not connected to security, but to resilience: to be sustainable is to be resilient. By implication, security itself is increasingly advocated in terms of ‘resilience’, whereas security in terms of protection and stability is rejected as illusory. As we move away from the development-security nexus, we move towards what Julian Reid calls a ‘sustainable development-resilience’ nexus. And building resilient subjects presupposes a disastrous world; a world of constant exposure to disaster or catastrophe. This is a permanent condition requiring constant global disaster management as well as intervention. Implicit in the shift from protection to resilience is also a movement away from the ‘event’ towards process. Against the idea of protection from the ‘event’ is pitched a process-oriented understanding of resilience and continuous ‘catastrophe politics’, a ‘resilience-disaster management nexus’. This implies a retraction from the ambition to plan, mobilise and engineer ‘development’, or to do so in relation to ‘security’, and embraces uncertainty as the ultimate expression of freedom.

Structure of this volume

With thought-provoking contributions by leading authorities in the field, this issue makes sense of the aforementioned paradigmatic shift, whereby the well-known merger of development and security into a ‘development-security nexus’ is being replaced by the institutionalisation of interventionism and intrusive disaster management. The collection is organised in three parts, which address the general theme from a range of perspectives and in a number of policy domains and cases. The first part (with contributions by Mark Duffield, Steve Graham and Jens Stilhoff Sörensen) addresses the securitisation and militarisation of policy and of our contemporary life-world, including that of development, and its spatial, architectural and social effects. The second part (with contributions by Julian Reid, Vanessa Pupavac, Giorgio Shani and David Chandler) focuses on various aspects of a changing liberal subjectivity and changes in development theory and practice. The third part (with contributions by Linnea Gelot/Fredrik Söderbaum, Michael Schulz and Alexandra Kent) deals specifically with the rise of intervention and interventionism, with emphasis given to the often-neglected encounter between interveners and those ‘intervened upon’.
Part 1: Securitisation, militarisation and splintering

In ‘Risk Management and the Bunkering of the Aid Industry’ Mark Duffield examines the militarisation of aid and risk management, taking the development of fortified aid bunkers and UN field security training as expressions of both a more permanent presence of the development-security industry in aid-dependent societies and of a new aid-worker subjectivity operating in these areas. The architectural expression of development, which is one of permanence rather than a temporary arrangement, illustrates the total securitisation of development, the impasse of development-security and its shift to a catastrophe politics of unending global disaster management.

In ‘Foucault’s Boomerang: The New Military Urbanism’ Steve Graham draws on his extensive research on military urbanism to present the argument of a boomerang effect between centre and periphery in structuring and organising spatial, urban and social life under shifting paradigms and discusses images of security from colonialism to the present time.

In ‘The Failure of State-Building: Changing Biopolitics and the Splintering of Societies’ Jens Stilhoff Sörensen explores the sustained attack on the modernist project and develops an argument for a shifting biopolitics accompanying neoliberalism, one which has become divisive rather than aggregate and with the effect of splintering societies in both social and spatial terms. The implication is that international (neo)liberal state-building, as a practice of global liberal governance, contributes to sustain and increase divisions and conflicts rather than mitigate them.

Part 2: Subjects and subjectivity in development-security theory and practice

In ‘The Disastrous and Debased Subject of Resilience’ Julian Reid analyses the relation between sustainable development and neoliberalism, crucially through the discourse of resilience, and then explores this discourse and the changing nature of ‘the subject’ under liberalism. Here, there is a new form of subjectivity emerging, one that needs to be adaptive, flexible and resilient, in the face of change as well as disaster, and an accompanying shift away from protection and security towards resilience and adaptation to risk and random and catastrophic events.

In ‘Global Disaster Management and Therapeutic Governance of Communities’ Vanessa Pupavac discusses the changing Western understanding of disasters and disaster-affected communities. Pupavac argues that traditional humanitarianism treated emergencies as phenomena caused by natural disasters and the community as innocent victims,
often represented as the helpless supplicant child, who needed aid. The recipient community in international aid was not portrayed as culpable, but it was infantilised. The last two decades have seen a shift from approaching emergencies as natural disasters to seeing them as ongoing complex emergencies. The concept merges emergency, development and political analysis and is influenced by social psychological theories. Complex emergencies are attributed to cycles of poverty, violence and psychosocial dysfunction. Under the concept, the community becomes pathologised as victims and perpetrators requiring therapeutic intervention in order to break the cycle of dysfunction.

In ‘Empowering the Disposable: Biopolitics, Race and Human Development’ Giorgio Shani critically engages with the biopolitics of development, some of the tools through which it operates, and the shifting categorisation and division of ‘life’ in racial terms and as ‘marketable’ and ‘disposable’. At work here is a politics, or rather a dispositif, that re-categorises life in terms of what can be developed and what must be abandoned to disaster management.

In ‘Development as Freedom? From Colonialism to Countering Climate Change’ David Chandler considers this discourse of empowerment and freedom in relation to the problematic of development and state-building interventions. The author starts from the notion that in the new international security order, interventions are posed in the language of individual empowerment, freedom and capacity-building. Rather than push for material development, the statebuilding paradigm of ‘development as freedom’ suggests that the solution lies with the empowerment of individuals and communities and that therefore their lack of agency or their inability to make the right autonomous choices is the problem which external statebuilding intervention needs to address. Chandler argues that the current framing of development seems little different from that of the colonial period – an externally driven civilisation project in which the ‘beneficiary’ was basically objectified.

Part 3: The neglected encounter between interveners and those intervened upon

In ‘Rethinking Intervention and Interventionism’ Linnea Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum take as their starting-point the fact that interference by ‘outsiders’ in the affairs of ‘insiders’ is emerging as a structural characteristic of today’s international system. This growing trend towards radicalised interventionism is deeply problematic, because the external interventions are too often designed to achieve the goals of the interveners rather than the ‘beneficiaries’ and those intervened upon. It is necessary both to problematise interventions and to take seriously
Rather than push for material development, the statebuilding paradigm of ‘development as freedom’ suggests that the solution lies with the empowerment of individuals and communities. Their lack of agency or their inability to make the right autonomous choices is the problem.

In ‘Whose Security? The Impact of the EU’s Security Sector Reform in Palestine’, Michael Schulz analyses the impact on Palestinian society of the EU’s intervention in the field of security sector reform. The study shows that the EU is taking a very active, but also normative, role that has both negative and positive impacts on the provision of human security in Palestine. Schulz argues that the EU needs to become more impartial and also avoid getting mixed up with other intervening parties and their objectives. The study concludes by drawing attention to the importance of a functioning relationship between intervener and intervened upon.
In ‘Intervention or Interaction? Developing Ideas from Cambodia’, 
Alexandra Kent uses experiences taken from a grassroots initiative for 
community development in post-conflict Cambodia to critique the way 
in which development intervention is used as a technology of control 
for furthering a cosmopolitan neoliberal security order. Kent contends 
that intervention provides an epistemological paradigm that furthers 
the exploitative interests of elites while negative experiences of inter-
vention on the part of the intervened upon are regarded as aberrations. 
The everyday insecurities felt by people like rural Cambodians often 
result from intervention into their lives by aspiring elites who are keen 
and able to promote neoliberalism. Hence, Kent is able to ‘unpack’ and 
problematising conventional notions of both intervener and intervened upon. Finally, by presenting a subaltern approach to development, Kent 
proposes that genuine empowerment of the most vulnerable will most likely require an epistemological revolution among today’s promulga-
tors of global security.
References


Risk Management and the Bunkering of the Aid Industry

Mark Duffield

As an object of study, the defensive bunkering of the aid industry, as reflected in the spread of fortified aid compounds and increasing risk aversion among aid workers, helps make visible something that is usually hidden or occluded; that is, the aid industry as a sovereign actor (Edkins 2003). What is noteworthy about aid’s material assemblages, at least with respect to their power effects, is that aid policy tends to operate as if such effects do not exist. Regarding current approaches to state and societal reconstruction, for example, a seminal text has been Robert Jackson’s (1990) *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Weak states are defined according to their relative degrees of ‘juridical’ and ‘empirical’ sovereignty. The former stems from the international recognition of a state’s legality while the latter denotes the actual capacity of the state to govern a given territory. Although weak states may enjoy juridical sovereignty, they lack empirical content. This distinction has been widely absorbed within aid policy. A consensus now exists that the gap between juridical and empirical sovereignty ‘…is the key obstacle to ensuring global security and prosperity’. Hence, for purposes of societal reconstruction, ‘…partnerships must be created to prepare and then implement strategies to close this sovereignty gap’ (Ghani *et al.* 2005: 4).

UNDP compound, Kajo Keji, South Sudan
From this perspective, the aid industry has no sovereignty or power effects of its own. In closing the gap between juridical and empirical sovereignty, it is given the appearance of operating as a sort of benign ‘hidden hand’. In effect, the industry dematerialises its own very concrete presence. As Lisa Smirl argues, the spatial and material practices of the international community ‘…are almost completely overlooked in any analysis of post-crisis reconstruction or emergency response’ (Smirl 2008: 237). In helping to give material form to the aid industry, this article is a modest contribution to the growing interest in the spatial attributes and effects of international intervention and assistance (Higate and Henry 2009; Smirl 2008; Siddaway 2007; Stepputat 2001). Its point of entry is the recent emphasis on field-security training among aid agencies in response to the perception that aid work is becoming increasingly dangerous (Bruderlein and Gassmann 2006). The aim of field-security training is to produce a new form of subjectivity or agency among aid workers. This subjectivity not only normalises defensive living, it experiences the fortified compound as both necessary and even desirable. Through analysing risk management and its relation to defensive architecture (Sorkin 2008; Lacy 2008), the intention of this article is to give form to at least some of the spatial effects of the aid industry. While aid policy may think itself a hidden hand, it is leaving an increasingly permanent architectural footprint.

Securing aid workers

It is useful to first consider how the fortified aid compound is being normalised. This involves examining how forms of aid worker subjectivity or individual agency are being called forth that accept segregated living as necessary, even desirable. Important here is the concern that aid workers are increasingly finding themselves the deliberate targets of political violence. Between 1997 and 2008, for example, there has been both an absolute and relative increase in the number of serious attacks (injuries, kidnapping and fatalities) on national and international staff worldwide. In absolute terms, such incidents have increased from around 30 to 160 per year (Stoddard et al. 2009). Several explanations have been given for this growth. Since the early 1990s, the UN has tended to focus on the changing nature of conflict, stressing the emergence of violent and, essentially, irrational non-state actors that do not respect the neutrality of humanitarian personnel (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 42; UN 2001: 2). Critical voices, however, have pointed to growing international interventionism and internal changes within the UN system itself. In particular, the effects of the UN integrated mission that brings together in a unified management system the UN’s humanitarian and development work with that of peacekeeping and political affairs (Eide et al. 2005).
UN integrated missions are not only found in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, they range from the Caribbean, through Africa, the Balkans, Middle East and into East Asia. UN specialist agencies and allied NGOs have been drafted into ambitious donor-led post-interventionary programmes of disarmament, demobilisation and reconstruction in support of an internationally recognised state. Besides pursuing a humanitarian agenda, integrated missions are instrumentally involved in attempts to reshape the social, political and economic structures of the countries concerned. Warring parties, especially non-state groups that have done badly in a peace agreement, ‘…may sometimes perceive such agendas as biased and politically motivated. Thus the universality of the values promoted by the UN no longer guarantees the security of its access in conflict situations’ (Brudelein and Gassmann 2006: 65). In places like Afghanistan, this politicisation of aid work has led to its effective paralysis (Donini 2009). However, it is important to emphasise that such problems are not confined to the TV hotspots but, like the integrated mission itself, are more general and widespread, fuelling the spread of the fortified aid compound and field-security training for aid workers.

With the breakdown of the early post-Cold War UN negotiated access programmes in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, a need for better field-security training first emerged in the mid-1990s. From this time, improving field security for aid workers, especially enhancing risk perception and more recently hardening of physical security, has been an ongoing issue (Van Brabant 1998). A key publication was Koenraad Van Brabant’s Operational Security Management in Violent Environments (2000). Largely based upon earlier ad hoc NGO programmes and train-
ing initiatives, *Operational Security* brings together in a comprehensive manner what has since become an industry-standard training template. It is in the nature of field-security training to tend towards standardisation; having different people or different organisations doing contrary things is counterproductive. In this way, security underpins a strong centralising tendency within organisations. It has been significant, for example, in transferring important managerial responsibilities from field operatives to headquarters staff. The generic training framework that has emerged typically divides security into a number of scenarios, including movement, work, home and personal components. Training programmes exist in basic or advanced forms, they can last from several hours to several days, and vary in realism from classroom examples to outdoor role-play exercises, including car-jacking and hostage-taking.

While individual UN agencies have developed their own policies, the main trend has been towards a ‘...system-based security approach’ (Bruderlein and Gassmann 2006: 65) involving the increasing centralisation and standardisation of security policy. Importantly, this has occurred at the same time as the global rollout of the UN integrated mission. In this institutional context, a system-based approach to security is argued to offer scalability and replication. This process began with increasing cooperation between the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) to ensure uniform security standards and procedures, including working towards comprehensive security and stress management training (UN 2001: 3-4). By the beginning of 2002, complementing individual agency initiatives, the UN had begun one-off security training in 111 countries. The August 2003 bombings of the UN and ICRC headquarters in Baghdad added further impetus to the centralisation and standardisation of security policy (Bruderlein and Gassmann 2006). In December 2004, a new UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) was established within the UN Secretariat. This brought together existing security personnel, such as UNSECOORD and the civilian security components of DPKO, under one roof. Headquarters supervision was thus strengthened and, following an improvement in the career prospects of security personnel, standardised security protocols were rolled out through what is now a global network of security officers.

At the same time, Minimum Operational Security Standards (MOSS) have been introduced. MOSS represents the development of an objective set of security standards covering security planning, training, communications and security equipment, for implementation at each UN duty station. These minimum standards spell out ‘...the standard
which must be met in order for the system to operate safely’ (ibid: 6). The adoption of MOSS standards, and more recently Minimum Operational Residential Security Standards (MORSS), is also a requirement of the UN’s insurance underwriters. The question of insurance is returned to below.

The militarisation of risk management

As a means of strengthening resilience, field-security training has a number of generic characteristics. The literature on increasing aid worker deaths contains ambiguity, conjecture and competing claims. For example, there are uncertainties over motivation, or whether increases are relative or absolute, or the implications of the different exposures of national and international staff, or the significance of geographical differences (Stoddard et al. 2006; 2009). Field-security training, however, strips out all shades of grey. It adopts an uncompromising view of the external environment; aid workers everywhere and at all times are now facing permanent and pervasive danger. It is not difficult to understand why this sense of certainty should exist. The purpose of professional security training is to encourage behavioural change and so strengthen personal and organisational resilience; it cannot do this if its main message is hedged with doubts and exceptions. At the same time, this purity of message means that training materials lend themselves to the deconstruction of field security as a design of power.

In Sudan, in order to enter the UN’s logistical system it is necessary for visiting headquarters staff or temporary consultants first to pass the UN’s basic and advanced training modules for security in the field (UNBSF 2003; UNASF 2006). Without passing these modules, you
cannot get a UN ID card, and without an ID card you cannot enter UN compounds, board UN flights or travel in UN vehicles; you are condemned to remain outside the international space of flows. These training modules come on two interactive CD-ROMs that combine voice-overs, video clips and role-play exercises with multiple-choice end-of-level tests. The basic and advanced modules both culminate in a final multiple-choice examination. Upon successful completion, the software prints a named pass certificate. Rather than go through field-security training in detail, I will describe a few of the important themes before discussing their implications.

UN field-security training is structured around a prime message from which all the desired behavioural changes can be derived. In its opening section, the ‘Basic Security in the Field’ CD-ROM quotes Mary Robinson, the former High Commissioner for Human Rights, as saying that ‘...some barrier has been broken and anyone can be regarded as a target, even those bringing food to the hungry and medical care to the wounded’ (UNBSF Module 1: 2). In different ways, this prime message is repeated throughout the module. Field-security training reinforces the idea that times have changed and, like it or not, aid workers now face pervasive threats from a calculating and unpredictable enemy. Since this
enemy is faceless, follows no particular pattern and can strike anywhere, constant vigilance and attention to one’s surrounding environment are required. The onus is on the aid worker to make the right choices from the available information and visual cues. As the environment changes, staying safe requires endless risk calculation and adjustment.

In certain countries, the advice will be to stop when your vehicle runs somebody over on the road; in another setting, the advice will be certainly not to stop until the next police post (Van Brabant 1999:9).

In terms of helping achieve such resilience, the aim of field-security training is to embed an interpretive framework and guide to action within the mind of the aid worker. Besides outlining the organisational protocols and local security procedures at the duty station, training covers all aspects of movement; home and office security; health and welfare; and personal safety, including how to respond if under fire or taken hostage. With regard to movement, for example, apart from avoiding travelling at night, the UN’s ‘Basic Security in the Field’ CD-ROMs cover such things as checkpoint etiquette; how to behave with child soldiers; how to react to weapons; anti-highjack techniques; and how to read the road, for example, slowing down before traffic lights so as to avoid stopping. Regarding the home and office, subjects covered include selecting a home neighbourhood. Important here are such things as the level of street lighting, numbers of pedestrians, levels of traffic and parking facilities. The training endorses urban segregation through pointing out that families ‘…with similar income levels tend to share similar lifestyles and security concerns’ (UNBFS Module 2: 6). Inside the home, advice is given on locks, window bars and alarms. With regard to the office, apart from similar neighbourhood concerns, the importance of office design is flagged. For example, having a secure reception area for screening visitors; using the front desk as a defensive structure; barriers in interview rooms; and having a secure bolthole. Besides advice on handling suspicious telephone calls and packages, tips are also given on how to defuse tension and handle hostile crowds.

In working through this training, it is necessary to complete numerous small tests and end-of-section exercises in order to proceed to the subsequent levels. For example, the actions that aid workers should take when first arriving at their duty station are rehearsed in a series of yes-no exercises. Those requiring a ‘yes’ answer include: do you seek a security briefing; meet your local warden; register your family members with the office; and find out how to obtain medical services? In contrast, the questions requiring the answer ‘no’ are: do you ‘…check area around the office and your residential areas on foot’ or ‘…try
food from local food vendors’ (UNBFS Module 2: 16)? By outlawing walking around or engaging with local people, the exercise reinforces dependence on the organisation while emphasising the danger of the streets. Repeated on the CDs in different scenarios, the main response to the pervasive threats faced by aid workers is to encourage isolation and risk aversion. This subjectivity is rapidly becoming the default setting of contemporary aid work.

External risk management, however, is reliant upon a complementary internal psychological practice. Aid workers cannot deal effectively with pervasive external threats unless they acknowledge and respect their own inner vulnerabilities. The importance of protecting the inner self as a necessary adjunct to managing external beneficiary groups has been intrinsic to field-security training since its early days (Van Brabant 1998). Trainees are told, for example, that empathy for victims ‘…does not mean sharing their diseases. To work effectively for others you need to be healthy’ (Dr Gro Harlem, former Director General, WHO, UNBFS Module 5: 2). The need to take care of oneself is central to the UN’s basic and advanced field-security training. Thus, in relation to health and welfare, how to recognise fatigue and stress in oneself and others is explored. Arguably, this is an internalisation of the practice of medicalising distress through the concept of trauma (Summerfield 1999). However, aid work is itself now subject to such medicalisation. The antidote to work-related stress is to maintain a ‘normal’ life within the confines of the aid system, for example, taking regular exercise, following a balanced diet, achieving a good work/life balance including a buddy system, and avoiding excessive alcohol consumption. The key message is that without protecting one’s
vulnerable inner self – including taking time out from traumatised beneficiaries – then the constant vigilance needed to manage pervasive external threats is undermined. Care of oneself involves a psychological distancing that complements, and requires, the physical walls and razor wire of the fortified aid compound.

It should be emphasised, no one is arguing that risks do not exist. It is obvious that they do. Nor is there intent to insinuate that the advice given is somehow flawed or useless. There is something more fundamental under discussion; that is, the institutionalisation and normalisation of risk management. This is new, at least in relation to an earlier approach to danger that made room for the rational subject and allowed him/her to make considered individual decisions on the basis of available information (Pupavac 2001). The institutionalisation of risk management erodes individual and local autonomy in favour of rule through distant security experts and protocols. Risk management within the civilian aid industry has been militarised and with this comes inescapable organisational demands for greater social conformity including social segregation and defensive living as part of everyday life. As with other aid agencies, the UN’s field-security training is not optional; it is a mandatory MOSS/MORSS requirement and, importantly, conditional for personal claims under the UN’s Malicious Acts Insurance policy: if you suffer lose, injury or death while not following security guidelines, you or your family get nothing. When militarisation is coupled with concerns over psychological stability, insurance requirements, including aid agency fears of litigation over lax security procedures (Butler 2003), a powerful governmental technology for changing behaviour and shaping new forms of subjectivity has come into existence.

Even if the surrounding environment does not warrant the averse and isolationist behaviour that the militarisation of risk management encourages, to satisfy organisational requirements, security becomes a mandatory performative act. The training reflected in the UN’s basic and advanced field-security CD-ROMs, much of which is generic, is a good example of what Vanessa Pupavac, in relation to the construction of traumatised populations, has called ‘therapeutic governance’ (Pupavac 2001). In our case, however, since the aid worker is also a potential victim, it is perhaps better to talk of therapeutic self-governance. As a way of avoiding and minimising risk, aid workers are expected to act upon themselves, to change their own behaviour and lifestyles in order to make themselves fit for helping others. This reflects another aspect of resilience, the promise that a life of constant adaptation will produce something new and better (Folke 2006).
Aid and urban pathology

For the new aid subjectivity, with its predilection towards risk aversion, its associated architectural form is the fortified aid compound. The integrated UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), for example, supports the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that covers South Sudan and the border areas of the Transition Zone. The UNMIS headquarters lie immediately to the south of Khartoum International Airport where the UN operates both its own aircraft and those leased to support UNMIS and the African Union/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) operations in the West. Given the volume of air traffic, the UN has its own terminal building to the east of the main runway. The UNMIS headquarters is a large rectangular compound fortified with double walls and razor wire, and complete with watchtowers and armed guards. Inside, besides a several-storey office block, lines of air-conditioned pre-fabs house the administrative staff. Around the extensive perimeter are rows of the UN’s ubiquitous white sports utility vehicles (SUVs). At first glance, the overtly defensive and militarised appearance of the UNMIS headquarters seems out of place. Khartoum is a relatively safe city and crime levels, especially violent crime, have historically been low. While UNMIS is associated with the peace agreement in South Sudan, it has brought the architecture of war into the city. In this context the HQ seems anomalous, a sort of mini-Green Zone but without the obvious dangers and violence of a Baghdad. While the UNMIS HQ remains

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1 In November 2009, working independently of the aid industry, the author spent a month in Khartoum travelling on foot or by local taxi both day and night. The relative safety of the city has been frequently commented upon in the ‘Making Sense of Darfur’ blog (http://blogs.ssrc.org/darfur/).
distinct in terms of its scale and fortifications, in recent years all UN office compounds in Khartoum have upgraded their defensive capabilities, including through the erection of outer chain-link fencing, double entrance gates and crash barriers.

While MOSS/MORSS standards can vary, it is important to realise that they constitute a set of centrally driven minimum operational requirements. In practice, this means that all UN operations — regardless of the actual security situation — have to be MOSS/MORSS-compliant. Propagated in the institutional medium of the UN integrated mission, fed by insurance requirements and driven by security experts, the fortified aid compound is now ubiquitous, from the Caribbean, through Africa to the Balkans and the Middle East, the Caucuses and East Asia. This centrally driven architectural dynamic creates a potential for both anomalies and unforeseen alliances. In Khartoum, for example, MORSS requirements have recently been updated. All UN office compounds now have to be at least 30 metres from the nearest road. Despite existing investment in defensive measures, these new regulations mean that existing UN compounds are no longer MORSS-compliant. Driven by security concerns, the UN system finds itself part of the wider southward extension of Khartoum, as agencies begin to plan the rebuilding of MORSS-compliant complexes in the city’s newly designated ‘diplomatic quarter’. In this respect, the aid industry is an important part of the spatial transformation of Khartoum currently underway, including the emergence of elite-gated communities (SOL 2008). Similarly, in Kabul, in order to overcome the fragmenting effects of the aid industry’s ad hoc security measures on the city’s urban landscape (Montgomery 2009), the authorities have raised the possibility of constructing a Baghdad-style Green Zone on the edge of Kabul. This would house the entire diplomatic, UN and aid community within one secure location with its own dedicated support infrastructure (Boone 2009).

As an architectural form, the fortified aid compound merges into the global trend towards elite gated communities, social segregation and defensive urban living (Minton 2009; Davis 2006; Graham and Marvin 2001; Blakely and Snyder 1997). How the security concerns of the aid industry are helping transform the urban geography of the global borderlands remains under-researched (Vöckler 2008). In relation to South Sudan it is important to stress that these militarised structures are among the first physical manifestations of the return to peace, albeit

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2 I am grateful for audience feedback and anecdotal evidence regarding the geographic spread of the fortified aid compound from seminars given in Rovaniemi (Finland), London, Warwick, Cambridge, Amsterdam, Leeds, Bristol, Bradford and Coimbra (Portugal) during 2008 and 2009.
an uneasy peace. The fortified aid compound is a defining feature of the architectural peace dividend. Instead of a celebratory rebirth, architecturally the aid industry has introduced the signs and visual tropes of international urban pathology. At the same time, there now appears to be more agency security protocols, restrictions and levels of bureaucracy than during the actual war.

In Juba, the capital of South Sudan, the type of aid architecture encountered in Khartoum is replicated. Besides the upgrading of older buildings, however, Juba has many new, purpose-built aid compounds. Not only is their size noticeable but, since 2005, whole districts have been taken over and divided up between different agencies. UNDP, for example, has a large compound that presents itself to the outside world as a high, white-painted exterior wall, topped by razor wire. ‘NO TRESPASSING’ is stencilled in blue all around its extensive perimeter. The main gate to this office complex is complete with the familiar guardhouse, heavy steel gates and crash barriers. In considering these structures, it is legitimate to ask what sort of impression they make on the public and, not least, those aid beneficiaries that agencies claim to empower and better? In their appearance and intent, these buildings are the very opposite of empowering; they are intimidating structures designed to keep the public out. Paradoxically, the industry’s current architectural form stands in contrast to the relatively open, low-walled government buildings, many of which date from the colonial period (Daly and Hogan 2005: 231–252). Rather than the beginnings of peace and reconstruction, aid’s alienating and exclusionary physical structures seem to embody failure, even before its developmental efforts have properly begun (also see Montgomery 2009). The aid industry, moreover, is introducing the same fractured urbanism into the South’s other small towns. Not only are these towns undergoing a process of rapid unplanned urbanisation following the 2005 peace agreement (Duffield
et al. 2008), given the relative paucity of the built environment, the spatial impact is, if anything, even greater than in Juba.

Similar to the self-contained gated neighbourhoods emerging in Khartoum, the fortified aid compound is, ideally, self-reliant in terms of basic requirements; they share the same exclusive and independent logic. Aid compounds have their own boreholes for water and, with their diesel stockpile, run their own electricity generators. This electricity renders the compounds independent of the erratic or absent town supply. It powers their security lights, telecommunications, refrigerators, air conditioning units and computers, thus allowing aid workers to maintain direct HQ contact and granting internet and satellite TV access. A stock of spare parts keeps the vehicles running and, in the event of a medical emergency, a sophisticated drugs cabinet is maintained. Not only does their built form contrast with the low-walled government buildings, the aid compound’s monopoly of resources and expertise heightens the apparent poverty and dependency of the latter. Established by treaty with the Government of Sudan, in most cases during the 1960s, UN aid compounds are sovereign spaces of the international. Agreements, for example, typically confer diplomatic status on international staff and inviolability on the offices, documents and equipment of the agency concerned (UNHCR 1968). Linked by exclusive and secure means of air and road transport, fortified aid compounds interconnect to form a spatial archipelago of international aid. From this perspective, the network of aid compounds that spans the global borderland provides an important material dimension to liberalism’s external sovereign frontier: the fortified aid compound marks the place where the international space of aid flows physically confronts underdevelopment as dangerous.


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Foucault’s Boomerang – The New Military Urbanism

Stephen Graham

*Political struggles are not fought on the surface of geography but through its very fabrication* (Pile 2000: 263)

*Today, wars are fought not in trenches and fields, but in living rooms, schools and supermarkets* (Barakat 1998: 11)

On 4 February 1976, Michel Foucault, the eminent French social theorist, stepped gingerly down to the podium in a packed lecture at the Collège de France in the Latin Quarter on Paris’s South Bank. Delivering the fifth in a series of 11 lectures under the title ‘Il faut défendre la société’ (‘Society must be defended’), for once Foucault focused his attention on the relationships between Western societies and those elsewhere in the world. Moving beyond his legendary re-theorisations of how knowledge, power, technology and geographical space were combined to underpin the development of modern social orders within Western societies, Foucault made a rare foray into discussions of colonialism.

Rather than merely highlighting the history through which European powers had colonised the world, however, Foucault’s approach was more novel. Instead, he explored how the formation of the colonies had involved a series of political, social, legal and geographical experiments which were then actually often bought back to the West in what Foucault – drawing possibly on Hannah Arendt’s famous work on totalitarianism – called ‘boomerang effects’ (Arendt 1958: 206, 223). ‘It should never be forgotten,’ Foucault said:

that while colonization, with its techniques and its political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West,

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1 For transcripts of the lectures see Foucault (1997) and the English translation by David Macey in Foucault (2003).
and the result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself (Foucault 2003: 103).

Such ‘boomerang effects’ centred on ordering the life of populations at home and abroad – what Foucault called ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’ – rather than on protecting sovereign territory per se. Foucault did little to elucidate these in detail, and rarely touched on colonialism or postcolonialism again (see Legg 2007). However, his notion of colonial boomerang effects is powerful because it points beyond traditional ideas of colonisation toward a two-way process in the flow of ideas, techniques and practices of power between metropolitan heartlands of colonial powers and the spaces of colonised peripheries. Such a perspective reveals, for example, that Europe’s imperial cities were much more than the beneficiaries and control points organising explicitly ‘colonial’ economic techniques of plunder and dispossession through shipping, plantations, mining, oil extraction or slavery. They were also much more than a product of the economic booms that came with the processing and manufacturing of resources extracted from the colonies.

