


# **Evolution and reform of UN Peacebuilding – Ten areas of change**



Sigrid Gruener  
Henrik Hammargren

**Publication Reference**

Evolution and reform of UN Peacebuilding – Ten areas of change  
(Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2025).

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**Authors**

Sigrid Gruener  
Henrik Hammargren

**Text Editor**

Simone Hagfeldt

**Graphic Designer**

Eva Ericsson

**Printer**

X-O Graf Tryckeri AB, Uppsala, Sweden, May 2025  
ISBN 978-91-987398-8-6

## **Author acknowledgements**

This publication is the result of 13 years of close and fruitful collaboration with the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Commission. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to Elizabeth Spehar, Oscar Fernandez-Taranco and Judy Cheng-Hopkins, the Assistant Secretaries-General for Peacebuilding Support, for their steadfast leadership and partnership during these years. We also wish to acknowledge the exceptional contributions of the staff at PBSO. While they are too numerous to name, a few deserve special recognition; Awa Dabo, Paolo Fontana, Chelsea Payne, Brian Williams and Marc-André Franche. Your expertise and dedication have been invaluable during the many years of engagement.

Our work has greatly benefited from the strong collaboration with the Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission, with whom we have had the privilege of organising the Commission's annual retreats and national and regional consultations since 2013. We also express gratitude to the Presidents of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council, as well as the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, whose engagement has furthered our collective efforts in the area of peacebuilding.

Finally, we would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to the Greentree Foundation, especially its General Manager, Ahmad Dawwas, for the support in hosting close to 20 events at Greentree Estate, all aimed at advancing the United Nations Peacebuilding agenda.



## On the design

The design theme for this report takes its inspiration from the origami paper crane. Origami, the ancient art of paper folding, originated in Japan over a thousand years ago. The term is derived from two Japanese words, Ori (folded) and Kami (paper). In Japanese lore, the crane — a type of large, majestic bird - was thought to live for a thousand years, and the animals are held in the highest regard. The paper crane has become a traditional Japanese symbol of peace, carrying a message of hope, recovery, and resilience.

According to ancient Japanese legend, folding a thousand cranes (senbazuru, meaning one thousand cranes in Japanese) grants a wish. Initially, folding a thousand cranes was an endeavour undertaken to wish for a long life for oneself or for a loved one. Over time, the tradition has evolved to be associated with wishing for recovery from illness or injury, for happiness and good luck in marriage, for success in one's pursuits, or for world peace. The tradition of folding a thousand origami cranes was further popularised and spread globally through the touching story of Sasaki Sadako, a survivor of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima during World War II.<sup>1</sup>

In this report, the paper crane not only reflects the legend but also, metaphorically, the core of peacebuilding. Just as each fold in origami must be intentional and precise, so too must be the steps taken to further develop the Peacebuilding Commission and the broader United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture.

While this report is a work on paper compiling the institutional history and recommendations to strengthen the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the UN's Peacebuilding Commission, its true purpose, like origami, lies in what it becomes. The ideas and strategies within must be brought to life through committed action. It is only in implementation that meaningful change takes flight.

For design purposes, in this report the steps for folding a paper crane have been simplified. More detailed pedagogical instructions can be found online, including at <https://web-japan.org/kidsweb/virtual/origami/exploring02f.html>.

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# List of acronyms and abbreviations

A4P	Action for Peacekeeping
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGE	Advisory Group of Experts
ASG	Assistant Secretary-General (United Nations)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CCA	Common Country Analysis
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund (UN humanitarian fund managed by OCHA)
CES	Country Engagement Strategies
CIC	The Center on International Cooperation (at New York University)
CSPPS	Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
DCO	Development Coordination Office (United Nations)
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (predecessor of UN OCHA)
DHF	Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EFF	Extended Fund Facility
EU	European Union
FCV	Fragility Conflict and Violence
GA	General Assembly
GPPAC	Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
HLAB	High-Level Advisory Board on Multilateralism
HDPP	Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding and Partnership
IID	Informal Interactive Dialogue(s)
INCAF	International Network on Conflict and Fragility
IDA	International Development Association (World Bank)
IDPS	International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
IEP	Independent Eminent Persons — 2020
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPi	International Peace Institute
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
NYPG	New York Peacebuilding Group
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance as defined by the OECD
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development



PBAR	Peacebuilding Architecture Review
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PDA	Peace and Development Advisors
PGA	President of the General Assembly
PRA	Prevention and Resilience Allocation Facility
PRSTs	President of the Security Council Statements
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of the UN development system
RC	Resident Coordinator (United Nations)
RDBs	Regional Development Banks
SBA	Stand-by Arrangement(s)
SCR	Security Council Report
SG	Secretary-General (United Nations)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SSTC	South-South and Triangular Cooperation
SPF	State and Peacebuilding Umbrella Trust Fund
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
ToR	Terms of Reference
TSF	The Transition Support Facility
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSDCF	United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USG	Under Secretary-General (United Nations)
UNU-CPR	United Nations University Centre for Policy Research
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security
YPS	Youth, Peace, and Security

# Executive summary

The 2025 comprehensive review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture (PBAR) presents a crucial opportunity to strengthen global peacebuilding efforts. This review comes at a pivotal moment, coinciding with the 80th anniversary of the United Nations, the implementation of the *Pact for the Future*, the fourth Financing for Development Conference, the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security. These milestones provide a unique occasion to reassess progress, enhance multilateral cooperation, and address persistent gaps in peacebuilding effectiveness.

However, it also takes place amid global crises, including the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, which challenge the rules-based international order based on the UN Charter. The number and level of armed conflicts have surged to a record high, causing humanitarian crises, regional instability, and worsening socioeconomic conditions. Climate change further fuels conflict through resource scarcity, environmental degradation, and displacement, intensifying global security risks.

At the centre of this review is the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), a key UN body responsible for advising, coordinating, and mobilising support for peacebuilding efforts primarily in conflict-affected and fragile states. Since its establishment in 2005, the PBC has evolved significantly but still faces structural, political, and financial constraints that limit its impact. This report examines the PBC's evolution, challenges, and opportunities within the broader UN peacebuilding framework and proposes a set of forward-looking recommendations to enhance its effectiveness.

## Key Findings and Challenges

Over the past two decades, the UN's peacebuilding efforts have undergone major transformations, reflected in the 2010, 2015, and 2020 Peacebuilding Architecture Reviews, the Sustaining Peace resolutions, and the

integration of peacebuilding into global policy frameworks and their implementation such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Despite these efforts, the global peace and security landscape has deteriorated, with the number of armed conflicts reaching historic highs, the situation is exacerbated by geopolitical tensions, economic fragility, and the increasing impact of climate change on security.

The PBC, while recognised as an important part of UN peacebuilding, continues to face three core challenges:

- **Limited influence within the UN System:** The PBC's advisory role, particularly in relation to the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the UN Development System, remains underutilised. Its ability to shape UN peacebuilding strategies is constrained by limited political leverage and fragmented institutional linkages.
- **Inadequate and unpredictable financing:** The UN Peacebuilding Fund remains reliant on voluntary contributions, creating financial instability. Calls for assessed contributions to ensure sustained funding for peacebuilding have yet to gain broad political support, leaving the PBC without the necessary resources to drive long-term initiatives.
- **Weak coordination and partnerships:** While the PBC has engaged with international financial institutions, regional organisations, and civil society, these interactions remain ad hoc and lack the strategic coherence needed to mobilise resources and ensure sustained peacebuilding impact. The PBC's engagement in peacekeeping mission drawdowns and other transition settings also remains underdeveloped.

## Ten areas for strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission

To address these challenges, this report identifies ten areas of change for strengthening the PBC's role in advancing sustainable peace presented in terms of the desired outcome:

- 1 The PBC has a stronger advisory role:** The PBC must strengthen its engagement with the Security Council and the General Assembly, ensuring that its recommendations influence peacebuilding-related mandates and funding allocations. A more structured approach is needed to align PBC's advice with Security Council decision-making, including on mission transitions. Additionally, the PBC should provide targeted peacebuilding advice to the General Assembly's committees, particularly on conflict prevention and financing.
- 2 The PBC effectively promotes coherence in the UN's engagements in peacebuilding and prevention:** To enhance coherence, the PBC should strengthen its engagement with UN Resident Coordinators and Country Teams to ensure peacebuilding is prioritised in national and regional strategies. Establishing closer linkages with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) will help integrate peacebuilding perspectives into humanitarian, development, and peace operations.
- 3 The PBC actively and strategically engages in UN mission settings:** The PBC should play a stronger role in supporting UN mission transitions, ensuring that peacekeeping withdrawals do not create instability. This requires structured engagement with the Security Council, DPO, and host governments. The PBC could also oversee the development of light footprint missions to sustain political and peacebuilding efforts post-transition.
- 4 The PBC effectively leverages its convening role across the UN system:** The PBC should use its convening power to align peacebuilding priorities across UN entities, financial institutions, and Member States. This includes holding more systematic dialogues

with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and regional development actors.

- 5 The PBC successfully fosters and strengthens partnerships for peacebuilding:** The PBC must deepen its engagement with international financial institutions (World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Regional Development Banks) and regional organisations. This includes advocating for dedicated financing for peacebuilding within development funding mechanisms and strengthening collaboration on joint programming for fragile and conflict-affected states.
- 6 The PBC effectively advocates for and facilitates timely resource mobilisation for peacebuilding:** Peacebuilding financing remains unpredictable and insufficient. The PBC should advocate for increased voluntary and assessed contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and explore innovative financing models, including partnerships with the private sector and blended finance initiatives.
- 7 The PBC actively supports the development of National Prevention and Peacebuilding Strategies:** The PBC should assist Member States in developing and implementing national prevention strategies, ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are aligned with national development priorities. This requires more systematic engagement with Resident Coordinators, UN Country Teams, and local peacebuilding actors.
- 8 The PBC constructively advances cross-cutting issues in UN Peacebuilding efforts:** The PBC should mainstream gender equality, climate-related security risks, and youth inclusion in all peacebuilding initiatives. This includes integrating Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) and Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) commitments across PBC's engagements and ensuring climate security is a core consideration in conflict prevention strategies.
- 9 The PBC communicates effectively about its role, activities, and the impact of its work:** Stronger outreach and strategic communication are needed to enhance the visibility and influence of the PBC. The Commission should develop a comprehensive

communications strategy, highlighting its successes and the tangible impact of peacebuilding efforts. This includes engaging with media, academia, and civil society organisations to expand global support for peacebuilding initiatives.

#### **10 The PBC has adequate capacity to fulfil its mandate:**

The PBC's operational capacity must be strengthened through increased Secretariat support and dedicated resources. This includes expanding PBSO's analytical capabilities, increasing staffing levels, and improving data collection and monitoring mechanisms to inform evidence-based policymaking.

Each *Area of Change* in the report is framed with a strategic and results-oriented approach. It begins with a desired outcome statement, outlining the intended impact of the proposed change. This is followed by a brief analysis of challenges and rationale, identifying key gaps, structural obstacles, or opportunities for reform. Finally, each section presents specific recommendations and actions to enhance the PBC's effectiveness.

Annexes 3-7 present original text from select resolutions and other documents for easy reference.

### **Conclusions and a call to action**

The 2025 PBAR represents a critical moment for enhancing the UN's peacebuilding efforts. As conflicts intensify and multilateralism is challenged, it is imperative to reinforce the role of the PBC and ensure that it becomes a more strategic, well-resourced, and impactful entity.

Not all recommendations need inclusion in PBAR resolutions; many can be implemented through PBC leadership, procedural adjustments and action. A structured approach is needed to organise and cluster recommendations from various sources, building on previous and ongoing efforts in this regard. The focus must be on implementation, ensuring concrete actions that drive meaningful, sustainable progress at the country level.

The key priorities for action in the 2025 PBAR should focus on:

- **Securing stronger political commitments** from UN Member States to enhance the PBC's advisory role and ensure greater coherence in peacebuilding policies.

- **Ensuring the effective implementation** of the Pact for the Future's commitments on peacebuilding, leveraging the momentum of the Summit of the Future and the 2025 Financing for Development Conference and the upcoming 2025 peacekeeping summit in Berlin.

- **Advancing discussions on sustainable financing mechanisms**, including the potential for increasing assessed contributions for the UN's peacebuilding architecture.

- **Strengthening the PBC's partnerships** with international financial institutions, regional actors, and civil society to improve coordinated peacebuilding efforts.

The Peacebuilding Commission is a unique mechanism within the UN system with important advantage – it already exists and does not need to be created. The PBC is well-positioned to advise and implement peacebuilding with and in Member States and through UN entities. To fulfil its potential, its advisory role must be recognised and utilised, engagement systems established, and operational capacity adequately resourced with strategic financial support. By seizing the opportunity presented by the 2025 PBAR, Member States can reinforce the PBC's role in sustaining peace, preventing conflict, and fostering long-term stability in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.





# Enhancing Peacebuilding through the 2025 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

— Prospects for the future of the Peacebuilding Commission

## Introduction

There is an urgent need for effective multilateral peacebuilding measures – for preventive actions and to build and sustain peace. The year 2025 presents a significant opportunity for United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding, marking the occasion of the fourth review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBAR) as well as the 80<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Organisation itself. This year also coincides with other key milestones, including the fourth Financing for Development conference, the World Social Summit, the start phase in implementation of the *Pact for the Future*, the 2025 peacekeeping summit in Berlin and the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the landmark UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)1325 on Women, Peace and Security and 10 years since the first resolution on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) SCR 2250, among others. Together, these events offer a crucial moment to reflect on past progress and reinforce commitments to advancing UN peacebuilding efforts.

This report aims to contribute to the 2025 comprehensive review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA), with a specific focus on the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).<sup>2</sup> Through an exploration of the PBC's evolution, challenges, and opportunities, the paper synthesises insights drawn from official documentation, contributions from researchers, and input from international and national civil society organisations, as well as UN Agencies, Funds and Programs, and Member States. It also draws on and reflects over 12 years of close collaboration and partnership between the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).

The document is structured in two distinct sections: The first provides essential background on the PBA, covering its origins, its evolution over the past two decades, and

key developments leading up to the *Pact for the Future* adopted in 2024 and the informal phase of the 2025 PBAR. In addition, it explores the linkages between the PBA and broader global frameworks and policy processes.

The second section takes a forward-looking perspective, presenting preliminary recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the PBC. It examines how the PBC can strengthen its influence across various levels — from the country level to the broader UN system, policy, and Member States — while aligning with the objectives of the 2025 review. In this section, ten key areas are presented with detailed recommendations and actions to drive progress and foster a more coordinated, effective, and sustainable approach to peacebuilding.

The rationale for structuring the report in two sections is to cater to different needs. The first section is intended to inform readers who are newer to the subject or wish to gain a deeper understanding of the PBA's history and evolution. It aims to reinforce institutional memory and help consolidate material from many different sources in an accessible format.

The second section may be more useful for experts already familiar with the history and structure of the PBA and can thus be read as a stand-alone document. This section is geared towards those seeking to engage in ongoing discussions and reform efforts of the PBC, offering analysis and recommendations on how to strengthen the PBC to become better adept at addressing contemporary challenges and promoting sustainable peacebuilding. A concluding chapter synthesises the findings and presents critical next steps for advancing peacebuilding efforts.

## **Section 1**

# **Evolution of the Peacebuilding Architecture and the Peacebuilding Commission**

This section explores the evolution of the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), examining their origins, rationale, and key developments. Following a framing of the context in which the 2025 PBAR is taking place, it traces the shift from early peacebuilding policies to a more coordinated, long-term approach to peacebuilding, marked by the establishment of the PBC, the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). Section one also explores how the PBA and PBC are linked to broader global frameworks, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the New Agenda for Peace, and the Pact for the Future, highlighting the integration of peacebuilding within the UN's wider goals of development, human rights, and security.



## 1.1 The 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review — contextual framing

Recent data underscores a troubling trend: the number of armed conflicts has surged, with 59 active state-based armed conflicts reported in 2023 – the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP.<sup>3</sup> This escalation affects millions of people and leads to widespread humanitarian crises, destabilising entire regions and exacerbating the challenges faced by communities already grappling with socioeconomic instability, human rights violations, and forced displacement. Simultaneously, the impacts of climate change are emerging as a significant driver of conflict, with resource scarcity, environmental degradation, biodiversity loss, and population displacement intensifying competition over dwindling resources.

### Global developments affecting UN peacebuilding

The 2025 PBAR is taking place in an international environment marked by extreme challenges, particularly the ongoing war in Ukraine and the crisis in Gaza. These conflicts have not only caused immense human suffering, but also profoundly affect the foundations of the rules-based international order established through the United Nations Charter.

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza, with their humanitarian toll, have highlighted the limitations of multilateral diplomacy and the UN system in preventing conflict and responding to crises. Ukraine and Gaza are two examples of the growing number of inter- and intrastate conflicts reshaping global security. The international response and the lack thereof, has exposed deep fractures in the global system. This context presents extreme challenges for the PBAR, as it must confront the shifting dynamics of international relations, where traditional mechanisms of peacebuilding and conflict prevention are being ignored and challenges.

The pursuit of prevention and peacebuilding is further compounded by the slow implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), hindered by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, political resistance, and fragmented strategies and engagement.

In this context, the need for conflict prevention and the enhancement of international capacities to build and sustain peace has urgently grown. The divergence between the expectations for multilateral action and the reality of state-centric interests underscores the need for a critical reassessment of peacebuilding in an era of geopolitical rivalry and fragmented responses to conflict.

The PBAR must therefore not only address the operational gaps within the current peacebuilding architecture. It must also consider the broader implications of a changing global order where the norms and frameworks that have long underpinned peace and security are under threat.

Despite these seismic shifts, some international multilateral frameworks continue to be upheld, and new ones agreed, offering a paradoxical sense of hope. Continued *cooperation on implementing the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement have been complemented by the Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), the Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ, High Seas Treaty) and the recent Pact for the Future* that underscore a global commitment to addressing the pressing issues of peace and security.<sup>4,5,6</sup> Moreover, advancements in technology, collective knowledge, data analytics, and innovative financial mechanisms present new opportunities to tackle these challenges more effectively.

A growing network of partnerships and an engaged global citizenry further contribute to the momentum needed for enhancing peacebuilding efforts. The barriers to development within the system are not due to a lack of resources or knowledge; rather, the necessary resources, institutions, and capacities exist and must be effectively mobilised and further developed to achieve meaningful progress in peacebuilding.

Within this global context, the role of the PBA, particularly the PBC, becomes critically important. Established in 2005 as a new organisational entity within the UN system, the PBC is a potentially powerful institution created to support countries in transition from armed conflict to peace by providing a dedicated platform for cooperation among UN Member States, with involvement of international organisations, and civil society.

In the context of the 2025 PBAR, it is essential to examine the evolution of the PBC and its contributions to

sustaining peace efforts globally. Recent initiatives such as the Secretary-General's *Our Common Agenda* and *New Agenda for Peace* and the Member States negotiated *Pact for the Future* further underscore the need for innovative and integrated approaches to peace and security.<sup>7,8</sup>

## 1.2 Understanding the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

This subchapter explores the historical evolution of peacebuilding, from the UN Charter to the development of a dedicated peacebuilding architecture and policies. It traces the key milestones in the development of peacebuilding initiatives, including the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the establishment of related entities including the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). It examines the outcomes of the previous Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) reviews and how each review redefined the roles and responsibilities of the PBA, highlighting past and ongoing efforts to improve the UN's peacebuilding system and adapting it to changing needs and geopolitical landscape.

### 1.2.1 The evolution of UN Peacebuilding - from the Charter to 'Sustaining Peace'

*'We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war',* — as outlined in the first words in the preamble of the UN Charter, create the foundation of international peace and security and have been a central objective of the UN since it was established in 1945.

The Charter provides the legal framework for the UN's peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts, reinforcing the importance of joint action in mitigating violence and war. It calls for the maintenance of peace through collective security, prevention of conflicts, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Charter also recognises the need to address root causes of conflict, laying the groundwork for what would later evolve into the concept of peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding, a cornerstone of international peace and security efforts, has evolved in parallel with other global

initiatives focused on humanitarian aid, development, and human rights and as a complement to peacekeeping. Initially peacebuilding was concentrated on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. Over time, the concept expanded to address not just the aftermath of armed conflicts, but also its prevention, tackling drivers of violence and fragility.

The establishment of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in 1991 marked the start of a new way of engaging in armed conflicts. The DHA was tasked with coordinating international humanitarian responses, ensuring that aid reaches those affected by conflict and disaster, thereby fostering stability and recovery.

In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali released *An Agenda for Peace*, a groundbreaking report that articulated a comprehensive approach to the UN's traditional approaches to peace making, peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy and introduced a new concept of peacebuilding.<sup>9</sup> This was defined as *'actions to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict'*. It laid the groundwork for the UN's evolving role in peace processes worldwide in the post-Cold War era.

In the 1990s, the UN engaged in a series of complex peace operations resulting in an unprecedented expansion of peacekeeping missions. Twenty new missions were initiated between 1988 and 1993 and the mandates developed into multidimensional peacekeeping operations, going beyond maintaining ceasefires, aiming to rebuild war-torn societies and promote democratisation.<sup>10</sup> However, tragic events revealed the inadequacies of the existing system, prompting necessary reforms. The international community faced harsh criticism for its inaction during and after the 1994 Rwandan genocide which became a catalyst for changes in the humanitarian sector.

In response to these failures, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was transformed into the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 1998. Major reforms were introduced with implementing agencies developing new standards and the UN annual appeals and cluster approach, organised humanitarian actors in sectors (food security, health, and

shelter) to ensure humanitarian needs were addressed comprehensively and collaboratively.

The reform also led to the establishment of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), which was created to provide timely and predictable funding to humanitarian action.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, in response to financial challenges and the need for adherence to international humanitarian law and best practices, the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative emerged.<sup>12</sup> This initiative encourages donors to reform their policies ensuring that funding is effectively allocated and aligned with humanitarian needs and principles. These reforms significantly enhanced the coordination, accountability, and overall effectiveness of humanitarian responses.

In the wake of the harsh criticism about the failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda, the fall-out from the implosion of the former Yugoslavia, the 'failure' of the state of Somalia, and the recognition of the limitations of humanitarian interventions, Secretary-General Kofi Annan embarked on an ambitious agenda for reform. Part of this initiative involved a review of UN peace operations and an assessment of the UN's capacity to effectively respond to global threats.

The outcomes from this process included The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (2000) and the creation of a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2003).<sup>13,14</sup> The panel issued a four-part report, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, in December 2004.<sup>15</sup> The report reaffirmed the UN's recognition of states' right to self-defence, but it also argued that post-conflict peacebuilding should be a core UN function. It also prescribed revitalisation of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the creation of a new Peacebuilding Commission.

In 2000, the UN introduced the Millennium Declaration, setting the stage for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with specific targets to be achieved by 2015.<sup>16</sup> During 2005, in commemoration of the UN's 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary, world leaders convened to evaluate progress on the Millennium Declaration.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a five-year progress report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration of 2000, which the General Assembly had

requested. The report, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, presented six months before the 2005 World Summit, set out priorities for action in the fields of development, security, and human rights; it suggested changes within global institutions, especially of the UN itself.<sup>17</sup> The second of the four parts of the report, *Freedom from Fear*, asked Member States to agree on a new security consensus. More importantly, it proposed the creation of an inter-governmental body, the Peacebuilding Commission, to fill what Annan had referred to as the 'gaping hole' of the UN institutional and structural capacity to address transition from war to peace.

### **1.2.2 The UN Peacebuilding Architecture and its mandate**

The PBA was created as an outcome of the 2005 World Summit.<sup>18</sup> It comprises the:

- *Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)*: The Peacebuilding Commission plays a pivotal role in promoting sustainable peace in countries emerging from conflict. It brings together key stakeholders, including governments, international organisations, and civil society, to advise and propose strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding. The PBC focuses on bridging the gap between short-term stabilisation efforts and long-term development goals, aiming to foster coherence and coordination in international peacebuilding efforts.
- *Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)*: The Peacebuilding Support Office serves as the secretariat for the Peacebuilding Commission and supports its work by providing strategic advice, policy guidance, and operational support. Established to enhance the effectiveness and coherence of peacebuilding activities, the PBSO facilitates partnerships between the UN system, international financial institutions, and bilateral donors. It assists in mobilising resources for peacebuilding initiatives and promotes knowledge-sharing to strengthen the capacity of countries in post-conflict recovery and development.

Initially created as a small office within the UN Secretariat, the PBSO was revitalised as part of the 2017 reforms of the peace and security pillar and

integrated into a newly formed Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA).

- *Peacebuilding Fund (PBF)*: The Peacebuilding Fund was established to finance immediate peacebuilding interventions in countries emerging from conflict or facing significant peacebuilding challenges. Managed by the UN Secretary-General, the PBF provides catalytic and timely support to national governments and local communities to prevent the recurrence of conflict and promote sustainable peace. It focuses on supporting initiatives that strengthen institutions, promote reconciliation, and foster inclusive political processes, thereby laying the foundation for long-term peace and stability.

