



DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD FOUNDATION

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Report from the High-Level Seminar

‘ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT FOR BURMA’

Mae Sod, 8-12 January 2003

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Introduction

This report contains summaries of the presentations delivered at a high-level seminar for the leadership of the Burmese democracy movement. This seminar was held in Mae Sod, Thailand, on 8-12 January 2003, and organised by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation together with the United Nationalities League for Democracy–Liberated Areas (UNLD–LA) and the National Democratic Front (NDF), in collaboration with the National Reconciliation Program (NRP).

The seminar was the first in a series under the title of ‘Another Development for Burma’. The purpose of the seminar series is to present alternative perspectives on development and to give participants an opportunity to discuss important development issues beyond the immediate liberation struggle.

The seminar was attended by more than 30 participants, including international resource persons, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation staff, NRP coordinators and organising committee members. The following resource persons were invited to the seminar: Kjell-Åke Nordquist from the Peace and Conflict Research Department at Uppsala University, Walden Bello from Focus on the Global South in Bangkok/Manila, Sheila Coronel from Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism in Manila, and Emilia Pires from the Ministry of Planning and Finances of East Timor.

The seminar was structured around presentations and discussions on the nature of democratic transition, the role of media in strengthening democracy and public participation, and globalisation and economic development. The East Timor experience during transition and the post-transitional period, especially in dealing with international institutions, was given special attention.

The seminar was facilitated and chaired by Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, Teddy Buri and David Taw. The lectures were directly translated to Burmese by Dr. Naing Aung, Nyo Ohn Myint and Dr. Lian H Sakhong.

The presentations delivered at the seminar were: Kjell-Åke Nordquist: ‘*Priorities in Transition*’ and ‘*Post-Transitional Challenges*’, Walden Bello: ‘*International Institutions, Transnational Corporations and Globalisation – Future Challenges and Alternative Perspectives*’, Sheila Coronel: ‘*The Role of Media in the Struggle for Democracy*’, ‘*The Role of Media During Transition*’ and ‘*The Right to Know*’, Emilia Pires: ‘*Strategies for Development – Experiences from East Timor*’.

The views expressed in the presentations are the resource persons’ and not necessarily the views of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation. The summaries have been made by Cecilia von Otter at the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and are based on tape recordings made during the seminar.

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and 'Another Development'

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation was founded in 1961 after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld, the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, preceding U Thant of Burma. It has for more than 30 years worked in the area of alternative development, with an aim to examine mainstream development patterns and to highlight perspectives and solutions from, in particular, the South, the Third System (civil society) and marginalised groups. By bringing together progressive-minded people from different backgrounds, the Foundation's seminars seek to inspire alternative and innovative thinking on a broad range of issues.

The concept of 'Another Development' was formulated in the Dag Hammarskjöld Report *What Now – Another Development*. This document was the main result of the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Project on Development and International Cooperation, in which 120 leading policy-makers and scholars were involved. The report was submitted – as an independent contribution – to the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly and published in six of the world's major languages.

'Another Development', it was concluded by those involved in the project, 'is people-centred, geared to the satisfaction of basic human needs for all – both material and, in its broadest sense, political; it is self-reliant, endogenous, ecologically sound and based on democratic, political, social and economic transformations which alone will make possible the attainment of the other goals. Another development also encompasses the search for societies overcoming discrimination of any kind – be they social, sexual, ethnic or economic. It is a participatory and pluralistic process.'

Since *What Now*, the Foundation has concentrated on attempts to develop the sectoral aspects of alternative development strategies proposed in the 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report and integrate them in present development policies. These strategies have been elaborated in the Foundation's seminars on health, education, science and technology, genetic resources, biotechnology, information and communication, international monetary policy and disarmament.

Current focus

Currently, the Foundation is focusing its activities on three projects areas:

- A series of seminars exploring the societal and environmental implications of new technologies such as nanotechnology (A first international seminar was held in 2001, followed by regional seminars during 2001-2003).
- The seminar project Another Development for Burma, together with the Burmese democracy movement in exile, which aims to stimulate critical discussion on alternative development strategies for a future democratic Burma.
- The What Next project, which aims to take stock of the developments in the last quarter-century since 'What Now' and, more importantly, look for new, alternative visions and challenges. The purpose of the What Next project is to contribute to the identification, refinement and dissemination of new alternative visions that can have a real impact on the world in the years to come.

In addition, the Foundation is carrying on activities in several on-going projects, covering a wide range of issues.

Summary of presentations

'Priorities in Transition' and 'Post-Transitional Challenges'.

Kjell-Åke Nordquist

Peace and Conflict Research Department at Uppsala University

The first part of the presentation gives an overview of priorities and challenges in transitional periods in general. The second part poses some of the challenges that are common in post-transitional periods, such as the question of responsibility, war-reparation and rehabilitation. The last section contains a summary of the group discussions.

Priorities in transition

Every conflict has three components. These are *conflict issues*, *conflict behaviours* and *conflict attitudes*. They can influence each other, for example when we have a military operation (conflict behaviour) this may influence the other components by creating harder attitudes, thus constructing a vicious circle. In order to break the vicious circle we can act for change on any of the components. For a transition to take place we need change on all three components. A transition period is defined here as the period between the first establishment of a change order, when the main actors have decided for change, and the installation of the new order, for example a new constitution.

When we speak of priorities in transition, priorities are generally identified for three different reasons: They can be things that you do just because they are necessary and/or logical. Secondly, priorities can be normative, based on judgement or ideology. Thirdly, priorities can be based on limited resources, e.g. lack of people, limited competence, or economic constraints.

A structural view of transition dimensions

Most societies can be seen as having three structural levels: The top, the middle range and grass roots. Each of these levels have their leaders. The middle range leaders are strategically placed, they represent a group that provides the basis for recruitment to the top leaders, as they have access to both the top leaders and the grass root leaders. The middle range leaders are a natural link between top and grass roots. Grass root leaders make up the group with credible access to the majority of the population, a critical function in a democratic society. All the three levels are affected by a transitional process and should of course be part of it. Thus, movements such as the Burmese democracy movement need to address all three levels. It seems important that the democracy movement, being inside and outside of Burma, has connections to all levels in Burma since transition will take place on all levels of Burmese society.

Another challenge is to coordinate actions on all three levels. For the grass roots and middle levels to be inspired and optimistic about general developments they need information about top level developments. A strategic decision for a movement is whether to choose to work from a 'bottom-up' perspective or trying to reach the top level immediately. Or to work through both approaches.

When are counterparts likely to give up?

There is a concept trying to explain when parties are likely to start negotiating during a conflict situation. The situation is called a '*hurting stalemate*': If the counterpart is facing increasing costs for maintaining status quo and at the same time cannot change the situation to its advantage, then the most favourable situation is at hand for a rational counterpart to change its behaviour from violence to negotiation.