In addition, the landscapes and monuments of Europe’s cities were organised, experienced and presented as explicitly imperial spaces which exhibited, monumentalised, and symbolised ideas of empire (Driver and Gilbert 1999; Nasr and Volait 2003). They were imagined, represented, planned and constituted, at least in part, through their links to far-off colonies and colonial cities. New ideas for controlling troublesome neighbourhoods or classes; of monitoring, disciplining, or imprisoning subjects; of dealing with disease, hygiene and education; and for governing, counting and registering populations were all shaped heavily by imported colonial experience.

From the famous panopticon prison, through Baron Haussmann’s radical restructuring of Paris through easily surveilled boulevards, to the adoption of fingerprinting: many of the great transformations in 19th century European cities had already been tried in colonial cities and peripheries.
From the famous panopticon prison, through Baron Haussmann’s radical restructuring of Paris through easily surveilled boulevards, to the adoption of fingerprinting; many of the great transformations in 19th century European cities had already been tried in colonial cities and peripheries. Colonised cities and spaces also provided the zones of experimentation through which Western powers were able to try out and hone techniques of aerial bombing, mass incarceration within concentration camps and genocidal extermination that laid the key foundations for totalitarian rule and total war in Europe in the 20th century (Arendt 1958; King and Stone 2007; Veracini 2005).

Historically, however, such boomerang effects have tended to receive scant attention. This is mainly because Western states have tended to be naturalised as stable, modern, liberal and secure entities that are fundamentally separated from the supposedly illiberal, anarchic and dangerous spaces, and the lurking hordes, within the colonies beyond their boundaries. Foundational here were pronouncements like those of Thomas Hobbes that ‘…it’s jungle out there. Anarchy is the rule; order, justice, and morality are the exceptions’ (cited in Gilpin 1986: 290; see also Campell 1998: 53). In splitting colonial reality into a stable, liberal, modern, civilised ‘domestic’ world and an unstable, illiberal, backward, uncivilised ‘foreign’ one the ways in which urban life in the metropole at the heart of empire was shaped by a complex series of Foucauldian boomerang effects was continually shielded from view. Even now, the routine separation of policy spheres, academic disciplines and geographic scales between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ enables this shielding to continue.

**Domestic colonies**

Historically, within Western Europe, the importing of colonial tropes into metropolitan cores has tended to centre on the construction of internal colonies within domestic cities for the putting down of revolutions and insurgencies, as well as management of criminals, the insane, or racialised minorities. As colonial migration to the increasingly post-colonial centres of empire has grown since the Second World War, so racialised depictions of immigrant districts as ‘backward’ zones threatening the body-politic of the (post)imperial city and nation helped Orientalist discourses, and imperial practices of urban subjugation, to telescope back to infuse domestic urban geographies. Hence the recent proliferation, especially in Western Europe, of what has been termed ‘inner city Orientalism’ (see Howell and Shryock 2003).

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2 On the panopticon, see Mitchell (2000); on Hausmannian planning, see Weizman (2003); and on fingerprinting, see Ginzburg (2002).
In France, for example, post-war state planning orchestrated the mass, peripheral housing projects of the banlieues effectively as ‘near peripheral’ reservations attached to, but distant from, the main metropolitan cores of the country (Kipfer and Goonewardena 2007). Here bitter memories of the Algerian and other anticolonial wars live on in the discourses of the French right about waning ‘white’ power and the ‘insecurity’ caused by the banlieues – a process that has led to a dramatic mobilisation of state security forces in and around the main immigrant banlieues housing complexes. Discussing the shift from external to internal colonisation in France, Kristin Ross points to the way in which France now ‘distances itself from its (former) colonies, both within and without’. This has operated, she writes, through a ‘great cordonning off of the immigrants, their removal to the suburbs in a massive reworking of the social boundaries of Paris and other French cities’ (Ross 1996: 12). The 2005 riots were only the latest in a long line of reactions towards the increasing militarisation and securitisation of this form of internal colonisation and enforced peripherality within what Mustafa Dikeç has called the ‘badlands’ of the contemporary French Republic (Dikec 2007; see also Ross 1996: 151–155).

Such trends have long operated well beyond France, however. In all Western nations, it is the postcolonial diasporas, and their neighbourhoods, that are the main targets of the new, internal and often highly racialised security politics. Along with a proliferation of increasingly militarised camps to process immigrants at home and abroad, they are amongst the key sites where the ‘codes of colonial conditions have infiltrated the metropolitan west’ (Veracini 2005: 1). In many nations, resurgent anti-urban, far right or ethno-nationalist movements work to portray such communities as primitive threats to white power or as ‘impure’, ‘primitive’ contagions within some putatively ‘pure’ ‘homeland’.

Such is the conflation of terrorism and migration these days amongst the right that simple acts of migration are now often being deemed acts of warfare within contemporary military doctrine. In the process, counter-terror and anti-immigration laws, and surveillance, increasingly blur into joint state activities centred on tracking, monitoring and targeting the Orientalised other in the name of ‘security’ (Veracini 2005). Laws and traditions based on notions of human rights or the rights of national citizenship are now routinely eroded or suspended and replaced by explicitly colonial tropes. These emphasise intrinsically devalued, racialised others lurking within the metropolitan core, and work to ‘unbundle’ ideas of universal citizenship based on ‘racial’ difference. Invariably, diasporic communities are the most profiled, scrutinised and surveilled, through the use of techniques virtually identical to
those being used in counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq or Palestine (data mining, biometrics, even satellites and drones). In places like Italy, such demonisation is already being translated into the specific registration of Romany groups and state-orchestrated violence against them.

Within rapidly growing settler-colony nations like the United States, Australia and Canada, meanwhile, processes of internal colonisation between the 18th and 20th centuries projected indigenous populations as barbarous and inferior subjects, or even non-human objects, to be eradicated, forcibly converted, or appropriated within the god-given destiny of internal white colonisation and nation-building. Foreignness, danger and otherness were thus often projected both outside and within such states, and colonisation operated within their internal, moving frontiers. In the US case, the legacies of African-American slavery are obviously central here. In these cases such projects of internal othering have long been the reason for militarisation, organised violence or systematic underdevelopment by the state against indigenous or postcolonial minorities and racialised others. Increasingly, in such countries, as within Western Europe, we see colonial tropes and techniques used against the racialised, ‘primitive’, internal other within the cities of the colonial core amidst right-wing discourses and fantasies of ‘white’ or ‘Anglo’ ‘decline’ (see Hage 1998; Huntington 2004). The US state’s response to New Orleans after Katrina in 2005, and the Australian government’s 2007 clamp-down of aboriginal communities are but two examples.

Contemporary boomerangs

Lorenzo Veracini has diagnosed a dramatic resurgence in the contemporary ‘importation of typically colonial tropes within the bounds of a metropolitan context’ of the ‘core’ cities in Europe and North America. Such a process, he argues, is once again working to gradually unravel ‘classic and long lasting distinction between an outer face and an inner face of the colonial condition’ (Veracini 2003: 2–3).

However, in a context marked by a reduction in the reach and power of classic territorial empires, and the rise of the post-colony, we know remarkably little about how such contemporary Foucauldian boomerang effects operate. Very little research has explicitly tried to explore how such effects help shape the resurgent imperialism characteristic of the contemporary era, with its forcible restructurings of geography by states and high-tech corporations linked closely to globe-spanning (although faltering) US military and geo-economic power (Gregory 2004).

As a central basis for the ‘colonial present’ (Gregory 2004), for example, the ‘war on terror’ – and its successors – have clearly involved trans-
formations in the geographies and experiences of urban life in Europe and North America and the Middle East’s ‘war zone’ cities, which have been umbilically connected. The new American militarism (Bacevich 2005) has involved imperial invasion as well as domestic crackdown; its ideas of the changing nature of conflict centre on cities both within and beyond the US nation. The continuing power of domestic/foreign binaries, however, means that these links have only rarely been the centre of attention. Thus, foreign policy, military, legal and international relations scholars have had the task of addressing the new imperial wars. A largely separate world of domestic, urban, legal or social scholars, meanwhile, have worked to explore the new politics of Western cities which have surrounded the ‘homeland security’ drive.

This continued division means that, in a rapidly urbanising and neoliberalising world, it remains unclear how Foucault’s ‘apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power’ (Foucault 2003) operate, boomerang-style, to link up Baghdad and Boston, Gaza and London, Kabul and Canberra. We can begin to understand why this is the case by pointing to three key processes that have long worked to inhibit efforts to transcend domestic-foreign binaries in a way which can follow the local-to-local logics of Foucauldian boomerang effects.

First, as we have seen, dominant, conservative and realist perspectives on the links between contemporary processes of globalisation and security rely on completely splitting contemporary reality into the home civilisation of the rich, modern North and a separate civilisation in the global South marked largely by backwardness, danger and anarchy. Indeed, such views of the world are actually a major force behind the new military urbanism. This is because such supposed pathologies of the South are deemed by many Western conservative foreign policy specialists to necessitate violent incursion or control from the North’s imperial militaries to facilitate the encroachment of the civilising effects of transnational capital.

Such views tend to project an Orientalised global South to be the source of all contemporary insecurity; they actively work to deny the ways in which urban and economic life in the global North fundamentally relies on, and is constituted through, the (post)colonial South. By obsessing about the realist geopolitical rivalries of nation-states, moreover, such perspectives completely ignore how cities and urbanisation processes also provide crucial territorial forms of domination, hyper-inequality, insecurity and the production and propagation of violence. Frederic Jameson writes that one of the fundamentals of the new modern experience ‘…can be found in the way imperialism masks and
conceals the nature of the system. For one thing, the imperial powers of the older system do not want to know about their colonies or about the violence and exploitation on which their prosperity is founded’ (Jameson 2003: 700).

Second, those academic disciplines that purportedly deal with urban issues, are, themselves, struggling to overcome the legacies of their own colonial histories and their own powerful implication within constructions of imperial geography. This dramatically inhibits their ability to follow the telescopic connections between cities in the global South and North through which the new military urbanism gains its power. Remarkably, many traditions of urban research are themselves still heavily constrained by the kinds of binaried imaginative geographies and Manichean separations that so characterise conservative writings about globalisation. In particular, the partitioning of the urban areas of the world into two hermetically sealed zones – ‘developed’ cities addressed through urban geography or sociology, and ‘developing’ ones addressed through ‘development studies’ – remains remarkably common. This has the effect of leaving ‘cities in poorer countries, in former colonies, or in areas outside western culture, to be apprehended through a static, non-dialectic lens of categorisation as other (non-western, African, Third World)’ (Robinson 2003; Robinson 2006). All this means, to put it mildly, that ‘urban studies […] have much to catch up with in the global dispensation of new imperialism’ (Kipfer and Goonewardena 2006: 24).
The relatively prosperous cities of the global North are today often idealised as centres of migration and laboratories of cosmopolitan mixing. This relatively tolerant mixing is now even seen to be absolutely central to their high-tech economic futures as the key nodes of the ‘global knowledge economy’ (see Florida 2002). Here, cosmopolitan mixing is seen to directly drive economic creativity within high-technology capitalism. At the same time, though, such celebrations systematically ignore how the North’s global cities so often act as economic or ecological parasites on the human or natural resources of the South. Even less recognised are the ways they act as the main sites for controlling, financing and orchestrating geographies of imperial or neo-imperial control over the developing world that are at the heart of the extension of neoliberal capitalism (Sassen 2002; Taylor 2003).

Even when the world system of so-called ‘global’ cities, straddling North and South, has been the centre of analysis (Taylor 2003), such studies have largely failed to attend to the way in which such cities orchestrate the capital, finance and technology crucial to the military aspects of neoliberal globalisation and the burgeoning markets for ‘security’ products and services. Thus, the ways in which the world’s system of global cities acts as the key driver of linked processes involving both global militarisation and extensions to neoliberal capitalism have been virtually ignored in the burgeoning literatures on the subject (Samo 1999; Goldblatt et al. 1999: Ch. 2).

Heavily neglected, then, are the complex political economies through which the relatively rich cities of the advanced capitalist world profit from ‘urbicidal’ violence which deliberately targets, erases or forcibly reconstructs the urban geographies of the global South to sustain capital accumulation (see Kipfer and Goonewardena 2007: 1-39; 2006: 23-33). More critical research is urgently required, as Stefan Kipfer and Kanish Goonewardena put it, to ‘alert us to one of the more ominous accomplishments of “our” urban culture […]: The barbaric killing of cities in the new and old colonies’. Their clarion call for ‘explicit analyses of the relationships between urbanisation, re-colonisation and racialised imperialism’ is one of the motivations for this article (Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2007: 1-39).

The final problem is that the links between militarism and urbanism in the contemporary world remain extremely under-studied and very poorly theorised. On the whole, as a result of the naturalisation of foreign/domestic binaries already discussed, questions of the links between cities, security, militarisation and military power have been overwhelmingly addressed by historians and political scientists, rather than
by urban social scientists. Not surprisingly, such writers have tended to portray cities as mere backdrops to political events and military struggles. The ways in which such processes are actually constituted through the production or reconfiguration of urban spaces – the urban geographer’s key starting-point – has rarely entered debate.

Despite the fact that the 20th century was constituted through unprecedented violence aimed at erasing cities and their inhabitants, those disciplines concerned with studying cities have massively neglected questions of militarised power and security and concentrated instead on apparently more positive discussions of cities as vehicles for development and modernisation. Historians Ryan Bishop and Greg Clancey

Even when the world system of so-called ‘global’ cities, straddling North and South, has been the centre of analysis, studies have largely failed to attend to the way in which such cities orchestrate the capital, finance and technology crucial to the military aspects of neoliberal globalisation and the burgeoning markets for ‘security’ products and services.

New York City firemen walk past the American flag as they work their way towards the heart of the devastation that was once the World Trade Center in New York, Sept. 14, 2001.
(2002: 63–86) speak of how they were astonished, when first reading urban studies literature, by the almost complete absence there of critical discussions about cities as the targets of military power and security doctrine. In disciplinary terms, the result of this was that the ‘urban’ tended to remain hermetically separated from the ‘strategic’. ‘Military’ issues were carefully demarcated from ‘civil’ ones. And the overwhelmingly ‘local’ concerns of modern urban social science were kept rigidly apart from (inter)national ones. This left urban social science to address the local, civil and domestic rather than the (inter)national, the military or the strategic. Such concerns were the preserve of history, as well as the fast-emerging disciplines of international politics and international relations. In the dominant hubs of English-speaking urban social science – North America and the UK – these two intellectual worlds virtually never crossed, separated as they were by disciplinary boundaries, scalar orientations and theoretical traditions. Such divisions made a critical appraisal of Foucauldian boomerang effects linking colonial and domestic cities all but impossible.
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The Failure of State-building – Changing Biopolitics and the Splintering of Societies

Jens Stilhoff Sörensen

*It is easier to believe in the efficiency of good intentions if we are sheltered from the shock of facts*

J. S Furnivall (1948: 545)

International state-building is failing. This appears to be the general trend if we look at the record where state-building faces its greatest challenge, in post-conflict ethno-plural societies that are divided and mobilised along ethnic, religious or cultural lines. Despite considerable international commitment, aid and military involvement, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo as in Iraq and Afghanistan the actual results are poor (Bose 2006; Čukur et al. 2005; Chandler 1999, 2006; Kostič 2007; Paris 2004; Sörensen 2009; Woodward 2011). In terms of facilitating inter-ethnic cooperation, reconciliation, social and economic development, social trust and trust in state institutions, progress is terribly slow, at best, and often non-existent.

Simply attributing these problems to the societies, cultures and socio-political structures in the regions in question would be highly delusive. Instead we need to question the nature of international state-building and post-conflict reconstruction, indeed of global liberal governance itself, of which it is an expression. In the following I argue that a crucial problem lies in the latter, especially in the nature, conception and character of state being promoted. In its aim to secure, I argue, contemporary state-building and global liberal governance contribute to social and spatial fragmentation in different forms, rather than reconciliation and re-integration. They do so by dismantling previously existing frameworks and introducing market relations where the state has few instruments for attracting cross-sectarian loyalty, and through a divisive biopolitics in both ‘soft’ aid measures, such as the promotion of civil society, and in direct security measures that are employed when the former fail.
For this purpose it is instructive to contrast contemporary state-building with earlier state-building projects, such as those taking place after de-colonisation, following a Keynesian paradigm, where the concept of state was radically different.

**Historical perspective on state-building**

Internationally supported state-building has changed considerably over the past 50 years. The first wave of internationally supported state- and nation-building came with decolonisation after the Second World War when the international economy and order were reconstructed under US hegemony. American-based capitalism and economic expansion required a breaking-up of the pre-war European colonial-based capitalism. In the process of decolonisation a new way of relating to the periphery was required, for which the solution became ‘development’ (cf. Smith 2003; Duffield 2007). Decolonisation also required a new territorial fixing of space, and here the autonomous nation-state became the model. Thereby international development came to promote state- and nation-building across the developing world.

One of the problems with independence had already been diagnosed by some of the more perceptive observers, such as J. S. Furnivall, as being how to organise a ‘common social will’, framed in what we may call a national sentiment (Furnivall 1948). Furnivall’s analysis of colonial policy contained a fierce critique of how the introduction of liberal economic relations, followed by Western institutions, had caused the destruction of the local social fabric, effectively leading to social disintegration. Colonial policy had produced the ‘plural society’ of the ‘tropics’ in which a medley of peoples, each with its own religion, culture or language, met only on the market-place, in buying and selling, but lived separately and never combined (Furnivall 1948: 304ff). Furnivall’s observation echoed Karl
Polanyi’s analysis of how the unleashing of market forces during the 19th century destroyed the very fabric of society and threatened the survival of civilisation itself, a sequence which then gave rise to various counter-movements to protect society (Polanyi 1944/1957). However, for Furnivall the effects of the free-market experiment were much more destructive in the colonies and with regard to ‘plural society’, for in Western society there was a common tradition to fall back upon. Moreover, laissez-faire policy went even further in the colonies and this was the crucial problem in colonial policy. When economic man ‘was cast out of Europe he found refuge in the tropics, and we see him returning with seven devils worse than himself’, wrote Furnivall (1948: 312). And the consequence: ‘Disintegration is the natural and inevitable effect of economic forces that are subject to no restraint but that of law,’ he argued, and ‘reintegration must be based on some principle transcending the sphere of economics’ (Furnivall 1948: 546). The two principles he could see as potentially providing this were religion (or for Furnivall, explicitly ‘Christianity’) or nationalism. Western institutions simply molded upon local society would not work. But if the social destruction and fragmentation in the colony was a result of the imposition of laissez-faire liberalism, this was a doctrine that had finally died in the inter-war years, to be replaced by what Furnivall termed a modern colonial policy, one that was permeated by the idea of social justice. Where the old liberal colonial policy had aimed at restricting state activities to a minimum, the modern colonial policy instead advocated state intervention in order to promote development and provide funds for social services that could improve native welfare and prepare the ground for autonomy (Furnivall 1948: 312-13).

During this period the entire discourse on the state became dominated by Keynesianism, both nationally and internationally. This also involved the colonies and shaped the conception of the state in the early years of independence. Under Keynesianism the state was considered a crucial agent in the economy both for the Western welfare state (by promoting industry, welfare and securing full employment – counter-cyclical management) and the state in the Third World (mobilising for industrialisation and modernisation). Internationally it concerned the regulation of trade and finance. To a great extent ‘development’ was state- and nation-building through modernisation. The widespread consensus that the state had a central role in the economy was shared by modernisation and dependency theorists alike. The theoretical and policy-prescriptive struggle was instead concerned with the role of exogenous versus endogenous explanations for (under)development and, as a consequence, the benefits of trade versus de-linking. Capitalist core countries protected and promoted their national industries, while movement of finance capital and international trade was regulated, and liberated only gradually. Regulations and state intervention in the economy were the foundation of the liberal modernist project.
The modernist project, which included both the Keynesian welfare state in the West and ‘development’ in the South, was based on the idea that the state would engineer economic and social development as well as social integration, and ensure labour supply to industry by promoting a healthy population. It implied an infrastructure based on common centralised services. The idea of delivering broadly equal services and public infrastructure was considered to have an integrative function in society as well as being crucial in promoting circulation and hence economic and social progress (cf. Graham and Marvin 2001). The foundation in the ‘liberal welfare state’ (or ‘social’ or ‘Keynesian’ state) was a social contract with mutual obligations and duties, in which the state protected and maintained a productive labour force and simultaneously provided a safety network to ease the hardship of the worst-off. The worker was protected through unemployment schemes and an economic policy with a commitment to full employment and the state oversaw the full chronology of life, ensuring the provision of welfare ‘rights’ from childcare to pension. The state became the ultimate life insurance agency and although this order had its exclusions (on the basis of gender or race, for example) and marginalised groups, (such as orphans or the mentally ill) it embodied a universalism where the population as a whole was considered, and certain social ‘rights’ were directly linked to citizenship.

In this model or conception of the state, the object, or reference, of government is population, or the promotion of life at the aggregate level of population. Michel Foucault (2007; 2008) developed the concept of biopolitics, a politics of ‘life’, at the aggregate level of population. Biopolitics can be contrasted with, for example, geopolitics, which is concerned with territory, borders and states. It is important to emphasise that the object of government in terms of external security at this time remained geopolitical. The imagery of security was founded on the nation-state in economic, social and military terms. Outside and beyond it, there was a fixed external security threat envisioned in the form of land-based invasions and nuclear annihilation, primarily with the European continent as the foreseen ‘theatre of war’. The enemy was external and the threat of war connected to the borders of the state; it was a condition in which war preparations required full national mobilisation. While there was a greater separation of development and security in discourse and institutions during the Cold War than there is today, they were always linked and in the bipolar geopolitical order ‘development’ served as a security technology to prevent decolonised states from falling into the communist camp.

Today, governmental rationality in relation to economy as well as security is different, and thus international state-building is different. Although there are geopolitical and structural reasons for this, we need to
address the change that has taken place in the governmental rationality of liberalism and the contrast between the modernist project under Keynesianism, on the one hand, and neoliberalism, on the other. Here, the crucial point is the changes in thinking about economy and security, which in turn constitute a changing biopolitics.

**From an aggregate to a divisive biopolitics**

We can think of liberalism as an ethos of government that aims to govern by promoting freedom conceptualised in a certain way and of biopolitics as a technology of government that is integral to liberalism. Biopolitics, as elaborated by Foucault, is concerned with humans as *species life* rather than with states, borders and territory, and aims to promote life, to gain knowledge about life and administer its processes, and to manage *risk*, not on the level of the individual but on the level of population (Foucault 2007; 2008). Population is not the same as ‘people’. A population is a quantity or cohort of individuals defined according to certain criteria; from an insurance viewpoint it is simply a risk pool (Dillon and Lobo Guerrero 2008: 267). Biopolitics aims to control *circulation* and manage *effects of circulation*, to promote good circulation, for example trade or movement of investment capital, and to prevent or manage the effects of bad circulation, such as disease, refugee flows, or the movement of terrorists and their financial networks (Foucault 2007, 2008; Dillon 2006; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). There is a non-liberal biopolitics, such as for example Nazi biopolitics during the Second World War or a contemporary Islamic biopolitics, but there is no liberalism without biopolitics.

Biopolitics, in Foucault’s elaboration, concerned life at the *aggregate* level of population. This was typical of the post-war modernist project and here it reached its zenith in the modern welfare state. But while biopolitics was aggregate it is necessary to break up the biological continuum of life in some way, and thereby biopolitics always has an
inherent logic of separation and categorisation. One way of dividing
is on the basis of race; others are through distinctions between liberal
and non-liberal or developed and under-developed life. Although lib-
eralism purports to be universal and makes universal claims it views
non-liberal forms of life as incomplete and potentially a threat. Such
life needs to be addressed and traditionally liberalism has done so in
one of three ways: with reform or development; by ‘preservation in situ’
(reservations or self-sustenance); or by extermination. Colonial policy
contained all three elements and after colonialism international devel-
opment emerged as the governmental form for addressing non-liberal
life. Under the modernist project the state was the central reference
for doing so. The Third World state was, with international support,
the vehicle for mobilising population and natural resources, addressing
domestic strictures, implanting new methods and technology, and push-
ing towards agricultural reform, industrialisation and modernisation. In
short, it was the vehicle for development and the model it would follow
in its developmental journey was the Western liberal industrialised and
modernised state. Thus the Keynesian projection in the South was the
‘developmental state’ (although the latter term was initially coined for
Japan and a particular form of Asian state-led development).

The Keynesian consensus came under powerful attack from neoliberalism
in the 1980s. Although neoliberalism has existed in a variety of forms,
there is a shared set of core values (for an overview see Mirowski and
Plehwe 2009). Crucial is that it was not just a market fundamentalist
ideology concerning the economy but an attack on the very founda-
tions of modernism, the social state and its governmental rationality.
It contained a new biopolitics that was divisive rather than aggregate.
Privatisation, outsourcing, deregulation and market logic extended to
basic infrastructure and state services became the new trend. In in-
ternational development the result was that the IMF and World Bank
forced states in the Third World to accept the new design of ‘structural
adjustment programmes’ (SAPs), leading in Africa to deepening poverty,
widening social polarisation, increasing unemployment, and, in the least
developed countries, de-industrialisation (Abrahamsen 2000: 10; Davis

The biopolitical dimension of the change has been addressed by Melinda
Cooper (2008). She argues that neoliberalism reworks the value of life as
established in the welfare state and New Deal model of social reproduc-
tion (Cooper 2008: 9). Neoliberalism does not merely want to capitalise
the public sphere and its institutions, but the life of the nation, social and
biological reproduction as a national reserve and foundational value of
the welfare state (ibid.). The realm of reproduction itself becomes exposed
to direct economic calculus. Keynesian economics attempted to safeguard the productive economy against the fluctuations of financial capital. Neoliberalism, by contrast, installs speculation at the very core of production. Neoliberalism, in other words, profoundly reconfigures the relationship between debt and life, as institutionalised in the mid-20th-century welfare state (Cooper 2008: 10). The result is a new kind of governmental rationality spreading to all spheres of social and political life.

**From society to community as correlate of government**

But the modernist project and its inherent universalism was also challenged on other grounds, notably from the left, from perspectives such as postmodernism, multiculturalism, feminism and sustainable development philosophy. In their effect these either share premises with neoliberalism or contain premises which neoliberalism has had a tremendous capacity to appropriate. Just as with neoliberalism, they all concern a new way of conceptualising the plane of reference for government, its objects, subjects, targets and mechanisms. Nicholas Rose has argued that we see a ‘detotalisation’ of society where the thought-space of the social is fragmented. It is fragmented in terms of multiculturalism, and in political controversies over the implications of pluralism, of ethnicity, religion, sexuality, ability and disability, together with conflict over the competing and mutually exclusive ‘rights’ and ‘values’ of different communities (Rose 1999: 135). The subjects of government are now understood as individuals with ‘identities’, which not only identify them, but do so through their allegiance to a particular set of community values, beliefs and commitments (Rose 1999: 135). Here, ‘community’ emerges as the ideal territory for the administration of individual and collective, argues Rose, and individual conduct no longer appears ‘socially determined’ but shaped by values that arise from ties of community identification (p 136). We thereby have a replacement of ‘society’ with ‘community’, or ‘communities’. This form of social breakdown is quite compatible with neoliberalism and implies a similar break with aggregate biopolitics. A shifting plane of reference on the part of government towards ‘civil society’ or ‘community’ constitutes no threat to neoliberal thought, and these can both be exposed to market logic and ideas of self-reliance.

But community, like society, is not a natural formation; it has to be constructed. The new correlate of government is mapped out, its distinctions and borders defined, and its interests and values identified. Society does not disappear in this process, but it is reworked through new categories that regenerate – or threaten – it. In Western societies the new conceptualisation is exemplified in concerns related to minority communities,
gender equality, specific community programmes and affirmative action. This entails a biopolitical separation that is mirrored in international development and security policy. In the global periphery liberalism rediscovers multi-ethnic post-conflict societies as tribal, communal and sectarian, features, which are not merely discovered and addressed but re-generated as a necessary correlate of government in the new kind of governmental rationality. As David Campbell has argued, liberal governance and ethnic national leaders have come to share a common ‘ethnic cartography’ (Campbell 1999). Campbell’s reference was to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but an extreme illustration would be the US counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq, especially from 2007 onwards. Following the complete breakdown of the Iraqi state under the US occupation from 2003, Iraqi society was rapidly divided and mobilised along its ethnic-religious fault lines. Resistance blended with civil war and the ethnoplural city of Baghdad became increasingly ethnically divided (Gregory 2008). The US counterinsurgency strategy popularly called ‘the Surge’ emphasised these divisions. Violence diminished only after a reduction of inter-ethnic contact surfaces, through segregation, walled-off neighbourhoods, and pay-outs to tribal leaders who mobilised their respective followers. The shared ‘ethnic cartography’ reflected biopolitical control measures that operated along ethnic-religious fault lines (Gregory 2008).

Spatial splintering

While influences from both the ‘left’ and the ‘right’ both contributed to deconstructing society into its various segments, physical infrastructure, various services and social space are being fragmented through privatisation and internationalisation. This has profound effects on social and urban space. In the modernist project infrastructure, such as water, power, roads, waste and communication networks, were considered to bind cities, regions and nations together in geographical and political wholes, to add cohesion to territory and society, and services were to be delivered on a broadly equal basis, a condition which required public ownership and control (Graham and Marvin 2001). Now, internationally, major infrastructure networks are opened up to private sector participation in management and provision of services, and public monopolies are being replaced by profit-driven markets. Globally, and especially in the South, the result is often increasing selectivity, uneven distribution and development.

The general hegemony of neoliberal governmental rationality, its breakdown of the idea of ‘public service’ and the exposing of the latter to
commercialisation and market rationality, generate social splintering and tensions to the extent that they challenge democratic legitimacy in the liberal core states. Colin Crouch argues that this has moved us towards a ‘post-democratic’ condition (Crouch 2004). However, the problem becomes more acute in the global South, especially in weak or fragmented states. If the essential legitimising and integrative functions of the state are removed, the problem becomes a direct security concern.