The PBC is a subsidiary organ to both the Security Council and the General Assembly and has three main purposes as laid out in its founding resolutions S/RES/1645 (2005) and A/RES/60/180:<sup>19</sup>

- 1 To bring together all relevant actors in order to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.
- 2 To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies to lay the foundation for sustainable development; and
- 3 To provide recommendations and information to improve coordination of all pertinent partners within and outside the UN, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities, and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery.

In accordance with the PBA's founding resolutions, the PBC developed its own rules of procedure and working methods which have been reviewed and revised over the years.<sup>20</sup> The working methods of the PBC have also been discussed and refined as part of an ongoing process with updates included as annexes to the Commission's annual reports. The most recent version at the time of writing is presented in the Report of the PBC on its Seventeenth session (published Feb 2024).<sup>21</sup>

It is important to note that significant initiatives to strengthen the work of the Commission have been

accomplished. These efforts can continue to be enhanced by refining and updating the PBC's working methods to ensure they remain relevant and effective in allowing the PBC to fulfil its potential.

Pursuant to the founding resolutions (notably operative paragraph, OP, 15), the Commission is requested to submit an annual report to the General Assembly and the Assembly to hold an annual debate to review the report. The report is also to be submitted to the Security Council, pursuant to its resolution 1646 (2005),<sup>22</sup> for an annual debate. The fact that the report is submitted to both the General Assembly and the Security Council for annual debates provides a valuable opportunity for dialogue moving beyond statements, which also could be made more systematic by enhancing the coverage of content and ensuring a more structured and coordinated exchange between these two bodies.

### **1.2.3 Observations from previous reviews of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture**

During its first decade, the Peacebuilding Architecture, despite many successful developments, grappled with significant challenges in optimising its role and to become an effective and efficient organisational entity within the UN system. The PBC worked hard but struggled to define clear operational goals and establish robust methods and systems for accountability and learning. These efforts often hindered the PBC's ability to engage effectively across the UN system and with Member States, limiting its impact at the country level.

### **The 2010 PBA Review – responding to initial challenges**

The first review of the PBA was conducted in 2010 as mandated by the founding resolutions and was facilitated by three Member State co-facilitators: Ireland, Mexico, and South Africa. The final review report highlighted six critical issues: the complexity of peacebuilding; the imperative of national ownership; the illusion of sequencing; the urgency of resource mobilisation; the importance of contributions by women; and the need for connection with the field.

The review concluded that the PBA had fallen short of initial expectations and argued that a concerted effort was needed to place peacebuilding at the centre of the

UN's overall work. Lacking an implementation mechanism and political will from Member States, little follow up or change resulted from the review.

### **The 2015 Review – introducing the dual ‘Sustaining Peace’ Resolutions**

Five years later, the 2015 review process took a different tack. It built on language in the General Assembly resolution that accepted the report from the 2010 review calling for ‘a further comprehensive review’ after five years.

Two main differences distinguished this review from the previous one. The first was that the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the review were designed with a two-stage process.<sup>23</sup> The first stage was to be conducted by an independent, seven-person Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) designated by the Secretary-General.<sup>24</sup> The second stage of the review involved an inter-governmental process led by two Member State co-facilitators, namely Australia and Angola.

The second and most important distinction was the scope of the review; it took seriously the call to be comprehensive. The 2015 PBAR was to examine the significance of the evolution of international peacebuilding efforts in addressing the elements of the gaping hole defined in 2005, and their implications for the role and positioning of the PBA.

One of its objectives was to examine the continued relevance and functioning of the three entities of the PBA, including their mandate, structure, resources, and working methods. In addition, its scope encompassed an analysis of relevant policy developments since the establishment of the PBA; the complementarity of the PBC to UN operational entities; and continuing or emerging gaps or constraints that limited the UN's ability to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict.

The first phase of the 2015 review concluded in June of that year with the AGE's comprehensive report, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace*.<sup>25</sup>

The main findings included an emphasis on peacebuilding, not only as a set of activities for post-conflict situations, but also for prevention; the primacy of politics; and a recognition that peacebuilding is the responsibility

of all pillars of the UN system that must work together in a coherent manner. This framework directly addressed the silos and fragmentation that undermine the organisation's efforts.

The AGE report, intended to be the main input to the inter-governmental process, was not addressed to the Secretary-General, but was submitted directly to the presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The intergovernmental process of the 2015 review resulted in the drafting of the twin Sustaining Peace resolutions, adopted by both the General Assembly and Security Council in April 2016.<sup>26</sup> The resolutions echoed much of the AGE's analysis and recommendations while also incorporating findings from two other parallel reviews, namely the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) and the Global Study on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women Peace and Security.<sup>27,28</sup>

The sustaining peace resolutions were recognised as a remarkable achievement, which established and framed the concept of sustaining peace as a core UN principle. Member States thus sent a clear and powerful message to the UN system and to themselves that many of the structures, practices, and policies for addressing or preventing violent armed conflicts were insufficient or inadequate.

As a result, the UN system, including the members of the UNDS, could not continue business as usual. The resolutions emphasised the need for greater coherence at all levels and introduced a new conceptual framework, which significantly stressed building peace as an ongoing process that spans prevention of conflict to the consolidation of peace after violence has subsided.

### **The 2020 Review – changing context, continued reforms, but insufficient progress**

A third comprehensive review of the PBA was concluded on 21 December 2020 with the adoption of dual resolutions on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace by the General Assembly (A/RES/75/201) and Security Council (S/RES/2558).<sup>29</sup>

The resolutions call on Member States, the UN and other stakeholders to 'continue to take action to implement the resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, and to advance efforts to bring greater coherence to peacebuilding efforts' (S/RES/2558, OP1).

The review built on the 2015 PBAR, both in terms of its content and its participatory approach. The ToR for the review outlined that it should aim to take stock of progress and be forward-looking, striving to further improve the work of the UN on peacebuilding, with emphasis on implementation at country level and advance implementation of the ongoing UN reforms.

As in 2015, the 2020 review called for a broad consultation that was not only to look at the three institutions collectively referred to as the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture, but more comprehensively to explore how the UN, its partners and other stakeholders are undertaking peacebuilding worldwide.

The ToR outlined an informal and formal phase of the review. The informal phase, concluded in August 2020, had three tracks: 1) A series of PBC meetings open to all Member States; 2) An independent panel of Independent Eminent Persons (IEP) appointed by the Secretary-General to offer reflections on progress on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.<sup>30</sup> And 3) Inclusive thematic and regional consultations by Member States and/or UN entities together with think tanks, policy and academic institutions and regional organisation.

The 2020 review showed persistent political differences among Member States that surfaced in relation to the integration of peacebuilding across all UN entities and the alignment of the Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace agenda with the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.

These divergences were indicative of the challenge of reconciling various perspectives on the implementation of peace and its long-term sustainability. A need for increased outreach and consensus-building among Member States was evident, particularly given the range of differing views on the role of peacebuilding in the broader international framework.

The year 2020 was also marked by the COVID-19 pandemic which severely exacerbated existing challenges,

increasing conflict risks and hindering the ability to conduct consultations effectively. As a result, the informal phase of the review process was extended, which allowed for deeper engagement with local civil society and non-traditional peacebuilding actors such as human rights organisations. With coordination provided by the PBSO, the process involved a range of actors, including the UN, governments, NGOs, and local civil society. A lot of key insights collected during these consultations were not fully integrated into the Secretary-General's report or the PBC's letter.

Nevertheless, this inclusive and participatory process was seen as setting a valuable precedent for future reviews, providing a model for collaborative, inclusive engagement across different stakeholders. Balancing state-driven processes with broader and meaningful civil society participation remains a key challenge in achieving more inclusive and effective peacebuilding strategies.

The previous reviews of the PBC have been important, leading to different developments in its structure and operations. While there has been criticism regarding what the PBC has not achieved, it is essential to recognise the steady progress it has made since its establishment.

Over the years, the Commission has evolved and adapted. However, many of the recommendations raised in past reviews remain highly relevant, and their full implementation is crucial for enhancing the PBC's effectiveness. To ensure the continued success of peacebuilding initiatives, it is important to revisit these recommendations, many of which are revisited in section two of this report.

## **1.3 Key Developments in the UN system impacting the Peacebuilding Architecture**

This subchapter provides an overview of key developments in the UN system that have had implications on the work of the PBC. It begins with an exploration of how implementation of the Sustaining Peace resolutions has evolved since their adoption and their relationship with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, highlighting how Member States have affirmed the indivisibility of peace and development. It then examines the

changing context for UN peacekeeping, focusing on the growing challenges facing peacekeeping missions. The subchapter continues by highlighting the reforms initiated by Secretary-General Guterres in 2017, which aim to improve conflict prevention, peacebuilding efforts, and coordination across the peace, development, and humanitarian sectors. Major initiatives such as 'Our Common Agenda', the 'New Agenda for Peace', and the 'Pact for the Future' are also examined, with a focus on their potential to strengthen the PBC's mandate and enhance multilateral cooperation. Finally, the importance of strengthening partnerships between the PBC and external actors such as the World Bank, the IMF, and Regional Development Banks is mentioned, underscoring the critical role of these institutions in sustaining peace.

### 1.3.1 The Sustaining Peace resolutions and the 2030 Agenda

The sustaining peace resolutions lacked any substantive references to the 2030 Agenda or the SDGs. This omission could partly be explained because the agenda had only been adopted in September 2015. However, it is also likely that the political sensitivity of issues of peace and conflict prevented their inclusion among the SDGs. The only specific mention is in the Preamble: 'Recalling General Assembly Resolution A/70/1, entitled "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", which adopted a comprehensive, far-reaching and people-centred set of universal and transformative Sustainable Development Goals and targets'. In addition, the sensitivity among some Member States about the possible over-politicisation and securitisation of development played a role as well.

Since the adoption of the sustaining peace resolutions, Member States have on numerous occasions affirmed the indivisibility of sustaining peace and achieving the SDGs. In January 2018, the Secretary-General issued his first report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, in line with paragraph 30 of the resolutions, which called for a progress report on implementation. He provided a set of recommendations for addressing remaining gaps, grouped into four categories: coherence, financing, leadership, and partnerships. The report highlighted that *'the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its commitment to leave no one behind contains the blueprint of the common vision of society towards which the*

*world is trying to move. Inclusive and sustainable development not only is an end in itself but also happens to be the best defence against the risks of violent conflict'*.<sup>31</sup>

That same year, Member States reaffirmed the value of the sustaining peace resolutions in two additional parallel resolutions — General Assembly resolution 72/276 and Security Council resolution 2413.<sup>32,33</sup> It is significant to note that the texts invited relevant UN organisations, including those of the UNDS, to advance implementation. They mandated a report by the Secretary-General, which in May 2019, covered the four fundamental elements of sustaining peace enumerated in the 2018 report<sup>34</sup>. Its main aim was to show evidence of efforts by different parts of the UN system to operationalise the sustaining peace resolutions and to provide information on how the ongoing reforms initiated by the Secretary-General — most critically, those related to the UNDS and the peace and security pillar — support their implementation.

The new twin resolutions adopted at the conclusion of the 2020 PBAR recognised that progress towards achieving the 2030 Agenda requires the integration of peacebuilding and sustaining peace into efforts to build back better.<sup>35</sup>

The SG's 2022 report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace underscored that *'inclusive and sustainable development, anchored in human rights, gender equality and leaving no one behind, is the best defence against violent conflict'*.

The SDG Summit held in New York in September 2023 reaffirmed global commitment to the 2030 Agenda, including SDG Goal 16, *'to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development'*.

SDG Goal 16 is vital for peacebuilding and sustaining peace, advocating for the reduction of violence, the rule of law, and accountable institutions. In the political declaration adopted at the end of the Summit, world leaders reaffirmed *'the need to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies that provide equal access to justice and that are based on respect for human rights (including the right to development), on effective rule of law and good governance at all levels and on transparent, effective and accountable institutions'*.<sup>36</sup>

The outcome of the Summit also highlighted the importance of addressing the drivers of conflict that hinder development, especially in fragile states, and reinforced the link between peace and development, emphasising that achieving Goal 16 is crucial for advancing all SDGs and sustaining peace.

Most recently, the 2024 Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace states that *'without identifying and addressing the underlying drivers of violence and instability, development will not take root or be sustained, nor can sustained peace be assured without sustainable and equitable development'*, (OP 30).<sup>37</sup> It maintains that understanding the 2030 Agenda through the lens of SDG Goal 16 requires increased focus on structural prevention and a risk-informed approach to peace and security and sustainable development.

### 1.3.2 A changing context for UN Peacekeeping

UN peacekeeping missions are facing severe changes and challenges that significantly impact their effectiveness and viability. In 2018 Secretary-General Guterres launched the 'Action for Peacekeeping' initiative aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and impact of UN peacekeeping operations. This initiative underscores the need for Member States to recommit to multilateral cooperation and support the UN's peacekeeping efforts amid evolving global challenges.

In 2021, the Secretary-General launched Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+) at an event to mark the third anniversary of A4P.<sup>38</sup> It is the implementation strategy of the A4P initiative for 2021-2023, aimed to focus on seven key priorities that are designed to be catalytic and enhance missions' impact.<sup>39</sup>

The number of active multilateral peace operations has decreased substantially and stands at 11 in 2025.<sup>40</sup> This reduction is in part an indirect result of financial constraints and shifting geopolitical dynamics, but importantly it reflects a trend towards growing distrust, increased involvement of regional organisations and lack of interest for new mandated missions or mandate renewals.

One of the most pressing challenges is the growing distrust between host governments and UN peacekeeping forces. Recent closures of operations, for example United

Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), highlight this issue, as host governments increasingly question the impartiality of UN mandates, particularly when they are critical of human rights violations committed by national forces.

The mandates of UN peacekeeping missions are also undergoing significant changes. Traditionally, these missions focused on ceasefire monitoring and stabilisation. Mandates that call for support to national governments' authority, risk compromising the missions' impartiality. This shift towards supporting counter-insurgency efforts raises new concerns and challenges the fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping. As a result, missions are struggling with broadened and sometimes conflicting mandates that lack the necessary clarity and focus.

Careful examination of the increasing deployment of parallel regional operations and/or private security actors in peacekeeping contexts may be a useful reference point in debates over the future of UN peacekeeping operations. Such actors have been deployed where missions are not authorised to undertake certain tasks, as for instance engaging in counter-terrorism operations, or where national authorities have spoken out against missions, such as in Mali.

The safety and security of UN peacekeeping personnel have increasingly come under direct threats and attacks. Over the years, the number of UN personnel killed in deliberate attacks has been alarmingly high. In 2023 alone, at least 11 peacekeeping personnel were killed due to malicious attacks, which is part of a disturbing trend that has seen the number of fatalities rise from 25 in 2021 to 32 in 2022.<sup>41</sup>

This underscores the increasing dangers faced by peacekeepers who are meant to serve as neutral parties in conflict zones but find themselves in increasingly hostile environments. As conflicts continue to escalate worldwide, the dangers facing humanitarian workers also have intensified. The year 2024 proved to have been the deadliest on record in that regard with 268 national and 13 international aid workers killed, with most of those deaths in Gaza among staff of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).<sup>42</sup>



Despite the setbacks, UN peace operations play a significant role in stabilising volatile regions. The growing debate around peacekeeping operations includes the need for innovative, flexible approaches to future deployments, as the UN aims to adapt to current geopolitical realities and evolving conflict dynamics. In response to these challenges, the UN has begun exploring more adaptable models for peace operations, such as a 'modular' approach that allows for tailored, task-specific missions.<sup>43</sup>

This shift is partly driven by the need to design more cost-effective and responsive missions that can address specific issues, like security during public health crises, rather than large-scale, state-building interventions.

The peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin scheduled for May 2025, as well as the ongoing PBAR, provide crucial opportunities for Member States to reassess and innovate within the framework of UN peace operations. However, the growing division within the Security Council and the rise of geopolitical rivalries suggest that achieving consensus on new operations may be increasingly difficult, even as global conflict numbers increase and new needs emerge.<sup>44</sup>

Projections for the future suggest that increased geopolitical polarisation may lead to multilateral inaction, fragmentation and/or reduction of peace operations. Another risk related to the increasing militarisation of peacekeeping, is the balance between upholding humanitarian principles and the focus on security objectives. These evolving dynamics will also place new demands on the PBC, requiring it to adapt its strategies, enhance coordination, and ensure that peacebuilding efforts remain focused on long-term priority in peacekeeping mandates.

### **1.3.3 The UN Development System reform and the Management reforms**

Since the beginning of his term in 2017, Secretary-General Guterres initiated a series of efforts to address challenges within the UN system and to make the organisation better positioned to deliver on the 2030 Agenda. Of particular note are three reform streams: 1) to the international peace and security pillar; 2) repositioning of the UN Development System; and 3) management. These

reforms are aimed at moving toward more effectiveness in prevention and in sustaining peace.

New regional divisions were created within the peace and security pillar to allow for better shared analysis, planning, and programming across the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) and to promote regional approaches to cross-border issues. Efforts to work across the peace, development, and humanitarian nexus include integrated inter-agency committees at headquarters and the engagement of Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs) at country, as well as more recently, at the regional level.

The reforms within the UNDS and the introduction of a reinvigorated Resident Coordinator system were intended to strengthen in-country capacities to conduct conflict and context analysis and to translate such analysis into more conflict-sensitive programming.

The empowered and impartial RCs are expected to '*bring(s) to the role an appreciation of the breadth of assets of the United Nations in the service of sustaining peace*'.<sup>45</sup> To facilitate their work across the usually separate efforts for peace, humanitarian action, human rights, and development and to advance engagement in prevention and political mandates, these reforms elevated the RC position within the UNCT and created a direct reporting line to the Secretary-General through the Deputy Secretary-General.

Greater capacity within RC offices is intended to enhance their ability to engage in a diverse range of processes, including the coordination not only of UN funds and programs, but also of specialised agencies.

The process aims to apply the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) based on a Common Country Analysis (CCA); it also should be grounded in national ownership and anchored in national development priorities which is a central tenet of sustaining peace.

RCs are now the official representative of the UN in country, not connected to any specific agency, which is intended to allow them to act in a more independent and impartial manner and to provide stronger leadership and coherence within UNCTs.

The Secretary-General's 2018 report underscored that setting the direction for implementing the sustaining peace resolutions is largely the onus of senior leadership at country level, specifically the RC and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG) in mission settings. RCs are '*responsible for coordinating development strategies that are risk informed and help to build peaceful and inclusive societies*'.<sup>46</sup>

Concerns have been raised about the lack of financial resources at their disposal acting as a hindrance to their empowerment. Another serious challenge facing RCs is maintaining the support of the host government while having the mandate to speak out on human rights violations and to engage in political debates, including in the service of sustaining peace.

The 2024 Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace highlights that the restructuring of the peace and security pillar was designed '*to make the pillar more coherent, pragmatic, nimble and effective, capable of collaboration with partners across the United Nations system and outside it to prevent violent conflict*'.

Further, having brought together the UN's core peace and security capacities around a single political-operational structure with regional responsibilities, the reforms are also seen to have facilitated the integration of peacebuilding across the pillar, enhancing links between various pillars, ensuring coherence of system-wide action and strengthening partnerships.

In mission settings, 'triple-hatted' RC's — those serving as RC, Humanitarian Coordinator, and DSRSG — are considered central to the integration of humanitarian, human rights, development and political efforts, ensuring coherence between support for development and peace and security efforts.

### **1.3.4 Peacebuilding coverage in key UN processes since the 2020 PBAR Review**

This subchapter provides an overview of key UN processes that are closely linked to the ongoing PBAR. The list is not exhaustive; rather, it highlights a few of the initiatives and documents considered most closely related to efforts to reform the UN's current and future engagement in peacebuilding. Included are *Our Common Agenda*, the

Secretary-General's *New Agenda for Peace*, and *The Pact for the Future*, which set the strategic direction for global peace and security.

Additionally, the subchapter examines the UN-World Bank *Pathways for Peace* report and the Bank's strategy for addressing fragility, conflict, and violence, along with the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) new engagement with conflict-affected countries.<sup>47</sup> Finally, it explores the growing role of Regional Development Banks in financing for peacebuilding.

## **Our Common Agenda**

In 2021 the Secretary-General launched a complex strategic initiative titled *Our Common Agenda* aimed at revitalising global cooperation and multilateralism.

It was developed in response to a call from Member States in 2020 when they adopted the *Declaration on the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations*, emphasising the need for a renewed social contract, better governance, and solidarity across nations and generations.<sup>48</sup>

*Our Common Agenda* outlines a set of key initiatives addressing challenges for future global governance all aiming to set the stage for the *2024 Summit of the Future*.

A *High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism* (HLAB) was established by the Secretary-General in 2022 to provide recommendations, building on the commitments the *Our Common Agenda*, on how to strengthen global governance and enhance multilateralism.

In its report *A Breakthrough for People and Planet*, HLAB proposed six key shifts to improve global governance and strengthen networked multilateralism, thereby advancing efforts to tackle pressing global challenges such as climate change, rising inequality, and geopolitical instability.<sup>49</sup> The report's fifth shift focused on '*Empowering equitable collective security*' and called for reforming security structures, including the UN Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission to make them more representative and effective in preventing conflicts and managing global security threats.

The HLAB proposed that the UN establish stronger frameworks for collaboration with regional organisations.

It called for the need for increased transparency and trust-building measures between states for de-escalating geopolitical tensions. It lifted the need for fostering cooperative approaches to shared security challenges and suggested adopting a broader concept of security moving beyond military threats. This includes addressing human security issues related to food, water, and climate security as well as recognising the interconnectedness of these threats to global stability.

In addition, the HLAB also proposed an expanded and enhanced role for the PBC; their recommendations included:

- 1 *Broader Mandate:* The PBC should be empowered to address issues that go beyond traditional peacekeeping, including gender-related security threats, such as the link between violent misogyny and violent extremism, as well as the growing security risks posed by climate change and environmental degradation.
- 2 *Stronger Linkages with Financial Institutions:* The PBC should develop formal relationships with international financial institutions to ensure that global financial flows are aligned with efforts to address the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and environmental stress.
- 3 *Regional Resilience Councils:* A key innovation proposed is the establishment of regional resilience councils or other regionally based bodies focused on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. These councils would operate at the regional level to strengthen preventive measures, increase resilience, and address local causes of conflict more effectively. By empowering regional actors and fostering regional cooperation, these councils could serve as critical platforms for early intervention and peacebuilding in conflict-prone areas.
- 4 *Transforming the PBC into a Peacebuilding Council:* The PBC's transformation into a Peacebuilding Council is suggested as a way to give it greater investigative and decision-making authority. This would enable it to lead a new generation of peacebuilding operations aimed at tackling the root causes of violent conflict, rather than merely responding to crises after they occur.

## The Secretary-General's 'New Agenda for Peace'

The *New Agenda for Peace*, (also shortened to NA4P) presented by the Secretary-General in 2023, outlined a new and comprehensive framework aimed at addressing contemporary global threats to peace and security.<sup>50</sup>

The report, (the ninth in a series of policy briefs related to *Our Common Agenda*) emphasised the need for a new and strong multilateral approach to peacebuilding in light of evolving geopolitical dynamics and emerging challenges.

Key highlights of the report include:

- 1 *Strengthening Prevention:* The agenda stresses the importance of national ownership in peace processes, advocating for Member States to develop their own prevention strategies to sustain peace domestically.
- 2 *Addressing Economic Drivers of Conflict:* Recognising the economic underpinnings of many conflicts, the agenda calls for reform of international financial institutions and emphasises economic cooperation as a pathway to reducing conflict.
- 3 *Enhancing Peace Operations:* The report highlights the need to revise current peacekeeping approaches, ensuring that missions are adequately resourced and politically supported, focusing on political solutions. The report goes further to suggest a shift from traditional peacekeeping toward politically engaged missions which could entail reducing reliance on large-scale military interventions and focusing on smaller, politically oriented operations.
- 4 *Emerging Risks:* NA4P also highlights the need for proactive measures to address emerging risks such as climate change, biological threats, and the implications of new technologies like artificial intelligence. The agenda advocates for establishing norms to mitigate these risks.
- 5 *Action-Oriented Recommendations:* In NA4P the Secretary-General proposes 12 specific actions aimed at preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts, urging Member States to engage in a dialogue about these proposals as part of their preparations for the Summit of the Future.

The New Agenda for Peace was met with a mixed reception, reflecting both its ambitious goals and the challenges it faces in implementation. Overall, the agenda has been

praised in diplomatic circles for its comprehensive approach and relevance to current global challenges.

The New Agenda for Peace, focuses on the inter-connectedness of peace, security, and development, proposing measures that address the economic and social drivers of conflict.