Ending a protracted civil war: A textbook example

The most critical dimensions of societies in a transitional period are the *security* and *political* dimensions. Along these dimensions are several aspects of transition that in theory may look well ordered. The first aspect reached in transition is the *fundamental agreement*. On the political dimension this means that the main political actors have agreed for major change. The talks preceding the fundamental agreement are usually a crucial accomplishment. For these talks to bear fruit one must consider who are the main actors needed for a fundamental agreement? The rule of thumb says anyone who could break the agreement should be part in forming the agreement. On the security dimension the fundamental agreement should mean that cease-fires are in place everywhere. If there is not security, people feel unsafe and might leave the process.

The second aspect in transition is the *preparation for a new government*. On the political dimension this usually brings some kind of transitional governmental structure. On the security dimension this usually includes the recruitment and training of a new police force and army.

The third aspect of a transition period brings the *installation of a political structure*: Elections and adoption of a new constitution on the political dimension. On the security dimension we can see the installation of new security forces, e.g. police and army.

The fourth aspect of a transition period concerns the *institutionalisation of new political structures*, on the political dimension a build-up of new government agencies and institutions while on the security dimension the new security forces are professionalised through training and education.

The fifth aspect of the transition regards *social and political trust-building*. On the political dimension this concerns whether the new structure is corrupt or not, if it is treating citizens fairly and equally. On the security dimension it is important that the new security forces respect the human rights and that the legal system is independent of the political system.

The final question for trust building in a society regards how the past can be understood: How to interpret the *common history of suffering*?

Three challenges in the process towards transition

- Are all organisations that have an interest in change and democratic development part of the movement for change and democratic transition? Or are there any 'free riders'? If so, how to deal with them?

- Strength in the struggle is created by the unity that comes from being together in the struggle. When a movement – in particular an umbrella movement – comes close to achieving its goal, there is a risk for disagreement about when to break up.

To identify together in advance what should be achieved before breaking up, and to stick to that, gives full strength to the movement up to the last moment of the struggle.

- A country needs a non-political space for self-reflection. In transition processes perspectives are easily lost, other groups' views are forgotten. But some issues are of national rather than of group/ethnicity interest and should be discussed as such. A 'Forum for Dialogue' can be effective in sorting out problems before they become serious political troubles.

Post-transitional challenges

Transition in Burma is something we, who want to see change in Burma, look forward to. That is an inside perspective. From the outside, a transitional period is looked upon very cautiously as a period of uncertainty. The transition period should ideally be relatively short; it should not become the 'normal' condition. We will now look into what happens after the transition period and what the major tasks a government will face then.

- *Normalisation.*

The international community will gradually de-prioritise your case. In order to avoid conflict when resources are decreasing, one thing is to agree on priorities as early as possible. An equally good way is to develop strategies of one's own and develop good relations with the international community and the donors thus preparing for the shift towards regular aid co-operation. The new government of Burma will have to live on its own financial basis, and now is the time to test this financial basis. The time after transition is also when Burma should create space for itself within the community of international institutions, deciding on its positions and creating a unique identity among the countries dealing with these institutions.

- *War-reparation.*

There will be a need to deal with the modern history of Burma and its implications on society. This is not really a part of the transition process because it takes years and years to do, and is thus rather a post-transitional challenge. Yet, one needs to prepare for these challenges early on: - Bringing back refugees and internally displaced persons.

- Rebuilding the infrastructure.
- Handling the psychological and social stress from violence and armed struggle.
- Reintegration of soldiers.

The former soldiers in the liberation army have usually been away from home for several years and have sacrificed much in their struggle. On a personal level they suffered greatly for this, and may lack education, job training, etc. They have a high moral standing, but at the same time they are unprepared, and unskilled for normal life. If this group is not supported it will be a problem. It is easy for them to pick up arms again.

The issue of responsibility

We said earlier that the three common components of conflicts are conflict issues, behaviour and attitudes. These are to be dealt with through various ways of conflict resolution, management of security issues in all parts of society, and through the

building of social trust. One question related to building social trust, that will come up during and after transition, is surely 'What happened?' Who will write the history of Burma? Will there be one common history book for all peoples of Burma or one each for the different states?

Maybe the most difficult question that comes up is the question of responsibility. Is there anyone responsible for what happened? There will be international views on responsibility, and maybe also internal views. There are several ways of dealing with the question of responsibility, social trust and reconciliation. Depending on whether one has a high or low moral focus and high or low legal focus, four different approaches can be outlined:

Moral Focus	Legal focus	
	Low	High
Low	Amnesty (e.g. Latin America)	Social pardon (e.g. Mozambique)
High	War crime tribunal (e.g. former Yugoslavia)	Truth commission (e.g. South Africa)

- *Amnesty*: In Latin America there has been a lot of amnesties. Before handing over power, it has been decided that no one can be brought to court for being responsible.

- *Social pardon*: An approach chosen by some countries in Africa, e.g. in Mozambique: How could the children that were recruited to be soldiers be reintegrated into their villages? They were brought back through a process of social pardon. A legal process was not relevant in their societies.

- *War-crime tribunal*: This is practised in Europe right now in the case of the wars in former Yugoslavia. It is only a legal process, no dimension of morality, social pardon or forgiveness.

- *Truth commission*: A construction like the one in South Africa. It is an attempt to combine morality and legality: 'If you tell the truth you will get amnesty, if you take responsibility we will not bring you to court'.

Which way to choose is really in the heart of each country's minds and traditions, although international law tries to be universal and has clear opinion on responsibility. Handling the question of responsibility should be done so that it doesn't threaten the overall process. There will always need to be compromises, and there is a word for what we talk about: *Transitional justice*. Democracy is the fundamental issue, and therefore these other aspects should not be allowed to harm the democratisation process.

Summary of group discussions

One group discussed the need to formulate an anti-military common strategy that is accepted by all opposition groups. There needs to be increased international pressure. Attempts should focus on creating more space for political parties inside Burma to be operative. The international community needs to be convinced that the military regime is not capable of governing Burma. The military regime must be weakened through economic and diplomatic sanctions, as well as increased military activities from armed opposition groups. Lobbying at the UN should aim to elevate the Burma issue to the Security Council level. One proposal on how to create a widened space inside Burma was that the leader of the opposition could come up with specific areas for dialogue, and thus force the SPDC to react to her specific suggestions.

The proposal from the UN Special Envoy on Burma for a 'National Convention' can be viewed as an opportunity for an offensive measure. Instead of thinking only of the former, failed National Convention, why don't we, the opposition, come up with a proposal of the preparations and proceedings for a Convention instead? It would put the ball in the right court.

Considering the normalisation of economic life in a democratic Burma, the groups believed that the economy needs to be agriculture-based. In addition, ecologically sound tourism can be promoted and investment from abroad invited. Burma is still rich in natural resources from which income for the state can be generated. Burma will probably engage in bilateral aid and loans. The current taxation laws also need to be reviewed and amended. Maybe experts and foreign government officials could be invited to come and help set up the taxation system.

'International Institutions, Transnational Corporations and Globalisation – Future Challenges and Alternative Perspectives'. *Walden Bello*

Focus on the Global South

The first part of the presentation concerns the global economic system and the globalised economy. The second part gives a brief description of the history and structure of the main international financial institutions, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, and of ASEAN. The third part of the presentation outlines a possible alternative path for the development of Burma. The last part contains a summary of the group discussions.