The neoliberal discovery of institutions

It was such security concerns that spurred a new focus on institutions in the second half of the 1990s, and was further accentuated with the ‘war on terror’ after 2001. Failures with ‘structural adjustment’ in Africa led the World Bank to reconsider the role of state institutions. However, the neoliberal foundation was never challenged. Rather, the end of bipolarism provided momentum for global neoliberalism in two senses; first, it had triumphed over the socialist alternative, which was now eliminated as a development model, with new space being opened up for capitalist expansion; second, the ‘unlocking’ of a binary geopolitics enabled more radical interventionism in the South. The break with bipolarism seemed to enable a new world order based on the vision of global liberal governance and liberal interventionism, thus expressing a responsibility for the global population. This new ambition and responsibility was legitimised and conceptualised in terms of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and a switch from state security to ‘human security’. The state could be by-passed in favour of operating in societies directly, through NGOs and the promotion of ‘civil society’, and borders between national and international could be abolished in international development and security policy. The increasingly explicit linking of development and security that became articulated in policy discourse in the 1990s was instrumental in this.

As a result of reconsidering SAPs the World Bank became oriented towards the character of the state, in particular its institutions. This led to the ‘good governance’ agenda for developing countries and to the ‘gradualist’ approach to post-communist transition in Eastern Europe. The Bank’s commitment to institutions has been signalled since the 1997 World Development Report (WB 1997). Here, as in subsequent reports, such as the 2002 World Development Report (WB 2002), Building Institutions for Markets and the 2004 report, Building Institutions in South and Eastern Europe, there is unquestioned commitment to the market economy. Graham Harrison (2004) has analysed the World Bank reforms in the African show-cases – Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique – that followed the good governance agenda. The reforms, he argues,
were stimulated by the failure to implement the SAPs, and where the new focus on institutions is a remedy to enable, implement and ‘lock in’ neoliberal reform packages. The failure of so-called ‘first generation reforms’ in rolling back the state has been followed by ‘second generation reforms’ focusing on the state’s capacity to receive and implement aid programmes, civil service reform, and so on, but with strong involvement (or intervention) on the part of the international agencies (particularly the World Bank) in shaping the reforms. This involvement is a central feature of what Harrison calls ‘governance states’.

We find the same pattern in international protectorates and state-building missions, such as Bosnia–Herzegovina, Kosovo or Iraq. Here, where post-conflict reconstruction is the concern, one might expect a stronger focus on the integrative functions of the state, with investment in institutions and services that could be utilised in post-war economic recovery and attract cross-ethnic popular legitimacy. Classical development thinking emphasised the state’s ability to provide welfare goods and services, employment and equitable taxes, as crucial for providing legitimacy to the state institutions (cf. Myrdal 1957). Today, by contrast, the dominant feature of state-building, and peace-building, is economic reform to provide for a market economy. The result is recurring instability. In Bosnia–Herzegovina and Kosovo, for example, the effort to privatise socially-owned (public) enterprise has been prioritised along with a process of continuous identity politics in existing institutions, contributing to the preserving of clientelist dependency and ethnic polarisation as well as shadow economic activity rather than an amelioration of the real economy (Donais 2005; Kostic 2007; Sörensen 2009). Apart from the privatisation of large-scale firms, the ‘engine’ of economic development is considered to be the promotion of small- and medium-range enterprise; thus the emphasis is on the individual entrepreneur.

In Iraq the institutional dismantling of the state during the first months of occupation provided a direct infusion to the military resistance. On 16 May 2003 the head of the ‘Coalition Provisional Authority’ (CPA), Paul Bremer, issued the order of ‘de-Ba’athification’ of Iraq (CPA Order No 1), which meant that all senior party members, as well as the three highest ranks within state institutions – from the ministries to the hospitals and universities – were dismissed from office and prohibited from future employment or service, which resulted in some 30,000–50,000 officials and party members being driven underground. This was followed by CPA Order No 2, on 23 May, to dissolve the army, police and security services, dismissing some 385,000 army employees and 285,000 employees in the Ministry of Interior. In one stroke half a million men, with special training and access to arms, were made unemployed.
The policy continued with a fast-track process to transform Iraq into a market economy, which included the closing of state-owned factories, hence increasing the unemployment total by tens of thousands of Iraqis. In a few months hundreds of thousands of Iraqis had been excluded from political and economic life and the country’s only unifying institutions had been dissolved (Ricks 2006: 163-65; Allawi 2007: 155ff). Not only is ‘market economy’ written into the constitutions, through a detailed guidance by international agents, as in the Dayton Peace Agreement that regulates Bosnia and Herzegovina and as in the UN recommendation and subsequent constitution for Kosovo, but also the reconstruction programmes have emphasised and executed rapid privatisation in all cases, often seeking foreign investment and take-over if possible. This has often resulted in considerable local opposition and legal disputes, as for example with the Oil Law in Iraq or with socially owned enterprise in Kosovo.

Just as the support to institutions is geared towards the free market economy, so too is there a neoliberal and Anglo-American bias in the conception of civil society (cf. Somers 2005a, 2005b; Sörensen 2006, 2009; Trägårdh 2008). This implies a division of society into spheres and an understanding of civil society as absolutely autonomous from the state. In this perspective, building on classical political economy, we have a concept of economy (and civil society) as consisting of ‘natural’ processes into which it would not merely be wrong by the government to intervene, but indeed against nature itself (see Foucault 2008). The Anglo-American bias in this conception can be contrasted to a Hegelian (or Neo-Hegelian) conception of state and civil society, emphasising their interrelation, where the state is a necessary mediator against particular interests generated in civil society. The best empirical expression of the latter is the Nordic model of civil society (Trägårdh 2012). However, in the donor agencies’ conception civil society is largely defined as autonomous and separate from the state and primarily consisting of NGOs that can be supported in order to promote liberal values, democratisation and reconciliation in the recipient societies (Sörensen 2006; 2009: Ch. 9; 2010).

The neoliberal governing principles have ensured that the concept of ‘human security’, in fashion since the 1990s, never came to include any economic dimension aiming at providing employment or welfare security. Rather, ‘human security’ furthers earlier ideas of sustainable development and self-reliance. Sustainable development began as an anti-modernist, non-material, romanticist alternative to industrialisation in the 1970s, but has come to foster the neoliberal ideal of integrating poor people in the market, where they can become entrepreneurs responsible for their
own survival (Duffield 2007; Pupavac 2010, 2011). The mainstreaming of sustainable development philosophy is well illustrated by Amartya Sen’s highly influential ‘capabilities’ approach, which is organised around the individual micro-entrepreneur and the realisation of the individual’s ‘capacity’ within existing political, economic and social relations (Pupavac 2011). Building on this tradition, ‘human security’ focuses on basic needs, such as health, water and nutrition, for the extremely poor, and on elements that threaten local self-reliance. In this manner it replaces earlier broader ambitions of modernisation and material development. In place of the modernist universal ‘developmental state’ it envisions a minimal ‘human-security state’ that provides basic functions while institutionally adapting itself to the forces of the market. In effect the discourse on human security is deeply ideological and enables international agents to securitise an issue faster and more arbitrarily and thereby legitimise intervention and a certain shaping of states.

State-building today is thus a historically unique phenomenon and in stark contrast to post-war and postcolonial experiences. The concern of international state-building, and of development more generally, is security. While we still have the imagery of the nation state (with features such as citizenship), its character has changed along with the conceptions of security and economy.

**State-building as security – shaping ‘human-security states’**

Western security doctrine has been radically re-imagined during the past decade. Security and economy are now borderless and interconnected in new ways. Denoting a state as failed or fragile invokes that it constitutes a security concern but, unlike with the term rogue state, it does so because of a lack of capacity to control its population rather than by its foreign policy orientation. Controlling and identifying threats within the population have become a central concern within Western states as well, where ‘homeland security’, increasing surveillance, biometric readings and control operate not just in airports and at borders but within the cities, across public and private space (Graham 2010). The profiling and identification of target groups, and restrictions on mobility and intrusion on integrity, illustrate a new segregative biopolitics of security that is more personal, domestic and borderless. Security is now at home and everywhere. War has been brought back into society. In this security the imaginary borders between national and international are abolished and states are no longer seen as autonomous units but as integrated in a network of global security that protects the circuits and functioning of the global circulation that is necessary to sustain liberal life. Threats to the liberal order and global economy are deterritorialised, biopoliticised and continuous.
Regarding post-conflict state-building, the objective is thus not an autonomous and developmental state, but securing the space for the liberal order. The referent here is population, but populations must be (re-)territorialised within a security state. We thus have a recasting in the order between state and population, with population replacing the state as the main referent for governing, while the state remains a primary instrument for the formulating and implementing of policy and for governing the population.

Here, development itself has abandoned its previous concern with material growth within states, industrialisation, modernisation and creating a more equal world, and moved to managing effects occurring at the level of populations. Development now appears as a security technology aiming both to secure the global liberal order, and its continuous extension, from disturbance and potentially dangerous disruptions in terms of refugees, illiberal networks, local conflict, political extremism and terrorism, and to secure the surplus population that is excluded, or generated, through the process of the unleashing of market forces on a global scale (see Duffield 2007). While states are expected to undertake market reform and adapt to neoliberalism, populations need to be contained and protected through measures to promote self-reliance and through poverty reduction among marginalised groups. Self-reliance is offered here as an alternative to liberal development.

State-building constitutes a security technology in a double sense; first, it provides a geographical fixing of space for global capitalism in that the character of the state is shaped for market relations. This is a contemporary extension of the fixing of space for an American-based global capitalism that followed the First World War through the creation of nation states in Europe out of the territories of the crumbling Habsburg and Ottoman empires, and the Second World War through the breaking-up of the global colonial system and creation of nation states in Africa and Asia (as argued by Smith 2003; 2005). Here, it secures global capitalism in its neoliberal form, by territorialising populations that are otherwise made redundant and potentially dangerous, as refugees or insurgents. Second, within these states, security technologies of sustainable development and self-help can be promoted in order to secure the surplus population from the social effects of the unleashing of market forces (cf. Duffield 2007; Pupavac 2009; Sörensen 2009: 270-72). Such biopolitically separated ‘other’ forms of life can be promoted and secured as self-reliant alongside ‘liberal life’.

The character of contemporary state-building is toward what we may call a ‘human-security state’. While sharing characteristics with what Graham Harrison (2004) labelled ‘governance states’, the former term...
better captures the character of the state and the direct link with the biopolitical shift in aid and development that was signalled with the concept of ‘human security’ in the early 1990s. Contemporary state-building is the extension of that established trend. Acting in the name of security it has a parallel in an increasing security and surveillance state in the West. Human security is a neoliberal concept that privileges self-reliance, adaptability and resilience, over a welfare state and over protection or risk socialisation. The ‘human–security state’ is a state that no longer provides comprehensive welfare or social insurance, just basic ‘critical’ infrastructure upon which population is now contingent.

The idea of the state

However, this raises questions regarding the conception or idea of the state, which is a crucial dimension for all states (Buzan 1983). In ethnically divided post-conflict societies this poses a particular problem. Ethnic reconciliation has been effective where it has been possible to provide an idea of the state that can be shared by all ethnic groups. A good example is socialist Yugoslavia after the Second World War. Here, in spite of vicious inter-ethnic violence, the partisan communists were able to provide an idea of the state based on equality among nations, and a project of development and modernisation linked to the promises in socialist ideology and the visible success of the Soviet Union. It was perhaps the only ideology available at the time for creating a unified Yugoslavia. As Furnivall observed in the 1940s with regard to a coming independence for the colonies, there had to be some unifying ‘social will’, be it religion or nationalism. In ethnoplural societies this unifying ideology is elusive, but communism has occasionally assumed the role. Liberalism, and especially market liberalism (laissez-faire or neoliberalism), has typically had an atomising effect on society, breaking the social fabric and enhancing divisions, as was already observed by J. S. Furnivall (1948) for the colonies, and Karl Polanyi (1944/1957) for the liberal West.

There are examples of cases where a liberal formula, and economic liberalism, has provided the legitimising principle for post-conflict reconstruction and state-building. In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978–79 on the birth of biopolitics, Michel Foucault argued that the Nazi project and Second World War had destroyed the key foundations of the idea of a united post-war German state, and that the Erhart plan of 1948 offered a solution where the economy, and economic growth, was the foundation of sovereignty and thereby of the idea of the state (Foucault 2008: Ch 8 and passim). However, the reconstruction of Germany took place within the framework of a complete reorganisation of the global political economy in which Germany had a crucial role; it took place in a society that was already highly industrialised before the war, and
integrated in the global economy; it took place under a Keynesian paradigm, where market liberalism was circumscribed and where the German form of neoliberalism (ordo-liberalism) emphasised a ‘social state’; and, moreover, it took place in a relatively ethnically homogenous society (cf. Sörensens 2009: Ch. 2). It thereby serves poorly as historical reference for contemporary reconstruction and state-building projects. The conception that the free market can provide legitimacy for the state is much less tenable in an ethnically divided post-conflict society located at the periphery of the global economy. Especially so with a global economy that contrasts so markedly with the Keynesian order in which Germany was reconstructed, with its regulated trade and restrictions on international finance. Today’s deregulated international finance and free-trade fundamentalism makes Furnivall’s warning on the post-colony a more relevant reference. Here too we see Polanyian counter-movements in the form of strengthening ethnic identities and traditional or communal ties. In contemporary peripheral, ethnically divided, post-conflict societies, the promotion of market forces, in the absence of unifying institutions, creates (competitive) conditions where the state has few instruments for attracting cross-sectarian loyalty. Thus people are forced to rely on clientelist networks for their survival. Furnivall’s dictum for the post-colony is back to haunt contemporary state-building: reintegration must be based on some principle transcending the sphere of economics.

**Conclusion**

We can now draw some general conclusions. Contemporary international state-building emerged in the 1990s with the rediscovery of the central role of institutions for implementing and managing the effects of market reforms, on the one hand, and from the increasing engagement in post-conflict reconstruction on the other, both being development-security agendas governed by similar neoliberal prescriptions (cf. Sörensens 2009: Chs 1–2).

State-building is, in a sense, global liberal governance at its most ambitious, and it represents the edge of the linking between development and security, which in its post-Cold War occurrence has been recast from a geopolitical to a biopolitical emphasis. Rather than rendering geopolitics irrelevant, the biopolitical emphasis expresses the more ambitious interventionist liberal agenda that was made possible with the collapse of the Soviet Union and which was articulated in the conceptual reframing of security in terms of ‘human security’ and ‘humanitarian interventions’. However, while state-building is an instrument of global governance and security it seems incapable of producing either development or security. Rather, the trend is the opposite; the production of social splintering and acceleration of uneven development and
inequality. The latter is a general feature of neoliberal development and a well-established empirical and theoretical finding in early development theory (Myrdal 1957). A typical feature of urban planning under neoliberalism is spatial segregation, with certain areas, for example the London docklands, upgraded in urban development projects, while others fall into disarray. The increasing gap between a privileged and protected private space and a decaying unsafe public space in cities worldwide is the architectural expression of this trend. It stands in contrast to urban planning under the Keynesian ‘modernist’ vision, where focus lay on a general infrastructural development, upgrading and connecting of whole cities. In underdeveloped, or in post-conflict ethno-plural societies this trend is particularly dangerous since it plays into existing divisions and identity ties that have already been mobilised in conflict, and reaffirms the dependency on clientelist networks, while leaving the state without instruments to attract cross-sectarian loyalty or to promote social integration. In the absence of a greater vision, contemporary state-building, as an expression of interventionist global liberal governance, has abandoned socially organised development to the forces of the market, while using the full institutional infrastructure as instruments to manage security; in essence ‘development’ has become totally securitised. Previously inherited notions of development have been replaced by a human-security agenda that favours a non-material ‘sustainable’ development of self-reliance and resilience. The latter indicates how ‘development’ has become a lost vision in contemporary liberalism. It signals a retreating liberalism, one that is no longer concerned with progressive development, even modernity, is capable of generating neither development nor security, but is obsessed with security in the sense of fortifying the borders of its own existence.

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The Disastrous and Politically Debased Subject of Resilience

Julian Reid

What is the relation between sustainable development and neoliberalism? Mark Duffield argues that the shift from strategies of development preaching modernisation to sustainable development owed much to a specifically neoliberal framing of the problematic of development (Duffield 2008: 67–70; see also Sörensen, Shani and Chandler in this volume). As he shows, sustainable development emerged as part of a neoliberal counter-critique of modernisation strategies of development which, rather than undermining the authority of liberalism’s economic reasoning, gave it a new and even more powerful footing. While recognising the function of environmental concerns in shaping the doctrine of sustainable development, Duffield draws attention to the neoliberal rationalities that have nevertheless defined it. For one, the strength of its challenge to traditional models of development owed much to its alignment with the neoliberal critique of the state (Duffield 2008: 67). Preaching that sustainable development would only follow once people gave up on state-led modernisation strategies and learnt to practise the virtue of ‘community-based self-reliance’, so sustainable development reflected a neoliberal political agenda that shifts the burden of security from states to people (Duffield 2008: 69). Sustainable development functions in extension of neoliberal principles of economy, Duffield argues, by disciplining the poor to give up on states as sources for the improvement of their wellbeing, and instead practise the virtue of securing themselves. Thus does sustainable development engage in the promotion of a neoliberal model of society and subjectivity in which everyone is demanded to ‘prove themselves by bettering their individual and collective self-reliance’ (Duffield 2008: 69). In African states such as Mozambique, for example, it has provided ‘a virtually free social security system offering the possibilities of adaptation and strengthening in order to manage the risks of market integration’ (Duffield 2008: 93).

Revealing the convergences between sustainable development and the neoliberal critique of the state, Duffield offers a powerful riposte to those narrative accounts of sustainable development as arising simply from the empowerment of ecological over economic reasoning.
ecological reason, then, just a proxy of the neoliberal rationalities which Duffield argues have shaped the agenda of sustainable development? If we understand sustainable development as a servant of neoliberalism, then what should we make of those voices arising from environmental movements, and the many other ways in which ecological reason has been mobilised, to critique economy-based strategies of development in the interests of sustaining life? Answering these questions requires grappling further, I believe, with the fundamental and complex correlations of economy, politics and security with life in neoliberal doctrine; what Duffield rightly names its biopolitics (2008: 4-8). Neoliberalism is widely understood as a ‘theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximisation of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered markets, and free trade’ (Harvey 2007: 22). Less understood, however, is how its claims to increase wealth and freedom are correlated with ways to increase the prosperity and security of life itself. Its capacities to correlate practices for the increase of economic prosperity with those dedicated to increasing the prosperity of the biosphere are precisely why the doctrine of sustainable development is so compatible with it.

This is firstly a problem of the neglect of the complexities of economic doctrines per se. Economics was conceived from its outset as a domain of knowledge concerned with the prosperity not just of human communities, families and subjects, but of nature in its entirety. For Aristotle, economics, it was said, ‘must conform to nature...in as much as nature has already distributed roles and duties within the species themselves’ (Mondzain 2005: 19) ‘Implicit’, therefore, ‘within the economy is the notion of an organic objective and functional harmony...a providential and natural order to be respected while acting in the service of the greatest cohesion of utility and well-being’ (Mondzain 2005: 19). As Michel Foucault’s historical analyses have shown, with the birth of the modern discipline of political economy so ‘nature’ lost its status as the major correlate of economy and thus did ‘life’ begin to play that role (Foucault 1997). For political economists of the modern age, however, the life which economy had to respect was specifically that of the human species; the question of the prosperity and security of human populations became conceived as limiting conditions for the exercise of economic reason and practices. Neoliberalism breaks from earlier liberalisms and traditions of political economy in that its legitimacy rests on its capacities to correlate practices for the increase of economic profitability and prosperity not just with practices for the securing of the human species, but with the life of the biosphere. These correlations of economy, wellbeing, freedom, security and biospheric life among
neoliberal regimes of practice and representation comprise the foundations of what have been named its biopolitics (Dillon and Reid 2009; Duffield 2008; Cooper 2008; Reid 2006). And if there is anything ‘fundamental’ to liberalism then it is this; one cannot understand how liberalism functions, most especially how it has gained the global hegemony that it has, without addressing how systematically the category of life has organised the correlation of its various practices of governance, as well as how important the shift in the very understanding of life, from the human to the biospheric, has been for changes in those practices.

Examining neoliberalism biopolitically means we can understand better how it is that ecological reasoning has enabled the growth of strategies for the promotion of market-based entrepreneurial capitalism in developing societies. Of particular importance here are how the very account of security deployed by neoliberal states and their development agencies has altered through its correlation with ecological reason. Crucial to this story is the relatively recent emergence of the discourse of resilience. When neoliberals preach the necessity of peoples becoming ‘resilient’ they are, as I will show, arguing in effect for the entrepreneurial practices of subjectivity which Duffield calls ‘self-reliance’. ‘Resilient’ peoples do not look to states to secure their wellbeing because they have been disciplined into believing in the necessity to secure it for themselves. Indeed so convinced
are they are of the worth of such capabilities that they proclaim it to be a fundamental ‘freedom’ (UNEP 2004). But the emergence of this discourse of resilience within the doctrine of neoliberalism owes massively, I argue, to the power of ecological reason in shaping the very rationality of security which otherwise defines it. In other words comprehending how a neoliberal rationality of security functions in shaping the agenda of sustainable development requires us to examine the constitutive function of ecological reason in shaping both. Far from being a proxy of the neoliberal rationalities shaping sustainable development, ecological reason has been formative of them.

**From security to resilience**

Strategically, sustainable development has functioned in the global expansion of neoliberalism by naturalising its frameworks of governance; the institutions, practices and forms of subjectivity it demands are brought into being in order to increase the economic prosperity of human communities. But how is it that neoliberal ways of governing came to be conceived as an answer to the problem of sustainability? Some of the answer to this question can be given, I believe, by examining the discursive expansion of the concept of ‘resilience’. Because that is the

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concept against which all such governance frameworks are increasingly legitimised. It is no accident that the concept of resilience derives directly from ecology, referring to the ‘buffer capacities’ of living systems; their ability to ‘absorb perturbations’ or the ‘magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before a living system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that control behaviour’ (Adger 2000: 349). Living systems are said by ecologists to develop not on account of their ability to secure themselves prophylactically from threats, but through their adaptation to them. Exposure to threats is a constitutive process in the development of living systems, and thus the problem for them is never simply how to secure themselves but how to adapt to them. Such capacities for adaptation to threats are precisely what ecologists argue determines the ‘resilience’ of any living system. Sustainable development started out by preaching that the economic development of societies must be regulated so that it contributes not just to the security of states and their human populations, but to the resilience of all living systems; shifting concern from human life to the biosphere, incorporating every known species, as well as habitats of all kinds, vulnerable to the destructions wrought by economic development. Life, not economy, it said, must provide the rationalities according to which peoples are entitled to increase their prosperity. Such a doctrine had to have significant implications for how not just the problem but the very nature of security was conceived in developmental circles. Once the referent object of development became the life of the biosphere rather than simply states and humans, so the account of security to which development is allied had to be transformed. Security became less fashionable and gradually gave way to the new concept of ‘resilience’. Resilience is a useful concept, the proponents of sustainable development argued, precisely because it is not a capacity of states, nor merely of human populations, but a capacity of life itself. Thus did resilience emerge within the doctrine of sustainable development as a way of positing a different kind of policy problematic to those formulated in the security doctrines of Western states previously. One which would privilege the life of the biosphere in all its dimensions over and against the human focus that shaped development practices previously. If one aspect of the subordination of rationalities of economy to rationalities of life in developmental discourse has been the shift from doctrines of economic development to sustainable development then a correlate shift has been that from security to resilience.

Allied to this shift, then, the doctrine of sustainable development fashioned a new guiding axiom, one which created a surface of friction with the rationalities of economic development. By the time of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, however, new ways of thinking about resilience were visible. A major report prepared
as input to the process of the World Summit described how resilience is a property associated not just with the diversity ‘of species’, but also ‘of human opportunity’, and especially ‘of economic options – that maintain and encourage both adaptation and learning’ among human populations (Folkes et al. 2002: 438). In an adroit reformulation of the problematic, neoliberal economic development became itself a core constituent of the resilience which sustainable development had to be aimed at increasing. Thus was it that, post-Johannesburg, the correlation of sustainable development with resilience started to produce explicitly neoliberal prescriptions for institutional reform. ‘Ecological ignorance’ began to be conceptualised as a threat, not just to the resilience of the biosphere, but to humanity (Folkes 2002: 438). Resilience was reconceived not simply as a property of the biosphere, in need of protection from the economic development of humanity, but a property within human populations which now needed promoting through the increase of their ‘economic options.’ As remarkably, the biosphere itself began to be conceived not as an extra-economic domain, vulnerable to the economic practices of human populations, but as an economy of ‘services’ which ‘humanity receives’ (Folkes et al. 2002: 437).

There is a double and correlated shift at work, here, then, in the elaboration of the sustainable development-resilience nexus post-Johannesburg. In one move ‘resilience’ has shifted from being a property of the biosphere to being a property of humanity, while in a second move ‘service’ has shifted from being an element of economy to being a capacity of the biosphere. Crucified on the cross that this double shift carves are ‘the poor’. For they are the segment of population of which resilience is now demanded and simultaneously the population said to threaten the degradation of ‘ecosystem services’. Increasing the ‘resiliency’ of the poor has become a defining goal, for example, of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the years post-Johannesburg (UNEP 2004: 39). Alleviating threats to the biosphere requires improving the resilience of the poor, especially, because it is precisely the poor that are most ‘ecologically ignorant’ and thus most prone to using ‘ecosystem services’ in non-sustainable ways. Thus does ensuring the resilience of the biosphere require making the poor into more resilient kinds of subjects, and making the poor into more resilient subjects requires relieving them of their ecological ignorance, and the means to that removal is argued to reside in building neoliberal frameworks of economy, governance and subjectivity. Developing the resilience of the poor is said to require, for example, a social context of ‘flexible and open institutions and multi-level governance systems’ (Folke et al. 2002: 439). ‘The absence of markets and price signals’ in ecological services is a major threat to resilience, UNEP argues, because it means that ‘changes in their conditions have gone unnoticed’ (UNEP 2004: 13). Property rights regimes have to be extended so that
they incorporate ecosystem services and so that markets can function in them (UNEP 2004: 15). ‘Markets’, it is argued, ‘have proven to be among the most resilient institutions, being able to recover quickly and to function in the absence of government’ (Pingali et al. 2005: 518). When and where the market fails to recover, development policies for increasing resilience have to be aimed at ‘ensuring access to markets’ (Pingali et al. 2005: 518). Ensuring the resilience of the poor also requires the building of neoliberal systems of governance which will monitor their use of ecological services to ensure they are sustainably managed (UNEP 2004: 39). The poor, in order to be the agents of their own change, have to be subjectivised so that they are ‘able to make sustainable management decisions that respect natural resources and enable the achievement of a sustainable income stream’ (UNEP 2004: 5). ‘Over-harvesting, over-use, misuse or excessive conversion of ecosystems into human or artificial systems damages the regulation service which in turn reduces the flow of the provisioning service provided by ecosystems’ (UNEP 2004: 20). Within ‘the poor’ itself women are the principal target population. ‘I will transform my lifestyle in the way I farm and think’ has become the mantra that poor women farmers in the Caribbean region are demanded, for example, to repeat like Orwellian farm animals in order to receive European Union funding (Tandon 2007: 12-14).

This double shift is integral, I argue, to the strategy by which neoliberalism has absorbed the critique of sustainable development. Whereas resilience was originally conceived by proponents of sustainable development as a property that distinguishes the extra-economic ‘life-support systems’ which humans require to live well, it has become reconceived post-Johannesburg as a property which humanity intrinsically possesses, is capable of developing further, and which it can never have too much
of. As a property of human populations it is dependent moreover on their interpellation within markets, their diversity as economic subjects, and their subjection to systems of governance able to ensure that they continue to use natural resources in sustainable ways. Thus did a doctrine which emerged in critique of neoliberal policy prescriptions for development transform into a doctrine which legitimates a neoliberal model of development based upon the constitution of markets and the interpellation of subjects within markets.

The disastrous and politically debased subject of resilience

Having established how sustainable development, via its propagation of the concept of resilience, naturalises neoliberal systems of governance, I want to consider how it functions to make subjects amenable to neoliberal governance. Every regime of governance invokes its own particular subject of governance. Producing subjects the liberal way has long since been a game of producing self-securing subjects. Subjects that are capable of securing themselves are less of a threat to themselves and in being so are not a threat to the governance capacities of their states nor to the governance of the global order either. And in this sense the correlation of development with security feeds upon the political imaginary of liberalism predicated as it became upon the belief that a global order of self-securing subjects would in turn deliver a more secure form of world order (Rosenau 1991, 2002, 2008). What, then, does the shift in the correlation of development with security to resilience tell us about the nature of the subject that development is now aimed at producing? What differences are entailed in being a resilient subject as opposed to a merely secure subject?

There is, in fact, a considerable shift here. The major condition of possibility for the subject of sustainable development is that it sacrifices its capacity and desire for security. Security, here, is less that which liberalism demands of its subjects than what it forbids them. The resilient subject of sustainable development is, by definition, not a secure but an adaptive subject; adaptive in that it is capable of making those adjustments to itself which enable it to survive the hazards encountered in its exposure to the world. In this sense the resilient subject is a subject which must permanently struggle to accommodate itself to the world. Not a political subject which can conceive of changing the world, its structure and conditions of possibility, with a view to securing itself from the world. But a subject which accepts the disastrousness of the world it lives in as a condition for partaking of that world and which accepts the necessity of the injunction to change itself in correspondence with the threats and dangers now presupposed as endemic. One can see readily how this
plays out in relation to debates, for example, over climate change. One enthusiast for resilience as an answer to the problem writes:

> What is vital to understand is not the degree of climate change that we should expect, nor necessarily the impact that we might anticipate on water resource management, coastal defence, food security, species survival, etc. What is important to grasp is that we do have the abilities to adapt and adjust to the changes that climate change will bring (Tandon 2007: 12).

Sustainable development is no longer conceived, thus, as a state of being on account of which a human is capable of securing itself from the world, and via which he or she becomes a subject in the world. Once development is said to follow ecological laws of change, and thus once exposure to hazard becomes a condition of possibility for development, so the question which sustainable development poses for the communities and individuals subject to it is: can you survive in the world without securing yourself from the world?