This reflects a modern understanding of conflict prevention that goes beyond military solutions. It focusses on inclusivity and calls for the meaningful inclusion of women and young people in peace processes, highlighting the importance of diverse perspectives in fostering sustainable peace.

The report also acknowledges and seeks to establish norms for emerging challenges like climate change, cybersecurity, and the implications of new technologies, which are crucial for future peacekeeping efforts. Finally, it is a clear call for reforming international financial institutions to better support developing countries, recognising that economic disparities contribute to instability.

However, critics have argued that while the New Agenda for Peace is ambitious, it lacks sufficient clarity on how its goals will be achieved and implementation strategies, particularly regarding peacekeeping reforms and the role of the UN in an increasingly multipolar world. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the New Agenda for Peace depends heavily on the willingness of Member States to cooperate and commit resources, which will be a substantial challenge in the current geopolitical climate.

### **‘The Pact for the Future’**

The *UN Pact for the Future* (the Pact) is a strategic framework drafted, negotiated and adopted by UN Member States during the 2024 Summit of the Future.<sup>51</sup>

The Pact reinforces the commitment of Member States to achieve the SDGs by addressing the root causes of global challenges, such as inequality, climate change, and conflict and is closely linked to the Secretary-General’s initiative, ‘Our Common Agenda’.

The Pact aims to revitalise global co-operation and to address global challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, outlining actions for a collective response to issues of climate

change, peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights.

It reaffirms the principles of multilateralism and the need to enhance the UN’s role and effectiveness. Specifically, in the Pact, Member States commit to 56 actions in the areas of sustainable development and financing for development, international peace and security, science, technology and innovation and digital cooperation, youth and future generations, and transforming global governance.

The commitments outlined in Action 44 of the Pact aim to make the PBC more strategic, coherent, and impactful in advancing sustainable peace. To achieve this, the Pact highlights several key measures to strengthen the PBC through the 2025 PBAR.

A top priority is to enhance the PBC’s role as a platform for peacebuilding, focusing on the sharing of good practices, the mobilisation of political and financial support, and the prevention of conflict relapse, in line with the Commission’s mandate.

The Pact also includes a commitment to make greater use of the PBC in supporting nationally owned peacebuilding initiatives, strengthening its advisory, bridging, and convening roles, and fostering collaboration with civil society, non-governmental organisations, and the private sector to ensure that peacebuilding efforts are inclusive and aligned with national priorities.

The Pact further calls for the establishment of more systematic and strategic partnerships between the PBC and international, regional, and sub-regional organisations, as well as international financial institutions. These partnerships are intended to mobilise resources, align peacebuilding efforts with national development strategies, and foster a more integrated approach to peacebuilding.

In addition, the PBC’s role in supporting countries during and after the transition from peace operations is emphasised, with close cooperation with the Security Council and UN Country Teams, as requested by the countries concerned. These measures are designed to enhance the Commission’s effectiveness in promoting long-term peace and stability.

### 1.3.5 Strengthening Partnerships and Collaboration

Effective peacebuilding strategies call for effective partnerships and collaboration beyond the traditional UN system. Multilateral and regional initiatives play a critical role in addressing the challenges faced by conflict-affected countries.

As the PBC continues to evolve it should engage and build on the contributions of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and Regional Development Banks. These external actors have a direct and indirect bearing on the PBC's ability to support sustainable peace, offering expertise, resources, and innovative strategies that complement the Commission's work.

#### **The World Bank – The Pathways Report and Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Strategies**

One of the most significant developments in the multilateral sphere that has implications for the work of the PBC and for peacebuilding financing is the World Bank's increased focus on addressing *Fragility, Conflict, and violence* (FCV) as part of its strategic priorities.

The 2018 *Pathways for Peace* report, published as a joint study by the UN and the World Bank, called on the World Bank Group to 'pivot to prevention' by further prioritising inclusive approaches to development that can help prevent and mitigate FCV risks before conflict and violence take hold.<sup>52</sup>

The adoption of the World Bank's multi-year Fragility Conflict and Violence (FCV) Strategy in February 2020 and the establishment of the FCV Envelope under International Development Association (IDA) 19 demonstrated strong support for preventing and transitioning out of conflict and fragility as a development issue.<sup>53,54</sup>

The State and Peacebuilding Umbrella Trust Fund (SPF) is the leading global multi-donor trust fund supporting implementation of the World Bank's FCV Strategy. At the country level, the SPF prioritises financing of activities conducted in collaboration with the UN, reinforcing partnerships with relevant UN entities and pursuing collective outcomes in FCV countries. (*The World Bank's engagement in peacebuilding financing is further elaborated in subchapter 1.4.3 page 31.*)

Furthermore, during the past few years, the World Bank has intensified its mission-driven partnerships, leveraging the complementary mandates, capacity, and expertise of partner organisations to maximise collective impact.

Its intensified collaboration and more systematic coordination have taken the form of joint analyses and assessments of multidimensional risks; coordinated efforts to address forced displacement crises; dialogue on the conflict prevention agenda; and data and information sharing. This builds on the UN-WB Partnership Framework for Crisis Situations of April 2017.<sup>55</sup>

The framework identifies four areas of operational collaboration:

- Identify and reduce critical multi-dimensional risks of crisis, and prevent violent conflict in relevant countries or regions within the mandate of both institutions.
- Coordinate support for situations of protracted crisis, including aligning strategies, objectives and collective outcomes, in particular for populations affected by forced displacement, and based on joint analyses and assessments.
- Develop joint analyses and tools where the complementarity of mandates may enable more effective solutions.
- Scale up impact, by leveraging existing financing and comparative advantages, and ensuring that operational policies, frameworks, and tools used by both organisations facilitate cooperation and improve efficiency and complementarity.

In 2019, PBSO launched the Partnership Facility, initially the Humanitarian-Development-Peacebuilding and Partnership (HDPP) Facility, as a dedicated instrument under the PBF that provides small grant financing for UN-World Bank partnership activities in the areas of joint data and analysis, as well as joint frameworks/priorities and seed funding to joint implementation. Through the HDPP, grant financing is provided to help Resident Coordinators, Agencies, Funds and Programmes, and/or UN peace operations partner with the World Bank in crisis-affected situations at sectoral, operational or strategic levels.<sup>56</sup>

The most recent monitoring report of the UN-World Bank Group Partnership in Crisis-Affected Situations highlights

examples of the partnership in practice from 58 prevention, peacebuilding and crisis contexts.<sup>57</sup>

The relationship between the PBC and the World Bank is, however, rather limited despite repeated calls for stronger and more strategic engagement. In 2023, an ambassadorial level meeting between the PBC Chair and the Managing Director of Operations of the World Bank Group generated a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening the collaboration between the UN and the World Bank in support of conflict-affected countries that could be revisited during the 2025 PBAR.<sup>58</sup>

### **IMF – new engagement with fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS)**

As a multilateral body mandated to promote macroeconomic and financial stability through policy advice, financial assistance and capacity development, the IMF has an important role to play in the economic stabilisation of conflict-affected countries and has been strengthening this engagement over the past decade.<sup>59</sup>

As an institution dedicated to promoting global monetary cooperation and financial stability, the IMF's engagement with fragile states has recently also included a focus on providing macroeconomic support, fiscal management, and debt sustainability.

Stepping up its support, in 2022 the IMF adopted its first multi-year Strategy for Fragile and Conflict affected States. The IMF's Executive Directors noted that about one fifth of Fund members are classified as FCS and agreed that the Fund has an important role to play, within its mandate, to help these countries exit from fragility and support them to achieve macroeconomic stability, enhance resilience, strengthen governance, and promote inclusive growth.<sup>60</sup>

The strategy includes adoption of principles of engagement to ensure that the IMF's mandate and comparative advantage are effectively leveraged to help country authorities in FCS achieve better macroeconomic outcomes; rolling out Country Engagement Strategies (CES) across FCS; calibrating IMF modalities of engagement to better serve the needs of FCS (eg with analytics and capacity development); and enhancing partnerships to amplify the Fund's comparative advantage including with

the World Bank and other development, humanitarian, and peace and security actors.

The IMF's economic stabilisation programs are essential for long-term peacebuilding processes, as economic recovery is closely tied to social stability. Through programs such as *Stand-by Arrangements* (SBAs) and *Extended Fund Facility* (EFF), the IMF helps post-conflict nations recover by addressing fiscal deficits and restoring public confidence. Furthermore, the IMF's involvement in debt restructuring and its emphasis on transparent financial management supports peacebuilding efforts by creating a stable economic environment.

Given its recognised ambition to expand its range of partners in complex FCS settings and a recognition of its limitations in engaging in these contexts due to limited field presence, there could be mutual benefits from stronger and more strategic collaboration between the IMF and the PBC. The IMF has a standing invitation to participate in all meetings of the PBC.

### **Regional Development Banks – increasing contributions to peacebuilding**

Regional Development Banks (RDBs), such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), are understood to have an important role in reducing multidimensional risk.

These institutions bring region-specific knowledge and expertise to peacebuilding efforts, enabling understanding of local dynamics and facilitating regionally tailored interventions. RDBs play a significant role in addressing the challenges faced by fragile and conflict affected countries by providing funding and policy advice on critical areas such as infrastructure, education, healthcare, and governance.

In promoting cooperation between neighbouring countries and regional actors, RDBs can help promote regional stability and prevent the spread of conflict in a given region. Through programs that focus on promoting economic integration, trade, and cross-border collaboration, RDBs contribute to building resilience in fragile states and ensuring that peacebuilding efforts have a broad regional impact.

For example, the AfDB's Fragile States Facility aims to support countries in Africa that are affected by fragility, conflict, and violence, with a focus on rebuilding infrastructure, enhancing governance, and promoting inclusive economic growth.<sup>61</sup>

In recognition of the various drivers of fragility, the AfDB has established a specific financing mechanism geared to assist regional member countries in fragile settings or in transition: The Transition Support Facility (TSF).

In 2024 the IDB Group developed a new approach to support Latin American and Caribbean countries in the face of growing challenges posed by criminal violence. The Framework to Support Populations in Situations of Fragility, Conflict and Criminal Violence addresses one of the region's main development challenges, including for middle-income countries.<sup>62</sup>

The ability of RDBs to work closely with regional organisations and governments allows for the alignment of peacebuilding initiatives with regional priorities and strategies. A collaboration between the PBC and RDBs offers opportunities for synergies in areas such as post-conflict reconstruction, governance reform, and regional security cooperation.<sup>63</sup>

### **The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)**

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) was developed through an initiative led by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

In 2007, the OECD DAC Fragile States Principles were launched to provide guidelines for actors engaged in development cooperation, peacebuilding, statebuilding, and security efforts in fragile and conflict-affected states.

The following year, at the 3rd High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra, a group of 'fragile states' — later known as the g7+ — called for a dialogue with development partners in setting peacebuilding and statebuilding goals and priorities.

The IDPS was officially created in 2008, with a mandate to establish peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives

and an action plan for effective engagement in fragile states. The outcomes of the Dialogue were presented at the 4th High-Level Forum in 2011 in Busan, where partners endorsed '*The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*', committing to its implementation.

The IDPS is made up of three constituencies: the g7+, a voluntary association of countries transitioning from conflict to development, currently with 20 members, the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), a subset of the OECD DAC; and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS).<sup>64,65</sup> The Dialogue is co-chaired by representatives from fragile states and development partners: the Chair of the g7+ and a representative from OECD INCAF. Since 2022 the IDPS Secretariat is hosted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s Crisis Bureau, Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding, and Responsive Institutions Unit.

The IDPS is recognised as having a potential role as an interlocutor to the PBC, building on the support the Commission has provided over the years to some of the g7+ Member States, including Timor-Leste, Liberia and Sierra Leone. This would require a clear understanding of the respective mandates and working procedures of both entities. The PBC could be further utilised as a platform to facilitate sharing of experiences and good practices within the context of the IDPS, strengthening South-South and Triangular cooperation for peacebuilding and prevention.

While the processes outlined in this chapter follow distinct tracks, there are clear linkages between them. Key milestones, such as the Financing for Development Conference in June and the World Social Summit in November, will likely play a pivotal role in shaping the future direction of multilateral efforts to address global challenges that fuel fragility and conflict. It is imperative that Member States and UN representatives ensure coherence among these various processes to maximise their collective impact. The advancement of recommendations in frameworks like the *New Agenda for Peace* and demonstration of will to live up to the commitments in *The Pact for the Future* will be crucial. As the Peacebuilding Architecture continues to be reformed to respond to complex and shifting realities, it is vital that it is done so through coordinated, forward-thinking strategies that bridge national, regional, and global efforts. Only through collective determination

and collaboration can the peacebuilding architecture – and the rest of the UN system – serve as an effective mechanism to address fragility and conflict undermining peace and development in communities across the globe.

## 1.4 Operationalising the Sustaining Peace Agenda - working methods, and resourcing

Clear and effective working methods are crucial for operationalising peacebuilding, ensuring that strategic goals are translated into actionable steps to foster prevention and sustainable peace. This subchapter examines practical measures that have been taken to implement the Sustaining Peace agenda through the PBA, focusing on the processes and reporting structures in place, as guided by the mandates regulating various entities. It also examines the PBC's role in mobilising resources and provides an overview of how peacebuilding efforts are financed, including a brief update on developments in the Peacebuilding Fund.

### 1.4.1 The PBC's annual workplan and reports

*The PBC Annual Workplan:* The PBC's Annual Workplan outlines the key priorities and planned activities for the PBC over the course of the year. It is developed through consultations with the Peacebuilding Commission's members, and through collaboration with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), and relevant UN entities, ensuring alignment with broader UN peace and security goals.

The Workplan identifies the Commission's country-specific, regional, and thematic priorities. It aims to ensure effective implementation of the Commission's mandate, sets objectives for supporting national peacebuilding efforts, and details the strategies and resources required to achieve these goals. It serves as a guiding framework for the Commission's interventions and activities, helping to ensure coordinated and effective support for countries that seek its engagement and support as well as for countries receiving funding from the PBF.

*The PBC's Annual Reports:* The PBC's Annual Reports provide a comprehensive overview of its activities,

achievements, and challenges throughout the year. These reports are prepared by the Commission and submitted to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. They highlight the Commission's work in supporting post-conflict countries, detailing the progress made in peacebuilding initiatives, challenges encountered, and recommendations for future actions.

The reports also assess the effectiveness of the Peacebuilding Commission's strategies, discuss resource mobilisation efforts, and outline how the Commission has facilitated coordination between the UN, international partners, and national governments in promoting long-term peace and stability.

Maximising the effectiveness of both the PBC's Annual Workplan and Annual Reports is vital for ensuring coordinated and impactful peacebuilding efforts. The workplan provides strategic direction, aligning the Commission's activities with broader UN goals, while the reports assess progress, challenges, and resource mobilisation. Together, these instruments ensure accountability and adaptability, enabling the PBC to more effectively support sustainable peace in post-conflict countries.

### 1.4.2 The Secretary-General's report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace

The Secretary-General's reports on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace have been pivotal documents in assessing the UN's progress and challenges in efforts to implement the sustaining peace resolutions. The first report was published in 2018 pursuant to paragraph 30 of the sustaining peace resolutions to update on progress in implementation and provided an array of recommendations for improvement that are still relevant today. Following an interim report issued in 2019 updating on progress in taking forward recommendations from the 2018 report, the 2020 Secretary-General's report was linked explicitly to the 2020 PBAR.

The resolutions concluding the 2020 PBAR requested the Secretary-General 'to continue to present a report every two years following that review, on continued implementation of the resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, with due attention to the impact of relevant reforms on the performance of the United Nations system in advancing the implementation of the resolutions



*on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, and with emphasis on the systematic impact made at the field level, for the consideration of Member States’.*<sup>66</sup>

The biennial report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace is a key opportunity for informing Member States of the UN's progress regarding its work on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, and for the General Assembly and other bodies to make informed decisions on future actions.

Its preparation involves compiling information on the progress of peacebuilding activities with input from diverse UN entities at the global, regional and local level. Given its function as a key instrument in monitoring progress and challenges in the UN's work on peacebuilding and sustaining peace as well as global developments affecting this work, and its intention to inform the direction of peacebuilding initiatives, the PBC could use the report more systematically as a reference point in developing annual workplans and in dialogue with other Member States.

#### **1.4.3 Resourcing the UN Peacebuilding Agenda: Challenges, reforms and the Role of the Peacebuilding Fund**

The resourcing of the Peacebuilding Architecture and the Sustaining Peace agenda has long been a critical challenge, particularly in the context of its dependence on voluntary contributions and fluctuating and often insufficient funding for selected peacebuilding efforts.

Since its inception the PBA has struggled to build a sustainable financial system for its organisation and operations. Furthermore, as the global demand for peacebuilding has grown amid escalating conflicts, the financing mechanisms for peace efforts within the UN system have faced significant constraints and vulnerability to changes in the allocations of Official Development Assistance.

Below is a brief summary of what resourcing aims to cover, with the focus on voluntary OECD DAC contributions, noting key developments, including changes to the ToR of the PBF in response to the allocation of assessed contributions, and evolution within the International Development Association replenishments of the World Bank.

#### **Resourcing for what?**

The challenges surrounding the financing of UN peacebuilding are twofold.

Firstly, there is the critical issue of securing adequate and sustained funding for peacebuilding actions, which is essential to support the growing need for peacebuilding in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. Despite its recognised importance, financing for prevention and sustaining peace remains disproportionately low. The dedicated instrument created specifically to meet these challenges, the PBF remains an essential tool.

However, the PBF has never managed to secure sustainable funding and primarily serves a catalytic role, leveraging additional funds from other sources rather than providing the comprehensive financing needed to strategically and timely address the scale of peacebuilding requirements as identified by conflict affected countries. This has created a dependency on a limited number of donors and financial mechanisms that are not tailored to the specific and long-term nature of peacebuilding, thereby hindering its strategic engagement, and its effectiveness and sustainability.

Secondly, the financial resourcing of the PBC and the PBSO presents another significant challenge. The operational capacity and success of these bodies are critically dependent on adequate and predictable funding.

For the PBC to fulfil its mandate, it requires sufficient resources to support its coordination functions, development and implementation of its annual workplans, and engagement with Member States and partners. In that regard, the PBSO, which serves as the Secretariat of the PBC, among other functions, requires adequate funding and staffing to ensure it can provide the necessary strategic advice, policy guidance, and operational support for peacebuilding initiatives. Without appropriate resourcing, the PBSO cannot effectively support the PBC's work or enhance its capacity to implement peacebuilding strategies, evaluate results, or foster the partnerships necessary for the implementation of the sustaining peace agenda.

The lack of sufficient and predictable funding for these entities undermines their ability to effectively support

countries in transition, and thus, the broader UN system's efforts to sustain peace.

### **Financing sustaining peace – a voluntary, fragile and unsustainable system**

The OECD's 2023 mapping of ODA for peacebuilding reveals significant challenges and negative trends that hinder its effectiveness. Peace-related ODA has reached a historic low despite escalating global needs driven by record-high levels of violent conflict. This decline is exacerbated by a growing focus on humanitarian aid, which overshadows underfunded conflict prevention efforts, despite their cost-effectiveness.

Moreover, peace financing remains heavily dependent on a few major donors, making it vulnerable to political shifts and changes in donor priorities. While fragile states face disproportionate vulnerabilities, peace ODA allocation remains broadly distributed with limited tailoring to specific needs, with investments favouring secondary peacebuilding activities over core functions, potentially overlooking foundational needs for sustainable peace.

The findings emphasise the need for donors to realign their strategies, focusing on conflict prevention, fragility-specific approaches, and sustainable peacebuilding. The OECD recommends tailored interventions, long-term investments, and better donor coordination to address these gaps.

### **Key Developments in Financing for Peacebuilding in the UN and the World Bank**

Despite the severe challenges posed by limited funding and the shifting landscape of development assistance, there have been some positive developments in the financing of peacebuilding over the last years that are important to note.

#### **Recent UN resolutions on financing peacebuilding**

In September 2022, the General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/76/305, which focuses specifically on the need for enhanced financing for peacebuilding. This resolution acknowledges the critical financing challenges that the UN faces in supporting peacebuilding efforts

and emphasises the importance of ensuring adequate, predictable, and sustained funding.

The resolution advocates for a multifaceted approach to financing, including the use of voluntary contributions, innovative financial mechanisms, and the allocation of assessed contributions to the PBF. It also encourages the further development of the Secretary-General's peacebuilding funding dashboard to strengthen accessibility that enhances information-sharing for the planning and coordination of financing, calling for it to catalogue all existing instruments and funding streams supporting UN peacebuilding, including pooled funds within the UN system at the global, regional and national levels.<sup>68</sup>

Building on this resolution, the General Assembly took a further step in December 2023, adopting Resolution A/RES/78/257, which approved an annual contribution of US\$50 million of assessed contributions to the PBF starting in 2025.<sup>69</sup> This decision marks a significant milestone in securing predictable and sustainable financing for peacebuilding activities. Together, these resolutions reflect a recognition of the importance of addressing the gap in funding for important peacebuilding and prevention efforts and could play a crucial role in strengthening the financial foundations necessary to foster long-term peace and stability globally.

### **Strengthening the Peacebuilding Fund - key revisions and enhancements**

Since its inception in 2006, the PBF has played an essential role in facilitating rapid and flexible financing for peacebuilding activities, helping fragile and conflict-affected countries address key priorities such as institution-building, reconciliation, and conflict prevention. The Fund is designed to respond to requests for financial support from countries in the early stages of recovery or those at risk of falling back into violence, providing much-needed resources to maintain peace and stability during fragile transitions. Despite its crucial role, the PBF has faced challenges in meeting needs and demand as a result of a lack of predictability and sustainability of its financing.

The ToR for the PBF were revised in response to GA resolution 78/257, adopted in December 2023 with the aim to strengthen the Fund's ability to support peacebuilding efforts more effectively.<sup>70</sup> The revision was driven by the

need for changes in response to incorporating assessed contributions to supplement voluntary funding, and ensuring better oversight and transparency.

The process involved discussions with the PBF Advisory Group<sup>71</sup>, stakeholders in the UN Secretariat and the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, as well as with Member States providing voluntary contributions, and through a structured consultation process with Member States in coordination with the PBC.

The revised ToR for the PBF includes an annual grant of US\$50 million from assessed contributions, earmarked for the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility, to be administered separately from voluntary funding. The revised ToR also strengthens transparency and oversight by expanding the membership of the PBF Advisory Group from 10 to 12 members, allowing for broader geographic representation. It also calls for the DPPA to provide more frequent briefings on the PBF's performance, while the PBC will have an enhanced oversight role, particularly concerning the allocation of assessed contributions. This will include annual reporting on the use of these funds, as well as mechanisms for future revisions.

National ownership remains a core principle of the PBF, with a requirement for having joint steering committees in each country, co-chaired by the RC and the relevant government authority.

Additionally, the ToR emphasises the importance of including key peacebuilding stakeholders, such as civil society and development partners, in these committees. They also highlight the need for innovation in resource mobilisation and further non-monetary contributions, with the Office of Internal Oversight Services tasked with evaluating the Peacebuilding Account and assessing new funding approaches.

### **Key Developments in Financing for Peacebuilding at the World Bank**

Despite the challenges posed by limited funding and the shifting landscape of development assistance, there have been notable developments in the financing of peacebuilding over the last years, including in the form of financial support from the World Bank.

### **Evolution of the World Bank's IDA replenishments**

Since 2016 the World Bank's International Development Association significantly increased its funding, particularly for countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence. The IDA20 replenishment raised US\$93 billion, with 42% of resources directed toward FCV-affected countries. This funding surge was further advanced by the IDA21 replenishment in December 2024, which secured a record US\$100 billion for the next four years.

These increases can have a direct impact on peacebuilding initiatives by enabling the World Bank to provide more predictable, concessional financing as outlined in the FCV strategy adopted in 2020.

The rise in funding has also allowed for more targeted investments in fragile states, helping them address key drivers of conflict and build resilience. This support aligns with the broader development goals and enhances the capacity of these nations to implement sustainable peacebuilding strategies.<sup>72</sup>

While the increase in funding through mechanisms such as the IDA replenishments offers a significant opportunity to advance peacebuilding efforts, there is a need for better understanding of how the PBA can partner with the World Bank to leverage these resources more strategically.

To maximize the impact of these funds, it is essential to enhance coordination between the various thematic funds within the UN system, as well as between the UN and the World Bank at both headquarters and country levels. This will require not only adequate capacity and competence within the relevant institutions but also strengthened collaboration and knowledge-sharing across sectors. By leveraging these financial resources more effectively, the international community can ensure that peacebuilding efforts are more integrated, sustainable, and impactful, addressing the root causes of conflict and fostering long-term stability.

The operationalisation of the Sustaining Peace agenda is critically dependent on clear and effective working methods, which ensure that strategic goals are translated into actionable steps for prevention and long-term peacebuilding. The PBC plays a key role in shaping

these efforts. Despite the progress made, challenges remain, particularly in securing sustained and predictable funding for peacebuilding activities and in aligning resources with the needs of fragile and conflict affected countries. Continued collaboration between the UN, regional organisations, and international financial institutions is essential to maximise the impact of resources available and to ensure sustainable peacebuilding efforts.