The global economic system: Main characteristics and weaknesses

The last fifty years of international politics are commonly divided into first the time of the Cold War, and then the post-Cold War period from 1989 and onwards. However, in terms of the global economy, the same period can roughly be divided into the 'pre-globalisation era' running from the late 1940s until around 1980, followed by the 'era of globalisation' from 1980 up to today. A general description of the pre-globalisation era would be an era of national capitalism under the hegemony of the US. The pre-globalisation economies of the North, or the 'developed' countries, could be seen to have the following characteristics:

- Dominance of monopoly capital.
- A strong role for state regulation in terms of governing the market.
- Social compromise between labour and capital.

Looking at the developing countries, one term coined to describe these economies is 'State assisted capitalist regimes'. Several major characteristics are:

- The dominant classes in society were the landed elite and a financial and commercial bourgeoisie, allied to the northern capital.
- The economies were undertaking import-substituting industrialisation: Production in order to fill domestic demand, using very high import tariffs and strict quotas against imports.
- Whatever the political colour of government, the State was very important in all dimensions of economic life – from production to exchange and distribution.

Turning to the era of globalisation, from around 1980 onwards, the main characteristics are:

- Rapid liberalisation of international trade and dismantling of protectionist walls protecting national industries.
- Rapid liberalisation of financial flows: lifting of barriers restricting financial flows.
- Liberalisation of flows of direct investment.
- Continuing very tight restrictions imposed on the mobility of labour.

In the developing countries in particular, this liberalisation of trade, financial flows and investment took place under what was called programmes of *structural adjustment*. Structural adjustment took place both in the North and the South. In the North it was known as Reaganism/Thatcherism - dismantling the role of welfare state to move the state away from an interventionist role and to end the compromise between labour and capital to the advantage of capital. In the South

structural adjustment of the state assisted capitalist regimes was made possible by the debt crisis in the early 1980s. Many of them could not pay their loans due to the heavy borrowing before the early 1980s and needed access to international financial institutions to be able to repay the commercial creditors. The US, working through the IMF and the World Bank demanded far-reaching reforms in these economies in order for them to get access to new money. These structural adjustment reforms had three parts:

- Drastic liberalisation of trade.
- Drastic de-regulation was made in an effort to minimise state intervention in production, exchange and distribution.
- The move of economic activities that before belonged to the state sector to the private sphere, through the dismantling of state enterprises.

It was the weakest region in the South – Africa and Latin America –that suffered the most from structural adjustment. This period in Africa and Latin America was marked by economic stagnation, rapidly increasing inequality and growing proportions of the populations falling under poverty line.

There was one area of the world that was an exception to this process: East and Southeast Asia, the so called ‘Tiger economies’. The structures of these economies were similar to Latin America, characterised by state intervention and protectionism. In addition, however, the Tigers had launched an export drive, heavily subsidised by the governments. The Tigers were aggressive exporters of labour-intensive products and later also of capital-intensive manufactured goods to the northern markets. There came a backlash on the Tigers with northern economies imposing increasing restrictions on imports from East and Southeast Asia. The reason the Tigers managed to resist the pressure to undergo free market reforms in the 1980s was mainly due to an inflow of Japanese capital. The increased comparative value of the Japanese yen in 1985, after the US and its European partners had forced a Japanese revaluation, had made it expensive for Japanese companies to produce at home and turned them to the relatively cheap labour in China, Taiwan and South Korea.

In 1990 the level of Japanese investment was tapering off but at the same time in the North, due to the developments during the Reagan and Thatcher era, there was large capital flows and speculative funds seeking quick and great short-term profit. Owing to the pressure exerted by these funds, the treasury of the US and the IMF, the governments in Southeast Asia de-regulated or minimised state intervention and removed regulations on inflow of capital. Between 1994 and 1997 100 billion dollars of speculative capital flowed into the region and into sectors like real estate, stock market and land. Large sums were concentrated in few sectors, creating over-supply which led to a collapse of these sectors. There was an economic dislocation and panic of investors. In the summer of 1997 currency speculators took advantage of the situation in order to make profit: 100 billion dollars left the region leading to economic collapse. Borrowers could not repay their loans and instead the governments had to nationalise, and take over, their loans. The governments lacked resources to do this so the IMF came up with ‘rescue packages’ containing similar structural adjustment reforms as earlier in Africa and Latin America. The one area of the world that had escaped structural adjustments was brought in line.

Globalisation and liberalisation is often argued in economic language, with claims that the market left alone will manage distributing wealth to all and lead to more prosperity. It is important to realise, however, that this really is an ideological argument. Whose interests are served by the ideology?

International financial institutions: How do they function and what is their impact on the South? IMF, World Bank, WTO and ASEAN

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

The initial function of IMF in the post-war period was to make rates of exchange between different currencies stable. This system was based on the value of gold, thus linking the value of the dollar (in effect the world's reserve currency) to a certain volume of gold. In 1972, the US President Richard Nixon cut the link between the dollar and gold and inaugurated a world of freely floating currencies. The IMF lost its original function but acquired a new role. Countries importing more than the value of their export have currency account deficits and have to borrow money from the outside banks or international institutions. The IMF would make sure developing countries maintained discipline over trade or currency accounts. The IMF could take up this role because of its ability to make emergency stability loans.

In the 1980s IMF expanded its range of activities to become the main implementing agent of comprehensive structural reform, pushing for liberalisation, deregulation and comprehensive privatisation. Structural adjustment went to the very core of the way societies function, requiring fundamental micro- and macro-economic policy changes.

In the 1990s IMF acquired yet another major function after pressure from the US government: The deregulation of capital, i.e. to make comprehensive capital liberalisation, capital account liberalisation, and to remove the flows of capital restriction.

World Bank

In the 1950s the World Bank was changed from a reconstruction agency for war-torn Europe into a development agency through which resources would be flowing from North to South. In the World Bank the North has majority due to a system of capital subscriptions, where voting power is based on the capital paid to the World Bank.

In the late 1960s and 1970s there was a huge expansion in the aid budget of the World Bank as it took on comprehensive projects for development. Since most of the World Bank aid went through governments, right-wing, free market proponents who came to power in the US in the 1980s began to question the World Bank – some even wanting to abolish it– because it was seen as strengthening states and creating opportunities for socialism. In the end the Bank was saved by the introduction of structural adjustment programmes allowing it to change its' role and instead become a force for liberalisation.

World Trade Organization (WTO)

The WTO was supposed to be born already in 1948, but did not come into being until over 50 years later, in 1995. In the meantime the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was in existence but with weak powers of implementation. In early 1980s when the US economy had become more dependent on trade and needed export markets, the idea of a stronger organisation for governing trade was brought back into life. In an eight-year process of negotiation – called the Uruguay round – the WTO was created. Under WTO quantitative restrictions were outlawed and had to be changed into tariffs.