This is precisely why resilience has become so intimately tied, in the doctrine of sustainable development, not just to neoliberalism but to disaster management. Indeed the latter is also crucial in legitimating the former. The ability of developing societies to manage exposure to hazard is dependent, the UN says, on their maintenance of a healthy and diverse ecological system that is productive and life-sustaining, but it also demands a healthy and diverse economy that adapts to change and recognises social and ecological limits (UN 2004: Ch. 1, S.2: 18). It requires ‘capturing opportunities for social change during the “window of opportunity” following disasters, for example by utilising the skills of women and men equally during reconstruction’ (UN 2004: Ch. 1, S.2: 20). As fundamentally, it requires making societies ‘aware of the importance of disaster reduction for their own well-being’ (UN 2004: Ch. 3, S.4: 1), because ‘it is crucial for people to understand that they have a responsibility towards their own survival and not simply wait for governments to find and provide solutions’ (2004: Ch. 3, S.4: 20). Disasters, thus construed, are not threats to the development of human beings from which they might aspire to secure themselves. They are events of profound ‘opportunity’ for societies to transform themselves economically and politically. They are events which do not merely expose communities to dangers from which they must be saved in order that they might be set back onto the path of development. But, rather, where communities, in their exposure, are able to undergo novel processes of developmental change in reconstitution of themselves as neoliberal societies. Exposure to disaster, in this context, is conceptualised in positive terms as constitutive of the possibility for the development of neoliberal systems of governance. But the working
of this rationality depends on a subject that will submit to it. Sustainable development requires subjects, the UN report insists in a remarkable passage, to understand the ‘nature’ of hazards. The passage of societies to such knowledge must in turn involve, it states:

...a consideration of almost every physical phenomenon on the planet. The slow movements in the earth’s mantle – the convection cells that drive the movement of continents and the manufacture of ocean floors – are the starting and also the sticking point. They lift mountains and shape landscapes. They also build volcanoes and trigger potentially catastrophic earthquakes. Like those other invisible movements that take place on a vast scale through the atmospheric medium – the carbon cycle and the water cycle and the nitrogen cycle – volcanoes and earthquakes, along with technological advancements, provide the bedrock of strong nations, rich industries and great cities. They do, of course, also have the potential to destroy them (2004: Ch. 2, S.1: 4).

The account of the world constituted by development agencies concerned with building resilient societies is one that presupposes the disastrousness of the world, and likewise one which interpellates a subject that is permanently called upon to bear the disaster. A subject for whom bearing the disaster is a required practice without which he or she cannot grow and prosper in the world. The human here is conceived as resilient in so far as it adapts to rather than resists the conditions of its suffering in the world. To be resilient is to forego the very power of resistance. ‘The imperative of adaptation rather than resistance to change will increase inexorably’, two ideologues of sustainable development claim (Handmer and Dovers 1996). In their enthusiasm for the ‘inexorable increase’ of this ‘imperative’, theorists of sustainable development engage in some vivid discursive representations of the human. ‘As a species, humanity is immensely adaptable – a weed species. We are also capable of considerable adaptability as individuals, and also as households (variously defined) – the latter being the perennial and universal human social unit’ (Handmer and Dovers 1996). The combination of the imperative of humanity to adapt with the representation of humanity as a ‘weed species’ recalls the discursive currency of similar combinations within the concentration camps of Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Those camps were, as Barrington Moore has demonstrated in a wide-ranging historical study, sites for the constitution of precisely such resilient subjects and the honing of precisely such adaptive capacities. The inhabitants of such extreme spaces of suffering often failed to exhibit resistance, seeking to survive through the development of complex and ultimately failed strategies of ‘adaptation’ to the conditions of their suffering (Moore 1978: 66). The ‘conquest’ of the perception of inevitability and necessity of circumstances is ‘essential’, Moore argues on the other hand, ‘to the develop-
ment of politically effective moral outrage’ (1978: 459). The making of resilient subjects and societies fit for neoliberalism by agencies of sustainable development is based upon a degradation of the political capacities of human beings far more subtle than that achieved in Auschwitz and Buchenwald. But the enthusiasm with which ideologues of sustainable development are turning resilience into an ‘imperative’ is nevertheless comparable with that of the SS guards who also aimed ‘to speed up the processes of adaptive learning’ among those populations in their charge by convincing them of the futility of resistance (Moore 1978: 66).

**Development contra neoliberalism?**

Can the doctrine of sustainable development be retrieved from the grip that neoliberalism seems to have achieved on it? My intention here has not been to dismiss claims as to the necessity of concern for the state of the biosphere, but to raise the problem of the surface of contact between such an ecological mode of reasoning and a mode of economic reason complicit with the degradation of the biosphere. While sustainable development deploys ecological reason to argue for the need to secure the life of the biosphere, neoliberalism prescribes economy as the very means of that security. Economic reason is conceived within neoliberalism as a servant of ecological reason; claiming paradoxically to secure life from economy through a promotion of the capacities of life for economy. If, then, sustainable development is to escape its appropriation it must contest the nexus of relations on which claims as to the necessity of neoliberal frameworks for the sustainability of life are based. For a start this must mean rethinking the ways in which it engages with the concept of resilience. The problem here is less the demands to improve the resilience of ecosystems which distinguished the agenda of sustainable development in its early years than it is the post-Johannesburg shift to propagating resilience as a fundamental property and capacity of the human. The ecological imaginary is colonising the social and political imaginaries of theorists and practitioners of development in ways that are providing fertile ground for the application of neoliberalism as a solution to the problem of sustainability. Understanding how that is possible requires understanding the biopolitics of neoliberalism; how its claims to be able to increase wealth and freedom are correlated with ways to increase the prosperity and security of life itself. For its capacities to correlate practices for the increase of economic prosperity with those dedicated to increasing the prosperity of the biosphere are precisely why the doctrine of sustainable development is so compatible with it.

What is needed is a policy and practice of sustainable development reflexive enough to provide space for a ‘speaking back’ to the forms of neoliberalism that are currently being pushed by Western states and international
organisations as answers to the problem of sustainability. A policy and practice that will cut the poor and underdeveloped some slack when it comes to issues of environmental degradation. A policy and practice that will, while taking into account the grave nature of these problems, take seriously the degradations of capacities for the development of political subjectivity that occur when adaptation rather than resistance to the conditions of worldly suffering becomes a governing imperative. We have enough voices, now, calling within the chorus of development for the saving of the planet. But where are the voices that will call for the saving of the political? For sustainable development to reinvent itself it needs to master the ecological reason out of which it emerged and forge newly political paradigms of thought and practice. Why is it that the conception of ecology at work in sustainable development is so limited that it permits neoliberalism to proliferate, like a poison species, taking over entire states and societies in the wake of their disasters, utilising their suffering, as conditions for its spread, installing markets, commodifying anything it can lay its hands on, monetising the value of everything, driving peoples from countryside into cities, generating displacement, homelessness and deprivation? It is not only living species and habitats that are today threatened with extinction, and for which we ought to mobilise our care, but the words and gestures of human solidarity on which resistance to such biopolitical regimes of governance depends (Guattari 1995). A sense of responsibility for the survival of the life of the biosphere is not a sufficient condition for the development of a political subject capable of speaking back to neoliberalism. Nor a sense of responsibility for the life of humanity. What is required is a subject responsible for securing incorporeal species, chiefly that of the political, currently threatened with extinction, on account of the overwrought fascination with life that has colonised the developmental as well as every other biopoliticised imaginary of the modern age.

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Damage after the earthquake in Haiti on January 12, 2009.
Global Disaster Management and Therapeutic Governance of Communities

Vanessa Pupavac

The Haitian earthquake in 2010 was one of the most devastating of modern disasters. The appalling loss of life and destruction, which mobilised people globally to donate to disaster relief, has raised questions about global disaster management. Disasters have been a core prism through which Western populations have related to the developing world over the last half-century, from the Biafran war in the 1960s to the Ethiopian famine in the 1980s, the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s or the Asian tsunami of the last decade. Western countries have also seemed more vulnerable to mass disasters than they have been for decades, whether to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 or natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina.

This article considers changing views on disasters and disaster-affected communities and their translation into global disaster management and therapeutic governance of communities. The article discusses how Western views shifted from optimistic sociological approaches to human agency in disasters to pessimistic ecological models of human pathology in disasters. I particularly draw upon changing frameworks of communal meaning among the British, which have both reflected and influenced changing international disaster approaches and responses to crises in the developing world. Traditional humanitarianism treated emergencies as being caused by natural disasters and the community as innocent victims. The recipient community in international aid was therefore not portrayed as culpable, but it was infantilised. In the last two decades a new humanitarianism has emerged around the concept of complex emergencies, which problematises affected communities as requiring therapeutic governance to break the vicious cycles of psychosocial dysfunction.
Changing historical approaches towards disasters

Disasters have assumed fundamental significance historically for human populations and the human condition. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods or comets have been seen as portending momentous events alongside their direct physical destructiveness. Disasters’ elemental character may encourage communities to suspend temporarily personal or public divisions and may engender a sense of common humanity, unrecognised in non-emergency conditions (Fritz 1996: 23). Our common humanity is expressed in traditional humanitarian principles, which assert the neutrality and impartiality of aid, irrespective of existing political, national, racial, ethnic, religious or social affiliations (ICRC, undated). Nevertheless, disasters are experienced within historically specific social paradigms, notwithstanding disasters’ trans-historical elements and how disasters shake up ordinary cultural expectations.
Disaster studies, following Quarantelli’s typology (1978, 1998), have identified three broad, historical understandings of disasters: acts of God, acts of nature and acts of humanity. The three understandings of disasters are associated respectively with the traditional pre-Enlightenment condition, the modern Enlightenment condition and the postmodern condition. Indeed, disasters have marked watersheds in human history: the 1755 Lisbon earthquake accelerating the Enlightenment, and the Holocaust and Atomic bomb stimulating post-Enlightenment thinking. These understandings are associated respectively with presumptions about disaster-affected communities and humanity in general: stoicism towards acts of God, agency in response to acts of nature, and pathology in relation to human acts.

Disasters from ancient times have had terrifying religious significance. Early antiquity often represented disasters as consequences of the gods’ malicious sport – as in the Greek myths about Poseidon, the god of the sea and the ‘earthshaker’. Later antiquity, especially the monotheist religious traditions, viewed disasters as God’s punishment for human wickedness. Yet disasters struck the good, not only the wicked. Disasters became represented as tests of faith. The Biblical and Koranic story of Job affirmed religious steadfastness under suffering.

Religious interpretations were profoundly shaken by the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, which occurred on the Catholic Feast of All Saints and killed between 30,000 and 40,000 people as well as destroying many buildings. The Lisbon earthquake prompted debates across Europe, raising questions about a providential religious order and promoting secular Enlightenment thinking (Braun 2005; Kendrick 1956). Famously, Voltaire’s Poem on the Lisbon Disaster called for enlightenment and for humanity to understand both itself and the natural and social world better (Voltaire 1911). Overall, public responses to the Lisbon earthquake encouraged a view of disasters as acts of nature, notwithstanding continuing religious interpretations. Importantly, the Portuguese authorities conducted one of the first scientific disaster enquiries and inspired scientific interest across Europe, underpinned by new confidence in the human potential to improve the world. Speaking of his ambitious plans for the city’s reconstruction, Portuguese Prime Minister Pombal defiantly asserted that one day they would be considered ‘small’ (New World Contributors 2008). This spirit of confident defiance was repeatedly demonstrated in the 19th and 20th centuries. Optimistic responses prevailed in disasters such as the devastating 1871 Chicago fire, after which reconstruction expanded the city and stimulated its economic growth (Rozario 2007). Venture and stoicism in the face of disaster was culturally affirmed – whether in the American pioneering spirit.
mythologised in works such as Laura Wilder’s *Little House* series, or the British colonial spirit in Kipling’s writings.

The 20th century human-created disasters of world war and extermination led people to question the Enlightenment-inspired humanist confidence that human science would be used for humanity’s benefit. The potential for nuclear destruction raised the spectre of catastrophes on a previously inconceivable scale – extermination of whole human groups and destruction of the planet itself. Right-wing political thinking had already been shaken by the First World War and the Russian Revolution, while the Holocaust, Hiroshima and the Soviet Gulags shook left-wing political confidence in social progress and human agency, expressed in works such as Robert Lifton’s *Death in Life* or Herbert Marcusse’s *One-Dimensional Man*. Critical theorists Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer drew pessimistic conclusions about the whole Enlightenment project in their study, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*:

> In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the full enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1976: 1).

Social pessimism fostered ecological concerns from the 1960s onwards, which were taken up later in sociological risk studies such as Zygmunt Bauman’s *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Ulrich Beck’s *Risk Society* and Anthony Giddens’ *The Consequences of Modernity*, and influenced global disaster approaches.

Until the 1980s, social pessimism was largely limited to elite or intellectual circles and the earlier optimistic humanist thinking prevailed in international disaster responses. For it was not automatic that the Holocaust or Hiroshima should undermine active humanist and reformist approaches. Indeed, creating the United Nations, reconstructing Europe and Japan, international revulsion against the Holocaust and formally delegitimising racist theories all demonstrate active humanist and reformist aspirations. Other developments undermined social optimism. I next consider how progressive politics encouraged optimistic sociological approaches, emphasising communal meaning and responses, and how its demise encouraged pessimistic ecological approaches, emphasising communities at risk.
Modern active and reformist communal meanings

Sociological approaches to disasters have historically emphasised communal meaning and communal responses. Religions may interpret disasters as warnings to humanity to return to religious faith and may encourage fatalism or stoicism in the face of danger. The Enlightenment humanist meta-narrative, premised on a belief in human progress, saw disasters as indicting unenlightened practices and testifying to the imperative for social improvement. Disasters were seen as avoidable or mitigatable in the long term through improved public infrastructure and interventions.

These Enlightenment ideas were intertwined with the rise of modern politics and nationalism, which further mediated how disasters were understood and were responded to. Left-wing responses to disasters were significantly associated with critiques of existing power relations and social inequalities and represented the humanity of the common man. They affirmed ordinary people’s mutual support, stoicism and dignity in the face of poverty, harsh working conditions and economic ruin as part of demanding social change (Steinbeck 1951: 177-184). The political potential generated by disasters was specifically represented in Marxist and other left-wing crisis theories. As disasters destabilised the existing political and social order, oppositional political movements could use the opportunity of crisis conditions to push for political and social change.

Conversely, conservatives tended to deplore political divisions, which they saw as socially divisive, and appealed to a common national identity. Consequently, conservative approaches tended to suppress divisions in disasters and sought to reaffirm social relations and social responsibilities (including responsibilities towards the poor) potentially destabilised during crises. Reaffirmation of the existing social order also potentially affirmed ordinary people’s reactions to new political forces. Right-wing theories were more likely to draw pessimistic conclusions from disasters where they shook established social norms. Crowd studies such as Ortega y Gasset’s The Revolt of the Masses and literary works such as T. S. Eliot’s The Wasteland following the First World War reflected the elite’s fears for civilisation and culture in the face of the of the mass society.

Post-war US and international disaster studies were influenced by observations of the British population’s reactions during the Blitz (Fritz 1996: 48-50). The catastrophic Second World War experience, requiring the population’s mobilisation to defend itself, affirmed ordinary people’s
responses, marginalised negative views and bridged political divisions, appealing to both a common national identity and a social reform agenda. The Blitz spirit, or courage and resolve under aerial bombardment, became the popular representation of wartime responses, and informed optimistic post-war expectations of ordinary people’s communal, altruistic, stoical responses to disasters up until the 1980s. Behaviour counter to the Blitz ideal, where people panicked or were selfish, was marginal in mainstream accounts (Jones et al., 2004). Both conservative and left-wing wartime narratives typically showed people heroically working together as a community, transcending their social differences. Significantly, the key slogan of post-war reconstruction was ‘homes fit for heroes’, affirming ordinary people’s wartime heroism. Positive public representations on both sides of the Atlantic were reinforced through popular films and music like Aaron Copland’s music Fanfare to the Common Man, celebrating ordinary people’s heroic wartime sacrifice.

Disasters, temporarily suspending existing social divisions, illustrated the potential for changing social relations beyond the disaster. The sociologist Richard Titmus’s The Gift Relationship (1970) studied the development of blood donor and transfusion services in Britain following the Second World War and its significance for underpinning socially altruistic relations towards strangers in modern society. The gift of blood affirms our common humanity and our common human needs. Blood donation involves not only the individual donors’ altruism,
but also their belief in others’ altruism towards strangers. Donors were acknowledging ‘the universal stranger’, people beyond their own family or group, and this concern for the unknown stranger underpinned the social welfare ideals of the post-war state (ibid: 268). Overall, the prevailing heroic wartime narratives of the victorious allies were active and reformist and influenced international development ideals and aid practice. Major international disaster organisations such as Oxfam came out of the Second World War – as did the UN itself.

**Sociological disaster management approaches: therapeutic communities**

Sociological disaster studies have examined communal meanings during disasters, exploring the interaction between disasters and cultural understanding, and developing secularised interpretations of older religious moral lessons from adversity. They have suggested disasters allow societies to transcend modern anomie, at least temporarily. Emile Durkheim’s classic 19th century sociological study *On Suicide* had observed war temporarily mitigated modern anomie and decreased individual civilian psychosis and could develop people’s sense of social responsibility (Durkheim 2006). Optimistic thinking prevailed in post-war disaster responses linked to wider belief in social progress, which saw disasters as natural occurrences to be overcome through human action. The broadly optimistic view about the capacity to deal with the physical impact of disasters was accompanied by similarly optimistic cultural expectations of people’s responses to disasters. And crises seen through the lens of socially progressive outlooks reinforced imperatives for social support.

Sociological accounts documented the spontaneous creation of therapeutic communities (Barton 1969; Fritz 1996; Kreps 1984; Saunders and Kreps 1987). Leading post-war US disaster expert Charles Fritz was struck by the fact that large-scale disasters produced ‘mentally healthy conditions’ (Fritz 1996: 9). His 1961 study *Disasters and Mental Health* argues that ‘disaster-struck communities and societies naturally develop therapies that quickly and effectively overcome the losses, traumas and privations of disaster – without the intervention of mental health care professionals’ (ibid: 25). Fritz contests ‘overworked metaphors of pathology’, although he warns of different responses if ‘outside forces or authorities intervene in spontaneous community processes of adjusting to the disaster’ (ibid: 27–28). Against negative predictions, the study suggests that panic and hysteria are rare, people exhibit self-control and concern for the welfare of others, and reports of looting are typically exaggerated (ibid: 18). Fritz questions the value of extrapolating from ‘routine crises or small-scale accidents to larger-scale disasters’, arguing
that their enormity shakes up cultural norms and everyday behaviours (ibid: 23). Significantly, disaster-affected communities may cross existing social, racial, minority divisions (ibid: 40-42) and ‘most of the behavioural pathologies of everyday life fail to increase or actually decline in disaster’ (ibid: 27).

Positive expectations of communal responses were exhibited in the appalling 1966 Aberfan mining tragedy in Wales, where 144 pupils and teachers were killed by a coal tip landslide (Furedi 2005). Cultural responses affirmed the community’s heroic stoicism, strength and moral capacity to recover without outside intervention. The surviving children returned to school within two weeks. Outside intervention was rejected. No legal claims were initiated by the Aberfan relations – the idea was rejected as bowing to vengeance (ibid.). However, such responses, especially from the mid-1980s, were professionally and culturally questioned.

**Disasters, social pessimism and risk consciousness**

In recent decades, both conservative and left-wing thinking has become more negative about humanity, seeing disasters as embodying human pathology and expecting dysfunctional or antisocial responses. Significant frameworks of meaning, notably belief in social progress and social welfare, had kept pessimistic critiques marginal and largely confined to conservative or left-wing cultural elites, until significant national frameworks of meaning eroded. It is possible to identify specific national tipping points as a result of which countries began to adopt more pessimistic professional and cultural outlooks. Pessimistic critiques gained wider cultural resonance in the United States in the 1970s, nationally demoralised over the Vietnam War and Watergate (Engelhardt 1998; Lasch 1984). In Britain, pessimism became more apparent a decade later, following the defeat of the year-long miners’ strike in 1985 and the demise of a working class movement. Individual countries’ national demoralisation was reinforced by a succession of international setbacks, including the end of the post-war economic boom, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the failed promise of 1968 radicalism, political repression and violent conflict in developing countries, and stasis or regression in international development (Laidi 1998).

The erosion of national morale led to a heightened cultural sense of risk and vulnerability; this was reflected in sociology, where the focus of interest shifted from social class to victimhood and risk (Bauman 1991; Beck 1992; Lasch 1981) and the professional expectations and cultural resonance of post-traumatic stress disorder, formally codified in 1980
The cultural shift involved the rise of social regulation through risk prevention, displacing traditional morality or political ideologies (Castel 1991). Risk governance involves identifying risks, prevention policies making individuals aware of risks and supporting individuals to modify their behaviour, and monitoring mechanisms and targets to reduce risk.

Victimhood and pathology rather than heroism resonated with the demoralised Western cultural mood. Disasters themselves, especially the Holocaust, became more central to the Western imagination with the demise of other frameworks of meaning (Hammond 2007; Laidi 1998). Disasters did not simply register as individual tragedies but came to be linked together culturally, reinforcing a pervasive sense of vulnerability and risk. At the same time disaster studies have become more pessimistic about the responses of disaster affected-communities, along with the erosion of previous frameworks of meaning, their associated communal relations and a sense of community mediating adverse experiences.

**Ecological disaster management approaches – communities at risk**

In recent decades, ecological accounts have displaced sociological accounts in disaster management literature. Ecological accounts or agent-specific approaches focus on the scale and causes of disasters, and communities’ vulnerabilities to external risks. They argue that technological disasters involving human error foster ‘corrosive communities’ rather than therapeutic communities, because of the way that disputes over culpability divide communities (Erikson 1994). Furthermore, the disasters attributed to human agency have expanded, as have the concepts of disasters, including toxic disasters (Furedi 2005). Ecological or agent-specific approaches associate human agency with pathology or culpability for disasters, and focus on vulnerability to disasters as opposed to the capacity to recover from disasters and make progress (ibid.). Populations tend to be approached dualistically as perpetrators or as victims at risk of trauma and dysfunction in the absence of expert interventions. Moreover, by the late 1980s, predictions of community dysfunction and long-term mental health problems were being applied to natural as well as technological disasters (ibid.). So whereas earlier sociological accounts saw the spontaneous creation of ‘therapeutic communities’, the new tendency in policy-making was to presume the need for therapeutic governance of disaster-affected ‘corrosive’ communities.
Risk consciousness, as it was absorbed into cultural norms, came to shape views of appropriate and inappropriate responses, including official models of functional and dysfunctional behaviour. Indicative of changing cultural expectations was the new attention given to emotional damage, and professional and cultural expectations of mass trauma from disasters. The vulnerability and trauma models were disseminated in media reporting. It became standard for UK media reports on disasters to refer to how the traumatised victims were receiving counselling. It also became standard for disaster reports or social problem documentaries to be followed by an announcement about a helpline for counselling or information available for anybody affected by the issues discussed. Cultural expectations of vulnerability were universalised socially. Thus in the UK it was automatically assumed any crisis-affected group, including farmers in rural communities previously associated with good support networks and traditional stoical attitudes, would need external therapeutic support (ibid.). Cultural vulnerability was also universalised globally.

Historically, however, human-created disasters, including Hiroshima and Aberrant, have not necessarily caused community corrosion (Fritz 1996; Furred 2005). Since the 1990s the new risk consciousness has been revising the cultural histories of disasters like the 1966 Aberfan mining disaster. Victims of these past disasters, interviewed about their experiences in contemporary documentaries or oral history projects, appear to be revising their memories according to today’s cultural expectations of vulnerability and psychological trauma.
Terrorism threats and the return of resilience

Critiques of professional trauma and vulnerability models and interventions followed, particularly prompted by the explosion of global psychosocial programmes in the 1990s (Bracken 2002; Summerfield 1999). Such critiques questioned the medicalising of normal reactions, the presumption of personal and communal vulnerability rather than personal and communal strengths, interference with community and personal recovery, and the orientating people into individualised, professional relationships. They emphasised personal and communal strengths and values in mitigating the impact of disasters. Their impact was limited in the 1990s but attracted more official policy interest following the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and the 2005 terrorist attacks in Britain. Interest revived in sociological studies documenting historical agency and productive communal responses to disasters (Fritz 1996; Furedi 2005; Rozario 2007; Solnit 2005). Ecological approaches have also become interested in resilience.

Crucially, critical security analysis pointed to the danger that the vulnerability paradigm amplified the negative impact of terrorist threats (Durodie 2008). Analysts advised that counterterrorism strategies needed to be re-orientated around resilience, and affirmation of communal values and relations. The revised counterterrorism policies have influenced crisis management more broadly. Since the mid-2000s there has been new emphasis on strengthening leadership and affirming communal values and positive social responses in the face of disasters, at least at the formal level. The very title of the UK government’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat and UK Resilience Section shows policy recognition of promoting community resilience (Civil Contingencies Secretariat 2009). These changed policies have also been evident in revised media reporting of disasters, which are refocusing on community spirit and activity.

However, the new resilience model is distinct from stoicism and does not necessarily mean a return of trust in people’s responses. The new resilience paradigm tends to replicate the assumptions of the vulnerability paradigm, which involves top-down approaches relying on professional interventions to make people resilient, instead of encouraging communities to act independently and build their resilience (Furred 2005). Importantly, the new resilience model has similar expectations of individual pathology without external governance. Communal civil values are affirmed at the formal level, but the expanding regulation of individuals continues, inhibiting spontaneous personal or communal responses.
Addressing disasters in the developing world

Western governments, organisations and individuals have increasingly sought meaning in international disasters or foreign conflicts as domestic sources of meaning have eroded since the 1980s (Hammond 2007; Laidi 1998). How have Western views of and interventions in disasters in the developing world evolved? Modern international aid began under the United Nations and in the climate of international rivalry to win the hearts and minds of the newly independent states. The new UN agencies and Western aid organisations shifted from assisting refugees in post-war Europe to the populations of newly independent countries. These aid organisations superseded earlier European colonial charity and missionary work. Foreign missionary organisations continue to be significant in aid work, US Christian organisations now competing with Islamic organisations. Indeed the numbers of foreign missionaries are larger than during colonial times (Hearn 2002). Secularised themes of salvation have persisted in global aid relations.

International emergency aid responses were to supplement international development approaches, whose original modernising industrial models aspired to overcome recurring natural disasters through the building of modern public infrastructure to prevent droughts, floods and disease, and social welfare systems to address poverty and health needs. A green revolution was to transform agriculture, increase food production and prevent famine. Political regimes could fall if they failed to address disasters. Some social progress was made after independence, but political instability increased, as development was uneven. Development studies repeatedly criticised the inadequacies of international development policies based on economic growth, and demonstrated that international economic relations and structural adjustment programmes exacerbated crises in the developing world and overlooked the basic needs of the poor.

Traditional humanitarianism represented emergencies as being caused by natural disasters and the community as innocent victims to be saved by international aid; thus the community was not held culpable but was infantilised (Burman 1994). Development education undertaken by NGOs sought to challenge Western stereotypes of the developing world, including those of NGO fundraising campaigns, which represented developing populations as dependent on external charity.

An important contribution to disaster analysis was made by the economist Amartya Sen’s entitlement approach to famine, building on the basic needs literature and critiques of economic growth strategies.
when food was available, and therefore that increasing food production or focusing on warning systems was inadequate. Famine prevention strategies needed to address households’ ability to secure commodities for survival. Loss of labour power or wages and purchasing power contributed to famines; public works creating wage-based employment, along with welfare security systems and the provision of ‘unconditional relief’, helped prevent famines (Dreze and Sen 1990). The political will to address household food security was therefore crucial. Famously, Sen argued that democracy prevented famine in India (Sen 1981). Modifying Sen’s conclusions, Alex de Waal (1989) proposed disease as the greatest danger in crisis conditions, and observed that populations had active coping strategies which mediated disasters and aimed to protect future household or community livelihoods, although they might not be able to protect all members. Furthermore, political violence and conflict undermined these coping strategies (ibid.). Other researchers argued that Sen downplayed the importance of India’s infrastructure, contrasting it with Africa’s poor infrastructure, which exacerbated transport problems and local food shortages (Kumar 1990).

Surviving the global development crisis?

Over the decades aid critiques have repeatedly advocated shifting from emergency relief to development to prevent disasters. But the 1980s’ debt crisis and structural adjustment meant that infrastructure and welfare systems were strained in developing countries. Furthermore, the World Bank’s free-market economics was opposed to public works and food subsidies, believing they lowered incentives to increase production, including food production. International development strategies became reorganised around selective basic interventions, maximising populations’ survival capacities, and are now embodied in the Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, which have replaced the earlier structural adjustment programmes (Duffield 2007). These strategies make sense as crisis management but abandon earlier aspirations to close the economic gap between developing and Western countries.

Sen’s entitlement approach captured the imagination of policy-makers and supplemented sustainable development thinking against dwindling belief in social progress through material development, but its concern with inequalities became interpreted in ways that supported the retreat of public employment and welfare provision. Development strategies became focused on empowering households to secure their own livelihoods and welfare through traditional small agricultural holdings or urban microenterprise (Duffield 2007). A life-cycle poverty model has now been adopted, effectively turning political economy into a natural
economy (ibid.). Under a homeostatic concept of development, poverty reduction polices target particular groups considered vulnerable within life cycles – such as widows or female-headed households – to enhance survival as opposed to bringing about significant economic improvement (ibid.). A population’s material security is envisaged essentially around customary livelihoods and living standards, but customary (gendered) divisions of labour are treated as dysfunctional and re-socialisation is required so that the economic insecurities of petty trading or subsistence farming, arising from the risk of crop failure, drought or floods, can be redistributed. So, insecure communities are somehow expected to experiment with post-industrial (gender) norms in a context of material stasis, in which their traditional way of life is considered ‘natural’ on the one hand, but pathologised on the other.