## **1.5 Strengthening the PBC and implementing the Sustaining Peace resolutions - informal assessments and initiatives**

This subchapter provides an overview of informal and external assessments aimed at supporting the effectiveness of the PBC and the implementation of the Sustaining Peace resolutions. It summarises key developments from recent informal retreats of the PBC, highlighting the discussions and outcomes that emerged from these gatherings. Additionally, the section outlines the regional and national consultations that have been held on implementation of the Sustaining Peace resolutions, with a focus on efforts made to incorporate diverse perspectives into peacebuilding strategies. A comprehensive summary of the Roundtable series organised by civil society organisations is also included, emphasising their critical role in fostering dialogue and engagement among stakeholders. Together, these assessments and initiatives contribute to a more inclusive and collaborative approach to sustaining peace in conflict-affected areas.

### **1.5.1 Outcomes from the annual informal PBC retreats**

Organised by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in partnership with the PBSO since 2013, the annual informal PBC retreat has become an important platform for reflection and dialogue among Member States, UN entities, and peacebuilding stakeholders.<sup>73</sup>

These retreats offer a space for candid discussions on the evolving roles and responsibilities of the PBC and have contributed to a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities in peacebuilding efforts by the UN system.

Key outcomes from these discussions include recognition of the need to strengthen the role of the PBC Chair and improved coordination across the peace, development, and human rights nexus.

The retreats also have reinforced the importance of inclusivity and intersectionality in peacebuilding, particularly in empowering marginalised groups, and emphasised the need for specialised agencies to better integrate peacebuilding principles into their programming.

Many of the ongoing debates around the prevention agenda underscore the importance of establishing a shared understanding of prevention to ensure more effective peacebuilding outcomes. These insights are crucial for shaping the future direction of the 2025 PBAR and advancing the global peacebuilding agenda.

Over the years, the PBC retreats have consistently emphasised the importance of prevention, making the connection to the 2030 Agenda and the need to address root causes such as poverty and inequality. Member States serving on the PBC have called for greater efforts to enhance the UN's commitment to prevention and encouraged a focus on early interventions to mitigate risks. The PBC has been recognised as a central multilateral UN platform to promote peacebuilding across peace, security, development, and human rights with its flexibility and ability to engage diverse stakeholders noted as being particularly valuable. Recommendations have urged a refinement in its working methods, and strengthening in its relationships with other UN bodies, especially the Security Council.

Financing for peacebuilding has remained a major concern, with challenges in resource availability and the unpredictability of existing funding mechanisms, such as the PBF. In retreat discussions since 2013, there has been a focus on securing sustained and diversified financing, with calls for innovative funding models, including private sector involvement and assessed contributions. Recommendations have stressed the need for more predictable funding, particularly for preventive actions. Strengthening partnerships and regional cooperation has been another constant theme, emphasising collaboration with IFIs, regional organisations, and civil society to scale up peacebuilding efforts.

Communication and visibility of peacebuilding efforts have been recognised as key challenges, with ongoing recommendations to improve communication strategies and increase the PBC's visibility, particularly through media and new partnerships to reach a broader audience.

The informal PBC retreat, through its events and reports, has become a predictable and effective instrument, providing a space for members to reflect on and engage in discussions about the implementation of the Sustaining Peace agenda. These gatherings have consistently included the presence of senior officials such as the President of the General Assembly (PGA), the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General, as well as the Presidents of the Security Council and ECOSOC, USGs, ASGs, and invited regional organisations, providing an informal yet critical space during these gatherings to reinforce commitment to and promote dialogue on how to advance peacebuilding initiatives.

### **1.5.2 Key findings from regional consultations on the implementation of the Sustaining Peace resolutions**

Over the past ten years there have been several events and discussions on the Sustaining Peace agenda held outside of New York to engage various parties across different sectors such as at the Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, Geneva Peace Week, PeaceCon in Washington DC, the annual meetings of the Academic Council on the UN System and in other locations.

Between 2016 and 2022 the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation conducted six regional consultations to elicit perspectives and experiences from diverse stakeholders on the Sustaining Peace resolutions and their implementation. These consultations were co-organised in partnership with and with participation from UN and civil society representatives as well as with engagement from government actors.

They were held in Accra, Lusaka, Seoul, Bogotá, Amman, Colombo and Nairobi. Overall, the consultations underscored the complexity and importance of integrating sustaining peace efforts across different levels and sectors, while adapting strategies to diverse regional contexts and enhancing collaboration with regional actors.

Key themes raised included:

- 1 *The concept of Sustaining Peace*: Participants generally supported the concept but highlighted a need for clearer definitions and more flexible approaches tailored to local contexts. There has been a call for integrating sustaining peace efforts with political, development, and human rights initiatives to address root causes of conflict.
- 2 *Implementation at Country Level*: Recommendations emphasise a need to decode the resolutions for practical implementation at national and regional levels. Effective communication and coordination across various stakeholders are crucial for translating policy into action on the ground.
- 3 *Linkages to Development and SDGs*: While the SDGs are seen as important, there's a recognition that not all development leads to peace, and vice versa. SDG Goal 16 is considered particularly important in supporting sustaining peace objectives, but broader coherence between development and peacebuilding efforts is essential.
- 4 *Addressing Fragmentation*: Efforts are needed to promote coherence in peacebuilding initiatives, challenge existing separations between humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding, and align funding structures to support long-term, sustainable peace efforts.  
*Inclusive National Ownership*: Emphasis is placed on supporting inclusive national leadership in peacebuilding processes, strengthening local capacities, and ensuring broad-based participation across societal levels, including marginalised groups, women and youth.
- 5 *Partnerships with Regional Actors*: There is growing recognition of the role of regional organisations in sustaining peace, but challenges include varying capacities and mandates of these bodies and non-compliance with agreed norms among Member States.

### **1.5.3 Summary of the 'Operationalising Sustaining Peace Roundtable' series**

The Operationalising Sustaining Peace roundtable series, held in differing formats since 2019, is currently organised by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in partnership with the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and the NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC), with the participation of Member States and relevant UN entities.

This thematic series of roundtable discussions aims to serve as a platform for in-depth exchange of ideas and perspectives on advancing implementation of the Sustaining Peace resolutions and the broader peacebuilding agenda.<sup>74</sup>

In summarising key themes from the roundtables held in the period leading up to the 2025 PBAR, one aspect is the need to strengthen the UN system's role in supporting regional and national prevention strategies.

The PBC has already demonstrated its potential to serve as a platform for countries to share their national peacebuilding and prevention plans, fostering political support and enhancing national ownership.

Going forward, the PBC is seen to be able to play a more significant role by hosting focused meetings to help countries develop and share prevention strategies, while mobilising the broader UN system to assist in their implementation.

Challenges such as the lack of consensus on the definition of 'prevention' and the absence of a comprehensive prevention toolbox still need to be addressed.

The roundtables also underscored the importance of increasing the quality and quantity of financing for peacebuilding. Despite some progress in securing funding for the PBF, a significant gap remains.

The growing disparity between military spending and peacebuilding funding, coupled with the limitations of traditional donor-recipient dynamics, reduces the impact of peacebuilding initiatives.

The PBC could strengthen its role in mobilising resources by fostering greater engagement with financial institutions and increasing donor coordination at the country level. Improved coordination, including the use of pooled funds and more flexible financing mechanisms, will be key to achieving impactful peacebuilding outcomes.

Lastly, the roundtables have highlighted the need to enhance the PBC's capacity to fulfil its full potential. While the Commission has made notable progress in facilitating learning, offering advice, and supporting peacebuilding efforts, there is a recognised opportunity

to expand its role further. Increasing its engagement with diverse peacebuilding stakeholders, raising awareness of its work, and improving its advisory capacity to the UN Security Council are considered key areas for development.

Strengthening the Commission's capacity through increased leadership from Member States and enhancing the support provided by PBSO are understood to be essential to its long-term success.

#### **1.5.4 Selected civil society efforts to strengthen the UN Peacebuilding Architecture**

Since its inception, civil society organisations and researchers have played an important role in supporting implementation of the sustaining peace resolutions, contributing valuable insights and recommendations along the way on how to improve the effectiveness and inclusivity of the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture.

Their work includes analyses of the PBC's role over time, fostering dialogue between the UN and civil society, and offering suggestions for better resource mobilisation and coordination across various sectors.

Below, some of these organisations and initiatives are identified along with a short introduction to the official CSO-UN dialogue. This list is indicative rather than exhaustive, and the selection includes mainly those organisations active and seeking to inform the discourse at the global policy level.

Annex A provides a compilation of written contributions to the 2025 review, many of which have been produced or co-authored by the civil society organisations listed.

#### **The CSO-UN Dialogue on Peacebuilding**

In 2023, DPPA, in collaboration with a core group of civil society and UN System partners, launched the CSO-UN Dialogue on Peacebuilding. The initiative aims to establish a platform for diverse civil society actors, particularly from the Global South, to influence global peacebuilding policies and objectives. It also seeks to enhance the UN's systematic engagement with civil society in advancing peacebuilding efforts.

The inaugural CSO-UN Dialogue on Peacebuilding took place from 30 November to 1 December 2023, convening 72 civil society participants from over 45 countries, predominantly from the Global South. They were joined by representatives from more than 20 UN entities and Member States to discuss challenges and opportunities for meaningful collaboration and partnerships between civil society and the UN in peacebuilding.

The second Dialogue occurred on from 12 to 13 December 2024 at UN Headquarters in New York City. Co-chaired by the DPPA/PBSO and Interpeace, with a focus on the 2025 PBAR and thematic priorities identified by the ImPACT Coalition on Peacebuilding, highlighted during the 2024 UN Civil Society Conference in Nairobi in support of the Summit for the Future.

### **Selected organisations and initiatives aiming to inform the global policy discourse**

*The New York Peacebuilding Group (NYPG):* NYPG is an informal coalition of organisations dedicated to advancing peacebuilding at the UN. Since its founding in 2014, NYPG has worked to strengthen civil society's role in UN peacebuilding and create space for dialogue with Member States.

In recent years, NYPG partners have provided input to the informal phases of the 2020 and 2015 PBAR and met regularly with the PBC Chair. The NYPG functions as a coordinator of civil society engagement at the UN and a catalyst for sustained focus on the Sustaining Peace agenda.

*Security Council Report (SCR):* SCR is an independent and impartial organisation that enhances the transparency and effectiveness of the UN Security Council by providing reports and high-quality analysis and information. In March 2025 SCR launched a detailed analytical report titled '*The Peacebuilding Commission at 20: Progress, Challenges, and the Road Ahead*'.

It underscores the PBC's role in enhancing coordination among stakeholders and fostering sustainable peace. Challenges include funding gaps, political tensions, and adapting to evolving conflict dynamics. The recommendations focus on enhancing institutional continuity, coordination, and impact by strengthening the

engagement by members, establishing clear roles for vice-chairs, improving follow-up mechanisms, and increasing the timeliness and quality of PBC advice.

They emphasise the importance of a strategic, impact-oriented approach, sustained financing, and fostering collaboration with other UN bodies. Additionally, the recommendations call for proactive engagement with the Security Council, ensuring that PBC activities align with broader peace and security initiatives and securing adequate resources to support its growing workload.<sup>76</sup>

*Center on International Cooperation (CIC):* New York University's Center on International Cooperation provides research and policy input on multilateral peace and security efforts. In the realm of peacebuilding, CIC's recent work has focused on strengthening UN mechanisms such as the PBC and promoting inclusive approaches.

A 2024 CIC report explored how the PBC can more effectively support national conflict prevention strategies, identifying ways to foster political buy-in, share best practices, coordinate assistance, and mobilise financing for National Prevention Strategies.<sup>77</sup>

More broadly, CIC contributes thought leadership on issues like peacebuilding financing and the relationship between the UN and the IFIs, the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, and the implementation of the Secretary-General's *New Agenda for Peace*. Through publications and policy briefs CIC helps shape global policy debates.

*Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies:* The Pathfinders initiative is a multi-stakeholder partnership launched in 2017 to accelerate progress on the SDG targets for peace, justice, and inclusion – (SDG16+). Co-founded by and hosted at CIC, Pathfinders brings together 46 UN member states and over 100 partners – including international organisations, civil society, and private sector actors – committed to implementing SDG16+ commitments.<sup>78</sup>

The group developed the Roadmap for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies which identifies three grand challenges for action: Halving Global Violence, Justice for All, and Inequality & Exclusion.<sup>79</sup> Based on these, Pathfinders convenes cross-regional coalitions to

share evidence-based solutions and best practices for reducing violence, expanding access to justice, and promoting inclusion. Pathfinders has become a key driver in translating SDG16+ targets into concrete reforms, thus directly supporting the prevention and peacebuilding components of the 2030 Agenda.

*Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC)*: GPPAC is a worldwide network of over 250 civil society organisations devoted to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

GPPAC has been a vocal advocate for elevating conflict prevention within the UN's sustaining peace framework. In follow-up to the 2016 Sustaining Peace resolutions, GPPAC, in collaboration with partners, produced analyses on how to implement sustaining peace.

A joint QUNO-GPPAC report *Building Sustainable Peace* (2018) underscored that a reinforced UN Peacebuilding Architecture and improved partnerships (including with civil society and regional actors) are crucial for delivering on sustaining peace.<sup>80</sup> GPPAC has consistently emphasised the importance of inclusivity and local ownership in and for prevention — noting that these remain under-utilised in practice and must be scaled up as part of sustaining peace.

GPPAC also contributes practical tools and has disseminated resources like *Building Peace Together*, a comprehensive peacebuilding handbook that catalogues effective methods and case studies for use by practitioners and policymakers.<sup>81</sup>

*Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO)*: QUNO is a long-time servant to UN peacebuilding and has worked with diplomats, UN officials and civil society since 1947. QUNO facilitates meeting, using its space and inclusive approach to gather diplomats, UN representatives and civil society for dialogue and off the record exchanges on peacebuilding and prevention, and provides expert policy briefs and reports. In recent years, together with the International Peace Institute (IPI), they have convened meetings focused on strengthening the PBC, generating recommendations to enhance the PBC's convening and bridging role.<sup>82</sup>

*International Peace Institute (IPI)*: IPI, an independent

think tank closely linked to the UN, has produced influential research on sustaining peace and the UN's peacebuilding instruments.<sup>83</sup> IPI's publications and events have assessed progress and gaps in implementation of UN Peacebuilding. For example, an IPI issue brief on *Operationalising the Sustaining Peace Agenda* drew lessons from country case studies (Burkina Faso, Liberia, Papua New Guinea) to illustrate innovations and remaining challenges in UN practice at the country level.<sup>84</sup> Other IPI studies on UN transitions from peacekeeping to post-mission settings have underlined the need for sustained attention to peacebuilding and development long after conflicts subside.

These insights – on linking peace and development, learning from past missions, and bolstering international support for nationally owned peace efforts — have actively informed UN policy dialogues.

*Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)*: NUPI conducts both academic and applied research on peace operations and peacebuilding and provides policy advice to governments and multilateral organisations.<sup>85</sup>

NUPI's work also focus on more effective cooperation among the UN and regional organisations (such as the African Union and European Union) in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Their peacebuilding research covers a wide range of topics informed by fieldwork, from Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law to the role of women and youth in peace processes, and the impacts of climate change and technology on conflict.

Over the past years NUPI has convened workshops with the PBSO and contributed to the 2015 and 2020 PBARs with evidence on effective peacebuilding practices. As input to the ongoing review, NUPI published a paper in October 2024 with a set of practical recommendations on how the impact of the PBC can be improved, and how the synergies of the Peacebuilding Architecture can be enhanced.<sup>86</sup>

*Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (DHF)*: Over the past decade, DHF has aimed to lend its support to various efforts to enhance the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture, working to inform policy development and to enable dialogue among a diverse set of Member States. Through formal and informal seminars and roundtables,



publications and bilateral partnerships, the Foundation strives to enhance the effectiveness of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and to operationalise the Sustaining Peace resolutions.

Together with the PBSO, DHF coordinates and co-hosts the annual PBC retreat and, in partnership with GPPAC and CIC, organises the Operationalising Sustaining Peace (OSP) roundtable series.

The DHF strives to connect realities at the country level with UN global policy by supporting regional and country-level consultations and bringing those insights to UN headquarters discussions. Specific themes the Foundation has focused on advancing are inclusivity in peacebuilding<sup>87</sup> and strengthening financing for peacebuilding including the engagement of the private sector<sup>88</sup> and use of pooled funding mechanisms.<sup>89</sup>

*Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS)*: CSPPS is the official civil society arm of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS).

This global network is comprised of civil society actors, practitioners, and experts from both conflict-affected countries and international NGOs, working together to influence peacebuilding and statebuilding policies. CSPPS's mission is to strengthen the voice and capacity of civil society to engage in and influence peacebuilding and statebuilding processes.<sup>90</sup>

*The United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR)* is an independent think-tank within the UN system, dedicated to providing policy-relevant research on global challenges, particularly in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Its mission is to deliver innovative, evidence-based solutions to inform UN policies and actions. In the past five years, UNU-CPR has provided various dedicated input for peacebuilding policy. Notably, it served as the secretariat for the High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism, contributing to the 2023 report *A Breakthrough for People and Planet*, which offers actionable recommendations to enhance global governance and peacebuilding.

Additionally, UNU-CPR conducted thematic reviews, such as the 2024 evaluation of the PBF's integration of human rights and peacebuilding efforts, providing guidance to strengthen these synergies.<sup>91</sup>

It can thus be concluded that collectively, CSOs and research organisations and initiatives have significantly informed and advanced the implementation of the sustaining peace resolutions. By complementing official efforts with independent expertise, broad partnerships, and diverse perspectives of experiences in local contexts, civil society engagement helps to advance the ambition of implementing sustaining peace.

The presence of CSOs in UN policy development enhances analysis, promotes transparency and strengthens the potential for sustainability. Many CSOs have established partnerships with local communities in the Global South, enabling them to offer valuable insights into the specific needs, challenges, and opportunities faced by those most affected by fragility and conflict.

This engagement allows for more inclusive and context-sensitive policy development, ensuring that peacebuilding strategies are grounded in the realities of local populations. Continuous and increased efforts are needed to ensure the direct inclusion of diverse representatives from civil society and social movements in the Global South.

## **1.6 The 2025 PBA Review – core elements of the informal phase**

This subchapter explores the core elements of the informal phase, which have set the stage for a more comprehensive examination of the PBA's effectiveness and its capacity to address the complex challenges of peacebuilding. Key components include the terms of reference that outline the scope and objectives of the review, as well as the official workstreams that have been included in the process. Significant events and documents have contributed to the dialogue, including the Security Council debate on peacebuilding, the 2024 Peacebuilding Commission Ministerial Meeting, and the concluding letter from the Eminent Persons Group. Additionally, the chapter examines the statement made by the PBC Chair, offering critical insights into the

Commission's perspective on its mandate and the future of peacebuilding within the UN system. Together, these elements form the foundation for a forward-looking review process that aims to strengthen the PBA's impact and relevance.

### **1.6.1 Context and the Terms of Reference**

The 2025 PBAR is mandated by the GA and SC resolutions (A/RES/75/201 and S/RES/2558) that concluded the previous review in 2020 and is structured in two distinct phases: an informal phase for consultations and discussions, and a formal phase focused on intergovernmental deliberations and negotiations on an outcome document.

The review's primary objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of the UN's peacebuilding efforts, identify gaps, and offer recommendations to improve its work in preventing conflict and sustaining peace, with a focus on national and regional initiatives.

The informal phase, which concluded at the end of 2024, was designed to allow for consultations involving Member States, members of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), agencies, funds and programs of the UN, departments within the UN Secretariat, and civil society organisations.

A group of eminent persons selected by the Secretary-General was to provide independent reflections and recommendations on the implementation of the sustaining peace resolutions. The intention was for this phase to provide essential insights for the formal phase of the review, where Member States have the task to negotiate an outcome document which is expected to be two new twin resolutions.

### **1.6.2 The three workstreams of the Informal phase**

Inputs during the informal phase of the review have come from three workstreams: 1) Meetings of the PBC and a summary of these in the form of a letter from the PBC Chair to the Secretary-General; 2) thematic and regional consultations from which recommendations are presented in written inputs and 3) the work of a Group of Eminent Persons selected by the Secretary-General whose analysis and proposals are consolidated in a letter to the Secretary-General.

In addition, a dedicated open debate in the Security Council early in the informal phase offered an opportunity for exchange among Member States on peacebuilding and raised important issues for consideration during the formal phase of the review.

The subchapters below elaborate on the first and third workstreams in greater detail—namely, the PBC meetings and the Chair's letter, as well as the work of the Group of Eminent Persons. The second workstream encompasses a broad range of thematic and regional consultations, resulting in written contributions from UN agencies, funds, and programmes that are too numerous and comprehensive to present here. These contributions provide valuable analysis, many of which merit further consideration; some of these ideas and recommendations were explored in the December workshop and are thereby taken forward in section two of this report. A comprehensive list of all contributions can be found on the PBSO website, while Annex 1 of this report provides a detailed compilation of relevant reports. Additionally, Annexes 2–5 include key texts, excerpts, and recommendations pertinent to the PBC's work.

### **Letter from the 2024 PBC Chair – synthesising main themes for the PBAR**

In a letter to the GA and Security Council, the 2024 PBC Chair, Sérgio França Danese representing Brazil, in accordance with the ToR of the 2025 PBAR, shared the main elements identified from open consultations convened by the PBC with Member States, UN entities, civil society representatives, and independent experts, including the Ministerial-level meeting mentioned in more detail below.

Several key themes are raised in the letter. The Chair highlights, for example, that the growing number of countries now requesting PBC consideration (31 in 2024) demonstrates the important advocacy role the Commission is playing.

A particular focus was placed on national ownership, strengthening the capacity of national institutions, and securing adequate financial resources for peacebuilding efforts. Engaging at the country level was recognised as crucial, with the PBC encouraged to facilitate regular dialogues with UN resident coordinators and relevant stakeholders.

The need for inclusive peacebuilding and sustaining peace initiatives tailored to specific contexts was stressed. The Peacebuilding Impact Hub, which provides data and empirical evidence for more informed and effective peacebuilding interventions, was also highlighted as an important development<sup>92</sup>. The engagement with The Gambia was identified as a good example of the PBC's flexible approach to peacebuilding, showcasing its role in preventing crisis escalation.

Drawing on thematic consultations, the letter emphasised the roles of youth in peacebuilding, including youth education, involvement in policymaking, and programming. While the engagement of the PBF in supporting youth initiatives was recognised, the letter also noted persistent challenges related to insufficient funding for youth-inclusive programs and a trust deficit between youth and political leaders.

The review process was considered as an opportunity to enhance the Commission's impact by focusing on national ownership, sustainable financing, and greater coherence within the UN system. Key recommendations for the review included enhancing the PBC's support to countries in transition, improving coordination with UN bodies, and promoting gender equality and youth engagement in peacebuilding efforts.

### **The 2024 Peacebuilding Commission Ministerial Meeting**

During the 2024 General Assembly high-level week, a ministerial level meeting on Peacebuilding was held on the topic '*The Road to the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review: perspectives and priorities*'. The meeting provided an opportunity for Member States to exchange views on their expectations and priorities regarding the 2025 PBAR process. The meeting featured discussions led by the PBC Chair, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) Under-Secretary-General DiCarlo, and Member States.

At the meeting, the DPPA Under-Secretary-General advocated for stronger peacebuilding efforts in follow-up of the adoption of the Pact for the Future, emphasising prevention, peacebuilding, and their link to sustainable development. The USG outlined five areas for the 2025 review to enhance the PBC's work, 1) support for national

prevention strategies, 2) advisory roles, 3) inclusive approaches, 4) partnerships, and 5) adequate financing.

A representative from the Group of Eminent Persons emphasised the importance of learning from past UN peacebuilding experiences, stressing two categories: general principles and specific practices of the PBC with national ownership as the most crucial principle, emphasising that the UN must be sensitive to Member States' needs and called for utilising all UN instruments and agencies to impact the ground effectively, improving cooperation with international financial institutions, and strengthening the PBC's operational role. He underlined the need for sustainability in peacebuilding and the participatory approach, including engaging women and youth. Additionally, he discussed the importance of political recognition for the PBC, expert preparation for decision-making, improved cooperation with international financial institutions, and stronger PBC-Security Council relations.

Other interventions highlighted the limited interpretation of the sustaining peace framework and the lack of practical implementation of inclusive national ownership with the need to move from normative agreements to practical actions. Several Member States raised the need for adequate, predictable, and sustained financing for peacebuilding activities, including innovative ways to support the Peacebuilding Fund.

There was also a call for tailored, flexible peacebuilding strategies, focusing on prevention and sustainable funding and to improve the PBC's cooperation with resident coordinators at the country level as well as with financial institutions and regional organisations.