WTO covers wide areas, including trade in agriculture and trade in services (from providing water to education services). It also goes beyond trade into so called trade-related issues, such as:

- Trade related investment measures (TRIMs)
- Trade related property rights (TRIPs)

According to the TRIMs agreement it is no longer possible to set up local content quotas. These measures cannot be taken in order to industrialise. The TRIPs agreement aims to control the spread of technology (especially to countries in Asia) by enforcing strict patent rules. TRIPs is outlawing industrialisation by imitation. It is revolutionary because it restricts the natural spread of knowledge.

From the point of view of developing countries the agreement on agriculture is the most important. It is highly protectionist of European and US market while opening the markets of developing countries for dumping of agricultural surplus.

WTO is supposed to be governed through 'one country, one vote'. Decision making in practice is limited to the four big powers plus another 17-18 countries. Only a few countries are invited to the so called 'the green room process' where the actual negotiations take place.

ASEAN

The tragedy of ASEAN is that the economic project is always subordinated by the political. It was built as an anticommunist formation. There are underlying strategic differences within ASEAN. Some countries (Indonesia, Malaysia) have seen the creation of free trade among ASEAN members as a model to recreate the previous 'Tiger' system among ASEAN members, while others (e.g. Singapore) have seen it as a prelude to international free-trade. The regional integration project of ASEAN has seen the creation of AFTA (Asia Free Trade Area) but there is currently no real effort to make AFTA come true.

An equally fundamental problem of ASEAN is that the people do not feel part of the project. It remains the project of the political and technocratic elites and has not been democratised. Whilst ASEAN has been wasting its time other regional projects have come true and China has risen to a real global economic powerhouse. The question for ASEAN countries is: Are we turning into a dumping ground for China's produce? A regional economic institution like ASEAN is needed, but without drastic reform ASEAN is useless!

What could be an alternative path for Burma? What are crucial choices to make?

Burma has 'the advantage of being late'. It is important to examine the development model that has been pushed on the countries in the South for the last 25 years:

- Globalised production: Our economies are being integrated into global systems of integrated production and integrated markets.
- Neo-liberal policies: Liberalisation of trade, de-regulation and privatisation.
- Export orientation: Export markets are seen as engines of production, not domestic demand.

- Foreign capital dependent: Foreign capital is seen as the strategic factor in development.
- Debt-driven: The dynamics of export oriented neo-liberal growth have made our economies become heavily indebted to IMF, the World Bank and commercial banks and private speculative funds.
- Natural resource intensive: Forces us to become competitive and focus on the extraction of natural resources since this is an area where we are supposed to have comparative advantage.
- Labour-intensive: Industrialisation is focused on labour-intensive areas like manufacturing. We have also become labour-exporting economies to regions lacking people, but the capital-rich.
- The subordination of agriculture to industry, and of countryside to urban areas. The idea is 'industry first', leading to stagnated agriculture.

The question to pose is: Do we want to recreate this structure in the future Burma? Planning must be the central activity of the authorities of a developing country, deciding what the objectives of the economic policies should be. Equity? The preservation of community? To have a pattern of development that is not disruptive? Balanced development? Planning means using the market as a tool, controlled and subordinated to basic values and our objectives. Economics is an intensely political process: Who gets what, how, and why? Economics used to be called political economy. Economics today has moved into a highly mathematic, theoretical practice. Economic collapse occurs because we have put economists in charge of the economy, not realising that economics is a highly political issue! There are some key issues the political leadership must arrive at some sort of decisions on:

- Balance between market and state.
- Balance between agriculture and industry. Should agriculture be the lead industry?
- Asset and income redistribution.
- Trade policy for development and industrialisation. Should you use tariffs and quotas to promote your industry? Remember: If you do you will be in conflict with the WTO.
- Subsidiarity: Making production stay at the local level when this is possible, realising the continuing importance of de-centralised production.
- Ecology and community: Putting development ahead of ecological equilibrium is short term, if you do it will destroy your development.

For Burma in particular:

- How should production take place in a federal union? What sorts of economic co-operation, technical co-operation, trade relations should be in place to avoid that some parts of the union develops at the expense of others?
- How will a democratic Burma relate to the multilateral agencies like WTO, IMF, the World Bank?

Summary of group discussions and questions/comments

The participants asked how land and property can be integrated in the national economy. Mr Bello meant that this was an issue regarding what kind of ownership should be integrated in the economy. The most commonly found systems of ownership are state ownership and management, private corporations, cooperatives, community ownership and transnational corporations. All these systems can be integrated into the economy, the issue is how to organise it, the legal forms and political decisions on the extent of the role they are allowed to take.

The participants asked for more explanation of how to balance agriculture and industry and the characteristics of agro-based industrialisation. According to Mr Bello, the development of agriculture, land reform and income distribution are key issues. A question is how to sustain this as a stimulus for industrialisation. Creating demand will not do it alone, at some time there is a need for huge sums of investment capital. One way of getting capital is through foreign capital, borrowing, which will get you into debt. Another is to establish efficient taxation practices with taxation gathering income and transforming income into investments. It looks the best, but you will need to tax everybody, including the rich. Asian states have generally been unable to follow effective taxation practices.

'The Role of Media in the Struggle for Democracy', 'The Role of Media During Transition' and 'The Right to Know'. *Sheila Coronel*

Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism

The first part of the presentations concerns the role of media in fighting for change, giving examples from other countries in Southeast Asia. The second part concerns the role of the media in the post-transitional situation. The third part of the presentation is about the Right to Information. Practical advice and examples on information and media legislation and media codes of conduct are given in the fourth section. The last section contains a summary of the group discussions.

The Role of Media in the Struggle for Democracy

All forms of authoritarian rule have monopoly of power and information. Such monopoly can be in the hands of a junta or of a single person, when, for example, a dictator has the right to decide what information the citizens should get. The fall of dictatorships starts with a fragmentation of power and information control. Increasingly there will be groups in society challenging the dictatorship's control of information. We have seen that in transition both in Indonesia and in Philippines: The seeds of free press are sown before the fall of dictatorship. Repressive governments, dictatorships, hold on to information because once people have information, once information is shared, then they are in real trouble. Information allows informed discussion and debate. People know what is going on in their country and they can then debate and oppose what the government wants them to do. Information makes possible active citizen participation and inspires people to organise themselves for collective action.

There are several ways that authoritarian regimes control information:

- Censorship and other laws restricting media freedoms and the freedom of citizens to obtain information.
- Ownership of newspapers, TV and radio stations and other information outlets.
- Restricting citizens' access to information media.
- Information ministries that keep a close watch on the media and instruct them what should be reported.
- Intimidation, imprisonment and murder of recalcitrant journalists, writers, artists, citizens and ban on publications, programmes, books, etc.

In Southeast Asia the press and other media have played a key role in both anti-colonial and pro-democracy struggles by:

- Exposing the excesses and abuses of ruling regimes, talking about corruption and abuses of human rights.
- Promoting alternatives to the ruling government.
- Publicising the successes of social and political movements challenging the regime, strengthening the opposition by persuading other people to join.
- Keeping members of the opposition in touch with each other and with their membership and constituencies.
- Providing outlets for the anger of citizens. Especially in interactive media like websites and call-in programmes. People can also express their anger *at* the media.