**Contradictions of global disaster management and therapeutic governance**

If development strategies now resemble crisis management and populations effectively have to depend on self-reliance, what happens to disaster strategies? The cyclical re-naturalised sustainable development model is in tension with global disaster management’s shift from approaching emergencies as natural disasters to on-going complex emergencies. A complex emergency is commonly defined by international organisations as ‘a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme (IASC 1994). The concept of complex emergencies sees the causes of disasters and conflicts as multiple, which allows it to be interpreted flexibly and used by different actors, both radically and conservatively (Duffield 2007). The concept merges emergency, development and political analysis and is influenced by social psychological theories. It encompasses internal and external causes, but its policy application effectively marginalises external causality emphasised in earlier development theories, or transforms it into an imperative for external intervention. Global policy tends to focus on populations’ cultural norms and their internal social and political inequalities, rather than the international political economy. Yet, local political war economies have involved conflicts over profitable routes into the international political economy, and war-affected populations’ welfare indicators have not necessarily been the worst in the developing world, for local political war economies involve relations of obligation (Duffield 2001).
Complex emergencies are conceptualised as cycles of poverty and dependency, trauma and violence, in which affected populations become pathologised as corrosive communities and traumatised victims are deemed at risk of psychosocial dysfunction and therefore potentially of becoming future perpetrators (Pupavac 2002). Thus, inherent within global disaster management is the contradiction that communities require governance to break cycles of poverty, trauma and violence, and also require governance to support re-naturalised cycles of communal reproduction. Meanwhile, material aid to disaster-affected communities is substantially the same as four decades ago and most people survive disasters through family and communal support (Duffield 2007).

Significantly, evolving global risk management now affects aid workers, who are also considered at risk of psychosocial dysfunction (Pupavac 2004). Risk management policies are leading aid workers to be accommodated in secured camps, and inhibiting informal unregulated contact with affected communities (Duffield 2010). Therapeutic governance of aid workers is evolving to ensure their safety and psychosocial wellbeing (for example, by making provision to encourage a good work/life balance). Personal relations between aid workers and communities receiving disaster relief risk are becoming more attenuated and community engagement is taking more formal superficial forms. Furthermore, risk
management is creeping into academia, and research into crises in developing countries may be conducted on a narrower base in the future. Security concerns risk slowing down the rate at which disaster relief reaches communities, as in the case of the 2010 Haitian earthquake. Heightened security concerns over the potential risks posed by locals to aid workers (or academic researchers) reinforce negative presumptions of communities as pathological and requiring external governance. Yet both global sustainable development and disaster strategies to address complex emergencies are tacitly premised on the need for intensive external cultural and psychosocial programmes. However, psychosocial interventions to break cycles of poverty, trauma and violence may increasingly take the form of incursions into communities whose ways of life are to be substantially maintained. Consequently, although global disaster management has greater potential technologies at its disposal, there are serious tensions in its governance of disaster-affected communities. Global disaster actors should ask what material aid they actually give communities and, recalling past sociological disaster studies (Fritz 1996), whether their risk models are jeopardising disaster relief and disrupting spontaneous therapeutic communities of mutual support.

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Empowering the Disposable? Biopolitics, Race and Human Development

Giorgio Shani

The 20th anniversary of the publication of the first Human Development Report (HDR) seems an appropriate time to reflect on the success of the ‘human development’ paradigm in redefining development in an age characterised until recently by an untrammelled commitment on the part of the principal institutions governing the international political economy to furthering the goals of capital accumulation along neoliberal lines. Contrary to the initial claims that we are now living in a ‘postneoliberal age’ following the return to Keynesianism in the immediate aftermath of the September 2008 financial crisis, neoliberalism has shown a remarkable resilience. This can be seen in the austerity measures associated with the EU bailouts of Greece and Ireland, the replacement of democratically elected with technocratic governments in Italy and Greece, and the ideological swing to the right in the US (the ‘Tea Party’) and the UK (the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition). The Asia-Pacific has similarly not been immune to the ideological resurgence of neoliberalism, with the Asia-Pacific Economic Community reiterating its commitment to the creation of a Free Trade Area through the ‘Yokohama Vision’ despite fears of its consequences for the security and livelihoods of vulnerable populations in the region.

The emergence of the concept of ‘human development’, with its reconceptualisation of development as freedom (Sen 1999), and its institutionalisation in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has constituted a powerful challenge to the neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’ of the IMF/World Bank. The term ‘Washington

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1 See the various contributions to ‘Postneoliberalism – A Beginning Debate,’ Development Dialogue No. 51, January 2009.
Consensus’, originally coined by John Williamson, refers to the convergence of economic policy prescriptions promoted by the IMF, the World Bank and the US during the late 1980s and early 1990s in favour of ‘liberalization, privatization, minimizing economic regulation, rolling back welfare, reducing expenditures on public goods, tightening fiscal discipline, favouring free flows of capital, strict controls on organized labour, tax reduction and unrestricted currency repatriation’ (Falk 1999: 3). The ‘human development paradigm’, on the other hand, regards ‘people’, not profit, as the ultimate end of development and, rejecting the instrumentalism of much of neoliberalism, views development as a process through which to expand human choices and strengthen capabilities. ‘People,’ the first HDR argued, ‘are the real wealth of a nation’ (UNDP 1990, 2010 – emphasis mine).

The play on Adam Smith’s *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, however, is neither frivolous nor coincidental. Despite attempts to draw clear boundaries between human development and the neoliberal project, the ‘human development’ paradigm continues to view ‘people’ from an economistic perspective. Although human development contests the hegemony of neoliberalism by viewing development in a non-monetarised form, it simultaneously extends ‘the rationality of the market…to domains which are not exclusively or not
primarily economic’ (Foucault 2008: 323). It does this through a focus on empowerment. Empowerment, it is argued, acts as a biopolitical technology, which constructs self-interested and self-governing disciplined individuals – *hominis oeconomici* – needed for the smooth functioning of a market economy out of the culturally differentiated great mass of humanity. It has become a preferred tool with which to produce ‘self-governing and self-caring social actors, orient them towards the free-market, direct their behaviours towards entrepreneurial ends, and attach them to the project of rule’ (Sharma 2008: xx). In attempting to create autonomous, calculating and reflexive economic subjects from ‘underdeveloped’ racialised ‘populations’, empowerment has become a coveted weapon of the ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1994), *individualising* poverty, *depoliticising* inequality and replacing the binary opposition of developed/underdeveloped with a new division: ‘marketable’ and ‘disposable’. By making the ‘disposable’ marketable, empowerment seeks to ‘de-racialise’ development and provide a solution to the perennial problem of ‘surplus populations’ (Duffield 2007).

The term ‘surplus population’ refers to the ‘human debris’ (Arendt [1950] 1998) caused by capitalism: a population ‘superflous’ to the demands of the market whose ‘skills, status or even existence are in excess of prevailing conditions and requirements’ (Duffield 2007: 9). Mark Duffield argues that ‘development’ emerges as a ‘liberal problematic of security’, as a way of diffusing the threat posed by potentially dangerous ‘surplus population’. He suggests that the distinction between ‘insured’ and ‘uninsured’ lives reinforces the racialised divisions between ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ populations. A regime of social insurance offering benefits drawn from taxation and contributory payments is a prerequisite for ‘insured’ life. Those ‘populations’ existing beyond or outside these ‘insurance-based’ welfare schemes – predominantly in the South but also including a significant and rising proportion of populations in the North – are considered underdeveloped. ‘Within development policy,’ Duffield argues, there is a ‘long-standing, indeed, unconscious acceptance that non-Western populations…are essentially self-reliant in terms of their general economic, social and welfare requirements, and moreover, that development is essentially about improving self-reliance through helping to meet basic needs’ (Duffield 2007: 18). It is here that empowerment plays a key role in development, understood as the attempt to ‘contain the circulatory and destabilising effects of underdevelopment’s non-insured surplus life’ (Duffield 2007: 19), by giving uninsured individuals the ‘capabilities’ needed to meet their basic needs themselves within the context of a market economy.
Human development and neoliberalism

Regarded by its proponents as ‘the most holistic development model that exists’ (ul Haq 2005: 21), human development has been institutionalised in the Human Development Reports of the UNDP. The reports have been credited with transforming the dominant conception of development globally and challenging the neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’. The success of the reports can be gauged by the watering-down of the commitment of the main international developmental institutions, including the World Bank, to key neoliberal tenets and the concomitant incorporation of some of the key concepts associated with the ‘human development’ approach, such as poverty reduction and empowerment, into hegemonic discourses of development.

At its most basic, human development is defined as ‘a process of enlarging human choices and strengthening capabilities’ (UNDP 1990). A capability refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that it is feasible for an individual to achieve. ‘Functionings’ are, in turn, ‘the various things a person may value doing or being’ (Sen 1999: 75). The objective of human development, therefore, is ‘to enlarge people’s choices’ by creating an ‘enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives’ (ul Haq 1995, 2005: 17). According to its founding father, the late Mahbub ul Haq, the central features of the ‘human development paradigm’ (ul Haq 1995) can be summarised as follows. Firstly, human development seeks to put people at the centre of its concerns, regarding human beings as the ultimate end of development. Second, the purpose of development is to enlarge all human choices – not only economic but also social, cultural and political. Indeed, many human choices that are intrinsic to human development such as knowledge, health, political freedom and gender equality, are not seen as dependent on income. Third, the human development paradigm is concerned both with building up human capabilities (through investment in people) and using those capabilities fully (through an enabling framework for growth and employment). It regards economic growth as essential but emphasises the need to pay attention to its quality and distribution, analyses at length its link with human lives and questions its long-term sustainability. Finally, the human development paradigm defines the end of development and analyses sensible options for achieving them (ul Haq 1995, 2005: 19).

From its very inception, the ‘human development paradigm’ was articulated as an alternative to the emerging neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’ of the IMF/World Bank (Jolly 2005). It sought to rescue ‘the broad and humane concerns that led to the birth of economics as a discipline’ from the ‘narrow and mechanical nature of the standard measures of progress on which the evaluation of economic success so
often depends in contemporary investigations’ (Sen 2005: viii). The ‘narrow and mechanical nature’ of neoliberal economic theory is attributed to its underlying philosophy of consequentialism. Consequentialism, particularly in its reductionist utilitarian form, judges all choices according to their consequences. Thus, every principle, choice or action is evaluated in terms of the utility generated and is not considered a good in itself. By assessing the sum total of utility within a society, neoliberal economics aims to evaluate the consequences of individual and collective choices and the welfare generated as a result of these choices. This, it is argued, ignores the problem of distribution and leads to the neglect of rights and freedoms (Sen 1999).

Proponents of human development reject the neoliberal view that economic growth can act as a panacea for all social ills, including mass poverty, and seek to re-inscribe the ‘human’ into the discourse of development by emphasising that human beings are the ultimate end of development – not convenient fodder for the materialistic machine (ul Haq 2005:19). Consequently, the principal objective of human development is the expansion of human opportunities and capabilities and not the maximisation of economic welfare. Although economic growth is regarded as conducive to the expansion of individual choices, it is not viewed as the end but merely the means to the ultimate end of ‘human’ development. This difference is reflected in the focus of concern and guiding principles of development. While neoliberals are primarily concerned with the functioning of markets, from a human development standpoint people remain the overriding focus of concern; they are the end to which all analysis and policy are directed. Therefore, equity – and not efficiency – is the guiding principle informing policy prescriptions
and poverty reduction, rather than economic growth, emphasised as the primary goal of development policy. By equating development with growth and ignoring the perceived and real needs and aspirations of people, neoliberalism stands accused of being ‘totally silent about the ends to which these economic indicators lead’ (Jolly 2005: 109).

Proponents of human development furthermore eschew conventional economistic definitions of ‘relative’ and ‘absolute’ poverty which take the poor to refer to the population living below a certain and often arbitrarily drawn minimum income line. Poverty is viewed instead in terms of the absence of choices or capabilities that allow the individual to take full part in the life of a society or community. The criteria used to calculate poverty are consequently multidimensional and measure the lack of access to the three central human capabilities: health, income and knowledge. State action is, therefore, required to remove the impediments that hinder the realisation of human capabilities and to create an enabling environment for the expansion of human choices and, therefore, freedom (Sen 1999). In contrast to the neoliberal preference for a minimal state, the logic of human development points to greater state involvement in the developmental process. According to ul Haq, conscious public policy is needed to translate economic growth into people’s lives. This may entail a commitment to the restructuring of socio-economic and political power through far-reaching land reforms, progressive tax systems, universal education and health care coverage, affirmative action policies, the provision of credit and insurance to the poor and the establishment of social safety nets in times of economic crisis (ul Haq 1995).
The differences between the two approaches to development mask, however, a common philosophical background in the liberal tradition of political economy. Both human development and neoliberalism share a fundamental belief in the importance of individual choices and agree upon the need for well-functioning markets to enable individuals to exercise these choices (Jolly 2005: 109). Indeed, most proponents of human development do not see a contradiction between human development and structural reform, believing there to be no alternative to neoliberal globalisation (ul Haq 1995). Instead, ‘adjustment with a human face’ is seen as the poor’s best option in times of rapid social and economic change (Jolly 2005). Furthermore, like neoliberals, proponents of human development share a preference for democratic governance, the rule of law and the recognition of basic human rights as providing the best framework for the smooth functioning of markets and, therefore, the expansion of individual choices.

The relationship between human development, a market economy and political freedom is most coherently explored in the work of Amartya Sen. In his classic *Poverty and Famines* (1981), Sen argued that the institutionalisation and recognition of ‘entitlements’ is the most effective means of preventing famine. Entitlements refer to ‘the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces’ (Sen 1984: 497). Sen distinguishes between four types of entitlement, all of which are characteristic of social relations under capitalism: trade-based entitlements obtained by ‘trading something one owns with a willing party’; production-based entitlements derived from the productive use of ‘one’s own resources’; entitlements deriving from ‘one’s own labour power’; and inheritance and transfer entitlements. Food, however, is not considered an entitlement by Sen. People made destitute by famine are not entitled to food but are, in Jenny Edkins’ words, ‘entitled to starve’ (Edkins 2000). Furthermore, the entitlement approach is predicated on the existence of private property. Rights or claims over resources in non-capitalist societies that are held collectively or are ‘fuzzy’ are incompatible with the entitlement approach, which is conceptually grounded in private property regimes, where resources are commoditised and owned by individuals (Devreux 2001: 258). Sen seems, therefore, to be suggesting that the privatisation of communal property rights is a prerequisite for the prevention of famines and links this, through a discussion of the Great Bengal Famine and the failure of the ‘Great Leap Forward’, to liberal conceptions of political freedom. Contrasting the experience of colonial and postcolonial India on the one hand and India and the People’s Republic of China on the other, Sen considered independent India’s success in famine prevention to lie in its widespread recognition of freedoms of expression, association and democratic participation.
The centrality of political freedom to development was subsequently developed in his best-known work, *Development as Freedom* (1999). Defining development as ‘a process of expanding the real freedoms people enjoy’, Sen views development as contingent on the ‘removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as tolerance or overactivity of repressive states’ (Sen 1999:1). However, Sen remains silent on the degree of coercion needed to ‘remove’ these sources of ‘unfreedom’, preferring to dwell on the constitutive role of markets in fostering political freedom. For Sen, the freedom to enter markets can itself be a significant contribution to development, irrespective of the efficacy of the market mechanism in stimulating economic growth (Sen 1999: 7). Sen seeks to provide a broader and more inclusive perspective on markets, regarding them as an outgrowth of the recognition of the individual’s freedom to exchange. The market mechanism, for Sen, ‘is a basic arrangement through which people can interact with each other and undertake mutually advantageous activities’. It has ‘achieved great success under those conditions in which the opportunities offered by them could be reasonably shared’ (Sen 1999: 142). Yet Sen appears to share the neoliberal belief that the market is not only ‘natural’ but also in fact constitutive of social relations between autonomous, self-interested and maximising individuals: *hominès oeconomici*.

**Homo oeconomicus, biopolitics and neoliberal governmentality**

Sen’s methodological individualism and belief in the naturalness of the market is consistent with the ‘biopolitics’ (Foucault 2007, 2008) of liberal ‘governmentality’ (Foucault 1991, 2008), which seeks, through the construction of rational, self-interested autonomous individuals, to reduce the great mass of culturally differentiated humanity to ‘bare life’ (Agamben 1998; Shani 2010). Defined as ‘the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species become the object of a political strategy’, the origins of biopower or biopolitics, go back to the attempt, starting in Europe in the 18th century, ‘to rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birth rate, life expectancy, race’ (Foucault 2008: 1). These problems, Foucault argues, are inseparable ‘from the framework of political rationality within which they appeared’: liberalism (Foucault 2008: 317). Liberalism, for Foucault, is neither an ideology nor a theory but a practice: ‘a principle and method of the rationalization of the exercise of government, a rationalization which obeys…the internal rule of maximum economy’ (Foucault 2008: 318). As a *form of critical reflection on governmental practice*, liberalism is based
on the principle that ‘one always governs too much’ (Foucault 2008: 321, 319). This qualifies the pastoral impulse implicit in governmental rationality: the power to ‘make live’ which is itself a legacy of the pastoral individualising power of the Christian ecclesiastical pastorate (Foucault 2007: 364). Consequently, the ‘market’ role is crucial in deciding who lives and who is disposable. In Foucault’s words, it enters the governmentalising processes as ‘privileged site of experiment in which one can pinpoint the effects of excessive governmentality’ (Foucault 2008: 320).

The market was considered by the classical political economists of the 18th century to be directed by natural forces. For Adam Smith, the development of a market economy is the outcome of a natural propensity within people to ‘truck, barter and exchange’ in pursuit of their material self-interest. Our instinctive desire to better our condition produces mutually beneficial outcomes through the operation of (God’s) ‘invisible hand’ and universal laws governing prices and wages (Smith 1976). Through concepts such as the ‘true price’ that is formulated by the natural workings of the economy, the market appears as a site of ‘veridiction’. Since the sovereign is thought of as incapable of fully grasping the ‘truth’ of the market, classical economists were therefore opposed to mercantilist restrictions on the free flow of goods and service and considered the proper role of government to ‘let things follow their course’ (Foucault 2007: 48). Although they appeared as ‘external’, the limitations on sovereign power imposed by the ‘market’ were, consequently, internal to the process of governmentality. Consequently, liberalism appears as ‘the principle of the self-limitation of governmental reason’ (Foucault 2008: 20).

Like Adam Smith and the other classical economists, Sen accepts the (internal) limitations placed on governmentality as ‘natural’ and, therefore, external to it. Human development, he argues, can only take place through participation in a market economy, which is the best guarantee of freedom. Where he departs from the neoliberal (but not the classical) tradition is in his insistence that the state and other governmentalising agencies can – and should – play an active role in the developmental process within the constraints imposed by the market. Whereas Smith and the other political economists considered homo oeconomicus to be a natural description of the human individual under conditions of freedom, Sen – in common with contemporary neoliberalism – believes that he or she has to be constructed through a discourse of ‘empowerment’. As a strategy of governmentality, ‘empowerment’ creates the liberal subjectivity needed for capitalism by ‘emancipating’ the individual from prior social and cultural arrangements and inculcating the skills and resources needed to participate in a market economy. The state, in Sen’s view, is pri-
arily responsible for the production of this liberal subjectivity through the dissemination, via compulsory education, of what Smith referred to as ‘habits of industry’: autonomy, calculation and reflexivity. The ‘empowered’ individual is expected to be ‘unencumbered’ (Hopgood 2000) by communal and social ties and to possess the ability to calculate and the capacity for reflexivity. A well-educated, healthy workforce made up of autonomous, calculating and reflexive individuals will thus have the ‘capability’ (neoliberals prefer ‘capital’) to attract foreign direct investment and to generate economic development.

For neoliberals, however, the state – particularly in the global South – has become a significant barrier to development. The state’s responsibility for executing the liberal project of modernity is entrusted instead to the private sector and a plethora of international, non-governmental and quasi-governmental organisations. This new institutional architecture is designed to allow neoliberal ‘governmentality’ (Ong 2006) to operate on a global scale. Neoliberal governmentality seeks to maximise market allocation at the expense of the state by making the market mechanism the sole legitimate means of allocating resources in society, thus rejecting the fundamentals of classical and ‘embedded’ liberalism. It responds to the biopolitical problems which beset human beings collectively as ‘a set of living beings forming a population’ by individualising them: as active informed citizens, individuals, and not the state, are made primarily responsible for their own welfare.

Furthermore, the dominant ‘Chicago School’ of neoliberalism seeks ‘to extend the rationality of the market... to domains which are not exclusively or primarily economic’ (Foucault 2008: 323). This includes forcibly imposing ‘the rationality of the market’ on ‘populations’ living in indebted ‘developing’ societies through IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). SAPs seek to create the disciplinary mechanisms needed for the construction of homo oeconomicus by transforming institutional structures and creating autonomy; inculcating certain habits such as calculation and reflexivity, and developing the capacity of the state so that it can undertake these tasks (Williams 1999: 90). Specifically, this entails ‘disciplining’ the state through privatisation of state-run industries, economic liberalisation, deregulation of the economy, rolling back of welfare, reduction of expenditures on public goods, tightening of fiscal discipline, favouring of free flows of capital in order to attract foreign direct investment, strict controls on organised labour, tax reduction and unrestricted currency repatriation. The disciplined neoliberal state consequently favours strong individual property rights, the rule of law and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade (Harvey 2007: 64).
This ‘global disciplinary’ neoliberalism, as Stephen Gill has pointed out, requires a juridical-political dimension in order for it to appear as hegemonic: a ‘new constitutionalism’ that seeks to ‘lock in’ the ‘rights’ of investors and privilege the ‘security of capital’ over ‘human security’ (Gill 2003). The new political architecture of the global political economy is provided by international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which ‘disciplines’ member states for pursuing policies detrimental to the interests of (multinational) capital, the World Economic Forum at Davos, which provides an arena where government, business and media leaders can meet and coordinate policy goals, and, perhaps most importantly, the Group of Eight (G8) and now the Group of Twenty (G-20) finance ministers and central bank governors, who met in London in April 2009 to discuss the world-wide economic crisis. Their objectives are ‘to create a set of long-term economic and political reforms that gain constitutional status, thus underpinning the extension of the disciplinary power of capital on a world scale’ (Gill 2000).

Concluding remarks – De-racialising development?

It is tempting to regard the regime of neoliberal governmentality, of which human development is an intrinsic part, as having replaced the racialised discourse of ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ with a new division between the ‘marketable’ and the ‘disposable’. However, such an approach ignores the very centrality of race to biopolitics and, therefore, any kind of ‘development’. As previously argued, compared with the sovereign’s right to decide on the ‘state of exception’ (Schmitt 1922), to ‘let live or make die’, biopolitics marks a new power: ‘to foster life or disallow it to the point of death’ (Foucault 2003: 138). In contrast with the individualising focus of disciplinary power, focusing on the human as machine, biopower is an aggregating or massifying power which has as its target ‘population’, seeking to ‘make live’ and ameliorate the living conditions of the population it subjugates and controls (Foucault 2003: 242-3). Requiring complex systems of coordination and centralisation, it is associated with the development of ‘governmentality’ and is represented by the development of economic, statistical, demographic and medical knowledge.

The Human Development Index (HDI) is the principal biopolitical tool or ‘technology’ through which the ‘human development paradigm’ or ‘capability approach’ is operationalised. States are ranked annually according to a set of indicators which include ‘conventional’ economic criteria such as income – measured in terms of GDP per capita – as well as other indicators which may, following Foucault (2007, 2008),
be termed biopolitical: life expectancy; infant and maternal mortality; access to safe drinking water; universal healthcare coverage; literacy, primary school enrolment; gender, ethnic and income equality. For Foucault, biopolitics ‘derive[s] its knowledge from, and define[s] its power’s field of intervention in terms of the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities, and the effects of the environment’ (Foucault 2003: 245). The use of the HDI to differentiate between states with (very) high, medium and low human development, serves to reinforce the racialised division between ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’, which have their legacy in colonialism.²

The contemporary discourse of development superimposes the markers ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ on the ‘colonisers’ and the ‘colonised’. Indeed, ‘development’, was only made possible through extension of colonial (sovereign power) in the South. Racism is a precondition for, and the legitimising ideology of, colonialism. For Foucault, racism introduced ‘a break into the domain of life which is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die…a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain’ (Foucault 2003: 255). Thus, racism enables a distinction to be made between those who are ‘made to live’ and those who ‘must die’. It is above all a ‘technology permitting the exercise of biopower’ whose function is ‘to regulate the distribution of death and make possible the murderous functions of the state’ (Mbembe 2003: 19).

Foucault locates the origins of ‘actual racism’ in 19th century Europe and distinguishes between ‘historical’ and ‘counter-historical’ discourses on race. Actual racism emerges as a ‘normalizing, scientific discourse’ designed to re-assert sovereign power over the masses and to counter the historico-political discourse of ‘race wars’ which challenged the sovereign. This ‘historico-political discourse’ constituted a threat since it preached a form of ‘social warfare’ and regarded ‘the Prince as an illusion, an instrument, or, at best, an enemy’. This was a discourse that, in Foucault’s words, threatened to cut off the king’s head (Foucault 2003: 59). State racism served two functions: the first to fragment the subject population, ‘to create caesuras within the biological continuum

² Western states, including former colonial powers, continue to be regarded as having very high human development whereas states in sub-Saharan Africa in particular are considered to be the least developed. Thus, the 2011 Human Development Report ranks the former white settler ‘dominions’ of the Australia, New Zealand and the United States behind Norway as the most developed states, and the ‘Black’ African former colonies of Burundi, Niger, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique as the least (UNDP 2011). This appears to not only reinforce but also reproduce the racialised colonial political imaginary in the context of the global political economy.
addressed by biopower'; the second, to permit the exercise of the ‘old sovereign right of death’ against the ‘inferior race’ in order to make ‘life in general healthier: healthier and purer’. In other worlds, racism makes ‘killing acceptable’ (Foucault 2003: 255-6). Colonialism spatialises this racism: the subaltern groups previously contesting the rights of sovereigns in Europe are ‘made to live’ at the expense of the racialised ‘inferior races’ in the colonies, now subject to the ‘murderous functions’ of the colonial state.

Similarly, following Duffield, it is argued that racism is central to development since ‘development embodies the biopolitical division and separation of the human species into developed and under-developed species-life’ (Duffield 2007:217). Although the ‘human development’ paradigm attempts to break down this biopolitical division by attempting to empower racialised ‘disposable’ surplus life through the inculcation of Smith’s ‘habits of industry’, it, paradoxically, reifies the very division it is trying to transcend by acknowledging only one path to freedom and development: through the market. Consequently, it ignores the plurality of different conceptions of human ‘progress’ and ‘emancipation’, embedded in lived experience and cultural practice, and de-legitimises the claims to ‘universality’ of non-Western ‘populations’ who do not merely ‘mimic’ the discourses of colonial modernity (Shani 2008). Human development, therefore, has been unable to escape the ‘shadow’ of ‘race’, which, as Mbembe (2003:17) argues, has been ‘ever present in Western political thought and practice’.
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Man transporting bags of charcoal to the market in Katakwi, Uganda.
Development as Freedom? From Colonialism to Countering Climate Change

David Chandler

In the new international security order, interventions are posed in the language of individual empowerment, freedom and capacity-building. This short article considers this discourse of empowerment and freedom in relation to the problematic of development. In today’s interventionist paradigm, individual autonomy or freedom is the central motif for understanding the problematic of development. Rather than a material view of development, human agency is placed at the centre and is seen as the measure of development in terms of individual capabilities. In the words of Amartya Sen, the winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize for Economic Science, freedom is increasingly seen to be both the primary end and principal means of development: ‘Development consists of the removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency’ (Sen 1999: xiii). In this post-liberal discourse, of ‘human development’, freedom and autonomy are foregrounded but development lacks a transformative or modernising material content. In this discourse, development is taken out of an economic context of GNP growth or industrialisation or a social and political context in which development policies are shaped by social and political pressures or state-led policies. The individualised understanding of development takes a rational-choice view of the individual, or an ‘agent-orientated view’ (Sen 1999: 11), in which development is about enabling individuals to make effective choices by increasing their capabilities.

Change does not come from above but through the agency of individuals, who act and make choices according to their own values and objectives (Sen 1999: 19). The outcome of development cannot therefore be measured according to any universal framework, as different individuals have different development priorities and aspirations and live in differing social and economic contexts. Further, a critique of top-down state-led approaches to development, the post-liberal framing, should not be confused with advocacy of the free market (see further, Chandler...
Markets are not of themselves seen as being capable of producing solutions or leading to development, as they depend on the formal institutional framework and the informal framework of social culture and ideas or ‘behavioural ethics’ (Sen 1999: 262). Although the individual in need of empowerment and capability- or capacity-building is at the centre, both the postcolonial state and the society are understood to have secondary and important supporting roles in developing the institutional and cultural frameworks to enable individuals to free or develop themselves (Sen 1999: 53).

The discursive framing of development in terms of empowerment and capacity-building centred on the individual responsibility of the postcolonial or post-conflict subject has been critiqued for its emphasis on ‘non-material development’, which has tended to reinforce global inequalities of wealth (Duffield 2007: 101-5) and as marking ‘the demise of the developing state’ (Pupavac 2007) as the poor are increasingly seen as the agents of change and poverty reduction rather than external actors. Vanessa Pupavac highlights that as development has come to the forefront of international agendas for state-building and conflict prevention, there has been a distancing of Western powers and international institutions from taking responsibility for development, with a consensus that the poor need ‘to find their own solutions to the problems they face’ (Pupavac 2007: 96; see also Pupavac’s and Reid’s contributions in this volume). This article draws out the changing nature of Western discourses of development and the understanding of policy practices as promoting the empowerment of the post-conflict Other.

Background

The problem of development has been one of the most sensitive questions raised in the external intervention in and regulation of the colonial or postcolonial state. The framing of development has been a sensitive question as it has arisen defensively, in the context of apologia: in the negotiation of the ending of formal colonial rule and, subsequently, as a way of rationalising support for one-party rule in postcolonial Africa and for the limited aspirations of external powers in the post-Cold War era. In the days when colonial hierarchies were unquestioned, development was not a question of concern, regardless of the nature of economic crisis. For example, in response to the Irish potato famines of the 1840s, British administrators did not blame colonial economic policy but saw Irish habits and lifestyles as the cause of poverty and famine. Questions of poverty and development were not discussed in economic terms but as racial or cultural problems connected to diet, overpopulation or laziness and indifference. In this context, ‘Britain’s
mission’ in Ireland ‘was seen not as one to ‘alleviate Irish distress but to civilize her people’ (Sen 1999: 174).

The discourse of development only arose defensively, in the context of external avoidance of responsibility for the inequalities that critics alleged were being reproduced and reinforced through the hierarchies of international power or the pressures of the world market. It is for this reason that the problematic of development has always tended to be linked with the question of local ownership and empowerment and has sought to shift the understanding of development away from a universalising perspective of modernisation to exaggerate the differences between the West and the postcolonial world, where the attenuation of development aspirations has been held to be a way of empowering or capacity-building postcolonial societies themselves.