### **The 2024 Security Council debate on Peacebuilding**

The 2024 open debate on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the UN Security Council, under Sierra Leone's presidency, provided a platform for discussing the New Agenda for Peace and its emphasis on conflict prevention.

Sierra Leone's Foreign Minister, Timothy Kabba, highlighted the country's post-conflict recovery and the critical importance of national ownership and inclusive governance in preventing violence and sustaining peace. Kabba stressed addressing root causes such as

economic marginalisation, youth unemployment, and political exclusion, using Sierra Leone's history as a model of reconciliation through national dialogue and reforms.

Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) Elizabeth Spehar representing the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) highlighted three key areas from the New Agenda for Peace:

- 1 *Promoting voluntary, inclusive, and nationally owned Prevention Efforts:* Strengthening peace infrastructures, with an emphasis on national action and priorities to prevent conflict.
- 2 *Comprehensive Approach to Prevention and Sustaining Peace:* Addressing root causes of conflict and promoting resilience through inclusive development, as aligned with the 2030 Agenda, focusing on addressing exclusion and inequalities.
- 3 *Strengthening Partnerships and Resources:* Enhancing cooperation between the UN, regional bodies like the African Union (AU), and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank. This includes greater engagement with the private sector and improving follow-up on peacebuilding outcomes.

ASG Spehar emphasised that conflict prevention requires a universal and coordinated effort. She underscored the necessity of addressing structural issues like inequality and exclusion, in alignment with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Additionally, the ASG highlighted the need to strengthen partnerships between the UN, regional bodies like the African Union, and financial institutions such as the World Bank, calling for more engagement from the private sector and bolstered resources for prevention strategies.

Sierra Leone's representative shared lessons from its own post-war recovery, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process, the role of women in peacebuilding, and the establishment of community-owned peace commissions. The country's early warning systems, peace monitors, and mediators serve as valuable models for conflict prevention. There is a call for more investment from donors in research and dialogue to support these efforts.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is another element of importance highlighted in the debate, particularly in building capacities and strengthening institutional coordination.

Sierra Leone underscored the essential role of UN missions in providing security, disarming combatants, and building institutions.

Additionally, the revitalised African Union Peace Fund, with windows for conflict prevention, institutional capacity-building, and peace support operations, was recognised as a promising initiative launched in collaboration with the UN and UNDP in 2023.

Member States emphasised that development, security, and justice are integral to conflict prevention. Participants underscored the value of local and national prevention strategies, calling for better coordination between the UN, regional organisations, and financial institutions to enhance these efforts.

### **The Independent Eminent Persons Group**

As requested in the ToR for the PBAR, the Secretary-General nominated a small group of independent eminent persons, selected from relevant UN senior advisory boards and groups, to carry out consultations and to provide their independent perspectives on the implementation of the resolutions on the peacebuilding architecture. The group was comprised of H.E. Mohamed Edrees (Egypt), Jayati Ghosh (India), Joyce Mendez (Colombia/Paraguay), Sara Pantuliano (UK) and Danilo Türk (Slovenia).

The input of the Independent Eminent Persons group was conveyed to the Secretary-General in a letter which outlines several key recommendations for strengthening the peacebuilding architecture in response to the increasingly complex global challenges and a growing demand for peacebuilding efforts. These challenges include a rise in violent conflicts, poverty, inequality, climate change, and threats to multilateralism.

The letter draws attention to the need for a new approach to peacebuilding that aligns with the goals set out in the New Agenda for Peace and the Pact for the Future. The letter calls for the 2025 PBAR to be an ambitious, strategic, and pragmatic process, with Member States fully implementing previous recommendations and using the review as an opportunity to strengthen the Peacebuilding Architecture.

A specific recommendation of the group includes the need to build and strengthen national ownership through inclusive participation of national stakeholders, including civil society, women, youth, and the private sector, with an effort to engage marginalised groups in peacebuilding decision-making, especially at the local level.

The group also emphasise the importance of maximizing impact on the ground in a coordinated effort led by the RC with support by PBSO, using all UN tools, including peacekeeping, political operations, and human rights mechanisms. They also urged for stronger coordination among UN bodies, such as the General Assembly, Security Council, and ECOSOC to ensure continuous engagement in peacebuilding with a focus on addressing the root causes of conflict, facilitating reconciliation, and supporting long-term recovery and development.

Additional recommendations include transforming the PBC into a global platform with political support, upscaled financing, and a flexible decision-making process, positioning the PBC as a proactive actor rather than a post-conflict mechanism.

On resource mobilisation, the group urges Member States to strengthen the PBC's mandate to mobilise resources and improve collaboration with IFIs like the World Bank and IMF. The group encourages increased contributions to the PBF, including a doubling of the current level of assessed to 100 million US\$, and an exploration of innovative financing solutions, such as reallocating unspent peacekeeping funds.

The group encourages that sustainable development and climate change be better integrated into peacebuilding efforts, with a focus on building national institutions, including justice and human rights and urges stronger partnerships with regional and global actors to address cross-border conflict drivers and integrate regional frameworks into peacebuilding strategies.

Finally, the Eminent Persons underscore the importance to invest in youth-led peacebuilding initiatives and to support gender empowerment through the PBF, with a focus on local organisations and national prevention strategies.

## 1.7 Conclusions

Since its inception the UN Peacebuilding Architecture has evolved significantly, shaping the way the UN approaches transition from peacekeeping to development, prevention and efforts to build sustainable peace.

Member States play a critical role in ensuring that the PBC is equipped to respond to emerging challenges and advance comprehensive prevention and peacebuilding strategies that support national actors in addressing fragility and conflict. The international community has increasingly recognised the need to strengthen the PBC, as evidenced by various initiatives within the UN system.

Recent multilateral agreements, including the *Pact for the Future*, signal an opportunity for a new era of collaboration and investment in the PBC's capabilities. However, given the current geopolitical environment, the path ahead is far from certain.

On the one hand, frameworks such as *Our Common Agenda*, the *New Agenda for Peace*, and the *Pact for the Future* reflect a commitment to revitalising multilateralism and enhancing the UN's role in global governance.

On the other hand, the growing geopolitical polarisation has led to a highly fragmented international landscape, making it increasingly difficult to achieve effective multilateral cooperation. The evolving context for peacebuilding and the changing demands on the PBC make it critical to assess and respond to both new opportunities and growing obstacles in sustaining peace.

The informal phase of the 2025 PBAR has laid a critical foundation for the formal phase, facilitating input through comprehensive consultations among Member States, UN entities, and civil society.

This process has underscored the importance of national ownership, inclusive participation, and sustainable financing for peacebuilding efforts. The insights gathered, including those from the 2024 Security Council debate and Ministerial Meeting, highlight the increasing demand

for peacebuilding support and the need for a more coordinated and impact-driven approach.

As mentioned in the introduction of this report and repeated here for emphasis, many of the recommendations identified in previous reviews and presented again in the informal phase of the 2025 PBAR do not require new mandates or commitment in the PBAR resolutions negotiated during the formal phase. Several can effectively be implemented through strong leadership of the PBC Chair with support and active engagement of the Vice-Chairs and other PBC members and continued adjustments to working procedures. Others can be advanced by UN representatives as part of their day-to-day work and responsibilities at the Secretariat and in Agencies Funds and Programmes at Headquarters, as well as at the regional and country level.

To maximise impact, a comprehensive approach must be taken to generate a shared understanding of the recommendations and how to take them forward. The ultimate goal should be to identify and commit to concrete actions that drive meaningful change. Implementation must be the priority, as the true measure of success is progress at the country level, where peacebuilding efforts must deliver sustainable and lasting results.

The first part of this report has identified the 'why' and 'what' of the PBAR process: why strengthening peacebuilding is imperative, and what key issues and recommendations have emerged.

The second section now shifts focus to the 'how', 'where', and 'who' of the implementation process. We structured these insights into ten areas for change that outline the practical steps needed to enhance the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture and to ensure it contributes to positive impact at all levels. ●



## **Section 2**

# **Prospects for the future of the UN Peacebuilding Commission — 10 areas of change**

Section Two of this report explores the prospects of the PBC, emphasising its evolving role in the context of the 2025 PBAR. Mandated by the 2020 dual resolutions on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (A/RES/75/201-S/RES/2558, OP5) the 2025 PBAR is a comprehensive review focused on enhancing impact and further operationalising peacebuilding and sustaining peace. It requires a substantive resolution as an outcome of the process to further operationalise peacebuilding and sustaining peace. The 2025 PBAR should build on the findings of the previous reviews, as well as the developments in the UN PBA since 2020.<sup>94</sup>

This section examines how the PBC can strengthen its influence at multiple levels — from the country level to the UN system, policy, and Member States — while aligning with the review's objectives. It identifies ten key areas with detailed recommendations and actions that can drive progress, fostering a more coordinated, effective, and sustainable approach to peacebuilding.



## 2.1 Context for change – priorities and political realities

The 2025 PBAR must start by recognising that change is needed and that prioritisation will be necessary. Furthermore, the success of any recommendation will be measured not by theoretical or policy shifts, but by the implementation and resulting changes observed at the country level.

That said, the 2025 review comes at an extremely challenging time for the entire international development system with political polarisation and financial difficulties that threaten the very core of multilateralism and the UN.

This is not the time to give up, but political engagement and space for change is limited. It is not a time to advocate for large-scale political reforms or suggesting new and costly financial arrangements.

The international landscape is increasingly fragmented, and the financial resources needed for ambitious reforms simply may not be available given changing political positions of core providers of financing.

Given these constraints, it is crucial to propose clear priorities, building on existing structures and ensuring that the peacebuilding agenda remains resilient and responsive to the realities of a rapidly changing global environment.

The ultimate results go beyond the formal outcome of the 2025 PBAR. While negotiated reforms are important, the PBC and its Member States must actively strengthen the PBC's effectiveness through the review process, regardless of political constraints. With intergovernmental negotiations likely to be difficult, dedicated support from Member States is essential to making the PBC more strategic, responsive, and impactful. Seizing opportunities to enhance its working methods, partnerships, and resource mobilisation will ensure that peacebuilding remains a priority beyond the 2025 PBAR's formal resolutions.

The effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts is ultimately determined by their ability to drive sustainable peace and development in countries affected by conflict. Achieving this goal requires change at multiple levels of the UN

system, each serving different purposes and demanding different approaches. It is not sufficient to focus on refining global policies; these policies must be translated into actionable frameworks within the UN system itself and ideally, they should also influence Member States to follow through by aligning their respective development efforts.

While global policy can set broad directives, the real difficulty lies in ensuring that these policies are operationalised within the complex structure of the UN system. This includes creating synergies between different UN entities and ensuring that these entities collaborate meaningfully on the ground. Without this internal coherence and effective coordination, even the most well-intentioned policy reforms risk being undermined by inefficiencies and fragmented efforts.

To make progress, the review should identify a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the PBC at different system levels. It is vital that recommendations consider the specific challenges at each of these levels — whether in global policy, UN system coherence, or country-level implementation — and address the practical realities of making these changes.

Without addressing each of these interconnected levels, peacebuilding efforts will remain fragmented and unable to generate sustainable peace at the country level.

**1 Delivery at the Country Level:** The most important impact of peacebuilding efforts is at the country level. This is where peacebuilding initiatives, tailored to the specific needs and contexts of affected countries, must be implemented. Recommendations that focus on strengthening the PBC's capacity to support national governments, civil society, and local actors will drive practical changes on the ground, ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are effective and responsive to the challenges faced by countries in conflict or post-conflict situations.

**2 UN System Level:** Many recommendations aim to enhance coherence and coordination across the broader UN system. These recommendations focus on improving the interactions between various UN entities. The PBC plays a critical role in ensuring that these efforts are coordinated, but for this to happen,

the internal structures and practices of the UN system need to be adjusted to ensure greater synergy and efficiency in peacebuilding operations. Many of these will require resolution coverage.

**3 Peacebuilding Policy Level:** Ensuring that the PBC and other peacebuilding entities are aligned with global standards and evolving peacebuilding paradigms require adjustments to policy at a systemic level. Recommendations may address how the broader frameworks and strategies of the UN's peacebuilding architecture should be refined to address issues related to new policy frameworks such as Youth, Peace and Security.

**4 Member States engagement:** Finally, recommendations may also be designed to drive change at the Member States level, encouraging them to engage in peacebuilding initiatives, commit resources, strengthen internal coherence and implement policies that support long-term peacebuilding goals. Recommendations that engage Member States must focus on how they can align national policies with international peacebuilding efforts, ensuring that countries are not only recipients of peacebuilding support but also active contributors to the global peacebuilding agenda.

Understanding the impact of recommendations across these levels provides a framework for assessing their effectiveness in strengthening peacebuilding efforts.

However, translating recommendations into meaningful change requires targeted action in key areas. The next section explores ten distinct areas of change that are critical to advancing peacebuilding.

## 2.2 Ten Areas of Change

The recommendations aimed at strengthening peacebuilding are not new; they build on decades of insights drawn from previous reviews and reports, observations by the PBC, by external experts and the experiences of CSOs engaged in peacebuilding efforts.<sup>95</sup>

Over time, recurring themes have emerged, highlighting both persistent challenges and opportunities for

reform within the UN's peacebuilding architecture. While progress has been made, the gap between policy and implementation remains a central concern, reinforcing the need for targeted action in key areas.

This chapter identifies 10 critical areas where change is necessary to enhance the effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives. These areas are not isolated but inherently interdependent, reflecting the complex nature of sustaining peace. They address the need for stronger national ownership, improved coordination within the UN system, alignment with evolving global frameworks, enhanced financial support, deeper engagement by Member States, and the adoption of innovative approaches to improve communication.

By examining these 10 areas, this chapter seeks to provide a structured analysis of how existing recommendations can be translated into meaningful and lasting change. The objective is not to introduce entirely new ideas but to consolidate existing knowledge and experiences into actionable pathways for reform, ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are more responsive, inclusive, and impactful at all levels.<sup>96</sup>


Each area of change is framed within a strategic and results-oriented perspective, offering practical steps to enhance the PBC's effectiveness and overall contribution to sustaining peace. Every change-area begins with a desired outcome statement, outlining the intended impact of the proposed change. This is followed by a brief analysis of the challenges and rationale behind the recommendation, highlighting existing gaps, structural obstacles, or emerging opportunities that necessitate reform.

Finally, each section presents specific recommendations and actions. Some of the recommendations or actions are intentionally repeated across change areas as they are all understood to be interlinked and pursuing the same objective from different approaches.

## ● Change 1

### **The PBC has a stronger advisory role**

The PBC is used as an effective intergovernmental platform to enhance coherence and coordination in peacebuilding efforts. A more influential PBC actively shapes decision-making at the highest levels by providing proactive, strategic, and solutions-driven advice to the Security Council, General Assembly, and other UN bodies, ensuring that peacebuilding priorities are effectively integrated into global policy and action.



### **PBC advisory role and interactions with the Security Council**

The PBC's advisory role to the Security Council is often limited in its impact. Its advice has been criticised for rarely introducing new information or analysis and frequently relies on pre-agreed language. This is largely due to the PBC's consensus-based operating structure and insufficient planning ahead of PBC meetings that are held to generate and agree on advice to the UNSC.

Consequently, the PBC's advice tends to reflect the 'lowest common denominator' rather than the strategic, politically informed counsel that it is mandated to provide.

Furthermore, the PBC has not been able to generate country-specific analysis that can be directly and meaningfully utilised by other intergovernmental bodies, including the UNSC, ECOSOC, and the Human Rights Council. The lack of institutional support, the absence of follow-up on the Commission's advice, and the insufficient integration of diverse expertise further limits its capacity to provide timely and actionable recommendations.

## ● Recommendations and Actions:

### **1 Strengthen institutional support for quality advice:**

- The PBC should enhance its capacity to generate political and informed advice by leveraging existing resources, such as the UN Secretary-General's reports and Common Country Analyses (CCAs). The PBC should not merely replicate these documents but instead use them to bolster its own recommendations.
- The PBC Support Branch of the PBSO, serving as the Secretariat for the PBC (hereafter referred to as the PBC Secretariat), must be strengthened to support the Commission in producing more holistic and action-oriented political advice, informed by diverse stakeholders. The PBC could use its advisory role to inter-governmental bodies including the UNSC to elaborate on the meaning of key peacebuilding terms, such as 'restoration and extension of state authority', a phrase frequently used by UNSC.

### **2 Establish a framework for following up on PBC advice:**

- To better understand and strengthen the impact

of its advice, the PBC should develop a framework to measure the outcomes of its recommendations, particularly regarding their influence on both global policy and field-level implementation. This framework should include mechanisms for engaging with national stakeholders to assess the impact and relevance of the advice over time and build on the PBSO's ongoing development of a Peacebuilding Impact Hub.<sup>97</sup>

### **3 Reinforce the quality of the Commission's advice:**

- The PBC could establish a 'Knowledge Hub' or 'Advisory Group' that draws on diverse technical experts to assist Member States in obtaining relevant, actionable information. This can enhance the Commission's role by ensuring its advice is targeted, comprehensive and rooted in diverse expertise.
- The PBC should update its working methods to prioritise quality over quantity in the advice it provides. This involves being more selective and strategic, focusing on areas where the Commission has a comparative advantage, such as advising on countries in transition. This will increase the potential for the PBC's recommendations to be impactful and aligned with the core objectives of peacebuilding. The UNSC should in turn prioritise requests for advice from the PBC on themes and in contexts where the PBC can add the most value.

### **4 The PBC should align its annual work plan with the UNSC's programme of work:**

- The PBC could better align its annual work plan with the UNSC's Programme of Work, including countries where it has expertise, particularly those in transition, contingent upon the country in question showing an interest to be discussed at the PBC. This approach rests on the foundational principle of national ownership, which underpins all work of the PBC.
- The Vice-Chairs and Chair of the PBC should work together to ensure a more effective and coordinated approach to annual planning, ensuring that the PBC advice is formally considered in the UNSC's mandate renewal processes.

### **5 Re-activate the use of 'Informal Interactive Dialogues' (IIDs) between the UNSC and PBC:**

- The PBC could advocate for the reactivation of Informal Interactive Dialogues (IIDs) between the UNSC and the Commission.<sup>98</sup> These dialogues can provide a format for addressing overlaps in the work of various intergovernmental bodies and promote greater coordination and coherence. The PBC should investigate the reasons behind the decline of interest in IIDs and explore ways to reinvigorate this modality which can enhance the flow of information and decision-making between the two bodies.
- Further inquiry can be also made as to what the UNSC can do to support the work of the Commission. Similar space available within the ECOSOC could present an opportunity to discuss how to better leverage the UN Development System for peacebuilding.

### **6 Increase the PBC Chair's engagement with UNSC and other intergovernmental bodies:**

- Build on the increased engagement of the PBC Chair with the UNSC in 2024 and expand this practice.
- The PBC Chair should be invited to brief other intergovernmental bodies, such as ECOSOC, more frequently to ensure that the PBC's perspective is consistently represented and integrated into broader UN discussions on peacebuilding.

## **PBC advice and interactions with the General Assembly**

The PBC's advisory role to the General Assembly (GA) has significant potential to advance peacebuilding priorities and foster greater coherence across the UN system. While the GA holds a broad peace and security mandate under the UN Charter, its scope encompasses a wider range of peacebuilding and prevention contexts that the PBC could support.

In the past, the GA has mandated peace operations or other mechanisms that have contributed to critical transition moments, from overseeing elections to monitoring ceasefires and withdrawals, supporting key peacebuilding priorities such as monitoring human rights, strengthening justice and police functions, and facilitating inclusive peace negotiations and transitional justice.

It has appointed special envoys, fact-finding missions, accountability mechanisms and otherwise used its good offices roles to promote human rights, sustainable development mechanisms and other issues crucial for peacebuilding.

The GA also brings its weight in moments of crisis response and management, using its global voice and wide membership body to condemn unconstitutional transitions of power and create pressure for peaceful elections and other key components for sustaining peace.

Despite this, the PBC has not fully leveraged this relationship in advancing the UN's peacebuilding efforts, and its advisory role to the GA remains underdeveloped. There has been increased interest from Member States that have been discussed at the PBC to further strengthen this engagement, in part with the intention of using the Commission's advice to gain support for GA resolutions.

While GA resolutions are non-binding, their 'soft power' is particularly effective in peacebuilding situations, where mandatory or coercive authority could be counterproductive or unnecessary. To fully realise this potential, it is crucial to strengthen the relationship between the PBC and the General Assembly.

## ● Recommendations and Actions:

### 1 Strengthen the PBC's advisory role to the General Assembly:

- The PBC should explore avenues to expand its advisory role to the GA. In the 2025 PBAR outcome document, Member States should, in follow-up of the Pact for the Future, consider including language that explicitly supports fully activating the PBC advisory capacity to the GA, with such engagements initiated upon request by either body. This could build on actions by and experiences of the PBC members who have served as Informal Coordinator between the PBC and the GA.

### 2 Develop regular modalities for interaction between the PBC and the GA:

- The GA should begin identifying regular and institutionalised pathways for interaction with the PBC. This will create a more formalised and consistent framework for dialogue and collaboration, allowing the PBC to channel its expertise and advice on

peacebuilding issues to the GA.

- Enhancing the PBC's engagement with the GA might require identifying a dedicated recurring agenda item for consultations with the Commission or simply ensuring that the existing annual review item offers a more robust space for dialogue, advice and collaboration. This year, the PBC Chair informally briefed the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), and similar informal engagements and consultations with other relevant committees could be taken forward.<sup>99</sup>


### 3 Pursuing new avenues for consultation and dialogue should not detract from other engagements:

- Strengthening the advisory role of the PBC to the GA should be viewed as an additional avenue to enhance the PBC's impact, not as a replacement for its work with other UN bodies, such as the UNSC, ECOSOC, or the Human Rights Council. Maintaining and enhancing these existing relationships should remain a priority, with the GA advisory role complementing and broadening the PBC engagement within the UN system.

## ● Change 2

### **The PBC effectively promotes coherence across the UN system**

The PBC is used to bridge gaps between UN entities and enhance peacebuilding efforts. A more effective PBC strengthens system-wide coherence by fostering collaboration, aligning mandates, and ensuring that peacebuilding priorities are integrated across the UN system for greater impact and efficiency.



The PBC has and can play a critical role in advancing coherence within the UN's peacebuilding efforts, yet there is significant potential to improve the integration and coordination of its activities.

Currently, the PBC's role in promoting coherence across both operational and policy dimensions is underutilised. The Commission could more effectively integrate diverse issues and stakeholders into its work, ensuring alignment with broader UN peacebuilding efforts, including those of UN Country Teams and peace operations.

Furthermore, while the PBC convenes experts from key stakeholders, its approach to inviting participants remains inconsistent and a systematic and strategic process is often missing.

Additionally, while the PBC could serve as a central hub for generating knowledge and promoting learning in peacebuilding, its capacity to do so is not fully harnessed.

There is also a lack of systematic engagement with Resident Coordinators. To enhance its impact and contribution to the coherence of peacebuilding efforts across

the UN system, the PBC must strengthen its internal processes, expand its engagement with stakeholders, and improve coordination across intergovernmental bodies and Member States.

#### ● **Recommendations and Actions:**

##### **1 Adopt a comprehensive approach to integrate diverse stakeholders:**

- The PBC should adopt a more comprehensive and intentional approach to including a broader range of stakeholders in its discussions. By convening experts from across the UN system, international and local civil society, IFIs, and other relevant actors, the PBC can foster greater synergies and coherence in its work. A more systematic approach to determining who is invited to PBC meetings would improve the effectiveness of these dialogues and ensure that a broader range of relevant voices are included in shaping peacebuilding efforts.

##### **2 Increase engagement with Resident Coordinators (RCs):**

- The PBC should engage more frequently with RCs,

who play a crucial role at the country level in bringing together various UN entities and supporting national priorities. Regular engagement with RCs will promote peacebuilding discussions at the country level and ensure better alignment between global and national peacebuilding priorities. The PBSO in collaboration with the Development Coordination Office (DCO) should facilitate follow-up after PBC meetings with RCs, recognising the challenges posed by shrinking capacities within RC offices. Support for RCs should be prioritised, including ensuring adequate resources for peacebuilding tasks within their mandates.

### **3 Make the PBC a hub for knowledge production, learning, and adaptation:**

- The PBC should strengthen its focus on knowledge generation and sharing good practices in peacebuilding. One of the Vice-Chairs could be assigned specific responsibility for knowledge, learning, and adaptation. The PBC could also convene an annual peacebuilding research and knowledge conference to take stock of the latest research on peacebuilding and sustain dialogue with the global peacebuilding research community. This could align with the Secretary-General's call for an annual peacebuilding conference, enhancing the Commission's role as a central hub for knowledge on peacebuilding.<sup>100</sup>

### **4 Encourage Member States to integrate peacebuilding expertise across the UN System:**

- Member States should be encouraged to integrate the peacebuilding expertise gained through their work with the PBC into their engagements with other intergovernmental bodies. This includes, for example in the work of the GA's Fifth Committee, in ensuring that PDAs remain financed and that peacebuilding tasks are not removed from the terms of reference when Member States leave the PBC. These experts should be tasked with carrying forward the peacebuilding agenda within other intergovernmental bodies.