Lessons learnt from Indonesia, the Philippines and Cambodia

- Free and democratic media do not automatically emerge during the transition just because you change regimes.
- Democratic institutions emerge much more easily if free media help develop and inspire public opinion.
- Independent media can only emerge and be a positive force if the community support and value the media's role. For example, in Cambodia there was little community support for a free press. People were more concerned about survival and it mattered little to them whether the press was free or not.

The role of the media during transition

Transition periods are usually very fragile, it is the time when the balance of power that will emerge in society is decided. During this period the media plays a very important role in providing information about the transition mechanisms, what is taking place, how the various sectors of society are working together. It also plays an important role in educating the public on such issues as citizenship: What are their rights and obligations as citizens of a democracy? The media is important in educating the public on the new structures of government, on the new ways of participating in government and new ways in which government is trying to relate to people.

Media is a watchdog of the government even at this early period: Is the new government doing a good job in setting up new structures that could allow for example the maximum participation of citizens? Are the new policies being implemented the right policies? Media should also already during transition provide various sectors of society such as the different ethnic groups, women, with a sense that their views are represented in the public sphere. In transition it is important to build social trust among groups in society. The media should help the different groups communicate, settle and reconcile their differences. There have been cases when media has been a negative and destructive force in building democracy. One way the media can create divisions in society is through hate speech, pitting one group against the other, repeating and encouraging historical biases, encouraging people to fight rather than reconciling their differences. Another way the media has been a destructive force is by keeping groups away from discussion in the public sphere through exclusion, e.g. special groups who have traditionally not been represented continue not to have a voice in the media. These can be indigenous peoples in the case of countries where there is a very strong centre. If the sentiments of these excluded groups are not heard in the media or are not taken up in the public sphere these groups resort to violent or destructive ways and methods so that they will be heard. Sometimes the media supports groups that are anti-democratic. For example the remnants of the military in Burma can still support newspapers and radio stations to destabilise the new regime.

Sometimes the media because of the lack of professional training or because of the need to sell newspapers provides incomplete, sensationalised or wrong information that adds to confusion in society. The transitional period is usually a time where there are so many rumours and uncertainty and the media can help fuel this uncertainty by providing incomplete or sensational information.

The right to know and the right to information

The right to know is a right individuals have, it is not something the governments can choose to give or to withdraw as they please. It is part of the universal declaration of human rights, like the right to free speech and the right to life. The right to be informed mainly concerns the right of citizens to be informed of the activities of government whether those activities are in the past, in the present or being planned for the future. Increasingly many democratic states around the world recognise the right of citizens to be informed. And they see it is a valuable right not only for the citizens but also for themselves. That is why all over the world now there are something like 44 countries that have a 'Freedom of information act' or laws guaranteeing access to information.

Democratic governments are recognising that providing access to information helps them govern well. If they know how the government budget is being spent and how much should go to each district, then citizens can see for themselves if public funds are indeed being used to purposes for which they are intended. Unless people know they cannot watch what government is doing.

Information also allows for intelligent discussion and debate. If people don't have the facts they cannot discuss intelligently and the level of discussion will consist mainly of ill-informed attacks and the exchange of biases. Armed with facts, public discussion can be more intelligent. There can be sober debate about what, for example, should be the priorities of a society. In this sense information empowers citizens.

The right to information also helps protect other rights, like land rights or the right to free expression. Without the right to information, enforcement of other rights is difficult. For example: Land rights. There are a lot of displaced farmers in the Philippines and just like in Burma many of them don't have the papers to say that this land is theirs. Unless they know that there are laws, that they can go to courts and the other ways they can assert their right to their land, they cannot act on their rights. So the right to information is often a precondition to exercising other rights.

A lot of multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank, are promoting the right to information because of economic efficiency. They claim businesses work better in a free market if there is also a free market of information.

Mechanisms to ensure access to information

There are several ways to ensure access to information and to promote a free press in the democratic regime that will be established. The examples given are based on experiences from other countries in Southeast Asia that have undergone a democratic transition.

- Reforming the constitution so that it allows for the recognition of the right to information.
- Reforming the existing laws, discarding the repressive laws of the former regime and making new laws guaranteeing free press and the right to information.
- Reforming the structure and organisation of the media.
- Reforming the bureaucracy so that it becomes more open and collects and organises information so that it is easily accessible and eventually made available to citizens.
- Reforming the courts to ensure they uphold the right to information. The right itself is nothing if you cannot seek protection for that right in the courts.

- Reforms aimed at empowering civil society. Who will exercise the right to information? It's not just media but also ordinary citizens, community groups, NGOs and social movements will have to demand information.

Limitations on the freedom of the media

As you all know Burma has a legacy of repressive laws, laws to restrict flows of information and freedom of speech dating back to the colonial era. It will be tempting for a new government to keep some of the laws to protect itself - tempting because probably the situation will not be stable and it might want to retain some of these laws as a protective measure. It is important to know that legislation all over the world recognises the right of the state to protect itself and the rights of individuals. Existing liberal legislation allows for such protection as long as the threat is imminent. Rights are not absolute. The only guideline is that the limitations need to be very specific rather than broad so that they are not abused. Examples of such limitations are:

- Protection of legitimate national security interests. This is valid if the security of the state is threatened and the threat is imminent.
- Withholding information if it may affect law-enforcement activities.
- Protection of privacy and individual reputation.
- Prevention of public disorder.

Guidelines for access to information legislation

- Information access should be applied to all public institutions. Most countries have exceptions, for example in Thailand there is a 75 years information ban on the royal family. But these exceptions should be kept narrow.
- Access should be not just to government records but also to government proceedings and to institutions like the courts. There should be access to information on institutional processes.
- Access to information also means there should be reasonable costs for example to make photocopies of the relevant material.

Legal reforms needed to ensure free flow of information

- To dismantle mechanisms of information control of the previous government.
- To enact a new regulatory framework, laws or mechanisms, to regulate ownership, content, distribution, and the professional activity of journalists.

One of the most important issues that has to be settled is: Who will own the media?

There are three general types of media ownership: State owned and controlled media, public service media (funded from government or government revenues, but independent from the government) and privately owned media. In many countries there is a mix of all types. But which type will be dominant is up to the new government to decide. Whatever the ownership pattern the ideal is to have multiple autonomous and independent media outlets at national, regional and local levels. There should be a competitive media, meaning no monopolies in content or distribution, certainly not a government monopoly. The media should express a range of views.

The media should be made accessible to the majority of people, if not to all. This means building for example an infrastructure of transmitters so that radio and TV

can reach all. This is very important since disparities in power and wealth can be compounded if there is also disparity in information access.