The post-liberal paradigm of international state-building builds on earlier discursive framings of development, stressing the need for ownership, but is distinct from earlier framings in that it ruptures the traditional liberal framing which understood economic development and political autonomy as mutually supportive aspects of liberal modernity. Earlier discourses of apologia sought to problematise liberal approaches to the colonial or postcolonial world through the emphasis on the problems of material development. The state-building paradigm inverts the problematic - the framing of the relationship between development and autonomy: posing the autonomy of the postcolonial or post-conflict subject as a problem for development rather than the lack of development as a problem for political autonomy. This means that development in relation to state failure or state fragility becomes a process of external relationship management and an explanation for inequality and intermittent crisis but without an end goal in which this situation is seen to be alleviated. In this article, the paradigm of development as freedom, central to discourses of development within the international state-building paradigm, will be traced out in relation to two earlier framings of the problematic of development and autonomy. These three framings of the problem of development can be seen from the viewpoint of Western policy-makers or international intervener and in their differing relationships to the object of intervention – the colonial or postcolonial state – and the different rationales in which development fitted into the paradigms within which this relationship of domination or influence was conceived.

The historically defensive and limiting nature of discourses of development is drawn out here through an initial focus upon the rise of the development problematic in the colonial era. In fact, it first arose with
the problematisation of colonialism in the wake of the First World War. Development as a set of policy practices was used both defensively, to legitimise colonial rule, and to help further secure it. The classic example of discussion of development under the period of late colonialism was that most clearly articulated by Lord Lugard under the rubric of the ‘dual mandate’, where development discourse operated to reveal the different and distinct development needs of colonial societies and therefore to indicate the need for a different set of political relations and rights than those of liberal democracies. The dual nature of the development discourse helped to shift the focus of policy-making away from the export of Western norms, such as representative democracy, and towards support for traditional elites, empowering more conservative sections of society in the attempt to negotiate imperial decline through preventing the political dominance of pro-independence elites.

The second period where development discourse comes to the fore in international debates is that of negotiating relations with the post-colonial world. Here, too, the discourse was a defensive one, with an awareness of the lack of direct interventionist capacity and a need to respond to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union gaining influence in many states that were no longer formally dependent on Western power. From the late 1950s to the early 1970s development was presented as necessitating a centralising state role as Western governments sought to bargain with postcolonial elites, facilitating a strong state to prevent rebellion led by movements sympathetic to the Soviet cause. The division of the world geopolitically, and the competitive balance of power, made the postcolonial state an important subject in its own right, with the possibility of choosing (and playing off) competing external patrons. The Western approach to development was one that argued that Western standards of democracy and governance were not applicable to the management of postcolonial development needs.

From the late 1970s until the end of the 1990s, development was largely off the agenda as models of state-led development failed and the Soviet model became discredited. In this period, the international financial institutions were much less defensive and, under the ‘Washington Consensus’ framework of structural adjustment, sought increasingly to assert regulatory control over the postcolonial state, gradually extending the reach and focus of economic policy conditionality, focusing on financial and monetary controls and attempts to ‘roll back the state’. The lack of defensiveness meant that there was little focus on development as a precondition for political equality, either in terms of independence or liberal-democratic frameworks of domestic rule; in this period, therefore, there was also little concern with the ownership of develop-
ment. Rather than focusing on the empowerment of the postcolonial state and society, the international financial institutions openly claimed the mantle of development expertise and had little concern regarding the social impact of their financial stringency or about advocating the market as the framework that would provide solutions. The lowering of the priority of development meant that from the late 1970s to the 1990s the development sphere became the sphere of non-governmental activity as voluntary bodies stepped in to fill the humanitarian gap left by the decline of official institutional concern (Duffield 2007).

Today the development of the postcolonial state and society has made a comeback as a central concern of international institutions and leading Western states. The precondition for development becoming more central to Western concerns has been a new defensiveness in relation to the postcolonial world as Western powers have sought to withdraw from policy responsibility. This discourse of withdrawal has taken place within the rubric of anti-modernisation frameworks, shaped by concerns over the environment and global warming. This defensiveness is reflected in the shift in focus, away from the open dominance of international financial institutions and away from the market as a means of resolving the problems of development. Instead, development discourse focuses on empowering and building the capacity of postcolonial states and societies in ways similar to those of the earlier discourses of the colonial and postcolonial periods. Once again postcolonial states and societies are held to be the owners of their own development, but in the very different context of Western regulation and intervention in the 21st century.

Today’s development discourse of the importance of empowering the postcolonial subject was well described by Gordon Brown, in 2006, while still the UK’s chancellor of the exchequer: ‘A century ago people talked of “What can we do to Africa?” Last century, it was “What can we do for Africa?” Now in 2006, we must ask what the developing world, empowered, can do for itself’ (Brown 2006). In today’s discourse of development, it is often asserted that what is novel about current approaches is empowerment of the postcolonial world in relation to the needs of development. Many critiques of this approach have suggested that the discourse of empowerment and ownership is a misleading one; considering the influence of Western powers and international financial institutions (for example, Harrison 2001, 2004; Rowden and Irama 2004; Gould and Ojanaen 2003; Craig and Porter 2002; Fraser 2005; Cammack 2002; Chandler 2006), this is no doubt the case. The focus of this article, however, is how the discourse of ownership and development is historically linked and how this discourse transforms and inverts the earlier attempts to explain differential policy frameworks,
which understood development to be a precondition for autonomy, and instead asserts a post-liberal claim that it is autonomy which is the problem for development. It is this distinctive framing, emphasising the autonomy of the postcolonial subject, which facilitates development interventions aimed at indirectly influencing the autonomous choices of the poorest and most marginal sections of postcolonial societies.

**Indirect rule in Africa**

In the British case, the African protectorates were already, in effect, a postscript to the glory of Empire. The African states were ‘protectorates’, not colonies, which already highlighted a defensive, contradictory and problematic approach to the assumption of colonial power over them. The distinction lay, not so much in the power that the British government could exercise but in the responsibilities it accepted. In 1900 the British courts (the King’s Bench) definitively ruled that: ‘East Africa, being a protectorate in which the Crown has jurisdiction, is in relation to the Crown a foreign country under its protection, and its native inhabitants are not subjects owing allegiance to the Crown, but protected foreigners, who, in return for that protection, owe obedience’ (cited in Lugard 1923: 36). Colonial administrators were conscious of the fragility of their rule and nowhere more so than in sub-Saharan Africa. It was in order to address this problem that the discourse of development and the policy-making frameworks associated with it, particularly in the administrative conception of indirect rule, developed in an attempt to shore up external administrative authority through talking up the autonomy and independence of native chiefs, whom they sought to rule through and whose capacities they sought to build and develop.

The insight that Lugard had was to make a virtue out of development differentials as an argument for recasting British policy requirements in ostensibly neutral terms. Rather than an overt act of political reaction, Lugard’s attempt to stave off the end of colonial rule through the empowerment of native institutions was portrayed to be in the development interests of the poor and marginal in colonial society. Through the rubric of interventionist administrative ‘good governance’ native institutions were to be built and simultaneously external control was to be enhanced. As Lugard describes:

> The Resident [colonial official] acts as sympathetic adviser and counsellor to the native chief, being careful not to interfere so as to lower his prestige, or cause him to lose interest in his work. His advice on matters of general policy must be followed, but the native ruler issues his own instructions to subordinate chiefs and district heads – not as the orders of the Resident but as his own – and he
is encouraged to work through them, instead of centralising every-
thing in himself… (Lugard 1923: 201).

For Lugard, ‘the native authority is thus de facto and de jure ruler over his own people’, and there are not ‘two sets of rulers – British and native – working either separately or in co-operation, but a single Government’ (1923: 203). Lugard states: ‘It is the consistent aim of the British staff to maintain and increase the prestige of the native ruler, to encourage his initiative, and to support his authority’ (1923: 204). Development was key to legitimating Lugard’s strategy of indirect rule, with the rein-
vention of native authorities with modern administrative techniques, which could assist in developing trade through introducing a wider use of money, rather than barter, and could expand the scope of political identification beyond personal social connections.

The discussion of development and its link with the mechanisms of in-
direct rule was the first attempt made to extend the policy framework of intervention with the goal of empowering and building the capacities of the colonial Other. This framing of empowerment developed in response to the negotiation of colonial withdrawal and the desire to use develop-
ment as a discourse to undermine the legitimacy of the nationalist elites through posing as the representative of the poor and marginal, in whose interest development had to be managed through the maintenance of traditional institutions. In order to counterbalance the elites, British colonisers sought to become the advocates of development centred on the needs and interests of the poorest. The voices of the poor became the subject of British advocacy to suggest that development should focus on their needs rather than on the aspirations of the elites.

The question of development and its relationship to empowerment and local ownership was revived in terms of content, but in a very different form, in the postcolonial era. Here, as considered in the next section, similar arguments to those put by Lugard, about the need for separate and distinct political forms to address the problem of development, were forwarded, while arguments that insisted on measuring the postcolonial state according to the standards of Western liberal democracy were seen as problematic in relation to development needs. Again the defensiveness of the discourse of critiques of liberalism can be seen in relation, not to the threat of anti-colonialism, but to the much broader problematic of support for the Soviet block and resistance to Western influence per se rather than just to Western rule in its most direct colonial form.
Postcolonial development

In the 1960s there was general awareness of the weakness and fragility of the postcolonial state, and development discourse focused defensively on distancing the problems of the postcolonial state from the history of colonial rule. This defensive concern deepened with the perception that development might lead to the growth of influence of social forces that would be more sympathetic to Soviet rule. Whereas the discourse of development and local ownership focused on the poor in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of ruling elites, in the 1960s, development discourse focused on ownership at the level of state elites in order to prevent the masses from becoming a destabilising force capable of aligning the regimes to the Soviet sphere of influence.

In terms of policy responses, the problem of development was seen to be a unique dilemma, which had arisen only in the postcolonial period. It was clear that while democracy was a central motif of the Cold War divide, the West was in no position to withdraw support from postcolonial states on this basis if it wished to keep them outside the Soviet sphere of influence. In postcolonial ‘transition’ societies, Western Cold War norms of judgment needed to be rethought. This sense of defensiveness is well expressed by Pye:

Is the emergence of army rule a sign of anti-democratic tendencies? Or is it a process that can be readily expected at particular stages of national development? Must the central government try to obliterate all traditional communal differences, or can the unfettered organization and representation of conflicting interests produce ultimately a stronger sense of national unity? Should the new governments strive to maintain the same levels of administrative efficiency as the former colonial authorities did, or is it possible that...because the new governments have other claims of legitimacy, this is no longer as crucial a problem? The questions mount, and we are not sure what trends are dangerous and what are only temporary phases with little significance (Pye 1962: 7).

Samuel Huntington’s 1968 book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, concretised the postcolonial perception of the problem of development and stands as the classic text for this period. Whereas previous analysts had suggested that instability and authoritarian rule could be inevitable, Huntington proposed a much more state-led interventionist approach to prevent instability and maintain order. He also inverted the late-colonial understanding of the problem as being that the state institutions were in advance of society, suggesting that the issue should be seen from a new angle. Rather than seeing the lack of economic
development as causing the state-society gap, he argued that it was the development process itself that was destabilising: ‘It is not the absence of modernity but the efforts to achieve it which produce political disorder. If poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor, and stable’ (Huntington 1968: 41).

Rather than being the potential solution, rapid economic progress was held to be the problem facing non-Western states, creating an increasingly destabilised world, wracked by social and political conflict: ‘What was responsible for this violence and instability? The primary thesis of this book is that it was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions’ (Huntington 1968: 4). It was not the case that the political institutions of the postcolonial state were ahead of their societies (in terms of representing a national collectivity which was yet to become fully socially and economically integrated). The problem lay with the institutions of the state rather than with society. Huntington’s state-building thesis consciously sought to privilege order over economic progress, as both a policy means and a political end.

Huntington was clear in his critique of the export of universal Western norms, asserting that the promotion of democracy was not the best way to bring development or to withstand the threat of communist takeover. The barrier to communism was a strong state, capable of galvanising society, possibly through the undemocratic framework of one-party or authoritarian rule: ‘the non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both’ (Huntington 1968: 137). He suggested, as did the colonial advocates of indirect rule, that focusing purely on organic solutions to development, waiting for economic growth to develop a middle-class basis for liberal democracy, would result in ‘political decay’ and weak states falling to communist revolution.

The institutional focus for Huntington, as for Lord Lugard, was not a bureaucratic one, but a political one. This much more ‘political’ approach to development reflected the Cold War framework of US foreign policy which sought to support ‘friendly’ authoritarian regimes in order to maintain international stability and order, rather than concern itself with questions of narrow economic policy or with representative democracy. It was not until the late 1970s and 1980s that the international financial institutions and the former colonial powers concerned themselves with the domestic politics of African states once the threat
of Soviet competition and the resistance movements they sponsored became increasingly lifted. In this period the discourse of development and local ownership went into abeyance, to return in the late 1990s.

Climate change

From the 1990s onwards development and local ownership have returned to the top of the international agenda and local ownership has been key to reinterpreting the development problematic. In many ways, the discourse draws upon the past: on the late-colonial discourse of emphasising the poor as the central subjects of development but also on the postcolonial discourse problematising the dangers of development and its destabilising effects. Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly vulnerable to climate fluctuations. The lack of development means that 70 per cent of the working population (90 per cent of Africa’s poor) relies on agriculture for a living, the vast majority of them by subsistence farming (NEF 2006: 12). It is no coincidence that the continent with the lowest per capita greenhouse gas emissions is also the most vulnerable to climate change. Rather than the problems of Africa being seen as a lack of development resulting in dependency on climate uncertainties, the problem of development has increasingly been reinterpreted in terms of the problem of individual life-style choices and the survival strategies of the poor.

The framework of intervention in the new security order views African development in terms of external assistance to an ‘adaptation agenda’ essential to prevent the impact of climate change from undermining African development (see, for example, UNFCCC 1994). According to the UK government’s white paper on development, Making Governance Work for the Poor, ‘climate change poses the most serious long term threat to development and the Millennium Development Goals’ (DFID 2006). The poverty agenda and the climate change agenda have come together in their shared focus on Africa. In the wake of international support for poverty reduction and debt relief, many international NGOs, international institutions and Western states have called for climate change to be seen as the central challenge facing African development. African poverty and poor governance are held to combine to increase Africa’s vulnerability, while the solution is held to lie with international programmes of assistance, funded and led by Western states, held to be chiefly responsible for global warming.

The ‘adaptation agenda’ brings together the concerns of poverty reduction and responses to climate change by understanding poverty not in terms of income or in relation to social to economic development but in terms of ‘vulnerability to climate change’. This position has been widely articulated by the international NGOs most actively concerned with the
climate change agenda. Tony Jupiter, executive director of Friends of the Earth, argues that: ‘Policies to end poverty in Africa are conceived as if the threat of climatic disruption did not exist’ (McCarthy and Brown 2005). Nicola Saltman, from the World Wide Fund for Nature, similarly feels that ‘All the aid we pour into Africa will be inconsequential if we don’t tackle climate change’ (McCarthy and Brown 2005). This position is shared by the UK Department for International Development, whose chief scientific adviser, Professor Sir Gordon Conway, states that African poverty reduction strategies have not factored in the burdens of climate change on African capacities. He argues that ‘there are three principles for adaptation: 1. Adopt a gradual process of adaptation. 2. Build on disaster preparedness. 3. Develop resilience’ (Conway 2006). The focus of the adaptation agenda puts the emphasis on the lives and survival strategies of Africa’s poor. Professor Conway argues that, with this emphasis: ‘Africa is well prepared to deal with many of the impacts of climate change. Many poor Africans experience severe disasters on an annual or even more frequent basis. This has been true for decades. The challenge is whether we can build on this experience’ (Conway 2006).

The focus on the survival strategies of Africa’s poor is central to notions of strengthening African ‘resilience’ to climate change. This approach has been counterposed to development approaches that focus on questions of socio-economic development dependent on the application of higher levels of science and technology and the modernisation of agriculture. As the NGO Working Group on Climate Change report states: ‘Recently the role of developing new technology has been strongly emphasized… There is a consensus among development groups, however,
that a greater and more urgent challenge is strengthening communities from the bottom-up, and building on their own coping strategies to live with global warming’ (Simms 2005: 2). Despite the claims that ‘good adaptation also makes good development’, it would appear that the adaptation to climate change agenda is more like sustained disaster-relief management than a strategy for African development (Simms 2005:4).

In re-describing poverty as ‘vulnerability to climate change’, there is a rejection of aspirations to modernise agriculture; instead there is an emphasis on reinforcing traditional modes of subsistence economy. Rather than development being safeguarded by the modernisation and transformation of African society, underdevelopment is subsidised through the provision of social support for subsistence farming and nomadic pastoralism. Once poverty is redefined as ‘vulnerability’ then the emphasis is on the survival strategies of the poorest and most marginalised, rather than the broader social and economic relations that force them into a marginalised existence.

The Working Group argues that community and individual empowerment has to be at the centre of the adaptation agenda:

[I]t has to be about strengthening communities from the bottom up, building on their own coping strategies to live with climate change and empowering them to participate in the development of climate change policies. Identifying what communities are already doing to adapt is an important step towards discovering what people’s priorities are and sharing their experiences, obstacles and positive initiatives with other communities and development policy-makers. Giving a voice to people in this way can help to grow confidence, as can valuing their knowledge and placing it alongside science-based knowledge (NEF 2006: 3).

African ‘voices’ are central to climate change advocacy as the science of climate change leaves many questions unanswered, particularly with regard to the impact of climate change in Africa (the problems of climate monitoring capabilities, particularly in Africa, are highlighted in UNFCC 2006: 4–5). Information, to support the urgency of action in this area, is often obtained from those in Africa, held to have a ‘deeper’ understanding than that which can be provided by ‘Western’ science. For example, the views of Sesophio, a Maasai pastoralist from Tanzania are given prominence in the Africa – Up in Smoke 2 report:

It is this development, like cars, that is bringing stress to the land, and plastics are being burnt and are filling in the air. We think there is a
lot of connection between that and what is happening now with the
droughts. If you bring oil and petrol and throw it onto the grass it
doesn’t grow, so what are all these cars and new innovations doing to
a bigger area? Every day diseases are increasing, diseases we haven’t
seen before (NEF 2006: 10).

Climate change advocates patronisingly argue that they are empower-
ing people like Sesophio by ‘valuing’ his knowledge and giving him a
‘voice’ rather than exploiting Sesophio’s lack of knowledge about climate
change and the fears and concerns generated by his marginal existence.
The focus on the ‘real lives’ of the poorest and most marginalised African
communities has gone along with the problematisation of autonomy and
the individual choices made by the African poor. The NGO Working
Group suggests that the problems of African development lie with the
survival strategies of the most marginalised in African society:

To survive the droughts, people have had to resort to practices that
damage their dignity and security, their long-term livelihoods, and
their environment, including large-scale charcoal production that
intensifies deforestation, fighting over water and pastures, selling
livestock and dropping out of school (NEF 2006: 10).
The view that climate change, rather than underdevelopment, is responsible for poverty, results in an outlook that tends to blame local survival strategies, such as cutting down trees to make some money from selling charcoal. When these views are reflected back to Western advocates, the African poor reflect Western views that they are part of the problem:

In nearby Goobato, a village with no cars, no motorcycles, no bicycles, no generators, no televisions, no mobile phones, and dozens of $5 radios, Nour, the village elder, said increased temperatures bake the soil… Nour also said villagers share the blame: ‘We cut trees just to survive, but we are part of the problem’ (Donnelly 2006).

The strategy of adaptation tends to problematise African survival strategies because, by talking up isolated positive examples of adaptation under international aid, it inevitably problematises the real life choices and decisions that the African poor have to make. The ‘adaptation agenda’ allows Western governments, international institutions and international NGOs to claim they are doing something positive to address the impact of global warming but the result is that the African poor are problematised as being responsible for their own problems. ‘Learning from the poor’, ‘empowering the poor’ and strategies to increase their ‘resilience’, end up patronising Africa’s poor and supporting an anti-development agenda that would consign Africa to a future of poverty and climate dependency.

**Conclusion**

The discursive framing of development and autonomy within the international state-building paradigm is that of understanding social and economic problems, most sharply posed by the problems of subsistence agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa, as those of individual lifestyle choices. The framework of engagement understands the problem not as a lack of material societal development but rather as an ideational and cognitive problem rooted in the institutional framework influencing these lifestyle choices. ‘Development as freedom’ understands the problems of lack of development, most clearly highlighted in the dependence on climate stability in sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of the lack of freedom of the individual to make the right choices in response to the external environment. Rather than push for material development, the state-building paradigm of ‘development as freedom’ suggests that the solution lies with the empowerment of individuals and communities and therefore that their lack of agency or their inability to make the right autonomous choices is the problem that external state-building intervention needs to address. In this respect, the current framing of development solutions seems little different from that of the colonial period, discussed at the start of this chapter, where Britain’s mission was not ‘to alleviate Irish distress but to civilize her people’ (Sen 1999: 174).
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Rethinking Intervention and Interventionism

Linnéa Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum*

Although history offers many examples of international intervention, the post-Cold War era has seen a burgeoning of different forms of outside interference and intervention by a range of state and non-state actors and for many different purposes. These include practices known as humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect, development intervention, governance intervention as well as peace-building and state-building intervention. Many of these interventions are controversial and many are judged as having mixed results, or even as being complete failures, as illustrated by present-day Iraq, Afghanistan and a number of interventions throughout Africa.

This article argues that ‘the problem of intervention’ cannot be divorced from its external political origins. A significant portion of research in the field shows that interventions have all too often been based on an insufficient understanding of the surrounding context, and on an external definition of the problem these interventions set out to solve. As many have noted, interventions are often designed for purposes other than solving the problems of those described as ‘beneficiaries’ and ‘targets’ (Rubinstein 2005; Richmond 2011). We argue that there is a need to rethink external interventions in general and what occurs in the encounter between interveners and those ‘intervened upon’ in particular. Indeed, determinations of the success or failure of interventions are partial unless they take seriously the role of local dynamics and cultural meaning systems that inform social action as well as the power relations between interveners and those intervened upon. This article constitutes our first step in outlining what such a ‘rethinking’ implies theoretically and conceptually.

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The rise of liberal interventionism

Since the end of the Cold War we have seen a proliferation of interventions by a widening range of actors, and the traditional international norms for intervention have been fundamentally altered. Although there are, historically, many examples of international intervention, the discourse of international relations – and of intervention – during the 20th century was dominated by the idea of the Westphalian nation-state order, predicated on national sovereignty, non-recognition of supranational authority, demarcated borders and non-interference in the internal affairs of individual nation states. The 21st century, however, has already seen a burgeoning of different forms of outside interference and intervention by a range of state (and non-state) actors and for many different purposes, such as humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect (R2P), rebuilding failed states, and development intervention. Indeed, intervention by ‘outsiders’ in the affairs of ‘insiders’ has become a structural characteristic of today’s global politics (Leurdkik 1996).

Interventionist activity is certainly not a new phenomenon, but contemporary interventions have, many contend, been transformed since the end of the Cold War and in the context of what is frequently referred to as ‘globalisation’ (Duffield 2007; see also Sörensen and Söderbaum, and Duffield in this volume). One of the most profound changes in the landscape of intervention is the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and R2P, which awards the international community responsibility for intervening when states are considered fragile, failed or abusive to their citizens. Many so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’ as well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been justified in this way and they are associated with blueprints for the promotion of universal freedom (Richmond 2005; see also Chandler in this volume).

Contemporary interventions by international actors in the affairs of individual countries are frequently justified in the name of the ‘global good’. For instance, humanitarian intervention is presented not only as a way of ending lethal conflict but also as a means of ‘getting politics right’ in the aftermath of war (examples include Cambodia, Kosovo and Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq). Other examples may include economic sanctions against certain regimes to address their financial crises (Southeast Asia, Latin America), or structural adjustment programmes designed to stabilise economies or ‘get economics right’ in large parts of the developing world.

One fundamental problem arises because ‘the global good’ is often taken as synonymous with ‘the liberal peace’ or as neoliberal ‘good governance’. This view is promulgated by the prevailing policy-making
consensus in the West and by a related scholarly body of work, which makes up a significant portion of the intervention literature (Sørensen 2006). The supposed fruits of intervention (stable/constitutional rule, macroeconomic stability, ‘good governance’, law and order) are intimately connected with a normative and ideological project: a liberal project. Therefore, when we discuss world order the liberal peace is essential to understanding the inherently political and normative assumptions that underpin and motivate contemporary interventionism. As pointed out by Richmond:

The liberal peace has become a model through which Western-led agency, epistemology, and institutions, have attempted to unite the world under a hegemonic system that replicates liberal institutions, norms, and political, social, and economic systems. It has been deployed in something like fifty to sixty post-conflict and fragile states over the last twenty years. Peace in these terms is seen not as an international gift, or as a local production, but as a contract. Emancipatory thinking about peace has collapsed into conditionality and governmentality (Richmond 2011:1).

Liberalising the world implies indirect rule, thus reducing or denying receiving areas the possibility of open-ended political processes. Constitutional democracy and free market economy are seen as core elements of the normative goal (the ‘good life’ and basic human dignity are defined within a liberal frame of reference, yet showcased as if they were universal understandings). This sets the direction and frame for interpretation of the actual political, economic, and social process, thus conflating the normative course chosen with an objective or universal idea.

Humanitarian intervention is presented not only as a way of ending lethal conflict but also as a means of ‘getting politics right’ in the aftermath of war.

Hamadiya IDP camp in Zalingei, West Darfur, Sudan.
Defining intervention

Intervention has been a frequently used but rarely defined concept in the social sciences. Generically, intervention is a specific kind of ‘intentional’ strategy, defined by the fact that it is externally initiated. Intervention is undoubtedly controversial. Political philosophies range from strict adherence to non-interventionism to arguing for strong societal control on a more or less permanent basis (interventionism). The general attitude to intervention also tends to shift over time with the nature and severity of the problem. However, history reveals that outside intervention is often granted broad legitimacy as a means of ‘managing’ many social and global problems, particularly in situations considered abnormal, such as post-conflict reconstruction or natural disaster.

Since the end of the Cold War one important topic in the larger debate has been humanitarian intervention. A widely used definition of humanitarian intervention is ‘the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied’ (Holzgrefe 2003: 18). There has been intense discussion about the ethical, legal and political dilemmas involved in humanitarian intervention, particularly when respect for state sovereignty conflicts with the protection of human rights (Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003). The R2P doctrine has emerged as an attempt to change the discourse and terminology surrounding humanitarian intervention, arguing that the ‘right to intervene’ is problematic and should be replaced with the ‘responsibility to protect’. Given many failures during the last two decades, there is still much controversy regarding when, why and for what purpose humanitarian intervention and R2P should be carried out as well as the role of force in intervention.

The fact that intervention cannot simply be based on coercion and non-consent (as in the narrow definition of humanitarian intervention) is even more evident in other types of intervention, such as state-building, peace-building and development intervention. State-building interventions concentrate on key state functions, such as security, the rule of law, bureaucratic institutions, public goods, democratic processes and the fostering of market-led development (Wesley 2008: 375). Peace-building addresses the sources of hostility and builds local capacities for conflict resolution and reconstruction after peace has been negotiated or imposed. Strengthening state institutions, increasing political participation, engaging in land reform, deepening civil society, finding ways to respect ethnic identities are all ways to improve the prospects for peaceful governance (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 22).
Historically the vocabulary of intervention in development is somewhat more controversial, but the term has gradually become more widely accepted in most strands of the development discourse. For instance, Escobar (1995) argues that the Third World was created as a needy object of international development intervention. From a very different standpoint, former World Bank economist William Easterly (2006: 327) argues that aid agencies must be constantly experimenting and searching for interventions that work. Similarly, one of the foremost experts of international development assistance, Roger Riddell (2007), refers to ‘aid interventions’, ‘NGO development interventions’ and ‘governance interventions’.

The rapidly changing global landscape, in which ‘outsiders’ intervene in the affairs of ‘insiders’, challenges the ways in which we can frame and respond to questions of intervention. While interventions have historically been performed by ‘the state’, contemporary international interventions are carried out by an increasingly wide variety of actors. This tends to blur the distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in the arena of global political action, which now includes many state and non-state actors who are not only beyond the control of any state, but who may in fact exert control over the intervened-in state. Therefore, interventions of different kinds may deliberately or unintentionally have the effect of modifying or, conversely, reinforcing political authority in the target society.

Malaysian and Portuguese contingents of the United Nations Formed Police Units, members of the International Stabilization Forces, and the Rapid Intervention Unit of the National Police Force participate in a joint-exercise to develop skills to deal with demonstrators.
We find the concept of external intervention useful for understanding interference and intrusion in most areas of politics, despite the multidimensional nature of such practices. Drawing on research conducted several decades ago, we define intervention as the carrying out of organised and systematic activities across recognised boundaries or borders, by one actor or a group of actors, with the goal of affecting the structures of political authority or an identifiable ‘problem’ in a target society (for example, reconstruction, reconciliation, state-building, or political or economic crisis) (Rosenau 1971: 292; Young 1968: 178). This definition enables investigation into the similarities, differences and links between different and largely isolated types of intervention (for example, humanitarian, military, peace-building, state-building, development, governance and aid interventions). The definition is deliberately abstract, thereby avoiding the specificities of particular definitions of intervention, especially the unhelpful tendency to focus on interventions as based solely on coercion or non-consent. Thereby the definition avoids academic compartmentalisation and allows various sub-fields within intervention literature to speak to one another. We focus on external interventions as intrusive though not always coercive forms of interference, with necessarily varying degrees of consent/dissent/acquiescence by the target state or other domestic actors, into domains that were traditionally considered within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state. This moves beyond conventional or orthodox analyses of intervention that give the state analytical precedence.

Interventions may not be short-term but instead protracted and enduring, as illustrated by the military intervention by the US in Iraq.
(as the prime agent and object of intervention), that focus only upon formal interventions, and that unquestioningly compartmentalise military, humanitarian, development or state-building activities.