### **5 Raise awareness of the PBC's work and improve information flow within the UN System:**

- Member States on the PBC should actively promote the work of the PBC to countries who have

not previously utilised its platform in support of their peacebuilding efforts. Many countries undergoing transitions are not fully aware of the support the PBC can offer and modalities for engagement. By raising awareness of the PBC's role and offer, Member States can generate greater interest and understanding, encouraging non-member countries to engage with the PBC.


### **6 Map existing peacebuilding efforts to promote coherence:**

- The PBC should leverage its convening capacity to map existing efforts in support of countries' peacebuilding priorities, particularly to avoid duplication of efforts. For example, in its engagement with São Tomé and Príncipe, the Commission conducted a mapping exercise of existing financial support, which helped stakeholders identify gaps and areas where further support was needed. Such mapping exercises should be expanded to enhance coordination and ensure that all stakeholders are working towards common peacebuilding goals. The Secretary-General's peacebuilding funding dashboard should be utilised as a resource in this regard.
- The PBSO should improve the flow of information between the PBC and Member States, particularly regarding important events and dialogues such as the CSO-UN Dialogue on Peacebuilding. Ensuring that all relevant parties are informed early can contribute to more coherent system-wide peacebuilding efforts. The PBSO can also support broader coordination across the UN system, helping to align peacebuilding efforts with other development and humanitarian initiatives.

## ● Change 3

### **The PBC actively and strategically engages in UN Mission settings**

The PBC provides strategic guidance and support during the transition and drawdown of peacekeeping operations, ensuring a smooth shift from UN-led missions to nationally owned peacebuilding efforts. As the role of UN peacekeeping evolves, with an increasing emphasis on political solutions and peacebuilding beyond military presence, the PBC plays a critical role in sustaining progress and international accompaniment. A more engaged PBC enhances stability by facilitating early planning, strengthening partnerships between UN agencies and national stakeholders, and mobilising resources to sustain peace and development beyond the presence of a peacekeeping mission.



### **PBC advice and interactions related to mission transitions and drawdowns in peacekeeping operations:**

The PBC plays a critical role, particularly in transition settings and mission drawdowns, where its expertise can provide valuable political accompaniment, convening power, and advisory support.

The 2022 Secretary-General's report on transitions in peace operations (S/2022/522) emphasises the importance of a comprehensive political strategy that engages multiple stakeholders around a shared vision for the post-mission phase.<sup>101</sup> Such a strategy must align with national development plans and include a long-term financing approach.

The PBC's mandate can offer substantial value in these contexts, as seen in Liberia and Burkina Faso. However, there is a need for a more consistent and integrated peacebuilding orientation within UN peace operations, particularly regarding planning, financing, and the involvement of the PBC itself. Strengthening peacebuilding in these settings requires early and continuous engagement, as transition should not be viewed as a fixed stage but rather a mindset that can evolve at any point. Without this integration, peacebuilding priorities may be overlooked, and transition processes risk losing momentum.

### ● **Recommendations and Actions:**

#### **1 Strengthen peacebuilding orientation in UN peace operations:**

- The 2025 PBAR resolutions could include language that emphasises the need to strengthen the peacebuilding orientation within UN peace



operations. For example, the resolutions could encourage the integration of peacebuilding into the planning and financing of peace operations, ensuring that peacebuilding priorities are addressed early and continuously throughout the mission cycle. There could also be consideration of involving the Peacebuilding Support Office in the task forces mandated to plan the mandates of peace operations.

## **2 Synchronise the PBAR with other key UN processes:**

- The 2025 PBAR's formal phase should consider the ongoing discussions regarding peace operations, including the review of peace operations, the upcoming UN Peacekeeping Ministerial Meeting, and follow up on the outcomes of the 2024 Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review (A/RES/79/226).<sup>102</sup> This alignment can help to foster a triple nexus approach, connecting peace, development, and humanitarian efforts, and leverage the broader UN development system to support peacebuilding.

## **3 Encourage the UNSC to seek the PBC's advice on peace operation mandates:**

- Member States could encourage the UNSC to consult the PBC on new peace operation mandates and mandate renewals, as prescribed by several resolutions and Security Council Presidential Statements (PRSTs). Rather than creating a parallel process, the PBC should channel its expertise into UNSC and GA discussions, reinforcing its advisory and bridging roles. This will ensure that peacebuilding expertise is embedded in the early stages of mission design and planning, aligning peace operations with long-term peacebuilding goals.

## **4 Strengthen peacebuilding capacities within UN peace operations:**

- Peacebuilding capacities within peace operations should be reinforced, including the integration of peacebuilding advisors or peace and development advisors who can offer a comprehensive package of expertise to support the peacebuilding and prevention needs of countries in transition. These advisors should be embedded within the operational structure to ensure peacebuilding is considered throughout the mission.

## **5 Increase engagement with national and local stakeholders:**

- The PBC should leverage its convening power to engage more with national and local stakeholders, including governments, youth groups, and women's organisations, to gather input on transition processes. This engagement will help ensure local ownership and buy-in for the transition process. Additionally, these consultations can inform the plans of development partners and promote joint discussions on how to integrate transition planning into development cooperation efforts.

## **6 Encourage UNSC engagement with the PBC for countries in transition:**

- The UNSC should encourage governments of countries undergoing transition to engage with the PBC, especially those that have not yet sought PBC support. For example, while the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has not yet been discussed within the Commission, there is potential for the PBC to contribute valuable insights. The UNSC could recommend to transitional governments to approach the PBC to benefit from its expertise and guidance.

## **Supervising 'peacebuilding support missions'**

The Group of Independent Eminent Persons has recommended the use of so called '*light footprint missions*' as a more flexible and sustainable alternative to traditional large-scale peacekeeping operations, reiterating an idea presented by the 2023 PBC Chair. These missions are designed to operate with minimal presence while focusing on providing political support, coordination, and targeted capacity-building.

However, the PBC's role in supervising such missions and their distinction from the existing model of special political missions managed by DPPA is not yet clearly defined. By taking on a supervisory role for missions intended to lend support to nationally owned and led peacebuilding processes, the PBC could help enable their success and integration into broader peacebuilding strategies, while ensuring that they remain responsive to evolving country needs.<sup>103</sup>

## ● **Recommendations and Actions:**

### **1 Develop a clear terminology and framework for peacebuilding support missions:**

- The PBC could work with relevant stakeholders to develop a clear framework for possible peacebuilding support missions that outlines their objectives, mandates, and the mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. This framework should focus on flexibility, responsiveness, and the ability to adapt to changing political and security dynamics, while ensuring that missions remain focused on building sustainable peace.

### **2 Ensure alignment of peacebuilding support missions with national peacebuilding priorities:**

- Any peacebuilding support missions that are established should be fully aligned with the peacebuilding priorities of the host country, ensuring that they address the root causes of conflict and support long-term development. The PBC should facilitate coordination between peacebuilding support missions and national peacebuilding and prevention strategies, ensuring that the missions complement and enhance existing efforts by national governments and local stakeholders.


### **3 Provide adequate resources and support for peacebuilding support missions:**

- While peacebuilding support missions are conceptualised and would be designed to operate with minimal presence, they still require sufficient resources, including funding, expertise, and capacity-building support. The PBC should work with Member States and relevant UN bodies to secure the necessary resources for these missions, ensuring that they have the capacity to deliver effective support and create lasting impact.

## ● Change 4

### **The PBC effectively leverages its convening role across the UN system**

The PBC operates as a more influential platform for prevention and peacebuilding coherence, bringing together diverse UN entities to align peacebuilding efforts. By leveraging its convening power, the PBC fosters more coherent and strategic engagement across the UN system, ensuring that peacebuilding priorities are integrated into broader development, humanitarian, and security agendas. This results in stronger partnerships, better resource mobilisation, and more effective responses to complex peacebuilding challenges.



The PBC holds significant potential in developing inclusive engagement across a range of countries, regions, and thematic areas on its agenda. However, its approach to engagement has often been ad-hoc, without a clear commitment to long-term partnerships or a systematic approach.

Furthermore, Member States who seek support from and engagement with the PBC have demonstrated and articulated different views and expectations of what they aim to receive from the PBC's work. This ranges from PBF eligibility to sharing of experience and promoting accountability for advancing peacebuilding priorities.

While the PBC's convening power is one of its key strengths, it has not been fully utilised in a way that promotes sustained dialogue, inclusivity, and effective collaboration. The PBC's meetings sometime lack a clear purpose or framework, and the involvement of key stakeholders — such as local peacebuilders, academia, and civil society — has been limited. Additionally, the current structure of convenings and decision-making processes can limit the PBC's ability to create meaningful partnerships and facilitate strategic peacebuilding initiatives. To maximise the

potential of its convening power, the PBC should adopt a more systematic, inclusive, and transparent approach to its engagements and strengthen its ability to drive positive, long-term peacebuilding outcomes.

#### ● Recommendations and Actions:

##### **1 Clarify the purpose and goals of the PBC's convening role:**

- The PBC should clearly define the goals and purpose of its convenings, ensuring that each meeting has a well-established objective. The PBC could develop a framework that outlines the roles and expectations of various stakeholders, including Member States, civil society, local peacebuilders, and IFIs. This framework can increase clarity on the type of information that is most valuable to share during meetings; help IFIs and others to better understand what is expected of them; and provide more guidance for the PBC's work and thereby its ability to be impactful and purposeful.

##### **2 Formalise and structure the PBC's convenings:**

- The PBC should implement a more structured approach to its convenings by providing clear and

timely information to stakeholders. Concept notes and agendas should be made available at least one month in advance to allow all participants — including Member States, civil society, and other partners — adequate time to prepare. This will encourage greater participation and ensure that all relevant voices are heard. The PBC should not allow meetings to proceed without proper preparation, and the Chair should take a more active role in ensuring that meetings are well-organised and meaningful.

### **3 Enhance inclusion of local peacebuilders, academia, and civil society:**

- The PBC should prioritise the involvement of local peacebuilders, academia, and think tanks in its meetings. These stakeholders bring valuable, country-level perspectives and can contribute to more inclusive and holistic discussions. Member States should be encouraged to propose briefers, and the Chair should ensure that the input by independent civil society is included in every relevant session. To facilitate this, the PBC could establish a systematic mechanism for selecting diverse civil society representatives, including women and youth, to ensure that different perspectives are consistently represented.
- In situations where there is an absence of civil society participation, the Chair has the prerogative (following precedent and if deemed appropriate) to decide not to proceed with the meeting.

### **4 Rethink the consensus principle for more effective decision-making:**

- The PBC should reconsider the application of the consensus principle across all its work, which often prevents meaningful civil society engagement and hinders decision-making. Instead, the PBC could adopt a voting mechanism on relevant questions to ensure that the views of all stakeholders are considered and that decisions are made in a timely and effective manner. This shift will allow for more inclusive, transparent, and accountable decision-making processes within the PBC.

### **5 Establish annual peacebuilding research and knowledge conference:**

- The PBC could organise an annual peacebuilding

research and knowledge conference, coordinated by the PBSO with guidance from a global research advisory panel. This conference would bring together researchers, peacebuilders, and stakeholders to discuss the latest developments in peacebuilding and share best practices. It could also serve as a platform for the PBC to collaborate with academic institutions and think tanks on the development of national prevention strategies, thus strengthening the knowledge base of the PBC and enhancing its strategic capacity. The potential and possible advantages of linking such a conference to the annual CSO-UN Dialogue should be explored.

### **6 Facilitate pre-meeting engagement with local peacebuilders:**

- To ensure meaningful local participation, the PBC should work with civil society to organise meetings with local peacebuilders ahead of its formal sessions. This will allow for a more inclusive and preparatory process, giving local stakeholders an opportunity to provide input and align their priorities with the broader peacebuilding agenda. These engagements should be scheduled with adequate notice, ensuring that local peacebuilders have enough time to contribute effectively.


### **7 Revise PBCs working methods to ensure diverse civil society engagement:**

- The PBC should revise its working methods to ensure that a diversity of civil society representatives, including those from marginalised communities, are meaningfully engaged during its meetings. This could include setting aside specific time slots for civil society input and ensuring that diverse perspectives are reflected in discussions. Furthermore, the PBC could develop specific guidelines for the inclusion of women and youth, ensuring that their voices are integral to the peacebuilding process.

## ● Change 5

### **The PBC successfully promotes and strengthens partnerships for peacebuilding**

The PBC operates as a more effective advocate for and facilitator of strategic partnerships for peacebuilding. By strengthening engagement with International Financial Institutions, Regional Development Banks, the private sector, and civil society, the PBC enhances collaboration and coordination among key stakeholders. This leads to stronger national ownership of peacebuilding processes, better alignment of international support with country priorities, and more sustainable efforts to address fragility, prevent conflict and support long-term peacebuilding.



Effective partnerships are essential to the success of peacebuilding efforts, particularly in an increasingly complex global landscape. As fragility and conflict continue to rise, the need for coordinated and inclusive approaches becomes more urgent.

The PBC plays a crucial role in fostering partnerships that connect national governments, regional organisations, multilateral institutions, and civil society. Strengthening these partnerships improves coherence across peacebuilding initiatives, promotes knowledge-sharing, and enhances the impact of peacebuilding strategies at all levels.

#### **Strengthening engagement with regional organisations for country-level peacebuilding**

The PBC has a critical role to play in building strong prevention and peacebuilding architectures, but its current engagement with regional organisations remains underdeveloped. Regional organisations, particularly those in conflict affected and fragile areas, have a deeper understanding of local contexts, greater acceptance among local populations, and are often better positioned to influence peacebuilding outcomes.

The PBC can enhance its impact by systematically strengthening its collaboration with these organisations. By better aligning the PBC's efforts with regional development plans, such as Africa's Agenda 2063 and the African Union's Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD), the PBC can provide more coordinated, holistic peacebuilding support that integrates local and regional priorities.

## ● Recommendations and Actions:

### 1 Formalise and strengthen partnerships with regional organisations:

- The PBC could establish formal partnerships with key regional organisations, including the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and ASEAN, to support country-level peacebuilding and prevention efforts. This could involve regular consultations and joint initiatives that align the PBC's work with regional priorities and strategies, ensuring a more contextually relevant and coordinated approach to peacebuilding.

### 2 Integrate regional development plans into PBC's work:

- The PBC could incorporate regional development plans, such as Africa's Agenda 2063 and the AU's Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, into its peacebuilding framework. This will ensure that the PBC advice and support align with long-term regional development goals, enhancing the sustainability and effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives at the field level.

### 3 Enhance knowledge exchange between the PBC and regional organisations:

- The PBC could facilitate regular knowledge exchange between its members and regional organisations, sharing best practices, lessons learned, and challenges faced in peacebuilding. This could be achieved through joint workshops, conferences, and collaborative research initiatives, enhancing mutual understanding and strengthening the collective impact of peacebuilding efforts.

### 4 Increase local stakeholder participation in regional dialogues:

- The PBC could work with regional organisations to create more inclusive peacebuilding processes by involving local stakeholders, including civil society, youth, and women's groups. This approach will ensure that regional peacebuilding efforts are not only locally driven but also reflect the needs and aspirations of the populations most affected by conflict.

## PBC's engagement with IFIs and Regional Development Banks

The PBC has significant potential to engage IFIs and Regional Development Banks (RDBs) in peacebuilding processes. Yet there remains a noticeable lack of interest and active engagement from these institutions. While the PBC is a key resource, it cannot provide comprehensive support for peacebuilding in countries on its own. PBC funding, while small, can help to attract investments by IFIs and RDBs. These institutions are well-positioned to contribute to peacebuilding efforts, as their involvement enhances development objectives and help reduce the risks associated with working in fragile and conflict-affected countries. However, to unlock this potential, the PBC must help to bridge the gap between the UN's peacebuilding architecture and the operational language and priorities of IFIs and RDBs. More frequent, structured engagement, alignment of language, and better understanding of expectations will be key to fostering stronger partnerships that can deliver impactful peacebuilding outcomes.

## ● Recommendations and Actions:

### 1 Explore the expectations of IFIs and RDBs for effective engagement:

- The PBC should deepen conversations with IFIs and RDBs to better understand their expectations from peacebuilding discussions. This will help to build synergies and identify areas where collaboration could be most effective. The PBC Secretariat should systematically investigate the specific needs and priorities of these institutions, ensuring that the PBC's engagement with them is relevant and mutually beneficial.

### 2 Align language between the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and IFIs/RDBs:

- To enhance communication and understanding, the PBC should work towards aligning the language used within the UN peacebuilding architecture with the terminology and frameworks employed by IFIs and RDBs. This alignment will improve clarity and ensure that both parties are speaking the same language, facilitating better collaboration and understanding of each other's roles and contributions.

### 3 Encourage joint peacebuilding assessments:

- The PBC should encourage joint peacebuilding

assessments between the UN and IFIs, ensuring that both entities are working from a shared understanding of the peacebuilding context and needs. These assessments should include input from both the UN system and IFIs to ensure that the most relevant and comprehensive data informs peacebuilding strategies.

#### **4 Improve internal coordination among bilateral donors:**

- Bilateral donors, particularly those represented on the advisory boards and governing bodies of IFIs, should improve internal coordination within and across their ministries. This will ensure that IFIs better understand the value of engaging with the PBC and can align their funding and peacebuilding efforts with the broader goals of the PBC.

#### **5 Encourage documentation and sharing of lessons learned:**

- The PBC should encourage IFIs and RDBs that are already engaged in peacebuilding, such as the African Development Bank, to document and share their lessons learned with other IFIs and RDBs. This exchange of experiences and best practices will help other institutions improve their own peacebuilding efforts and ensure that the most effective strategies are being implemented across regions.

#### **6 Explore additional international fora for engagement with IFIs and RDBs:**

- Members of the PBC should explore other international forums, such as the G20, to engage IFIs and RDBs. While peacebuilding is rarely the focus of these discussions, forums like the G20 have a significant impact on IFIs. By raising peacebuilding issues in these spaces, the PBC can help bring greater attention to the importance of peacebuilding and encourage IFIs to incorporate it into their broader agendas.

### **South-South and Triangular Cooperation**

South-South and Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) represents a vital framework for collaboration among countries of the Global South, aiming to share knowledge, expertise, and resources in various sectors,

including peacebuilding. It can take place bilaterally, regionally, or through multilateral platforms and provides an opportunity for conflict-affected countries to learn from each other's experiences, enhancing resilience and capacity for peacebuilding. Triangular cooperation extends this model by incorporating support from traditional donor countries and multilateral organisations, facilitating resources and technical assistance to strengthen South-South initiatives. This cooperation is increasingly recognised within the Peacebuilding Architecture as a critical tool for conflict prevention, resolution, and sustainable peace.

Despite its potential, there are several challenges associated with SSTC in peacebuilding contexts. These include securing the necessary operating space and trust among participating countries, especially in sensitive or fragile settings. The role of the UN is crucial in facilitating and enhancing SSTC efforts, leveraging its intergovernmental platforms such as the PBC to support exchanges of good practices, mobilise financial resources, and provide a platform for the Global South to engage with conflict-affected countries. To unlock the full potential of SSTC, it is essential to address capacity gaps within the UN system and strengthen its coordination across peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian sectors. The goal is to ensure that SSTC becomes a mainstreamed approach within peacebuilding efforts, fostering more inclusive and effective strategies for sustaining peace.

### **Recommendations and Actions:**

#### **1 Develop an institutional framework for SSTC in peacebuilding:**


- The PBC could adopt a more explicit approach to SSTC in peacebuilding, outlining best practices, operational guidelines, and key areas for engagement. This could ensure a more structured and coordinated approach and facilitate peer-learning exchanges among Global South countries, enabling them to share successful peacebuilding strategies, governance models, and reconciliation processes. The PBC could also promote regional and intergovernmental dialogues on this theme.
- The PBC could explore dedicated financing mechanisms to support SSTC peacebuilding initiatives, ensuring sustainable funding for South-South partnerships.



## ● Change 6

### **The PBC facilitates and enables adequate and timely resource mobilisation for peacebuilding**

The PBC operates as an effective advocate for peacebuilding financing, ensuring that adequate and sustained resources are available to support conflict prevention and long-term peacebuilding. By strengthening its engagement with IFIs, RDBs, private sector actors, and bilateral donors, the PBC expands the range of funding sources for peacebuilding initiatives. This results in more predictable, flexible, and long-term financing, enabling countries to implement comprehensive peacebuilding strategies, address structural drivers of conflict, and build sustainable peace.



The PBC plays a vital role in mobilising resources for peacebuilding efforts, yet its current capacity to do so effectively is underdeveloped. Despite the growing need for peacebuilding funding, especially in post-conflict countries, the PBC lacks the mechanisms to fully align its efforts with the PBF, mobilise domestic resources, and engage the private sector.

Additionally, there is limited focus on creating sustainable national peacebuilding funds or ensuring that peacekeeping missions allocate appropriate resources for peacebuilding activities. The reliance on intermediary models for financing, while necessary, often limits the direct impact of funding on local actors. To enhance the PBC's role in resource mobilisation, there needs to be a more strategic, coordinated approach to funding and resource allocation that includes exploring innovative funding models, and better engaging national and private sector stakeholders.

## ● Recommendations and Actions:

### **1 Empower the PBF with increased funding and enhanced working methods:**

- The PBC should advocate for increased resources for the PBF to ensure that it can meet the growing demands for peacebuilding support. This includes exploring new funding sources and ensuring that the PBF's working methods are regularly streamlined to improve efficiency and effectiveness. The PBC should work closely with all Member States and other stakeholders to secure the necessary resources and refine the operational processes of the PBF, ensuring that it remains flexible yet accountable in its support for peacebuilding initiatives.

### **2 Align the PBC and the PBF's work for greater accountability and flexibility:**



- The PBC should strengthen the alignment between its activities and those of the PBF, while maintaining the PBF's flexibility to respond to dynamic and context-specific peacebuilding needs. This could include more regular briefings to the PBC on progress of PBF-funded projects; an annual exchange between the full membership of the PBC and the full PBF Advisory Group; and a standing invitation for a PBC member to join field visits by the Advisory Group to PBF project sites.
- The PBC can play a critical role in ensuring that resources are used effectively and in a manner that reflects the priorities identified in peacebuilding strategies supported by the PBC.

### **3 Encourage domestic resource mobilisation and private sector engagement:**

- The PBC should actively encourage domestic resource mobilisation, particularly in countries undergoing transition, to ensure that peacebuilding efforts are more sustainable. In addition, the PBC should work to foster greater engagement from the private sector in supporting peacebuilding initiatives. By involving private sector actors, the PBC can help distinguish between bilateral donor support and national capacities, ensuring that both domestic and international resources are mobilised effectively for long-term peacebuilding.

### **4 Explore the creation of National Peacebuilding Funds:**

- The PBC should explore the creation of national peacebuilding funds to complement the work of the PBF and other country-based pooled funds that may have a development or humanitarian focus. While the PBF cannot sustainably support all peacebuilding activities in a given country, national peacebuilding funds can provide a more sustainable source of financing, drawing in resources from domestic governments, IFIs, and RDBs. The PBC could look to models like Liberia's peacebuilding fund as a potential model for other countries, ensuring that funds are tailored to the specific needs and context of each country.

### **5 Ensure peacekeeping missions allocate resources for peacebuilding:**

- The PBC should advocate for peacekeeping

missions to allocate a set percentage of their budgets for peacebuilding activities. In many cases, more resources are available within peace operations' budgets than in the PBF. The PBC should work with the DPO to ensure that peacekeeping budgets are used strategically to support peacebuilding objectives, and that unspent peacekeeping funds are transferred to peacebuilding efforts where appropriate. This approach will help to ensure that peacekeeping missions contribute to long-term peacebuilding goals, rather than just addressing immediate security concerns.


### **6 Review and enhance Intermediary Financing Models:**

- The PBC should support the review of existing intermediary financing models to improve the quality and accessibility of funds for peacebuilding. Bilateral donors often rely on the UN, international NGOs, and other networks as intermediaries to distribute funds. The PBC should explore how these models can be improved to ensure that local actors have better access to resources and that funding reaches those who can most effectively drive peacebuilding efforts. By identifying the intermediary models that result in greater impact, the PBC can help refine the ways in which funds are distributed and utilised at the local level.

## ● Change 7

### **The PBC actively supports the development of National Prevention and Peacebuilding Strategies**

The PBC serves as an effective platform for countries to receive support for and input on their national prevention and peacebuilding strategies, including in mobilising resources for such strategies. By leveraging the guidance provided in the UN General Assembly Resolution on Financing for Peacebuilding (A/RES/76/305) and aligning with the Pact for the Future, the PBC supports Member States in developing well-resourced prevention strategies tailored to their national priorities. This enables countries to build resilient institutions, address root causes of conflict, and create conditions that attract further donor investment in stabilisation and long-term development.