Ways of guaranteeing a diversity of voices in media

In a country like Burma, where there are many nationalities, it is very important that the various peoples are well represented in the media. There are several ways to regulate media to ensure that diversity of voices, views and nationalities are heard:

- Subsidies, providing printing presses, building infrastructure and financial subsidies.
- Special taxes to support the media. E.g., in order to own a TV-set you should pay a tax to support the small media rather than the big.
- Dividing franchises and licenses, especially in broadcasting. You can have a policy where franchises are distributed among various nationalities and communities so that the central government and their allies don't control all.
- Regulate advertising. In many countries government advertisements is a major source of revenue for the media. There can be a law to ensure that advertisement is evenly distributed among national, regional and local media.
- Infrastructure support, providing TV-sets to communities to increase the audience and make media more viable to advertisers
- Provision of airtime or space for special groups, ethnic minorities, women.
- Rule of law. To make sure that laws enacted are also enforced. You need courts to protect media's right to obtain and report information and citizens access to information.
- Within media there should be self-regulatory mechanisms so that journalistic abuses can be corrected without limiting journalistic freedoms. The idea is that journalists themselves have mechanisms to correct ethical lapses or unprofessional conduct without the state interfering. Here media watchdogs, journalist associations, individuals and even NGOs can play a role.

Summary of group discussions

The participants viewed the current situation of the Burmese media as dismal on the inside, while rather satisfactory on the outside, along the border. They ruled out the use of new information technology while acknowledging a need to improve the competence of minority group, as well as generally in the field of audio-visual media. In the beginning of the tripartite dialogue there should be an agreement on how the state media can provide airtime for discussion on the dialogue process. Once there is democratic rule, the restrictive laws and decrees of the former regime should be repealed. The right to information should be clearly inscribed in the new constitution.

The participants stressed the importance of promoting local, regional and ethnic language media. When there is a federal state structure, there will be state governments that should support independent public service media. Franchises and licenses should be distributed to ethnic language media. Infrastructure support is needed to ensure that even remote areas have access to the media. The economic viability of local and regional media should be enhanced either directly through subsidies, or through taxation and advertisement revenues.

Concerns were raised about the role of the media linked to the opposition in the time of struggle and afterwards. Ms Coronel stressed the importance of allowing criticism: the opposition organisations need criticism and feedback from their constituents. There should be a balance between criticism and the reporting on accomplishments. Once a democratic regime is in place, a solution based on self-regulation is advisable rather than laws and regulations. The media themselves should construct codes of conduct and press councils, to minimise abuses of media freedom. The limitations on media freedom aimed at protecting e.g. national security interests or privacy and individual reputation need to be very specific so that they are not misused.

'Strategies for Development – Experiences from East Timor'

Emilia Pires

Ministry of Planning and Finances of East Timor

The first part of the presentation concerns the preparations before East Timor gained independence. It is followed by a description of the process behind the National Development Plan, a plan establishing the East Timorese priorities in development that was evolved through a participatory process. Thereafter is a section giving some recommendations for Burma based on experiences from East Timor. The last section contains a summary of the group discussions.

The process of establishing a development strategy

Preparing for transition

During the 25 years of struggling for independence, preparing East Timorese people for the future was not among the priorities of the independence movement. At the top of the movement there was a small political group, especially in the diaspora, and below a large group of grassroots followers, particularly inside East Timor. Although there was a growing number of technical and professional East Timorese during this period, they were not actively brought into the resistance movement. Only in April 1998, the umbrella organisation National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) was formed under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao, bringing together all the different groups who promoted independence for East Timor. It was at this point that concrete changes started to take place for the better.

In October 1998, Xanana Gusmao, imprisoned in Jakarta, appealed to all the East Timorese people, particularly the intellectuals and professionals, to start thinking of the future development for East Timor. Xanana wanted this group of people from all over the world to come together and prepare a development plan for the country, should it become independent. There was also international concern that perhaps East Timor had not enough human resources to ensure its viability as an independent nation.

Two conferences were organised outside East Timor, which produced a strategic development plan for the future development of the country. Unfortunately neither of the two processes managed to build the necessary trust required between the political and technical groups to ensure that the former accepted the blueprint as a common strategic document for the country. Without such a strategic plan, the influence of East Timorese as a whole, on the country's reconstruction process and establishment of institutions once independence was granted, would be limited.

Once the Indonesians left the country and the International Community took over, the reconstruction process began without strong guidance from the East Timorese. The World Bank came in to organise the inflow of aid. Although efforts were made to ensure the participation of the East Timorese in all these processes, the lack of organisation and coordination between the political and technical groups on the side of the East Timorese ensured that we were mostly followers. Development priorities were decided but not in a systematically consensual and coordinated fashion. Many of the East Timorese, particularly the politicians, failed to understand that even though the first few years were mainly addressing emergency and

reconstruction issues, decisions were been made that set the directions for the future development of the country.

By 2001 it was clear that a plan was needed to ensure that everyone was working towards the same goals. Together with the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) the East Timorese established a 'Planning Commission'. To ensure everyone's participation and Timorese ownership, the commission was composed of five people from the transitional government (which was an all Timorese government) lead by the Chief Minister himself, and five people from civil society lead by Xanana Gusmao (at that time not yet President). The intention was to make the process East Timorese and all inclusive. There was also a need to bring in the other players who did not fit in the above categories such as donors and the private sector. Ensuring the Donors involvement right from the early stage increased the chance of the Plan being financed, given that East Timor was not yet in a position to finance it with its own limited resources.

In order to make the planning process an easy one, so that everyone could understand and participate, only four questions were asked to be addressed:

- *Where are we?*

To address this question which was to enable us to understand the current conditions of the country, we undertook three exercises: Firstly, an evaluation of what had happened during the period between 1999 and 2001 was conducted by eight inter-ministerial working groups, made up of senior public servants and each led by a Minister. The results of this evaluation were then reported in a document called The State of the Nation.

Secondly, a nation-wide poverty assessment was carried out through a joint survey with support from four development partners: World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). We were able to determine East Timor's Poverty Line through this process and at the same time identified that 41% of our people lived under that Poverty Line which was established at 0.55c per day.

Thirdly, a National Human Development Report with UNDP's support was undertaken, giving opportunity to compare East Timor's Human Development Index with other 161 countries which undertake a similar exercise. It was the first time that data was gathered to give the real picture of the situation in East Timor. Future allocation of resources would be prioritised on the basis of these data. We tried to be as objective as possible with the questions asked in the survey so as to ensure a depoliticised process, thus creating possibilities of consensus on the plan.

- *Where do we want to go?*

A countrywide consultation process was undertaken to formulate a common vision and to ensure that everyone felt that the process belonged to all, not just the government. Workshops were organised in all of the five hundred villages in East Timor and the villagers were asked: What kind of East Timor did they want to see in 2020? What were their three top priorities? On each of the identified priorities the villagers were asked follow-up questions such as: What problems needed to be overcome for them to achieve their vision? How can these problems be solved? What could they do themselves to help solve them? What can civil society do? What can the private sector do? What can the government do? This exercise was

important not only because we were going to formulate the national vision for the country but development priorities were also going to be set. It needed everyone's agreement so as to ensure smoother implementation of future programs. To change them one would need to go back to the people. In this way, arguments among the top leadership would be minimized as the people had already spoken. In East Timor the priorities determined were primary education, basic health care, agriculture (irrigation) and infrastructure.

- How do we get there?