As touched upon above, an intervention is necessarily linked to the notion of ‘intention’ since the shared perspective behind all types of intervention is a desire to bring about change. The notion of intention is built on the idea that social entities can be steered, guided, managed and corrected. According to this view of the social world, it is possible to manage/correct a local problem with an externally initiated solution. We view external intervention as analytically distinct from other kinds of outsider-insider interfaces. An intervention is a special kind of response to the diagnosis of an ‘extraordinary’ and assumedly time-limited set of circumstances (conflict, underdevelopment, lack of governance and so on) in which action is considered necessary for a delimited period of time. The action is not intended to be permanent although there are cases where this is not straightforward. In theory intervention differs from governance, government, or policy, which constitute more ‘normal’, long-term actions. However, the dividing line is not crystal clear since interventions may not be short-term but instead protracted and enduring, as illustrated by the military intervention by the US in Iraq. Yet, this example also illustrates the way in which governance and interventionism may overlap; governance becomes interventionist, or vice versa, interventions become governance.

The failure of liberal interventionism

There is a vast amount of research that analyses from a top-down perspective the way in which external interventions (especially humanitarian interventions, peace-building and state-building interventions) are executed and implemented. This literature tends to focus on operational limitations, such as the lack of political will, the under-financing of missions, insufficient force, poor logistics, issues of coordination between actors, and interaction dilemmas between civil and military forces, which in turn lead to legitimacy and authority problems, and undesirable outcomes (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Thakur 2005; Weiss 1999). Good outcomes, it is assumed, follow from getting the technical or operational side of things right (usually starting on day one of the intervention and ending on the day of staff evacuation). In this way, much of the intervention literature favours political order and stability, and tacitly accepts and legitimises liberal governance. In other words, it approaches intervention in a problem-solving, operational-technical manner. Often, it evaluates efficiency and legitimacy within specific missions (see, for example, Diehl 1993; Durch 1993). By focusing on cases, typologies or mission-specific operational and institutional constraints, the analysis
is rarely embedded in the local and national context and rarely considers those intervened upon as acting subjects. Indeed, those intervened upon are usually defined as objects or as powerless (illiberal), are not systematically discussed, or are overlooked (Richmond 2011). Likewise, critical issues, questioning and problematising for whom and for what purposes interventions are carried out receive rather muted attention in the debate. Here it needs saying that international development cooperation is more systematic in its emphasis on the relationship with national counterparts and recipients, and national/local ‘ownership’ and participation, than are military or emergency/relief interventions.

There are of course reasons why the encounter between intervener and those intervened upon has received too little attention. Framing a local political issue into a ‘concern’, something ‘dangerous’ that requires an external intervention, implies an act of detachment. It demarcates who brings the rescue (rational political order) and who needs it (zones of irrationality/political chaos). Indeed, societies in need of intervention or international rescue can be seen as irrational, assumed to be prone to chaos and sometimes even barbaric violence. This in turn results in these societies being objectified or deemed passive.

The strong emphasis on top-down analysis, from the standpoint of the interveners, is not simply an academic problem. The bias to conceptualise and theorise intervention more or less in isolation from those intervened upon is part and parcel of the failure of many contemporary interventions. There is a growing literature that draws attention to the failure of liberal intervention and liberal interventionism in most parts of the world (in the global South in particular, where most liberal interventions are carried out). In widely different settings, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Sudan, the DRC, Haiti, El Salvador and Afghanistan, research has shown that intervention can exacerbate the inequalities in the target society that give rise to conflict (Duffield 2001; Keen 2005; Kostic 2007; Richmond 2011; Sörensen 2009, and Sörensen in this volume). Indeed, interveners sometimes leave behind a society afflicted by a culture of impunity, and sometimes the situation is more prone to the ‘chaos’ and criminality that the intervention was ostensibly meant to rectify (Bellamy 2004; Pouligny 2006: 237-258). Significantly, critical and post-structuralist contributions have repeatedly shown that in the wake of interventions, new types of conflicts, tensions and frictions are generated – which very rarely appear in more orthodox assessments. As pointed out by Richmond:

Liberal peacebuilding has caused a range of unintended consequences. These emerge from the liberal peace’s internal contradictions, from
its claim to offer a universal normative and epistemological basis for peace, and to offer a technology and process which can be applied to achieve it. When viewed from a range of contextual and local perspectives, these top-down and distant processes often appear to represent power rather than humanitarianism or emancipation (Richmond 2011: i).

Furthermore, many studies of ‘good governance’ and neoliberal aid interventions in African domestic economies reveal that these interventions have primarily benefited the local elites and the donors themselves (Abrahamsen 2000). Interventions have also weakened the state’s domestic moral legitimacy. For instance, if the government acts as middleman between international aid donors and rural recipients locally, it may with time become perceived as transferring loyalty from the local to the international arena. Governments (or national elites) thus become interveners in relation to their own people. To the extent that interventions alter the political economy of a poor nation, the state may lose domestic legitimacy (Hughes 2003). These studies underline the significance of research on the perspectives of those intervened upon and the national context. They have also helped reveal the limits and silences of orthodox top-down analysis.

There is a rich and steadily growing literature on the limits and failures of liberal intervention. The problem may be further illustrated with a concrete example: the EU’s peace-building intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The EU aspires to be a global peace and security actor, and the Union is very active in various types of peace-building operations and security interventions in Africa. The EU’s role in the DRC is both comprehensive and much debated. In fact, the DRC has become a laboratory for EU crisis management. A significant portion of research reveals that the EU’s coherence and effectiveness as an actor in peace-building and security sector reform is severely compromised by the Union’s bureaucratic and organisational complexity (Lurweg 2011; see also www.eugrasp.eu). The EU’s institutional set-up provokes institutional divisions as well as overlapping competencies within the Union and among its member countries. The top-down and Brussels-led approach that is applied by EU bureaucrats negates or sidelines policy advice emanating from the field. These shortcomings are further exacerbated through personality-driven policies as well as mistrust, personal rivalry, mutual envy and open disrespect expressed by various Commission and Council actors against each other. Although the EU tries to follow a multifaceted approach both in its rhetoric and through the provision of a significant amount of development as well as humanitarian assistance and the deployment of various
civil and military missions in the DRC, its efficiency and relevance as an external intervener is deeply problematic. The inefficient and poorly defined strategy is closely related to the EU’s internal weaknesses as well as its failure to develop appropriate links and relationships with those intervened upon (Froitzheim, Söderbaum and Taylor 2011). Importantly, the Union focuses exclusively on the Congolese government as its counterpart and fails to develop links to other actors of society and those intervened upon in a broader sense.

The EU’s approach is state-centric and rather formalistic, which is flawed in a context where the ruling political regime in the DRC is both part and cause of the problem. Hence, the context and the logic of the conflict are not sufficiently taken into consideration by the EU, with the resulting effect that it becomes an actor for financing rather than for policies. In addition, while the regional dimension of the conflict is highlighted in the EU’s rhetoric, the Union lacks functioning instruments and policies to deal with cross-border and regionalising effects. The EU continues to deal exclusively with the Congolese state, no matter how dysfunctional it is, and even if there is much talk about accommodating the regional dimension of the conflict. This demonstrates the EU’s inability to deal with a regional conflict where no credible regional counterpart is present. Taken together, in spite of the enormous amount of attention and spending on the DRC and the larger Great Lakes region, the EU lacks a coherent strategy for its peace-building interventions in the DRC (Froitzheim, Söderbaum and Taylor 2011). Our research within the EU-GRASP project (www.eugrasp.eu) reveals that the EU’s interventions are poorly designed in terms of their links to those intervened upon. This is closely linked with the fact that the EU appears to be more concerned with establishing symbolic presence and political representation than with real achievements and genuine peace-building on the ground.

Rethinking intervention
– Towards a two-pronged approach

An intervention cannot be a neutral or impartial act because it brings new political opportunities and rewards for both intervener and intervened upon at various points in time. Outsiders and target populations become linked through new forms of interaction and political processes. Researchers and policy-makers must therefore begin to acknowledge both the importance and the complexity of the relationship between the intervener and those intervened upon. In particular, there is a need to recognise that interventions always become embroiled in local power struggles. Rubinstein observes that interventions are always ambiguous, meaning one thing for the intervener and another thing for those intervened upon:
The intervener maintains a perspective on the issues at hand and, by taking action to try to change that situation, takes a position on the situation… At the same time, those who receive the intervention make it meaningful from within their own experience and cultural framework. Sometimes, this can lead to interveners having understandings of what they are doing that are very different from those of the people who are subject to the intervention (Rubinstein 2005: 529).

Power relations between intervener and intervened upon affect the way interventions are constructed by different actors, even if they do not make up the full story of impacts. ‘Whether or not the intervention is invited, there is always a delicate hierarchical relation between the intervener and the intervened’ (Rubinstein 2005: 529). Richmond (2005) distinguishes between four different models/strategies of the liberal peace (hyper-conservative, conservative, orthodox and emancipatory), emphasising that each of these models is based on a different relationship between intervener and intervened upon. The point is that it is only the latter two that recognise the problem inherent in external forms of domination through intervention (Richmond 2005: 217; Chandler 2008). Hence, there is a pressing need for more research on how to understand, conceptualise as well as theorise the encounter between intervener and intervened upon.
It is important to avoid simple categorisations and simplistic understandings of what constitutes intervener and intervened upon, but also the nature of their interaction. One fruitful example of research that avoids simplistic categorisations is Mannergren-Selimovic’s study about how groups in Foca, Bosnia-Herzegovina, used local narratives of truth, justice and reconciliation, through their encounter with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), producing processes that often differed from the outcomes intended by the outsiders/interveners (2010). Mannergren-Selimovic shows how interveners take part in the construction of a social arena, but also that the ensuing contentious exchange of plural meanings is not completely steered by one side, or one single actor. An important point is that the intervened upon never simply respond to an intervention that either succeeds or fails, without the intervener also becoming affected by local actions and constraints on actions (Mannergren-Selimovic 2010: 219; Sörensen 2009). Therefore, interventionary power cannot be understood as top-down domination even in encounters characterised by power inequalities.

A core constructivist insight is that all social relationships may affect social identities. Applied to relationships between interveners and intervened upon, this insight suggests that the encounter leads to identity changes. Such identity changes, and what they might mean for intervention impact, has not been sufficiently or systematically addressed (for exceptions, see Acharya 2004; Tussie 2003; Abrahamsen 2004; Pouligny 2006; Mehler 2008). The encounter between intervener and intervened may have implications for the self-image and identity of both parties, and consequently for their respective notions of truth and right. This may also have implications for understandings of efficiency. The intervener or intervened upon may as a result of their encounter react to, adapt to, work with, sabotage, or acquiesce in this social relationship. Against this backdrop, the complexity of the notion of consent becomes evident. The act of consent-giving to intervention will vary over time. It is not an absolute value; there will always be a spectrum of consenting, dissenting and opposing actors. The encounter enables new political possibilities that could not have been anticipated by either outsiders or insiders.

Intervening (successfully) in the domestic jurisdiction of a state would require getting close to local communities, because of the far-reaching and value-laden political projects and changes that this entails. Outsiders (interveners), there for a time-limited phase, nonetheless struggle to achieve such closeness, which impedes trust-building (Pouligny 2006: 251). Since outsiders connect themselves to ‘universal’ moral values, such as upholding the right to life through measures to protect civilians, or
promoting the liberal peace, there will inevitably be tensions with insiders – especially if these have not been consulted about what their needs really are (Pouligny 2006: 181). Hence, the local legitimacy of an intervention is best understood as a process-based value, dependent on local perceptions of impacts during the mission. Our argument is that interventions therefore should be analysed both from a top-down and a bottom-up perspective; or, differently expressed, both from the perspective of the intervener and from the perspective of those intervened upon.

When interventions are strongly regime-biased, local legitimacy is quickly lost. The two peace operations deployed to Darfur to bring security and protection – the AU-led AMIS (2004–2007) and the AU–UN hybrid mission UNAMID (2007 onwards) – have had tremendously disappointing results. Insufficient conflict analysis and consultations were carried out by the AU and the UN, resulting in quite poor relations between intervener and intervened upon. In their considerations on when and how to implement the mission task to protect civilians, the AU and the UN prioritised the wishes of the host state – even though the host state’s counter-insurgency strategy had caused most of the atrocities. Civilians and representatives of non-state armed groups, in their encounters with interveners, observed to what extent implementation matched the mandate formulations and public statements by AMIS/UNAMID mission leadership. In response they adopted pro- and anti-intervener strategies.² AMIS/UNAMID have had their

² The section draws on Gelot’s field research in the Darfur region in November–December 2006. Pro-intervener strategies include cooperation and negotiation. Anti-intervener strategies include demonstrations; rebels’ or traditional leaders’ refusal of patrols; attacks, kidnapings and killings of international staff.
freedom of movement and access to those most insecure in Darfur (anti-government civilians in rural areas) blocked by the government of Sudan. Observing these developments, local authority leaders, traditional leaders, rebels and internally displaced people (especially those living in areas held by the most powerful rebel groups) maintained that the AU and the UN were biased in favour of the government of Sudan. A common impression was that the peacekeepers they hoped had come to protect their lives could not even protect themselves. Many civilians had seen peacekeepers witness but not stop attacks, killings and looting. Peacekeepers came after the attacks to write reports, with the permission of the military party controlling the area.

Pouligny’s ‘micro-sociology’ of UN-led peace operations is a valuable example of how interventions can be studied from the bottom up. She highlights the importance of local agency, power relations, and perceptions regarding what interveners say and do. She demotes clinical and technical efficiency as valid parameters of intervention performance. The study carefully avoids homogenising the local society into a monolithic constituency and demonstrates that agency and political preferences are dynamic and plural. In spite of the obvious strengths of Pouligny’s study, we need to point out that this is not an example of the type of two-pronged approach we are advocating here. Pouligny does not advance a theoretical argument. It is hard to discern what overall argument is advanced by the rich empirical material, and to whom it is addressed. Pouligny’s argument is quite pragmatic: if interveners took the time to understand better the context into which they were entering, if they were prepared to negotiate interaction more frankly, and with more respect, interventions would have better impact overall (Pouligny 2006: 34-35). We believe that our two-pronged approach is more systematically focused on both ends of the relationship, taking into account both the intervener and the intervened upon. This is obviously an ambitious task.

We have identified what strand of intervention research we are engaging with, and why. We make the case for moving from efficiency to impact, and this case has been supported with reference to empirical illustrations of unintended, disappointing outcomes. Nonetheless, we take Pouligny’s point that once interventions begin, the interveners’ capacity for action becomes both enabled and constrained by local social and political realities. The inclination of the overall corps of outsiders (mission heads as well as other levels of intervening staff) towards understanding these realities and towards interaction will influence their own capacity for action (Pouligny 2006: 141).
Given the emphasis on local power struggles, future research focusing on the encounter between intervener and those intervened upon will need to pay close attention to how to unpack terms such as host state, national elite, society, civilians, as well as consent, and other contested issues relating to the question of by whom, for whom and for what purpose interventions are designed and carried out. Hence, it is crucial also to unpack the meaning of both intereners and those intervened upon. Focusing on the encounter between the intereners and those intervened upon is meant to avoid simplistic categorisation as well as dichotomisation. Neither the intervener nor the ‘targets’ of intervention are homogenous groups. In particular, given the tendency to ignore those intervened upon, it is certainly necessary to problematise and nuance this group. The targets are not simply objects deprived of agency. Nor do they speak for all of society; nor do they represent moral rightness any more than the intereners do. Having argued that the exclusion of the targets of intervention has led to poor peace and security governance, we cannot simplistically assume that their inclusion will ensure the best outcome in all cases. There is a considerable lack of research on this aspect, and further theoretical development depends on more empirical research on the patterns and degree of inclusion/exclusion (Schulz and Söderbaum 2010; Richmond 2011; MacGinty 2010).

Although there are many ways to theorise and study the encounter and power struggles between intereners and those intervened upon, our elaboration above leads us to the conclusion that a critical perspective is the most promising. By adopting the distinction between problem-solving and critical theory developed by Robert Cox one may differentiate between an intervention account that looks at isolated technical flaws, ‘top down’, and one that instead contextualises, denaturalises or problematises the practice, ‘bottom up’. The problem-solving mode of intervention analysis takes the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised as the given framework. The purpose of problem-solving modes of knowledge production is to make the order of the day work more smoothly; hence the starting point is to accept that intervention performs an essentially problem-solving task in world order (Bellamy and Williams 2004: 6).

The critical mode of intervention analysis, instead, calls into question world order by enquiring into the origins of existing institutions and social power relations, and by observing how and whether they might be undergoing change. Indeed, it is first and foremost critical (and poststructuralist) research that has enabled both a problematisation of external interventions as well as a more systematic analysis from the bottom up, which seeks to turn local populations into subjects, as op-
posed to objects (Bellamy and Williams 2004: 7). The forte of critical analysis to date has been its explicit normative discussion of tensions in world politics, laying bare the political and normative assumptions behind interventions, and the dangers and tensions that may follow. Importantly, critical research is able to incorporate that interveners and recipients are bound together by complex relationships that extend beyond the temporal limits of any particular intervention. The promise of social change and emancipation facilitates the imagination of, and the discursive constitution of, alternative politics. Indeed, some studies have advanced a bottom-up perspective, which emphasises the role of non-state actors, civil society and outsider-insider relations for ongoing conflict transformation or emancipatory politics (Bleiker 2004; Richmond 2011; Stamnes 2004).

Conclusion

Given the many millions that die in the large-scale emergencies that interventions are trying to manage or solve, and the enormous amount of resources invested in various types of interventions every year, it is difficult to imagine any research area within the social sciences that has higher policy relevance, or one which is more controversial. The academic significance of ‘the problem of intervention’ is further enhanced by the difficulty of finding solid arguments for how complex social problems can be solved from the ‘outside’, by external ‘interveners’.

This article takes as its starting point the realisation that in spite of a massive amount of literature in the field, there is little agreement regarding when and why interventions ‘fail’ or ‘succeed’. Even if certain interventions are widely considered ‘successful’, the majority of interventions are controversial. Empirical evidence shows that many interventions – regardless of whether these are humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping operations, peace-building or state-building interventions, governance interventions or development interventions – tend to be poorly planned, guided by narrow ideological or strategic goals, and yield less than satisfactory results. Indeed, many interventions even appear to be counterproductive.

The core of the problem, in our view, is that most interventions are usually analysed and assessed as well as designed and implemented from the standpoint of the ‘intervener’, with less attention given to national context and those being intervened upon. We need, therefore, to rethink the way we study as well as carry out external interventions. Our main message is that the encounter between interveners and those intervened upon lies at the heart of any improved understanding of the logic and impact of external interventions.
Our study draws attention to the fact that interveners (and the underlying motives and goals of external interveners) need to be problematised, rethought and reconceptualised. Likewise, as elaborated upon earlier, the so-called ‘intervened upon’ are not a homogenous group or objects deprived of agency. We suggest a focus on the *encounter* and the relationship between interveners and those intervened upon. Such an encounter necessarily requires a broadening of the conventional parameters of intervention and at least a partly new type of analysis whereby we combine the top-down approach with a bottom-up perspective. Through the top-down perspective one can analyse how intervention is implemented and legitimised by the interveners whereas the bottom-up perspective can provide evidence regarding how the intervention is perceived and reacted upon by those who are objects or recipients of intervention, both on the national and the local level. In essence, in sharp contrast to the current tendency in the field to concentrate on interventions from the top down, we draw attention to local dynamics and cultural meaning systems that inform social action as well as the power relations between interveners and those intervened upon.

Even if certain interventions are widely considered ‘successful’, the majority of interventions are controversial.

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Whose Security in Palestine? The Impact of the EU’s Security Sector Reform in Palestine

Michael Schulz

The purpose of this article is to analyse the EU’s security sector reform (SSR) in the Palestinian self-rule areas. The main focus is on how it has contributed to strengthening the general security situation, and in particular human security – that is, the safety of individual Palestinians. In other words, the focus is not the EU’s own security concern in its so-called neighbourhood (North Africa and the Middle East), but rather whether the objectives of the SSR were achieved and what the security implications are for Palestinian society as well as for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at large.

The EU has increased its involvement in various conflict zones in the global South. The literature has of course discussed the EU as a global security and peace actor. Many studies have focused on the EU’s own security (Keukelerie and MacNaughtan 2008), its governance capacity (Kirchner 2007; Telo 2007), its effectiveness as a coherent actor, and what kind of political animal the EU is (Telo 2006; Bicchi 2006). However, what is much less discussed is the issue of the EU’s relations with other regions, particularly in the South (see Söderbaum and Stålgren 2010), and even less, the impact of the EU’s actions in regional conflict contexts. Although it is not the primary focus of this article, it is relevant to note that the EU’s activities in regional conflicts are often linked to multilateral arrangements, especially the United Nations, but also other actors such as the US. It is therefore important not only to analyse the EU’s actions in themselves but also to situate and discuss the EU’s policies and activities within a broader multilateral context.

The EU has long taken a strong stand in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Despite its relatively low profile as a mediator in comparison with the US, it has nonetheless been involved in various ways. In 1980 the then EC member states agreed to the Venice Declaration that stipulates a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hence, the EU can be seen as a diplomatic front-runner in the quest for a possible solution.
to the conflict. It has also provided space to manoeuvre for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), in the sense that it gave legitimacy to the organisation as a core party in the conflict, long before Israel or the US did so (Pardo and Peters 2010; Schulz 2009; Tocci 2007).

However, despite the fact that the EC legitimised the PLO in this way very early on, the Europeans felt sidelined by the US and the USSR until the post-Iraq war period, during which the first Arab-Israeli talks occurred, at the start of the Madrid conference in 1991. The signing of the so-called Declaration of Principles by Israel and the PLO, in 1993 in Oslo, opened the door for the Europeans to become involved in the peace process again. Some claimed that the Europeans became the ‘payers not the players’.¹ It was not until the beginning of the 21st century that the EU could become directly involved in key security issues. Since the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (1993-2000), and the outbreak of the second uprising – the so-called al-Aqsa intifada in 2000 – the EU has taken on a somewhat different role. It also became a strong proponent of the ‘road map to peace’ that was launched in 2002 by the EU, the US, Russia and the UN. The road map – which was ultimately accepted after several rounds of revisions and talks between the core parties – aims at establishing a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Further, in 2005 the EU agreed to a civilian mission to assist the Palestinian Authority (PA) at the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. This mission is called the European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EU BAM Rafah). Its mandate began in November 2005, and has been extended several times, most recently until 30 June 2012. The police mission for the Palestinian territories, under the EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPS), is another civilian mission involving the EU. The mission started on 1 January 2006, and had a three-year mandate. This mission’s main objective was to support the PA police in taking greater professional responsibility for law and order. Both reforms should be seen as part of the EU neighbourhood strategy within the overall European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The EU sees resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a key issue, since the conflict also has wider security ramifications in the entire region (Altunisik 2008).

These security sector reforms have formally been declared as key tools of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) strategy in the

¹ Among the many politicians to claim that the EU has only served as a ‘payer’, with little political influence, is Prince Hassan of Jordan. See www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/hassan3/English
Mediterranean area; however, in practice they have only been applied in Turkey and the Palestinian self-rule areas (Lecha 2007). As has been mentioned, ‘[f]or the EU, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the key to peace and security in the region…’ (Biscop 2007: 8). Hence, a case study of the Israeli-Palestinian case can scrutinise how the EU has acted in an area that it considers as vital for its own, as well as Middle East, security. However, this study’s focus is primarily on the impact of the EU’s actions vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the consequences the SSR has had for the overall conflict. Further, in order to assess the extent of success of reforms, it is essential to determine what impacts – intended as well as unintended – they have had on human security in Palestinian society.

Previous research on SSR

Several articles and book chapters analyse the implications of the EU-adopted Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) from 1993, and link it to various aspects of reform, including SSR. Much emphasis has been placed on what actor capabilities the EU has. Often the EU is compared with the US, underlining its normative and economic power, rather than its military and security capacities (see Katsioulis 2009; Attinà 2008; Duke and Ojanen 2006).

In some studies, special emphasis is placed on the SSR as a tool within the overall CFSP EU strategy. Generally speaking, security sector reform has become a tool within peacebuilding interventions in war-torn societies. It became fashionable with the UNDP report of 1994, in which human security was the focus. Hence, security sector reforms
were meant to be a tool in which the military sectors within war-torn societies would be placed under the rule of law and civilian rule, and would become institutionalised within a democratic political system.

Taking those studies that have evaluated the EU’s security sector reforms in the Palestinian self-rule areas, we find mixed opinions on how successful the reforms have been. Several authors underline that the EUPOL COPPS mission was difficult to implement, due to the escalation of internal conflicts between Hamas and Fatah that resulted in a de facto division of the PA. Hamas took over control in the Gaza Strip, while Fatah took control of the West Bank. Hence, the blockade of Hamas by the EU also downsized the SSR mission, excluding several police forces and militia groups from the reform (see Lecha 2007; Altunisik 2008).

A Finland Civilian Crisis Management Study concludes:

EUPOL COPPS is an ongoing mission and will be evaluated many times in the future. These conclusions suggest that in this small ESDP mission with its high political significance, operational goals have partly been achieved, but achievement has been hampered by the political development as well as by the need for more time-consuming transformational change. Human security principles are quite well followed by the mission itself, proving that principles proposed by the Madrid Report could be even more systematically followed by all ESDP missions, thus ensuring a more systematic standard practice, and very practical mission environment. Compliance with these principles on the strategic and policy-making level that led to the establishment of this mission was less tangible and more vague (Kerkänen et al. 2008: 33).

This relatively positive conclusion requires some follow-up remarks. The main idea behind the EUPOL COPPS mission was to place all police forces under democratic civilian authority. This could also contribute to enabling the Palestinians to become committed to implementing parts of the so-called road map to peace. However, Crespo and co-authors, who see the mission both as long-term and a new form of EU involvement, consider that this mission represents a break with previous low-profile EU actions. These authors believe that these activities need to be organised in closer joint security cooperation with the US (Crespo et al. 2007).

Some warnings have also been raised. Sabiote emphasises that EU involvement through the SSR is crucial, but that ‘it must not be forgot-
ten that the main source of insecurity to the Palestinians is the Israeli occupation’ (Sabiote 2006: 9). In other words, minor reforms of the Palestinian police, and the security reforms, do not necessarily create increased security for Palestinian citizens. Sherriff (2007: 96) claims that the SSR dramatically changed its scope and direction after Hamas won the 2006 national elections. For instance, instead of the aim of placing all police and security forces under the (Hamas) control of the prime minister’s office, these forces were placed directly under the control of President Mahmoud Abbas (Fatah control), thereby raising the spectre of democratic accountability for the security forces. Lending partial support to President Abbas, in his power struggle against Hamas, also led the EU and the other road map partners to neglect the clampdown by the security forces on those critical of Fatah. Human insecurity increased as a result of this political stand.

Analytical model

The analysis focuses on determining the impact of the SSR in terms of creating law and order, and also increased individual and collective security for Palestinians in the Palestinian self-rule areas. Hence, both objectives of the reform will be compared to the operational implementation of these aims. The analysis will also consider how the Palestinians perceive the EU, as well as the extent to which security, and people’s trust in the Palestinian police, have increased in the eyes of the public. This is done in order to discern whether the reform has reached the public in terms of creating increased human security.
How can the EU reform be evaluated? One can argue that each SSR strategy must be considered within the specific context in which it is to be implemented. The aspects that should be considered can be placed at different levels and can have different dimensions. One is directly linked to the impact of the reform itself. In other words, in what ways were the objectives of the reform met, in terms of both the input and outcome? Here we intend to analyse what investments were made, and what resources were used, in order to identify the achieved outputs of the reform, such as the number of police forces that underwent the reform, the extent to which professional civil control has been achieved, and so on. A focus on how the EU made its conflict analysis is important, since this will influence the EU’s way of designing its activities, what actors need to be considered and what entry-point they should use.

The second issue is linked to the intended and unintended consequence of the reform, that is, the impact on Palestinian society as a whole. The impact could refer to such factors as the extent to which political stability has increased in society, the extent to which human rights abuses have decreased, and so on (see also Wulf 2004: 22–3). The implementation of each action needs to be linked to the theory of change. How are the series of actions interlinked and related to the overarching idea of establishing an improved security situation? What steps did the EU consider to achieve this aim?

Thirdly, as noted above, the Palestinian public’s attitudes towards and perceptions of the police forces in the self-rule areas will also be considered. In addition, since the EU is part of the quartet that drives the road map process, certain parts of the analysis will be linked to the extent to which coordination between the EU, and the other members of the quartet – the US, the UN and Russia – has taken place, and how this has impacted on the effectiveness of launching the reform. Statements made by the other road map partners that were critical of Hamas could seriously impact on the EU’s room for manoeuvre.

Impact of SSR in Palestine

Security sector reforms are usually concerned with the military, but can also include the police and security forces of a particular country. In the Palestinian case, a conventional military force is absent, since the PA was prohibited, under the terms of the Oslo Accords, from establishing its own military capacity. Having said this, the PA police force is probably the biggest police force in the world in terms of police per capita of population.
The overall objective of the decision to implement the EUPOL COPPS reform was to establish a ‘transparent and accountable police organization with a clearly identified role, operating within a sound legal framework, capable of delivering an effective and robust policing service, responsive to the needs of the society and able to manage effectively its human and physical resources’. \(^2\) Hence, in the overall objective we find not merely a narrow ambition to reform the police, but also include broader societal objectives for human security.

**The direct impact on Palestinian police and the Palestinian security forces**

The Palestinian police underwent training, received new police equipment (new patrol vehicles, uniforms, and so on) and were provided with the EUPOL COPPS headquarters staff in Ramallah (53 staff members) as mentors and a support base. This direct material and human resource strengthening did increase the capacity and efficiency of the Palestinian civil police. A long-term transformation of the police corps should follow the model of the Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme, which was jointly formulated by the PA, the US and the EU in 2004. Today approximately 80 police buildings exist in the West Bank, several of which were established with EU financial assistance. However, the investments of EUPOL COPPS are around US$ 55 million – far short of the US$ 243 million promised (Sayigh 2009: 8). This has meant most police stations are poorly resourced, for example lacking computer capacity, and failing to comply with proper health and safety standards. At the training centres the police were taught human rights, rule of law and democratic principles, and how they could best serve the Palestinian public. However, as Sayigh emphasises:

> The fact that National Security Forces are becoming more disciplined and professional and that the Civil Police receives human rights training does not erase the reality that the Preventive Security Apparatus and General Intelligence Department continue to trespass on the jurisdiction of the Civil Police, which is clearly unable to exercise the ‘primacy’ called for by EUPOL COPPS and claimed by the Palestinian Authority (Sayigh 2009: 16).