The Pact for the Future (Article 17) encourages Member States to adopt national prevention strategies and approaches to sustain peace 'on a voluntary basis and in accordance with national priorities'. As any other mechanisms, such strategies and approaches to be effective need to be adequately financed.

The UN General Assembly Resolution on Financing for Peacebuilding (A/RES/76/305) provides guidance on the national and multilateral pathways to funding such prevention strategies. The rationale is that properly funded national prevention strategies and approaches could serve as a foundation of the interest of more donors to invest into the country's stabilisation and development.

#### ● Recommendations and Actions:

**1 Activate the PBC's convening role to national prevention strategies:**

- The PBC could play a role, particularly through its convening function, in making the case to various donors for financing national prevention strategies, including from national funding, bilateral donors, multilateral development banks, and other IFIs. Specifically, the PBC could strive to mobilise funding from the World Bank's Prevention and Resilience Allocation Facility (PRA), which requires the existence of a national prevention strategy as one criterion for funding. Beyond financial resources, the PBC can mobilise required support in the development of strong policies by bringing relevant stakeholders together. Through the convening power of the PBC, countries can identify and/or communicate gaps that need to be filled.

**2 Explore linkages at the country level:**

- Engagement with IFIs can also be pursued at the

country level under the leadership of the RC. For example, in Papua New Guinea (PNG), following the development of a national prevention strategy that was supported by the PBF, World Bank funding was secured for its implementation.

### **3 Increase cooperation between the PBC and the PBF:**

- Cooperation between the PBC and PBF could be strengthened, including by allowing countries that present their national prevention strategies to the PBC to receive special consideration for PBF funding and organising an annual meeting on PBF financing for such strategies. The PBF can share good practices in supporting national prevention strategies and communicate them to the PBC through the format of annual thematic review.


### **4 Take action to unlock private finance:**

- The PBC needs to develop a clear strategy for engagement with the private sector which currently does not exist. Such an effort could start with a mapping or exploration of where the private sector is willing to engage and connect these efforts to national prevention strategies. Lessons could be learned from efforts in recent years to strengthen financing for the SDGs using blended financing and public-private partnerships.

## ● Change 8

### **The PBC constructively advances cross-cutting issues in UN Peacebuilding efforts**

The PBC operates with an expanded thematic capacity, enabling it to address key cross-cutting issues in peacebuilding more effectively. By prioritising inclusivity and national ownership, the PBC strengthens its support for locally driven peacebuilding efforts, with a particular focus on advancing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda and the Youth, Peace, and Security agenda. Additionally, the PBC effectively integrates climate-related risks into peacebuilding strategies, ensuring that climate adaptation and mitigation efforts contribute to sustaining peace and preventing conflict. It also bridges the development-peace-human rights nexus, ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are holistic, rights-based, and aligned with broader UN objectives. This results in more responsive, inclusive, and sustainable peacebuilding approaches that better reflect the diverse needs of affected communities.



Despite advancements, the PBC faces challenges in fully realising its potential to advance thematic priorities within peacebuilding. Climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities, increasing the likelihood of conflict over scarce resources, displacement, and economic instability. However, peacebuilding efforts often fail to fully integrate climate considerations, resulting in fragmented approaches. Additionally, the absence of dedicated financing and insufficient institutional capacity within the UN system limit the PBC's ability to address climate-security challenges comprehensively.

A persistent gap remains between policy commitments and on-the-ground implementation in advancing inclusivity and whole of society approaches in peacebuilding processes, particularly in ensuring meaningful participation of women and youth. Structural barriers, limited funding, and socio-political resistance continue to hinder the full realisation of UN Resolutions 1325 and 2250, reducing the effectiveness of inclusive peace efforts.

Similarly, the integration of the development-peace-human rights nexus remains a complex challenge. While there is growing recognition of the interdependence

of these pillars, operational silos within the UN system, inconsistent political buy-in from Member States, and fragmented funding streams often weaken coordination and implementation. The PBF struggles with securing long-term, predictable financing for projects that align peacebuilding with human rights and sustainable development objectives, limiting its ability to support comprehensive and preventive approaches. Addressing these challenges requires not only financial support but also political commitment, improved coordination among UN entities, and effective engagement with local actors.

## ● Recommendations and Actions:

### 1 Strengthen partnerships and enhance climate-sensitive peacebuilding strategies:

- The PBC should initiate and systematically collaborate with key UN bodies such as UNEP, UNDP, and the Climate Security Mechanism to incorporate climate-related risks into its country-specific and thematic discussions, ensuring that peacebuilding strategies address environmental stressors.

### 2 Further institutionalise the Women Peace and Security and Youth Peace and Security agendas within the PBC's mandate:

- Ensure that all PBC country-specific meetings integrate WPS and YPS considerations, with analysis on gender and youth inclusion. The PBC could also establish systematic consultations with youth-led peacebuilding organisations and enhance its engagement with women's networks, civil society organisations, and UN Women.
- The PBC's gender strategy<sup>104</sup> and the Commission's Strategic Action plan on Youth and Peacebuilding<sup>105</sup> should be actively applied and regularly followed up on to ensure inclusion of gender and youth analysis and gender and youth specific priority areas in all substantive PBC documents and their updates. In doing so, the PBC should consider intersectional approaches and applications with the aim of realising the promise in the 2030 Agenda of leaving no one behind.<sup>106</sup>

### 3 Strengthen coordination with Human Rights mechanisms:

- Establish formal linkages between the PBC and the UN Human Rights Council and OHCHR to enhance coherence in peacebuilding strategies


and that human rights are systematically included in PBC advice to the Security Council and General Assembly, advocating for justice, accountability, and inclusive governance reforms.

- The PBC could actively advocate for the inclusion of human rights monitoring and protection mechanisms in national and regional peacebuilding, ensuring that transitional justice and accountability measures are prioritised and support projects that address structural inequalities, discrimination, and marginalisation, reinforcing the human rights-development-peace nexus.

## ● Change 9

### **The PBC communicates effectively about its role, activities and the impact of its work**

The PBC operates with a more strategic and integrated communication approach, effectively conveying the importance of peacebuilding and prevention.<sup>107</sup> By proactively highlighting the long-term value of sustaining peace over reactive crisis responses, the PBC enhances its visibility and influence within the UN system and beyond. Improved communication ensures that Member States, UN entities, and external partners better understand and support peacebuilding efforts and the role of the Peacebuilding Architecture, reinforcing peacebuilding as a UN priority and generating broader political and financial commitment.



In recent years, there has been increasing demand from Member States for the PBC to enhance the visibility of its work. Despite its vital role in peacebuilding and conflict prevention, PBC's contributions remain under-recognised both within the UN system and externally. This lack of visibility undermines the Commission's potential to generate broader support for peacebuilding and prevention efforts, as its work often fails to be fully understood. Peacebuilding is inherently complex, and its successes are not as immediately visible as the acute crises that capture global attention. To date, the PBC has not effectively communicated this essential aspect of its work, leaving its value underappreciated.

To address this, the PBC should adopt a more strategic and integrated communication approach. This includes addressing a core challenge in communicating the importance of prevention over reaction — highlighting the

long-term value of peacebuilding and sustaining peace over the more visible responses to crisis.

Recent shifts in the discourse toward prioritising prevention offer an important opportunity to reframe the narrative around peacebuilding, underlining that it should be regarded as an essential investment rather than a reactive solution.

By enhancing its communication efforts, the PBC can raise its visibility and ensure its work is more effectively understood and supported by a broad range of stakeholders, including other Member States, various UN entities, and local partners. This would elevate peacebuilding as a UN priority and help make the case for sustained investment and ensure that the work of the PBC becomes a central element of the UN's peacebuilding and prevention efforts.

## ● Recommendations and Actions:

### 1 Develop a PBC strategic communication framework:

- The PBC should collaborate with the UN Department of Global Communications to develop a comprehensive communication strategy. This strategy should be aligned with the PBC's objectives and include clear messaging about the work it does, its impact, and the challenges it faces. The strategy should guide both internal and external communications, focusing on enhancing visibility and ensuring the Commission's peacebuilding and prevention efforts are recognised at both global and country levels.

### 2 Clarify the PBC's objectives for effective communication:

- To communicate the value of the PBC effectively, its specific objectives and goals must be clearly defined and communicated. This clarity will help tailor messages to target audiences, making the case for why peacebuilding and conflict prevention are essential investments. Clear objectives will also assist in measuring the impact of communication efforts, ensuring that the Commission's contributions are understood by a wider audience.

### 3 Integrate communications into peacebuilding programming:

- Strategic communication should not be an afterthought but integrated into peacebuilding initiatives from the outset. This approach should be implemented especially at the country level, where awareness of the PBC's role can be increased among national governments, civil society, and local partners. By embedding communication strategies into ongoing operations, the Commission can ensure its work is continually visible and understood throughout the duration of peacebuilding efforts.

### 4 Leverage media platforms and public engagement:

- The PBC could utilise a variety of media platforms, including radio, television, and social media, to amplify its message and reach a broader audience. This includes collaborating with regional bodies, academic institutions, and multilateral organisations to further promote the Commission's

mission. The use of Goodwill Ambassadors and global campaigns can help raise the profile of the Commission's work and attract attention to the importance of peacebuilding and prevention.

### 5 Train PBC members and partners on media and public advocacy:

- Media training should be made available, particularly to newly elected PBC members, to equip them with the skills necessary to advocate effectively for the Commission's work. This will enable members to speak confidently about the PBC's impact and importance, both within the UN and in broader public forums. Training should include strategies for engaging with media outlets, stakeholders, and the public, ensuring consistent and effective messaging.

### 6 Encourage active advocacy by Member States:

- Member States should be encouraged to actively advocate for the work of the PBC within their own countries and in other multilateral forums. This includes engaging with regional bodies, academic institutions, and civil society organisations to raise awareness of the PBC's role in peacebuilding. By amplifying the Commission's work through their own platforms, Member States can help build broader support for peacebuilding initiatives.


### 7 Utilise a 'what, why, and what now?' framework for PBC messaging:

- Building on the UN's Global Communications Strategy, the PBC should use the 'what, why, and what now?' framework to guide its messaging. This approach will help clarify the problems the PBC is working to solve, why audiences should care about peacebuilding, and what actions are being asked of them. By providing clear, actionable communication, the PBC can engage its target audiences more effectively, encouraging them to take tangible steps to support peacebuilding efforts.

## ● Change 10

### **The PBC has adequate capacity to effectively fulfil its mandate**

The PBC operates with strengthened institutional capacity, enabling it to fully deliver on its advisory, bridging and convening roles. With improved resources, predictable financing, and expanded analytical and operational support, the PBC responds more effectively to evolving peacebuilding challenges. A fully capacitated PBC fosters greater engagement with Member States and UN bodies, ensuring that its mandate translates into impactful and sustained peacebuilding efforts.



The PBC is facing increasing demand for its work at a time when its capacity to respond effectively and strategically remains limited. Many Member States, particularly those undergoing transition, do not fully grasp the value proposition of the PBC. This calls for efforts to enhance communication of the PBC's work and impact, investing resources to raise awareness of its role within the broader UN system. Moreover, increasing the visibility of the PBC and reinforcing its operational capabilities are essential steps to ensure that it can meet the growing demands for peacebuilding support, and channel this support with the most impact.

#### ● Recommendations and Actions:

##### **1 Strengthen the PBC Secretariat:**

- The PBC Secretariat should be reinforced as a foundational component of the PBC. This enhancement will help the PBC assess and communicate its value proposition to Member States and stakeholders more effectively. The PBC Secretariat could also take a more systematic approach to gathering and analysing information, strengthening the PBC's strategic direction and increasing its impact on peacebuilding efforts. The ongoing

efforts to develop the Peacebuilding Impact Hub (see p44) is a welcomed step in this direction and should be reinforced.

##### **2 Ensure dedicated space and interpretation for PBC meetings:**

- The PBC should secure dedicated meeting space, such as the Trusteeship Council, and ensure that interpretation services are available for all meetings. The lack of interpretation services has led to the cancellation of PBC meetings in the past, hindering its ability to convene and engage effectively. Providing dedicated space and interpretation will ensure the PBC work proceeds without disruption, enabling it to carry out its functions more efficiently.

##### **3 Clarify and strengthen the role of Vice-Chairs:**

- The introduction of four Vice-Chairs to the Commission is a positive development, and their roles should be clarified in order to fully utilise their potential complementarity alongside the work of the Chair. Potential roles for Vice-Chairs include: engaging with countries to prepare for



PBC meetings; overseeing follow-up actions on the PBC meetings; focus on thematic issues such as financing (link to PBF), partnerships, mental health and psychosocial support, climate security and Artificial Intelligence. This division of responsibilities can help to ensure that key areas receive focused attention, and that the Commission's work is more systematic and strategic.

#### **4 Enhance awareness among Member States of the PBC's mandate and capacity:**

- Member States on the PBC should take active steps to raise awareness of the PBC's role within the broader UN system. A practice like that of ECOSOC, where members circulate concept notes within their regional and negotiating groups, could be adapted to help other Member States better understand the PBC work and generate interest in engaging with it. This will increase the PBC visibility and ensure that its expertise is utilised by a wider range of UN bodies and Member States.

#### **5 Improve follow-up on the PBC's recommendations:**

- The PBC must enhance its follow-up mechanisms to ensure that recommendations are acted upon. For instance, after Somalia presented to the PBC in December 2020, a recommendation was made for the Peacebuilding Fund to increase support for civil society actors, but no follow-up action was taken. Establishing a clear follow-up function, perhaps assigned to one of the Vice-Chairs, supported by the PBC Secretariat, will ensure that recommendations lead to tangible outcomes and maximise the impact of the PBC work.

#### **6 Develop a system for evaluating and documenting impact:**

- There is a lack of documented evidence regarding the impact of the PBC work, which hinders its ability to demonstrate its effectiveness and prioritise its activities. To address this, the PBC should invest in impact evaluation efforts, including annual assessments and could build on the development of the Peacebuilding Impact Hub. This Hub should support the collection of reports, studies, and impact assessments from diverse stakeholders. Strengthening the Secretariat's capacity to document and evaluate the PBC's

impact will provide valuable insights and improve the PBC's ability to adapt and prioritise its work.

#### **7 Engage more with UN field presences:**

- The PBC should increase its engagement with UN field presences, including peace and development advisors, to enhance awareness and understanding of the PBC's work at the country level. Peace and development advisors should act as representatives of the PBC, ensuring that its priorities and strategies are integrated into national-level peacebuilding efforts. This will help promote the PBC's value and facilitate closer coordination with national stakeholders and development partners.

#### **8 Document good practices for future PBC Chairs:**

- The PBC Secretariat should document 'good practices' and key precedents in the PBC's operations, such as decisions regarding the inclusion of civil society speakers. This will help ensure knowledge transfer as the PBC membership changes and enable new Chairs to build on previous successes. By capturing and institutionalising best practices, the PBC can ensure continuity and effectiveness in its work, even as leadership transitions.

## 2.3 Conclusions

The PBC has undergone significant transformation, adapting its methods, roles, and responsibilities to better meet the evolving challenges of peacebuilding. These changes have strengthened its ability to promote prevention, advance peacebuilding initiatives, and foster sustainable peace. The PBC has expanded its advisory functions, deepened engagement with the Security Council and other UN entities, and improved coordination across the UN system. These developments mark important progress in positioning peacebuilding as a strategic and integral part of the UN's peace and security architecture.

However, while these positive steps have enhanced the PBC's effectiveness, more must be done to shift the UN's peacebuilding approach to proactive prevention and sustainable peacebuilding efforts.

The PBC's role, particularly in shaping UN-wide strategies and influencing the work of the Security Council, General Assembly, and IFIs, must continue to evolve to ensure a more cohesive and impactful global peacebuilding framework.

The 2025 PBAR must deliver pragmatic, results-oriented recommendations that strengthen the PBC's advisory, bridging and convening roles while ensuring that peacebuilding efforts translate into real impact on the ground. By prioritising country-level effectiveness, UN system coherence, sustainable financing, strategic advisory influence, emerging challenges, and member state leadership, the PBC can position itself as a more agile, impactful, and responsive entity capable of driving meaningful, long-term peacebuilding efforts in a rapidly evolving global landscape. Member States in the formal phase of the 2025 PBAR should focus on implementation strategies, ensuring that the proposed reforms lead to measurable improvements in conflict prevention, post-conflict recovery, and sustainable peace worldwide.

What is important extends beyond the formal outcome of the 2025 PBAR. While one critical dimension of change will be powered by the reforms and commitments that emerge from new PBAR resolutions, an equally important dimension lies in the ability of the PBC and its Member States to take proactive steps in strengthening the Commission's effectiveness and operational impact.

Regardless of the scope of negotiated reforms, Member States must actively support and enable the PBC to function as a more strategic, responsive, and results-driven platform. This is particularly crucial given the likely constraints of the intergovernmental process, where political sensitivities and competing priorities may limit the extent of formal changes agreed in the review. The PBC, with dedicated support from Member States, should seize all available opportunities to enhance its effectiveness — whether through improved working methods, stronger partnerships, or better resource mobilisation — ensuring that peacebuilding remains a central priority within the UN system, beyond the formal negotiations of the PBAR outcome.

A careful distinction must be made between recommendations that require formal revisions to the mandates and structures of the PBC, PBSO, or the PBF and those that can be operationalised within the existing scope of the Commission's work. Recommendations that imply structural or procedural changes may require broader consensus and formal approval, potentially complicating negotiations for the 2025 PBAR outcome document. To avoid overburdening the PBAR process while ensuring progress, recommendations that fall within the operational scope of the PBC should be made actionable through the discretion of the Chair, in dialogue with Vice-Chairs and other PBC members, and within the PBSO's established internal processes.

The PBAR process underscores the need to translate recommendations into clear, implementable steps that lead to observable changes at multiple levels, namely at the country, UN system, policy levels and with Member States.

Moving forward, the following should inform prioritisation:

- *Implementation*: Develop concrete, measurable actions to operationalise PBAR recommendations, ensuring that commitments lead to visible outcomes.
- *Collaboration*: Strengthen partnerships that integrate the experiences, resources, and expertise of Member States, civil society, researchers, and the broader UN system into a shared vision for sustaining peace.

- *Accountability*: Establish robust mechanisms to monitor progress, evaluate impact, and ensure responsibility for delivering results at all levels.

The road ahead requires both ambition and pragmatism. While political and financial constraints pose significant challenges, they must not lead to complacency. The PBAR must be an opportunity to reinforce the foundations of peacebuilding by identifying clear priorities, focusing on practical reforms, and ensuring that the PBC remains a dynamic and responsive actor in global peace efforts.

By anchoring its recommendations in political realities and committing to meaningful action, the PBAR can help drive a more effective and sustained approach to peacebuilding, ensuring real impact where it matters most — on the ground, in countries striving for lasting peace. ●

# Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> More on this story can be read in an article as well as a guest blog by Sadako's brother on the Elders website at <https://theelders.org/news/story-sadako-sasaki-and-hiroshima-peace-cranes>
- <sup>2</sup> In this report, both the abbreviation 'PBC' and the term 'the Commission' are used interchangeably to refer to this UN body.
- <sup>3</sup> Uppsala University, The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) accessed in March 2025, <https://ucdp.uu.se/year/2023>.
- <sup>4</sup> <https://www.cbd.int/gbf>.
- <sup>5</sup> <https://www.un.org/bbnjagreement/en>.
- <sup>6</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/pact-for-the-future>.
- <sup>7</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/common-agenda>.
- <sup>8</sup> <https://dppa.un.org/en/a-new-agenda-for-peace>.
- <sup>9</sup> United Nations Security Council, 'An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping', (New York: United Nations, 1992), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/145749?v=pdf>
- <sup>10</sup> <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history>.
- <sup>11</sup> <https://cerf.un.org>.
- <sup>12</sup> <https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/home-page.html>.
- <sup>13</sup> United Nations, 'Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects', A/55/305-S/2000/809, (New York: United Nations, 2000), [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a\\_55\\_305\\_e\\_brahimi\\_report.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a_55_305_e_brahimi_report.pdf).
- <sup>14</sup> United Nations General Assembly, 'Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change', (A/58/L.7) (New York: United Nations, 2003), <https://docs.un.org/en/A/58/L.7>.
- <sup>15</sup> United Nations Department of Public Information, 'A more secure world: Our shared responsibility' (New York: United Nations, 2004), [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/hlp\\_more\\_secure\\_world.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf)
- <sup>16</sup> United Nations General Assembly, 'United Nations Millennium Declaration' (A/RES/55/2), (New York: United Nations, September 2000), <https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/55/2>.
- <sup>17</sup> United Nations General Assembly, 'In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all' (New York: United Nations, March 2005), (A/59/2005), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CPR%20A%2059%202005.pdf>.
- <sup>18</sup> United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1), 2005. This resolution outlines the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and provides the framework for the UN Peacebuilding Architecture.
- <sup>19</sup> <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n05/654/17/pdf/n0565417.pdf>
- <sup>20</sup> The PBCs rules of procedure are contained in document PBC/1/OC/3/REV.2 [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc\\_1\\_oc\\_3\\_rev.2.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_1_oc_3_rev.2.pdf)
- <sup>21</sup> [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/a\\_78\\_765-s\\_2024\\_153.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/a_78_765-s_2024_153.pdf)
- <sup>22</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/76/678>
- <sup>23</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/69/674>
- <sup>24</sup> On 22 January 2015, the Secretary-General appointed the following members of the Advisory Group: Anis Bajwa (Pakistan), Saraswathi Menon (India), Funmi Olonisakin (Nigeria), Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania), Charles Petrie (France), Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala) and Edith Grace Ssempala (Uganda). Gert Rosenthal served as Chair of the group.
- <sup>25</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/69/968>
- <sup>26</sup> [https://www.daghammarskjold.se/hrf\\_faq/peacebuilding-sustaining-peace-agenda/](https://www.daghammarskjold.se/hrf_faq/peacebuilding-sustaining-peace-agenda/).
- <sup>27</sup> United Nations General Assembly 'Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects Comprehensive review of special political missions Strengthening of the United Nations system, (A/70/95-S/2015/446\*)', (New York: United Nations, 2025), [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s\\_2015\\_446.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_446.pdf).
- <sup>28</sup> <https://wps.unwomen.org/index.html>.
- <sup>29</sup> <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/2020-review-un-peacebuilding-architecture>
- <sup>30</sup> On 31 January 2020, the Secretary-General appointed the following members to the 2020

- group of Independent Eminent Persons (IEP): Roza Otunbayeva (Kyrgyzstan), Nasser Judeh (Jordan), Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala), Annika Söder (Sweden) and Liberata Mulamula (Tanzania).
- <sup>31</sup> United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council 'Peacebuilding and Sustaining peace Report of the Secretary-General, (A/72/707-S/2018/43), (New York: United Nations, 2018) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1468106?v=pdf>.
- <sup>32</sup> United Nations General Assembly, 'Follow-up to the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding and sustaining peace', (A/RES/72/276), (New York: United Nations, 2018) [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A\\_RES\\_72\\_276.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A_RES_72_276.pdf).
- <sup>33</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 2413 (2018), (S/RES/2413 (2018), (New York: United Nations, 2018), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1484218?ln=en&v=pdf>.
- <sup>34</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/A/73/890>.
- <sup>35</sup> [https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2558\(2020\)](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2558(2020)).
- <sup>36</sup> United Nations General Assembly, 'Political declaration of the high-level political forum on sustainable development convened under the auspices', (A/RES/78/1), (New York: United Nations, 2023), <https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/78/1>.
- <sup>37</sup> <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/367/51/pdf/n2436751.pdf>
- <sup>38</sup> <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-peacekeeping>.
- <sup>39</sup> <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-peacekeeping>.
- <sup>40</sup> <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>.
- <sup>41</sup> <https://press.un.org/en/2024/org1738.doc.htm>.
- <sup>42</sup> See: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1157371> and <https://www.reuters.com/world/record-aid-worker-deaths-2024-era-impunity-un-says-2024-11-22/?utm>.
- <sup>43</sup> In November 2024, DPO released an independent study that it commissioned, titled, Future of Peacekeeping, New Models, and Related Capabilities. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/study-on-future-of-peacekeeping-new-models-and-related-capabilities>.
- <sup>44</sup> Daniel Forti and Richard Gowan, 'Fresh Thinking about Peace Operations at the UN', International Crisis Group, 7 January 2025, online, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/fresh-thinking-about-peace-operations-un>.
- <sup>45</sup> Language included in the Resident Coordinator's job description, available at <https://unsdg.un.org/>.
- <sup>46</sup> See note 31.
- <sup>47</sup> United Nations; World Bank, 'Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict' (Washington DC: World Bank, 2018) <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28337> License:CC BY 3.0 IGO.
- <sup>48</sup> <https://www.un.org/pga/74/wp-content/uploads/sites/99/2020/07/UN75-FINAL-DRAFT-DECLARATION.pdf>.
- <sup>49</sup> High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB), 'A Breakthrough for People and Planet: Effective and Inclusive Global Governance for Today and the Future', (New York: United Nations University, 2023), [https://unu.edu/sites/default/files/2025-03/highleveladvisoryboard\\_breakthrough\\_fullreport.pdf](https://unu.edu/sites/default/files/2025-03/highleveladvisoryboard_breakthrough_fullreport.pdf).
- <sup>50</sup> See note 8.
- <sup>51</sup> See Annex 6 in this report.
- <sup>52</sup> The World Bank 'Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict', (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2020), <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/4c36fca6-c7e0-5927-b171-468b0b236b59>.
- <sup>53</sup> <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence/publication/world-bank-group-strategy-for-fragility-conflict-and-violence-2020-2025>.
- <sup>54</sup> IDA 19 refers to the replenishment system of the International Development Association (IDA), is a process through which donor countries provide financial contributions to replenish IDA's resources. These contributions are used to fund the concessional loans and grants given to low-income countries.
- <sup>55</sup> [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/un-wb-partnership\\_framework\\_for\\_crisis-affected\\_situations\\_signed\\_april\\_22\\_2017.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/un-wb-partnership_framework_for_crisis-affected_situations_signed_april_22_2017.pdf).
- <sup>56</sup> <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/guidance-hdpp-applicants>.
- <sup>57</sup> [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/16778-wb\\_2022\\_un-wb-partnership-web.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/16778-wb_2022_un-wb-partnership-web.pdf).