This question was mainly addressed by having the technical people working on a five year plan through which our goals would be reached. The 2020 national vision and sector priorities established through the countrywide consultation gave the broad framework for the technical people to draw up strategies and policies which became a part of the National Development Plan. There were also parallel consultations with the private sector, NGOs, political parties, and other interested groups. The Plan and the Budget were adopted with consensus by the National Parliament. The International Community also gave its full support. The Plan now works as the main coordinating tool the Government uses in its contacts with the donors and other development partners. Only proposals for projects which support the strategies contained in the Plan are accepted. However, there are still a number of issues to be dealt with in trying to implement the Plan. We have not got enough human resources who are able to translate the strategies and policies into concrete proposals of programmes and projects.

- How do we measure our progress?

The process of measuring progress is going on right now in East Timor. We are working on setting up the appropriate targets based from the data collected and taking into consideration of what we want to achieve in the five year period with the limited technical and financial constraints.

How to pursue an alternative development agenda: Lessons learnt and recommendations

The negotiation process

One very important lesson we learnt was that it is very important for the leadership to be united. They must at least have some preliminary discussions among themselves, reach some consensus before deciding to receive representatives from the International Financial Institutions like the World Bank, ADB, IMF.....etc. We observed often how we were approached on numerous occasions with huge documents all written in a language which we could not understand and asked to make some decisions within very limited time. Very often the leadership had no technical advice and therefore no clue on what they were being asked to decide upon.

Practical recommendations:

- If you are asked to receive a representative of any IFIs, or bilateral donors, you must always be accompanied by your relevant technical staff and legal people.
- Ask that you are given the relevant documentation a few days in advance, in a language that your people understand, to allow them to study it and advise you on its contents. The documents should always be brief. Ideally what comes to

you should really be no longer than 2 or 3 pages. It should be an executive summary of the main document.

- Ensure you have sufficient time to discuss the document with your technical people before discussing it with the representatives of the donor community.

Human resources

The East Timorese made a human resource survey to find all its technical persons living outside East Timor. These technical people were aware of what had happened in other countries and so they worked towards ensuring that similar things would not happen to East Timor. Nonetheless, we still failed at ensuring we kept our best people. We faced situations of lack of local capacity to deal with a generous international community which for a number of reasons including that of sustainability felt that everyone should be paid at the same level. Obviously this did not attract the Timorese in the diaspora and gradually we lost most of our talented people who returned to their host countries because they were not able to sustain themselves and their families in two different countries. These technical people could have played an important and critical role in fulfilling the roles of senior managers while others were sent abroad for training.

The lack of senior managers is now a very clearly identified problem within the administration which is trying to address it. Nonetheless, the current way we are addressing the problem will not be sustainable for the country. What we are doing is sending some East Timorese on scholarships to be trained outside the country and meanwhile we fill in the positions where we lack human resources with foreign technical assistance. It is a very expensive method and not sustainable. What we really should do is to try to recruit our own people, be them from whatever political party or coming from whatever country. In recognition for their skills and professionalism, they should be rewarded accordingly, which would still never be as much as what a foreign expert would charge.

Practical recommendations

- Identify your best people and invest in them.
- Ensure public service is de-politicised and served with the best of professionals, no matter which political party they come from. Reward them accordingly.
- There should be trust between technical people and politicians. There is a high risk that politicians will trust the international experts more.
- Ensure different perspectives are represented. Don't narrow yourself to the people from your own political parties. Use all available resources.
- To avoid educated locals being absorbed by the international institutions and NGOs: Make an agreement with international organisations to set the same wages for all local staff.

Planning and coordination:

It is crucial that planning and coordination between the different donors are in the hands of the government. Coordination can easily be done by e.g. the World Bank but don't rely on them to do this! Develop your own policy in dealing with different donors and institutions. It is a big challenge to assure that grants are really spent in the country. Usually a lot is spent on technical assistance, meaning pay for their consultants and then the money goes out.

Practical recommendations

- Establish a unit within government for planning and coordination. Choose your best human resources with excellent negotiation skills and whom you trust to work there.
- Maintain good and close relations with all donors and ensure good knowledge of donors' systems and procedures. This way your people will be able to get information from the donors and to recommend you which donors to turn to for different projects.
- Develop a good database to track and capture the aid flow and output in the country. Otherwise there will be duplications.
- Ensure capacity-building in projects. Make explicit demands for what you want to be part of the projects.
- Ensure job-creation in projects. Sometimes a project can be done slow but labour-intensive, or fast with big machinery. You need to balance this. The decision is yours.

Summary of group discussions

The participants asked questions regarding how the citizens were persuaded to join in national planning. Ms Pires explained that in East Timor they had gone through the positive elements in society and used media to communicate the importance of participating now when the country had gained independence. In the consultations at the village workshops, results from e.g. the poverty assessment study were presented so that all would understand the current situation. The results from the consultation have been fed back to the people through e.g. booklets.

The participants acknowledged the importance of recruiting good human resources but also saw the potential conflict between politicians and the technical people. Ms Pires explained that East Timor had lost many of their capable technical staff due to the conditions they were asked to work under and the pay they were offered. Many expatriates didn't stay even if they at first had tried to come back. A good technical person is someone who is able to balance the system, who is open to all ideas and can communicate both with the politicians and the administrators. A good technocrat should not be visible. These people are rather scarce and therefore you need to pay them well to keep them working for you.

Programme

High-level seminar on ‘Another Development for Burma’

Organised by NDF, UNLD–LA and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
in collaboration with the National Reconciliation Programme

Wednesday, January 8

09.00 – 10.30	Welcome Introduction of participants
10.30 – 11.00	Coffee break
11.00 – 12.30	The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, ‘Another Development’ and background to the project <i>Olle Nordberg and Niclas Hällström</i> Presentation of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation to provide an understanding of the concept of ‘Another Development’ and an overview of the Foundation’s areas of work. Introduction of the background to and general ideas of the project ‘Another Development for Burma’.
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch

Theme I: Priorities in Transition

Resource person: Kjell-Åke Nordqvist, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

Providing key concepts in conflict resolution research illustrated by experiences from East Timor. Discussion and reflection on transitional processes and the need to develop strategies and policies well in advance of rapid political changes.

14.00 – 15.30	Challenges of transitions
15.30 – 16.00	Coffee break
16.00 – 17.30	Experiences from the East Timor process

Thursday, January 9

09.00 – 10.30	Post-transitional challenges
10.30 – 11.00	Coffee break
11.00 – 12.30	Concluding discussion of the theme
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch

Theme II: International Financial Institutions, Transnational Corporations and Globalisation – Future Challenges and Alternative Perspectives

Resource person: Walden Bello, Focus on the Global South, Bangkok/Manila

Presentation of alternative views on globalisation, critically examining the main international institutions and outlining possible alternative policies in dealing with them, particularly for a country in transition.

14.00 – 15.30	The global economic system: Main characteristics and weaknesses
15.30 – 16.00	Coffee break
16.00 – 17.30	International financial institutions and transnational corporations: how do they function and what is their impact on the South?

Friday, January 10

09.00 – 10.30	What could be an alternative path for Burma? What are crucial choices to make?
10.30 – 11.00	Coffee break
11.00 – 12.30	Concluding discussion of the theme
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch

Theme III: Challenges to Establishing and Maintaining Democracy: Southeast Asian Perspectives on the Need for Participation, Access to Information and Freedom of Speech

Resource person: Sheila Coronel, Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism.