In other words, the Preventive Security Apparatus and General Intelligence Department have taken on the role of law enforcer in the West Bank. The fact that the CIA has been involved in training and supporting the Fatah-controlled security branches does not make the

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boundary between EU and US actions any clearer. These two security branches behave as a *de facto* police force, and assume full powers of arrest and imprisonment (mainly of members of Hamas and people opposed to Fatah). They administer military courts and disregard civilian law courts. No real rule of law has existed in the West Bank since June 2007, and these two organisations act unlawfully, thereby undermining the EUPOL COPPS mission’s achievements.

However, it should also be emphasised that the EU, as a member of the quartet responsible for the road map proposal, clearly took a stand against Hamas after their election victory in January 2006. When the EUPOL COPPS mission was formulated, a complication emerged due to the EU decision to boycott Hamas. In June 2007, when Hamas took over control of the Gaza Strip, the EU BAM Rafah mission at the Egyptian–Gaza crossing came to a standstill. In other words, the EU, jointly with the US, allowed the reversing of the election result, and supported Fatah’s return to power. Hence, the Civilian Police within the Hamas authority in the Gaza Strip was placed outside the EUPOL COPPS mission. Since then contact between the Civilian Police in the West Bank and that in the Gaza Strip has been rare, thereby increasing the difficulties of a future re-unification of the two entities. The EU has thereby taken a partial position in the overall Israeli–Palestinian conflict, while ‘the US and EU decided to intensify their military, financial and logistical support for the Abbas regime’ (Abdullah 2009: 5). The overall security sector reforms in the Palestinian self-rule areas, including the EUPOL COPPS mission, thereby risk being seen, in the eyes of the Palestinian public, as constituting a ‘reliable instrument for Israeli security policy and the US-led war on terror’ (Friedrich and Luethold 2008: 208). Hence, the EU’s overall political position vis-à-vis Hamas and Fatah also has indirect implications for the success of the EUPOL COPPS mission (Sayigh 2009; Friedrich and Luethold 2008; Abdullah 2009).

Further, according to the Arab Organization for Human Rights, more than 1000 prisoners are held in PA jails in the West Bank (Abdullah 2009: 6). Many of these are political prisoners, belonging to the Fatah opposition. Arrests are carried out, in which security forces do not identify themselves, and generally do not follow internationally recognised standards for arrests (Abdullah 2009; Sayigh 2009).

Reports by Amnesty International claim that during interrogations torture is used against prisoners, and that they are generally ill-treated by the PA’s General Intelligence and Preventive Security Services. Human Rights Watch has claimed that the methods used include mock executions, kicking, punching, and beatings with sticks and pipes. This
treatment has on occasions led to the deaths of prisoners (Abdullah 2009). This further underlines that, in a context where the parliament – the Palestinian Legislative Council – is not in operation, and society is run by presidential decree, no rule of law can be followed, particularly not by security services and police branches. Hence, the EUPOL COPPS mission risks focusing too narrowly, on (albeit important) training and equipment capacity-building efforts of the Civil Palestinian Police, while at the same time sidelining the contextual structural issues that are responsible for creating the unlawful environment. The majority of the police forces have successfully improved their capacity and effectiveness as a result of the SSR, but these achievements cannot obscure the fact that the Preventive Security Apparatus and General Intelligence Department are acting unlawfully. Hence, the objective to form a police force compliant with rule of law in the Palestinian self-rule areas, under a democratic order, is at risk.

The Palestinian public’s attitudes towards police and security and the EU

It is also important, at a more general level, to ask what the Palestinian public think about the performance of the Palestinian police and security forces, and the degree of trust they have in those authorities, and in the performance of the EU. Earlier polls, from 2006, indicated that Palestinians generally hoped that the police and security forces would become more rights-respecting, less corrupt and more efficient security organisations (Friedrich and Luethold 2008: 200).

In our own studies, we found a pattern of change over time. In 1997 and 2001, the PA was still under the control of President Arafat, and we can identify a general decrease in trust in the PA courts, police and other security forces. Significantly, in 2006, when the new Hamas government took power, the trust level was at approximately the same level as in 2001. It should be remembered that during this period, the police and security forces were still controlled by Fatah. Some analysts

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3 The survey data derive from a joint research project between the Department of Peace and Development Research at the University of Gothenburg (Sweden) and the Department of Sociology at Birzeit University (West Bank) on Democracy and State Building in Palestine, which was initiated in 1996. Three surveys were conducted: in November 1997, July 2001 and April/May 2006. A random sample of 1,308 Palestinians was selected for the 1997 survey, 1,492 for the 2001 survey, 1,500 for the 2006 survey, and 1,504 for the 2009 survey. The surveys contained between 150 and 200 questions. The target population comprised individuals who were aged 18 years or over and were resident in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or the city of Jerusalem (under Israeli control). The samples were made with the help of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). Although some of the questions were amended, removed, or newly added over the course of the survey period, several aspects that this study is concerned with have been measured during each of the three survey stages.
have also underlined that the outbreak of the *al-Aqsa intifada* was not solely a reaction against Israeli occupation, but was also very much a reaction against, and critique of, the Arafat-led PA regime, which was perceived as being nepotistic and corrupt (see Lindholm Schulz 2003). However, in 2009, three years after the EUPOL COPPS mission had taken place in the West Bank, we could see a slight increase of trust in the courts, police and security forces. Again, the trust levels were around the same level as in 2001, during a time when the *al-Aqsa intifada* was ongoing. Hence, it appears that some increase in public trust has been achieved, and the EUPOL COPPS mission has been at least moderately successful with at least some parts of its mission.

Table 1. Degree of public trust in Palestinian courts, police and security forces (The categories are: do not trust, do trust to a certain extent, trust, trust a lot. In the table the results for ‘trust’ and ‘trust a lot’ are merged and presented as one figure). Source: the University of Gothenburg-Birzeit University surveys.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian courts</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian police</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian security forces</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
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Nonetheless, trust levels are still relative low, and a general sense of security is non-existent in Palestinians’ day-to-day lives. The Israeli occupation is still seen as the overarching cause of insecurity, but the perceived corrupt and unlawful behaviour of the Palestinian security services are another important factor. However, in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas holds authority, we can see that Palestinians trust the Hamas courts, police and security forces even less than they trust the equivalent PA authorities in the West Bank. Also, in controlling for whether West Bank Palestinians have different views, in terms of trust, of the Hamas-controlled police and security compared with Palestinians in Gaza, we found no difference. Also, comparing Palestinians’ view of the PA in the West Bank, no statistically significant difference can be identified. This indicates that the performance of the West Bank policing forces are judged as being more efficient and trustworthy than those in the Hamas-controlled areas. Hence, the EU can see this as one indicator of success of the SSR. However, there is still a long way to go before a majority of Palestinian society feels that human security has been achieved. This is most likely to be achieved when unity between Fatah and Hamas is established, and then of course to a greater extent again after the end of Israeli occupation.
Focusing on the EU itself: Palestinians exhibited a low degree of trust in the EU’s capacity to mediate in the conflict. Just 12.3 per cent ‘trust’ or ‘trust a lot’ the EU’s mediation efforts in the overall conflict (September 2009). However, it should be emphasised that Palestinians are generally highly sceptical of outside mediators. Comparing trust in the EU with Palestinians’ trust in the three other members of the quartet – the UN (9.7 per cent), the US (5.8 per cent) and Russia (5.9 per cent) – we see that the EU enjoys the highest levels of Palestinian trust of the quartet. The EU is also more trusted than Iran (9.4 per cent). Only the Arab League (17.4 per cent) enjoys higher Palestinian trust than the EU.

Table 2. To what degree do you trust the European Union to mediate a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Do not trust</th>
<th>Trust to some extent</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Trust much</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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Given that the EU is a member of the quartet, and that the US is also involved in security sector reforms, this further risks undermining trust in the EU’s actions in the view of the Palestinian public. The involvement of the US in Palestinian security sector reforms stems from 1998, when the Wye River Agreement was signed between Israel and the PA/PLO. Since then, the CIA and other American organisations have been involved in reforming and supporting the Palestinian intelligence services, with the aim of preventing Hamas and Islamic Jihad from engaging in violence against Israel. Hence, the EU’s actions in the security sector are largely perceived as part of a joint US-EU action, in the eyes of many Palestinians.

Conclusion

In summarising the findings of the EU as a peace and security actor in the Israeli-Palestinian case, we can see that the EU has had limited success in reforming the West Bank Palestinian civil police into an increasingly disciplined and efficient force. At the same time, several unintended consequences follow from the EU mission. The EU’s role is seen with a certain scepticism by many Palestinians, particularly because some security branches that do not follow rule-of-law principles, and are contravening human rights standards, are supported by both the EU and the US in clamping down on Hamas. The risk that EU involvement is seen as indirectly supporting Israeli security needs is clear. Despite a certain improvement in trust in security and police in the West Bank, trust is far
from being at an ideal level. It is also hard to see how such a reform can succeed without the ending of the Israeli occupation, which is the root cause of the lack of human security. Despite the even lower levels of trust shown in the police and security forces of the Hamas Authority in the Gaza Strip, the question of whether or not the international isolation and boycott of the Hamas Authority further contributes to increasing human insecurity is unavoidable. The EU is part of this boycott.

The EU has increased its role as a security actor in the overall conflict, particularly with the EUPOL COPPS and EU BAM Rafah missions. Hence, the EU risks being seen as part of the US mission that is already perceived as biased towards Israel. If the EU’s strategy was to increase its own security by involving itself in solving security issues in its neighbourhood, then its involvement in Palestinian security issues, and the overall conflict, risk inciting a backlash. The EU needs to reconsider its strategy: to find a way to become more impartial, as well as to create an intervention that is seen and judged by the public as a purely EU intervention, de-linked from other actors’ interventions. This is not to suggest that no interventions should be coordinated multilaterally. However, if multilateral interventions risk creating a perception of partiality on the part of the EU, as well as fomenting distrust of the EU by the parties themselves, it is prudent to steer away from direct involvement, and instead to work to convince the partners, and the parties to the conflict, of the EU’s own roadmap for first implementing the two-state solution.

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Intervention or Interaction? Developing Ideas from Cambodia

Alexandra Kent

This article describes experiences from a grassroots initiative for community development and peacebuilding in post-conflict Cambodia and suggests how these may critique the way that development intervention is used to further a global security order. Development intervention is delivered with the explicit intention of altering the target society in order to align it to a paradigmatic notion of world order. In this process, both the subjects of intervention and also the intervening policy-makers and scholars are guided by their historical and cultural backgrounds (cf. Der Derian 1995). However, interveners tend to regard the knowledge of the ‘intervened upon’ as local cultural curiosa while assuming their own knowledge to be independent of culture and of universal applicability. Reports that interveners receive of intervention in fact deepening power differentials and exacerbating insecurity for the intervened upon may therefore be read as irrelevant deviations from the norm. This article asks whether it may not be a cultural conceit for a set of norms and ideas that is upheld by today’s cosmopolitan elites to be imposed upon others; instead, should the intervention paradigm not be open to critique by subaltern experience and should different forms of knowledge not be given equal importance?

The ‘moral’, the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ all feature in protecting and propagating a desired global order. For instance, today’s global security paradigm arises from the ‘liberal peace’ model, which constitutes a neat moral and politico-economic package; democratisation, human rights, liberal market economics and the integration of societies into the global community are together assumed to promise peace and stability (MacMillan 1998). Both international and national actors then justify intervention initiatives with seductive slogans such as human security and the responsibility to protect. Development interventions thus evoke hopes of improvements in wellbeing, living standards and opportunities, but they also mean commodification, industrialisation, modernisation and globalisation, all of which serve the raw economic and political interests of global or national elites (Edelman and Haugerud 2005: 1; Whitman 2005).
The goals of intervention are thus rooted in cultural values and the politico-economic interests of positioned actors; intervention is always ambiguous, holding one set of meanings for those loyal to the interveners and another for those who are subject to intervention (Rubinstein 2005). However, intervention performance is evaluated primarily according to how closely the interveners’ objectives have been met rather than according to how it has impacted upon the everyday lives of the intervened upon. In particular, the voices of those who experience intervention negatively tend to be ignored in the evaluation and design of further interventions.

The objectives according to which interveners draw up and execute their programmes have therefore been criticised for being narrow and short-sighted, ignoring past experience (Jenkins and Plowden 2006) and broader or negative effects. Intervention may limit violent conflict in the short term but it often fails to address the root causes of conflict and it may instead exacerbate them (Peter Griffiths interview 2003). Empirical studies in widely different settings such as Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Cambodia and Afghanistan, have shown that intervention may accommodate or even deepen the inequalities that originally gave rise to tensions (Duffield 2001; Keen 2005: 177; Kostic 2007; Springer 2009) and may leave a culture of impunity in its wake (Ayub and Kouvo 2008). Of course, it is politically expedient for interveners to locate the reasons for failure in the target society rather than in their own approach.

More troublingly still, elites are profiting from the perpetuation of global inequity. For all that they rhetorically fête democracy, today’s elites are often willing to stand by while power is used to brutally discipline or exclude the poorest in order to stabilise the neoliberal order and pattern of wealth accumulation (Hughes 2003; Springer 2009). In other words, the current global security effort seems to be about securing a world order based on free market principles and the price is being paid by the most vulnerable. If the mind-set of ‘inter-vention’ ultimately helps secure a global neoliberal order I suggest that a mind-set of ‘inter-action’ may be required to genuinely address local vulnerability.

The experiences presented in this article are gathered from a small-scale, local community development initiative in Cambodia. They are intended to make a case for addressing experiences of vulnerability by honing in upon human relationships and the role of interveners in them. Doing fieldwork in Cambodian villages may lead one to draw the depressing conclusion that the vulnerable are being steamrollered by today’s global neoliberalism. However, hope may lie in the way individuals interact with the system: the way people relate to power. After all, the seeds of historical change inevitably germinate at the level of interpersonal communication.
Insecurity in Cambodia

The stated aims of the United Nations Development Programme for Cambodia are to enhance the government’s ability to deliver public services to the population in an equitable and accountable manner, to consolidate democracy and civil society and to enhance economic growth, private sector development and the sustainable use of natural resources. However, long after Cambodia’s doors opened to international development intervention with the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991 and despite the introduction of procedural democracy and apparent economic growth insecurity and underdevelopment seem as entrenched as ever. Hughes (2003) has examined the changes in Cambodia brought about by international intervention since the early 1990s. She has argued that economic liberalisation results in internationalisation of the privileged and control of rural political economies by profit-seeking urbanites and officials. In a similar vein, Springer (2009) has shown how national authorities use violence and intimidation to discipline the populace and thereby create the order and stability necessary for donor-driven neoliberal reform; stability results from repression rather than from grassroots democratic process. The donor community’s rhetoric of providing ‘security’ for the poor in fact seems to belie an increasingly global subservience to economic interest groups.
Cambodia’s history of war and genocide1 together with today’s new forms of marginalisation have left an enduring legacy of mistrust (Zucker 2007). According to the Asian Development Bank’s measurements,2 some 30 per cent of Cambodians were still living in poverty in 2007 despite years of ‘strong growth performance’; economic growth in the cities has not flowed through to rural areas where around 80 per cent of the population live. The majority of Cambodians therefore continue to have precarious access to food, healthcare, employment, education and justice. In this context, international intervention has arguably just given vulnerability a new emphasis – replacing the direct violence of the 1970s and 1980s with the indirect or structural violence of predatory commercial interests.

Although it has been contended that ‘all social insecurities are culturally produced’ (Weldes et al. 1999: 1), little attention has been paid by interveners to the socio-cultural realities faced by the most vulnerable. For instance, a study of almost a thousand development projects in Cambodia concluded that ‘few development activities have been specifically designed to meet the situation of the poorest...[only] 3% of activities are tailored to their situation’ (Biddulph, et al. 2000: 23). Further, the global idea that the cure for vulnerability is neoliberalism has been internalised even by the vulnerable; almost everyone has become a speculator.

Development intervention in Cambodia has focused on a functional approach to absolute poverty and on delivering material resources instead of looking at the structural (or ‘relational’) causes of inequitable distribution (Simmons and Bottomley 2001: 19). The influence of factors

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1 The use of this term to describe what happened in Cambodia in the late 1970s has been debated. It is used here simply to refer to the disastrous consequences of the Khmer Rouge regime’s experiment with communism from 1975 to 1979 when almost a quarter of the population perished.

2 See http://www.adb.org/Documents/Fact_Sheets/CAM.pdf
such as the feelings evoked by poverty – contempt or pity for the poor by those who are richer, and shame, resignation or frustration among the poor – are rarely considered. Simmons and Bottomley therefore argue that for development to make a positive difference to the very poor ‘the struggle for survival must be understood not only through theories and statistics, but through the eyes of those who experience it’ (ibid: 21).

Towards restoring life in Cambodian villages

The heading of this section is taken from the title of a short book that I found moving but unsentimental. The narrative was told by the Cambodian NGO worker Meas Nee to Joan Healy, who wrote the text for publication. This unpretentious little book talks about people’s feelings – of trust, dignity and shame – and it brings them and their relationships to life on the page. These portrayals are also couched in a discussion of the mismatch between the goals of interveners and the lived realities of those intervened upon.

I had encountered this kind of disjunction early on in my fieldwork in Cambodia when I interviewed a Western woman who had been running an NGO in Cambodia for more than a decade. One of the things she told me was how frustrated she felt when villagers borrowed money from the micro-credit facilities her organisation offered and then donated to the Buddhist monks instead of investing in something that would yield an economic return. Often, she said, this meant that they had difficulty repaying.

Reflecting on his own experience of war, flight to the Thai border camps and later of establishing the community development NGO Krom Aphiwat Phum, Meas Nee describes how well-meaning interventions like the one I encountered often fail to consider how relationships operate in the village.

A loan scheme may be a very useful thing for the economic development of the middle class and rich ... [but] it is not a way of re-developing the structures of the community.... If the borrower does not have money to give back at the time s/he will borrow from another money lender or will sell an asset. The agency may think that the loan scheme is a success because of 100% repayment. Full repayment is not difficult to achieve but to understand the effect of this on the lives of the people and the spirit of the village is very difficult (Meas Nee 1995: 50).

A village money-lender reported: ‘NGO activities actually increase my business because people who would not normally borrow are encouraged to join loan schemes and are then forced to borrow money from me to repay the NGO’ (Simmons and Bottomley 2001: 20).
Meas Nee notes that understanding the complex fabric of village society requires time and a willingness to listen and learn from the people. His comments may seem obvious but these simple yet resonant recommendations fly in the face of current global intervention praxis.

Where community development has worked well the thing that has happened is not the projects. It is the people of the community moving together to support each other... The first thing is to make relationships, not to make projects (Nee 1995: 42, 46).

International intervention means that an outside party deliberately tries to change the local course of events in order to solve an identified problem. The United Nations’ stipulated Millennium Development Goals, for instance, focus on quantitative and time-bound targets that require continuous monitoring and evaluation. Interventions are thus conceptualised as discrete events that can be isolated from the social flow and are amenable to control. They are designed with input from ‘experts’: planners, statisticians, economists, demographers and so on, who are unlikely to spend much time trying to understand village relationships. The failure of interveners to conceptualise development in terms of human beings trying to work together, with their particular histories and cultural equipment, can create very real problems for locals. Meas Nee notes,

I have met Cambodians working in villages who feel pressure not only from the difficult task of creating relationship in the village but also from balancing the expectations of foreigners who have set up the objectives of the project. This is a very stressful situation because hurrying projects to meet outside expectations takes away the emphasis of the more important task of restoring the good relationships. When there is trust and dignity in the way that the people relate, good projects follow very quickly (ibid: 55).

**Krom Aphiwat Phum**

The name Krom Aphiwat Phum literally means Village Development Group. It is a local NGO based in Battambang Province in northwestern Cambodia. It was founded in March 1993 by five women and five men. Half of these were returnees from the border camps. The group subsequently expanded to 12 core members and four supporting staff, still with an equal gender balance. I visited the headquarters of the group at

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3 The Cambodian NGO pioneers I have interviewed have all shared a background in the Thai border camps where they learned English and knowledge of development. In this sense, they are cultural go-betweens who are familiar with the worldviews of both the village and the representatives of the international development community and yet are also outsiders to both.
its location inside a Buddhist pagoda when I was in Cambodia in 2007, in part because I had heard from various Cambodians and foreigners alike of its unique, flat management style that breaks with the hierarchy of Cambodian society. The Board of Directors includes representatives from government, from international and Cambodian NGOs and from two of the more than 20 villages that the organisation works with. The stated goals of the organisation are to pay balanced attention to the material, social and personal wellbeing of those with whom it works. The core management group rotates leadership and responsibilities between all members, major decisions require consensus and the members are on equal salaries. This unconventional set-up demonstrates how development workers may act as significant agents of cultural change (see Harris 2008) not by imposing prefabricated ideas on others but by first transforming their own way of organising themselves and relating to one another and the villagers (cf. O’Leary and Nee 2001).

NGOs and their workers are often felt by the Cambodian public to be riding the gravy train of foreign aid with their relatively high salaries; NGO representatives often roll up in a village in a four-wheel-drive vehicle. Krom Aphiwat Phum’s workers ride mopeds just as the villagers do. In these ways there is a conscious attempt to create feelings of camaraderie with the villagers while at the same time selectively breaking with traditions in order to find novel solutions to problems. Meas Nee notes the importance of time and patience for painstakingly repairing the relationships that are the precursor to progress and development,

You cannot easily change the damage caused by war or caused by the systematic breaking of relationships, or the loss of dignity....We need to find ways to restore the confidence and trust of individual people, of families and whole communities. This is done in the same way that any relationships are made. Slowly (Nee 1995: 41).
Krom Aphiwat Phum has received recognition for its success with this special approach. In 1998, a study that compared various approaches to development in Cambodia, such as UN, international, bilateral and indigenous Cambodian NGO work, claimed that,

Krom Aphiwat Phum is a unique example of a process-oriented approach. Its success derives from the long-time presence in communities. Its emphasis on building up trust and confidence as preconditions for development marks it as an organisation with special insights and sensitivities to the Cambodian situation (Chim Charya 1998: 42).

**Engaging in transformation**

Those who have written about Krom Aphiwat Phum often stress that the philosophy and practice of the organisation enable mutual influence and transformation of parties to an interaction. This is very different from the understanding of intervention noted above, as concerning an outside party that tries to bring about a transformation in a target society while supposedly itself remaining unaffected by the process.

In 2001, Moira O’Leary and Meas Nee (2001) conducted a study of why capacity-building efforts in Cambodia had been less successful at fostering genuine transformation than expected. They claimed that development practitioners need to engage in personal transformation in tandem with their efforts to effect change among those they work with. ‘Capacity builders need to be conscious of the factors – within themselves and within participants – which inhibit the facilitation of learning’ (p. ix). While their study focuses on Cambodian workers and their interface with Cambodian villagers, the principle that they unearth here could be extrapolated to the interface between the intervener and the intervened upon at any level: global, regional, national or local. For instance, their insight that an effective development worker should be able to ‘relate a new insight from practice to existing knowledge and practice’ (p. 123) could apply equally all the way up the hierarchy of the international intervention industry to decision makers at its pinnacle. Instead, as Jenkins and Plowden (2006) note, we find that intervention design tends to ignore feedback from past experience and to drive agendas that are designed to consolidate the neoliberal status quo rather than keeping it open for critique. The lack of humility and self-criticism among interveners is apparent in Meas Nee’s description of a well-building project that backfired,

In the meetings about the location of the wells, the articulate people who happened to be the richer people were very ‘helpful’. We noticed that the wells were close to their houses. They could also reassure the
agency that each family would be willing to pay two dollars towards the costs of the well. Later the poorer people said, ‘I did not ask for the well,’ and they did not pay. The organisation began to think of this village as a dishonest place. ... The people were angry and said that the water from the wells gave them diarrhoea; they returned to their usual practice of drinking water from the river (Nee 1995: 53-54).

The donors in this case apparently blamed the recipients for failure rather than reflecting upon weaknesses in their own relationships with the locals, and this is in line with Jenkins and Plowden’s contention above. Intervention appears to be delivered with little sensitivity to the way in which it seeps through nexuses of relationships, sometimes souring them in the process.

**Intervention as interaction**

If we take the views of people like Meas Nee seriously, then positive development is first and foremost the outcome of the dynamics of human relationships. Some ideas from transactional analysis⁴ may be useful here, since intervention is a form of transaction. Transactional analysis aims to bring about transformation of individuals by moving them from acting out unquestioned scripts towards conscious choice, problem-solving and autonomy. Its ultimate aim is to help individuals recognise and change patterns of interaction based on dominance and submission and to work towards complementary and reciprocal relationships (I’m OK, You’re OK⁵).

The initial encounter between an intervener and the intervened upon may take place in a situation of acute crisis and therefore inevitably take the asymmetrical form of ‘victim–rescuer’ (I’m OK, you’re not OK) in which the latter is dependent. In times of military intervention into violent conflict or of famine relief, it may be undeniable that the intervened upon are dependent on interveners for their survival. This is ‘intervention’ in its lexical sense of ‘coming between so as to modify the ... course of events; ... come as an extraneous factor... [L *intervenire* as inter–, *venire* come]’ (Allen 1990). However, if the dynamics of the relationship persist, then both parties become locked into a fruitless cycle of co-dependence.

By contrast, if longer-term efforts to consolidate peace and development are framed in terms of ‘interaction’, in its lexical sense of ‘act[ing]

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⁴ Transactional analysis was developed by the Canadian psychiatrist, Dr Eric Berne, as an integrative approach to psychology and psychiatry. His seminal work *Games People Play*, published in 1964, spawned numerous subsequent works that popularised his core ideas.

⁵ This is the title of one of the popular self-help works written by Dr Thomas A. Harris in the wake of Berne’s writings.
reciprocally, act[ing] on each other’ (ibid.), we may come a closer to what Meas Nee seems to be preaching. In proposing to think of development work as interaction rather than intervention, I grant that both parties exercise agency. There may still be power differentials between them but these are not absolute; they may be affected by the nature and circumstances of the interaction.

Three points may be made about the capacity of practice to effect change in the system. Firstly, ‘[c]hange is largely a bi-product, an unintended consequence of action’ (Ortner 1984: 157); secondly, change that comes about over generations may not be appreciated in analyses of social reality that ignore history. Thirdly, a single action by an individual at the ‘right’ historical juncture may radically alter the course of history.

The voices of members of a small-scale NGO working in a remote part of Cambodia might at first glance appear insignificant against the Goliath of international and national intervention. For instance, in 2003 the Cambodian Ministry of the Interior declared that all civil society organisation activities ‘must have cooperation from provincial or municipal governors’ (AHRC 2009). In late September 2008, emboldened by a landslide electoral victory, a robust economy, increasing Chinese direct investment and the promise of oil and gas revenues, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen called for the revival of a controversial law which would require the country’s more than 2,000 associations and NGOs to complete a complex registration process and submit to stringent financial reporting requirements (Guthrie 2008). The government may thus be putting a straitjacket on the freedom of NGOs to voice criticism.

However, the power of history and happenstance should both be heeded. When AP photographer Nick Ut published his award-winning photograph of the naked, nine-year old Kim Phuc fleeing from napalm bombing in Vietnam in 1972, neither the little girl nor the photographer had any formal power to influence global politics. Yet the haunting photograph had a profound effect on public opinion in the United States; by ‘moving’ people, it moved history.

The power of an individual’s action lies in its resonance with the historical climate. When someone communicates their experience in ways that make others conscious of our shared human predicament, they sometimes change history. For this reason, all efforts to inform the world about people’s experience may have a great impact. The deciding factor is whether or not they are taken seriously.
The variables for development interventions are so complex and the vested interests so entrenched that outcomes are almost impossible to predict. Ultimately, no matter how rational and refined the intervention scheme, human development is always dependent on what is communicated between real people with feelings and desires.

**Conclusion**

The paradigm of intervention is the fruit of a particular cultural tradition and it is translated into action by people whose social positions in the global community privilege their neoliberal world order and eclipse alternatives. So although development intervention may be delivered in a pleasing rhetorical guise in practice it operates to ensure the supremacy of the interveners.

I suggest that we challenge this paradigm and make space for the experience that it eclipses. Instead of demanding that the people who are intervened upon internalise and adapt to fixed development models, interveners could engage in the transforming, self-critical process that interaction with others can enable.

Ironically, the everyday insecurities felt by people like rural Cambodians are often the direct result of intervention into their lives by aspiring national elites who profit from neoliberalism. I have suggested that even the lexical weight of the concept of intervention should alert us to the way it creates inequity. The ways in which people try to cope with such inequity should prompt social scientists and policy makers to listen with an open mind and to seek culturally sensitive understandings of security, wellbeing and development. I contend that we should try to understand people as far as possible on their own terms and as situated in the unfolding history in which we all participate. To do this requires a reflexive stance that relativises cosmopolitan understandings of development and security. A philosophical shift of this kind might open the way for genuine empowerment of local knowledge within global epistemology.

If the cosmopolitan worldview was refined by a more balanced engagement with other people’s experience, this would at least limit its hegemony and perhaps even provoke an epistemological revolution. Ordinary people’s feelings, common sense and ways of relating could be given as much value as the theoretical and political posturing of those who have their hands on the purse-strings. Each of us is, after all, responsible for deciding how to relate individual agency to the world order that we are collectively developing.
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Thinking and policy on ‘development’ and ‘security’ have undergone paradigmatic shifts in recent decades. The well-known merger of development and security into a ‘development-security nexus’ is now shifting towards an increasingly institutionalised securitisation. Security is everywhere, and development is security. A new discourse and practice is arising as the meaning of these concepts shift and the referents and objects of development and security are changing. Gradually we are moving beyond the development-security nexus into the reign of continuous global disaster management. These new articulations of the development-security nexus and global disaster management have served to legitimise a more radical interventionist agenda – first and foremost carried out by the West in the Global South.

With thought-provoking contributions by leading authorities in this burgeoning field, this volume makes sense of the aforementioned paradigmatic shift. The articles explore the rationale and forces behind the institutionalisation of interventionism and intrusive disaster management as well as the consequences thereof in a number of policy domains and cases.

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