Drawing on the examples of other Southeast Asian countries: discussing the importance of access to information and freedom of speech as tools to enable participation in political processes. Discussing legislative and organisational aspects on the role of media in creating an open and transparent democratic society.

14.00 – 15.30	Moving from dictatorship to democracy: The cases of the Philippines and Indonesia
15.30 – 16.00	Coffee break
16.00 – 17.30	The role of the media: Lessons from the region

Saturday, January 11

09.00 – 10.30	Challenges and priorities for countries in transition
10.30 – 11.00	Coffee break
11.00 – 12.30	Concluding discussion of the theme
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch

<i>Theme IV: 'Strategies for Development – Experiences from East Timor'</i>

Resource person: Emilia Pires, National Planning Commission, East Timor

Discussing policy alternatives on issues such as economic reconstruction, international financial institutions, and transnational corporations. Lessons learnt from the East Timor negotiations with bilateral donors and multinational organisations.

14.00 – 15.30	The process of establishing a development strategy
15.30 – 16.00	Coffee break
16.00 – 17.30	The current negotiation process: Challenges faced by East Timor

Sunday, January 12

08.00 – 9.30	Lessons learned and recommendations: How to pursue an alternative development agenda?
9.30 – 10.00	Coffee break
10.00 – 11.30	Concluding discussion of the theme
11.30 – 11.45	Snack
11.45 – 13.30	Concluding discussion
	The future of the project 'Another Development for Burma'
	Evaluation of the seminar and discussion on the future of the seminar project. What issues would be most needed to explore further? How should the following workshops be organised?
	End of seminar
13.30	Lunch

International Resource Persons

High-level seminar on ‘Another Development for Burma’

8–12 January, 2002

Organised by NDF, UNLD–LA and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in collaboration with the National Reconciliation Programme

Walden Bello

Walden Bello is the founding director of Focus on the Global South, a policy research institute based in Bangkok, Thailand. Prior to that, he was executive director of the Institute for Food and Development Policy (Food First) in Oakland, California.

Educated at Princeton University, where he did his doctorate in sociology in 1975, he subsequently taught at University of California, Berkeley, where was research associate with the Center for South East Asian Studies.

A renowned campaigner for international justice and development and one of the leading independent critics in the South of current global economic arrangements, he is the author of numerous books, including:

A Siamese Tragedy: Development and Disintegration in Modern Thailand (with Shea Cunningham and Li Kheng Poh) (1999)

Dark Victory: The United States, Structural Adjustment and Global Poverty (with Shea Cunningham) (1994)

People and Power in the Pacific: The Struggle for the Post-Cold War Order (1992)

Dragons in Distress: Asia’s Miracle Economies in Crisis (with Stephanie Rosenfeld) (1991)

Brave New Third World? Strategies for Survival in the Global Economy (1990)

Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines (1982)

Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (2002).

Sheila Coronel

From 1989 to the present, Executive Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, an independent, nonstock, nonprofit agency that specializes in investigative reporting. As head of the agency, supervises journalists doing investigative reports, edits and markets their articles, oversees book and documentary projects, and administers a staff of 16 people. Also acts as editor of a quarterly investigative reporting magazine published by the Center.

From 1995 to the present, conducted training on investigative reporting for journalists in Thailand, Indonesia and Nepal.

From 1987 to 1995, Manila correspondent of The New York Times and The Guardian of London and Manchester.

From 1986 to 1988, special reports writer and columnist, The Manila Chronicle. Wrote reports, features and analyses on current Philippine affairs.

From 1982 to 1986, political affairs writer, Philippine Panorama Magazine. Wrote magazine articles on Philippine politics and society.

Kjell-Åke Nordquist

Dr Kjell-Åke Nordquist Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden. His research has dealt with conditions for durable boundary agreements, autonomy as conflict-solving mechanisms, and social and political reconciliation after civil wars.

Since 1997 Kjell-Åke Nordquist has been involved in the process towards independence for East Timor, first as an expert on autonomy and conflict resolution for a bi-partisan East Timorese study group, and after the referendum 1999 and until today, as a mediator/facilitator between the two main groups in the conflict, i.e. originally CNRT/Falintil and pro-Indonesian/militia groups, respectively. He has also served as an adviser to Swedish mediators in international conflicts, and the Department of Peace and Conflict Research has arranged a number of seminars between groups in on-going armed conflicts.

Kjell-Åke Nordquist was born 1952 in an area close to Norway, is married to Inger with two children, Anna Lina and Carl Johan, and is an amateur musician when time allows.

Emilia Pires

Emilai Pires born in East Timor and oldest of a family of 7, was refugee in Australia for 25 years since 1975. Graduated from Latrobe University with a Bachelor of Arts (Statistics) in 1983, and then in 1994 completed a Graduate Diploma in Government Law at the University of Melbourne, Australia. Worked for over 15 years as Victorian Public servant for the Human Services Department (Housing). Then moved on to work for Mr Xanana Gusmao, CNRT President as his Development officer in 1999. In 2000 was nominated by Mr Sergio Vieira de Mello as the Head of the National Planning and Development Agency of the first Transition Government of East Timor, under the United Nations. During the 2nd Transition Governmet of East Timor, Emilia became the Secretary of the Planning Commission and was responsible for the first National Development Plan for East Timor. Currently Emilia works as Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Planning and Finances of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Her responsibilities include the monitoring of the implementation of the National Development Plan and the Management of External Assistance to East Timor.

List of participants

High-level seminar on ‘Another Development for Burma’

8-12 January, 2002

Aung Moe Zaw	DPNS
Dr Lian H. Sakhong	UNLD-LA
Dr Sui Khar	CNF
Dr Thaung Htun	NCGUB
Hkun Okker	PPLO/ NDF
Hteh Bupeh	KNPP
Kaing Mar Kyaw Zaw	WLB
Khai Rey Khai	ALP
Khaing Htun Htun	NDF staff
Khaing Myo Khaing	UNLD-LA
Khaing Myo Minn	ALP
Khaing Soe Naing Aung	NDF
Khun Manko Ban	UNLD-LA
Ma Ohmar	NRP
Naing Aung	NRP
Nang Hseng Nounng	WLB
Naw Paw Paw Gyi	KWO
Nyo Ohn Myint	NLD-LA
Rimond Htoo	KNPP
Sai Mawn	UNLD-LA staff
Sao Seng Suk	SDU/ SSO
Saw David Taw	NDF
Saw Htoo Htoo Lay	KNU
Saw Rocky	NDF staff
Teddy Buri	MPU
U Bo Thaung	NLD-LA
U Maung Maung Latt	MPU
U Tun Aung Kyaw	NLD-LA
Zing Cung	CNF
Walden Bello	Resource person
Sheila S. Coronel	Resource person
Kjell-Åke Nordquist	Resource person
Emilia Pires	Resource person
Chao Tzang Yawnghwe	Resource person
Niclas Hällström	DHF
Olle Nordberg	DHF
Cecilia von Otter	DHF