- <sup>58</sup> [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc\\_-\\_wb\\_chair\\_summary\\_final.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_-_wb_chair_summary_final.pdf).
- <sup>59</sup> <https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/fragile-and-conflict-affected-states>.
- <sup>60</sup> <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications Policy-Papers/Issues/2022/03/14/The-IMF-Strategy-for-Fragile-and-Conflict-Affected-States-515129>.
- <sup>61</sup> African Development Bank, 'Fragile States Facility', (2020). <https://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/financial-products/african-development-fund/debt-sustainability-and-adf-grant-eligibility/enhanced-engagement-in-fragile-states>.
- <sup>62</sup> <https://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/topics/fragility-and-resilience>.
- <sup>63</sup> <https://www.iadb.org/en/news/idb-group-adopts-new-territorial-approach-address-criminal-violence-latin-america-and>.
- <sup>64</sup> <https://www.g7plus.org>.
- <sup>65</sup> <https://www.cspps.org>, See also Section 1.5.1 p37.
- <sup>66</sup> [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/s\\_res\\_25582020\\_e.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/s_res_25582020_e.pdf)
- <sup>67</sup> United Nations General Assembly, 'Financing for peacebuilding', (A/RES/76/305), (New York: United Nations, 2022), [https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A\\_RES\\_76\\_305.pdf](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A_RES_76_305.pdf).
- <sup>68</sup> <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/secretary-general-peacebuilding-funding-dashboard>.
- <sup>69</sup> United Nations General Assembly, 'Investing in prevention and peacebuilding', (A/RES/78/257), (New York: United Nations, 2023), [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/a\\_res\\_78\\_257.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/a_res_78_257.pdf).
- <sup>70</sup> Based on: 'Revision of the Terms of Reference of the Peacebuilding Fund', Report of the Secretary-General, A/79/541, available at UN Documents. [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/revised\\_tor\\_final\\_a-79-54154.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/revised_tor_final_a-79-54154.pdf)
- <sup>71</sup> In accordance with the Terms of Reference of the PBF, the Secretary-General appoints eminent individuals for a term of two years, taking into consideration gender and regional balance; candidates are nominated by Member States. In November 2024 the members of the eighth Advisory Group were appointed, with Ambassador Macharia Kamau of Kenya invited to serve as the Chair. The full list of members and their bios is available at <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/eighth-ag>.
- <sup>72</sup> The World Bank. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fragilityconflictviolence>.
- <sup>73</sup> The PBC retreats are held as an annual event, organised in a collaborative partnership by PSBO and the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in consultation with the PBC Chair and are held at Greentree Estate in Manhasset, NY.
- <sup>74</sup> Summaries from each of the individual roundtables can be accessed at <https://www.daghammarskjold.se/our-work/sustaining-peace/operationalising-sustaining-peace-roundtable-series/>.
- <sup>75</sup> As the NYPG does not have a formal membership structure, participation in the groups meetings is somewhat fluid. At the time of writing, members include the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, CIC, GPPAC, IPI, Interpeace, PAX, Peace Direct, QUNO, World Vision, the Baha'i International Community, the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders, Life & Peace Institute and Nonviolent Peaceforce.
- <sup>76</sup> The report can be accessed at [www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-peacebuilding-commission-at-20-progress-challenges-and-the-road-ahead.php](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-peacebuilding-commission-at-20-progress-challenges-and-the-road-ahead.php).
- <sup>77</sup> Céline Monnier, Sophie Rutenbar, Betty N. Wainaina, Marta Bautista Forcada and Natalie Briggs, 'What Can the Peacebuilding Commission Do to Support National Prevention Strategies?', Center on International Cooperation, New York University, (New York: New York University, 2024), [cic.nyu.edu](http://cic.nyu.edu).
- <sup>78</sup> For more information see: [cic.nyu.edu](http://cic.nyu.edu)
- <sup>79</sup> Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies, 'The Roadmap for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies – A Call to Action to Change our World', (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2017), (updated 2019).
- <sup>80</sup> Megan Schmidt; Laurie Mincieli, 'Building Sustainable Peace: How inclusivity, partnerships and a reinforced UN Peacebuilding Architecture will support delivery', (New York: Quaker United Nations Office and The Hague: The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2018), [https://quno.org/sites/default/files/timeline/files/2018/Building%20Sustainable%20Peace\\_Final\\_PrintSingle.pdf](https://quno.org/sites/default/files/timeline/files/2018/Building%20Sustainable%20Peace_Final_PrintSingle.pdf).



- <sup>81</sup> [qcea.org](https://qcea.org).
- <sup>82</sup> For more information: [ipinst.org](https://ipinst.org).
- <sup>83</sup> For more information: [ipinst.org](https://ipinst.org).
- <sup>84</sup> Agathe Sarfati, 'Operationalizing the Sustaining Peace Agenda: Lessons from Burkina Faso, Liberia, and Papua New Guinea', (New York: International Peace Institute, 2020), [https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2006\\_Operationalizing-Sustaining-Peace.pdf](https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2006_Operationalizing-Sustaining-Peace.pdf).
- <sup>85</sup> For more information: [nupi.no](https://nupi.no).
- <sup>86</sup> <https://www.nupi.no/en/publications/cristin-pub/improving-the-impact-of-the-un-peacebuilding-commission-and-enhancing-the-synergy-of-the-peacebuilding-architecture-input-paper-for-the-2025>.
- <sup>87</sup> <https://www.daghammarskjold.se/publication/realising-inclusivity/>.
- <sup>88</sup> <https://www.daghammarskjold.se/publication/financing-peacebuilding/>.
- <sup>89</sup> <https://www.daghammarskjold.se/publication/enhancing-quality-financing-for-local-peacebuilding-through-pooled-funds/>.
- <sup>90</sup> [cspps.org](https://cspps.org).
- <sup>91</sup> <https://unu.edu/cpr/report/2024-pbf-thematic-review-synergies-between-human-rights-and-peacebuilding-pbf-supported>.
- <sup>92</sup> <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/impact-hub>.
- <sup>93</sup> Identical letters dated 29 November 2024 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council (A/79/634-S/2024/869) with the annex: 'Letter dated 21 November 2024 from the group of independent eminent persons selected for the 2025 review of the peacebuilding architecture addressed to the Secretary-General'.
- <sup>94</sup> Some of the developments include the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/76/305) on Financing for Peacebuilding, the 5th Anniversary of the Pathways for Peace Report, the launch of the Peacebuilding Impact Hub, and ongoing implementation of the UN reforms. NYU's Center on International Cooperation has indexed nearly 1,000 recommendations submitted for the 2020 PBAR, extracted from 77 papers, where the most common topics were inclusivity, cross-pillar approach, financing, and national ownership. Many of these recommendations have not yet been implemented, as is true of many of those from the 2010 and 2015 reviews.
- <sup>95</sup> The recommendations in this section build on insights from the Outcome Report from the Workshop on Strengthening the UN's Peacebuilding Architecture – Transforming Commitments into Action, held on 9–10 December 2024 at Greentree Estate, Manhasset, NY. The workshop was organised by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, the Life & Peace Institute, and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), with the support of the Global Challenges Foundation and co-sponsorship from the Permanent Missions of Australia, Colombia, Norway, and the Republic of Korea. The outcome report by Sigrid Gruener, Henrik Hammargren, and Marina Kumskova, served as a key reference for these recommendations.
- <sup>96</sup> The annexes to this report provide references and links to previous resolutions, SG reports and other relevant documents that include previously presented recommendations for consideration and action during the 2025 PBAR.
- <sup>97</sup> <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/impact-hub>.
- <sup>98</sup> The Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) of the UNSC has no official definition. Note 507, which is a compendium of the methods and practices of the UNSC's working methods, refers to the Council utilising informal dialogues, when appropriate, to 'seek the views of Member States that are parties to a conflict and/or other interested and affected parties'. Key characteristics of an IID, which distinguish it from Arria-formula meetings, are that they are presided over by the Council President, are considered proceedings of the Council and are attended by all members.
- <sup>99</sup> At the time of writing in 2025.
- <sup>100</sup> (A/79/552-S/2024/767, para 67).
- <sup>101</sup> <https://docs.un.org/s/2022/522>.
- <sup>102</sup> <https://docs.un.org/en/a/res/79/226>.
- <sup>103</sup> The term 'Peacebuilding Support Missions' is introduced by the authors of this report and is not an officially recognised term within the context of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. It is used as a placeholder for 'light footprint' missions and similar expressions, referring to UN-led peacebuilding initiatives designed to operate with minimal yet responsive UN presence and leadership. The usage

of this term aims to describe potential missions that provide targeted, flexible, and adaptive support in line with peacebuilding objectives, pending the development of a more formal and widely accepted UN terminology.

<sup>104</sup> <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/gender-strategy>.

<sup>105</sup> [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc\\_strategic\\_action\\_plan\\_on\\_youth\\_and\\_peacebuilding.agreed.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/pbc_strategic_action_plan_on_youth_and_peacebuilding.agreed.pdf).

<sup>106</sup> Further inspiration and background on the conceptual framework of intersectionality can be found in the 65 th edition of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation's Development Dialogue Volume 'Intersectionality: Experiences, views and visions for change' (Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld Foundationn, 2023). <https://www.daghammarskjold.se/publication/intersectionality-experiences-views-and-visions-for-change/>.

<sup>107</sup> Based on discussions at the retreat of the PBC – 'Strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission and its Advisory, Bridging and Convening roles'. Organised by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) 5-6 May 2022.





## Annex 1.

### Documentation and Resources on PBAR Recommendations

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Annex 1 lists key UN documents and high-level agreements with recommendations on enhancing and developing the mandate and function of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). While not an exhaustive list, it highlights materials considered particularly relevant to the PBAR and provides easy access to the information.

#### 1. PBC recommendations in official documents - resources and references:

##### 1 Final Report from the Advisory Group of Experts (2015):

- *'The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture'*
- <https://docs.un.org/en/A/69/968>

##### 2 Resolutions on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2016):

- **General Assembly Resolution 70/262:**
  - *'Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture'*
  - <https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/70/262>
- **Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016):**
  - *'Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture'*
  - [https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2282\(2016\)](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2282(2016))

##### 3 UN Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2018):

- *'Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace'* (A/72/707–S/2018/43)
- <https://docs.un.org/en/a/72/707>

##### 4 UN Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2019):

- *'Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace'* (A/73/890–S/2019/448)
- <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n19/158/83/pdf/n1915883.pdf>

##### 5 UN Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2020):

- *'Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace'* (A/74/976–S/2020/773)
- <https://docs.un.org/en/A/74/976>

##### 6 2020 Peacebuilding Architecture Review Resolutions:

- **General Assembly Resolution 75/201:**
  - *'Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture'*
  - <https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/75/201>
- **Security Council Resolution 2558 (2020):**
  - *'Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace'*
  - [https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2558\(2020\)](https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2558(2020))

##### 7 UN Secretary-General's Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace (2022):

- *'Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace'* (A/76/668–S/2022/66)
- <https://docs.un.org/en/S/2022/66>

**8 Peacebuilding Financing General Assembly Resolution (2022):**

- ‘Financing for Peacebuilding’ (A/RES/76/305)
- <https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/76/305>

**9 General Assembly Resolution on investing in prevention and peacebuilding (2023):**

- ‘Investing in prevention and peacebuilding’ (78/257)
- [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/a\\_res\\_78\\_257.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/a_res_78_257.pdf)

**10 High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB) (2023):**

- *A Breakthrough for People and Planet - Effective and Inclusive Global Governance for Today and the Future*
- [https://unu.edu/sites/default/files/2025-03/highleveladvisoryboard\\_breakthrough\\_fullreport.pdf](https://unu.edu/sites/default/files/2025-03/highleveladvisoryboard_breakthrough_fullreport.pdf)

**11 The UN SG New Agenda for Peace (2023):**

- ‘Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 9’
- <https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-for-peace-en.pdf>

**12 The SDG Summit (2023):**

- ‘The Political declaration’
- <https://www.un.org/en/conferences/SDGSummit2023/political-declaration/>

**13 The Summit of the Future (2024):**

- ‘The Pact for the Future’
- <https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/pact-for-the-future/>

**14 Peacebuilding Fund Thematic review (2024):**

- ‘2024 PBF Thematic Review Synergies between Human Rights and Peacebuilding in PBF-supported Programming’
- [https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/2024\\_pbf\\_thematic\\_review\\_executive\\_summary\\_hires.pdf](https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/2024_pbf_thematic_review_executive_summary_hires.pdf)

**15 Letter from the PBC Chair (2024):**

- Letter from the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, Sérgio França Danese to H.E. Mr. Philemon Yang, President of the General Assembly and H.E. Dame Barbara Woodward, President of the Security Council 13 November 2024

## **Annex 2.**

### **Written inputs to the informal phase of the 2025 PBAR**

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Annex 2 offers a reference list of written inputs to the informal phase of the PBAR. This list includes thematic and regional/ country consultations as well as other written inputs and is regularly updated. A full list with links to the individual documents can be accessed at

<https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/thematic-and-regional-papers>

#### **1. Thematic and Regional Consultations**

1. Chair's Summary - Asia-Pacific Regional Consultation on the 2025 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture PDF
2. Summary of the session on 'Enhanced Inter-Agency Collaboration Towards the Agenda 2030, Sustainable Peace, and Peacebuilding'
3. Aswan Forum - Conclusions on Re-envisioning Global Governance for Peace and Development PDF
4. Australian Aid, UN Women - Young Leaders for Women, Peace and Security in Asia and the Pacific, Strategic Outcome Document - July 2024
5. Kingdom of the Netherlands - Contribution to the PBA Review 2025, Impact
6. DCAF Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance - Security Sector Reform and Governance (SSR&G) and Sustaining Peace
7. Shaping the 2025 UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review: Meeting of Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Actors Working on Forced Displacement Issues in Geneva, Switzerland - June 2024
8. South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, ACCORD - Building Resilient Peace: Strategic Pathways for Strengthening the UN Peacebuilding Architecture in Africa - October 2024
9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 75, New York Roundtable: Human Rights, Prevention and Peace, November 2023
10. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 75: Civic space: Enhancing participation through strengthened Partnerships, September 2023

#### **2. Other Consultations**

11. Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation – 'Enhancing partnerships for financing peace' Panel discussion at the Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development - May 2024PDF
12. Challenges Forum - Sustaining Peacebuilding Support Beyond UN Peacekeeping Operations - May 2024PDF
13. ODI - Outcome Document - Thematic consultation pre-UN Peacebuilding Architecture - June 2024PDF
14. ZIF Xchange - Recommendations on Supporting transitions with peacebuilding tools - July 2024PDF
15. GPPAC, ICAN - 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review with Local Women Peacebuilders - August 2024PDF

16. Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) - Outcome Document of the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review - September 2024PDF
17. Peace in Our Cities, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime - Urbanization, Peace, and Security - September 2024

### **3. Written Submissions**

18. Permanent missions of Argentina, Costa Rica, Germany, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, together with the Prevention Project hosted by the Center for Human
19. Rights and Global Justice of the School of Law at NYU - 'A Framework Approach to Prevention' A Brief on Possible Elements of National Prevention Policies
20. Kingdom of the Netherlands - Contribution to the PBA Review 2025, MHPSS
21. Policy Note: Perspectives from Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) on the Peace Building Architecture Review (PBAR)
22. Women Building Peace in a Changing Environment -Report of the Women Mediator Networks Retreat - July 2024
23. How the UN System Can Advance Tangible Results on Women's Participation in Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding by 2030 - July 2024
24. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs - Improving the impact of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and enhancing the synergy of the Peacebuilding Architecture - October 2024
25. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs - Peacebuilding Draft policy note as input to the 2025 UN Peacebuilding Architecture Review
26. The Future of Human Rights and Peace and Security, December 2023
27. OHCHR Thematic Paper: The Contribution of Human Rights to Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace
28. OHCHR Thematic Paper: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals in Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace
29. OHCHR Thematic Paper: Joined-Up Rights-Based Analysis for Prevention
30. OHCHR Thematic Paper: Peacebuilding, Sustaining Peace and Transitional Justice
31. OHCHR Thematic Paper: The Universal Periodic Review and Sustaining Peace
32. OHCHR Recommendations to the Independent Eminent Persons, October 2024
33. NYU Center on International Cooperation - What Can the Peacebuilding Commission Do to Support National Prevention Strategies? - November 2024

## **Annex 3.**

### **Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 9: A New Agenda for Peace**

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Full text: <https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-for-peace-en.pdf>

#### **Action 12: Build a stronger Collective Security Machinery - Elevating the work of the Peacebuilding Commission**

The 2025 review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture should operationalize the recommendations below and consider what adjustments need to be made in the Peacebuilding Commission's methods of work, composition and support capacities so that it can effectively perform these functions.

#### **Recommendations:**

1. Enhance the role of the Peacebuilding Commission as a convener of thematic discussions on cross-pillar issues, with a focus on the interdependent and mutually reinforcing nature of peace and development.
2. Create a mechanism within the Commission to mobilize political and financial support for the implementation of the national and regional strategies suggested in action 3.
3. Formalize the Commission's relationship with international financial institutions and regional development banks in order to align financing instruments with national priorities and enable the Commission to fulfil its mandate in marshalling resources for peacebuilding.
4. Formalize the participation of regional and other organizations in the Commission to enable holistic engagement, coordination and inclusiveness in the deliberations of the Commission.
5. The Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Human Rights Council should ensure that the Commission is consulted in their proceedings. The Security Council in particular should more systematically seek the advice of the Commission on the peacebuilding dimensions of the mandates of peace operations.

## **Annex 4.**

### **The High-Level Advisory Board on Multilateralism – 2023 report ‘A Breakthrough for People and Planet’**

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Full text: <https://highleveladvisoryboard.org/breakthrough/>

Shift 5, Peace and Prevention - Empowering Equitable Collective Security, - shift from reactive measures to proactive peacebuilding initiatives.

The High-Level Advisory Board on Multilateralism (HLAB) provided several key recommendations to reform and strengthen global security and the UN peacebuilding architecture. HLAB proposed that the UN establish stronger frameworks for collaboration with regional organisations, the need for increased transparency and trust-building measures between states for de-escalating geopolitical tensions and fostering cooperative approaches to shared security challenges and suggested adopting a broader concept of security moving beyond military threats (addressing human security issues related to food, water, and climate security and recognising the interconnectedness of these threats to global stability).

Key among the recommendations in Shift 5, Peace and Prevention - Empowering Equitable Collective Security, is a focus on strengthening the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, particularly the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Reforms for a more responsive and inclusive UN Security Council Reform include expanding its membership as well as democratised decision-making and enhanced accountability.

HLAB proposes an expanded and enhanced role for the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to address a wider array of non-military threats to peace and security. Key recommendations for strengthening the PBC include:

1. **Broader Mandate:** The PBC should be empowered to address issues that go beyond traditional peacekeeping, including gender-related security threats, such as the link between violent misogyny and violent extremism, as well as the growing security risks posed by climate change and environmental degradation.
2. **Stronger Linkages with Financial Institutions:** The PBC should develop formal relationships with international financial institutions to ensure that global financial flows are aligned with efforts to address the root causes of conflict, such as poverty, inequality, and environmental stress.
3. **Regional Resilience Councils:** A key innovation proposed is the establishment of regional resilience councils or other regionally based bodies focused on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. These councils would operate at the regional level to strengthen preventive measures, increase resilience, and address local causes of conflict more effectively. By empowering regional actors and fostering regional cooperation, these councils could serve as critical platforms for early intervention and peacebuilding in conflict-prone areas.
4. **Transforming the PBC into a Peacebuilding Council:** The PBC's transformation into a Peacebuilding Council is suggested as a way to give it greater investigative and decision-making authority. This would enable it to lead a new generation of peacebuilding operations aimed at tackling the root causes of violent conflict, rather than merely responding to crises after they occur.

## **Annex 5:**

### **The 2020 twin SC and GA Resolutions on Sustaining Peace: - Key Recommendations for the Peacebuilding Commission**

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Full text of A/RES/75/201 and S/RES/2558:

<https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/content/2020-review-un-peacebuilding-architecture>

The 2020 General Assembly resolution on sustaining peace contains several key recommendations regarding the Peacebuilding Commission.

The recommendations underscore the Peacebuilding Commission's central role in supporting national efforts, enhancing UN system-wide coherence, and securing adequate financing for peacebuilding initiatives:

1. **Role of the Peacebuilding Commission:** The resolution highlights the importance of the Peacebuilding Commission in strengthening its advisory, bridging, and convening roles. It is called to enhance its efficiency and impact, particularly in supporting nationally owned peacebuilding priorities in countries and regions under its consideration.
2. **System-Wide Coordination:** The resolution emphasizes that effective peacebuilding requires the involvement of the entire UN system. It advocates for joint analysis and strategic planning to ensure long-term engagement in conflict-affected countries.
3. **Financing for Peacebuilding:** The resolution recognizes that financing remains a critical challenge for peacebuilding. It calls for a high-level meeting during the 76th session of the General Assembly to explore options for ensuring adequate, predictable, and sustained financing for peacebuilding.
4. **Review and Reporting:** The resolution mandates a further comprehensive review of peacebuilding in 2025. The Secretary-General is tasked with providing interim reports in 2022 and 2024 to assess the implementation of peacebuilding resolutions and the effectiveness of UN reforms in advancing peacebuilding efforts.

#### **Resolution text:**

- Welcomes the progress made in the implementation of the resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace by Member States, including through the relevant intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations, and by the entire United Nations system, including through the reforms of the United Nations, and in particular at the field level through the work of peacekeeping operations, special political missions and United Nations country teams, and the important work of the Peacebuilding Fund, and encourages Member States and the entire United Nations system, in partnership with relevant stakeholders, including regional and subregional organizations, international financial institutions, civil society organizations, local peacebuilding stakeholders and, where relevant, the private sector, to continue to take action to implement the resolutions on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, and to advance efforts to bring greater coherence to peacebuilding efforts, in support of national peacebuilding priorities, and in particular in conflict-affected countries;
- Welcomes in particular the important role of the Peacebuilding Commission, and calls on the Commission to continue strengthening its advisory, bridging and convening roles in support of nationally owned priorities and efforts in the countries and regions under its consideration, as well as to continue strengthening its working methods to enhance its efficiency and impact in support of peacebuilding and sustaining peace;



- Reaffirms that effective peacebuilding must involve the entire United Nations system, and in this regard, emphasizes the importance of joint analysis and effective strategic planning in its long-term engagement in conflict-affected countries;
- Notes that peacebuilding financing remains a critical challenge, and therefore decides to convene a high-level meeting of the General Assembly at the seventy-sixth session to advance, explore and consider options for ensuring adequate, predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding, and invites, starting at the seventy-fifth session, the relevant United Nations bodies and organs, including the Peacebuilding Commission, in accordance with respective mandates, to present inputs in advance for Member States' consideration and discussion at this meeting, and affirms a commitment to pursuing action-oriented outcomes;

## **Annex 6:**

### **The Pact for the Future - Key Recommendations for the Peacebuilding Commission**

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Full text: <https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/pact-for-the-future/>

#### **Action 44. We will strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission.**

72. We affirm our commitment to strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission through the 2025 review of the peacebuilding architecture to bring a more strategic approach and greater coherence and impact to national and international peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts.

We decide to:

- (a) Enhance the role of the Commission as a platform for building and sustaining peace, including through sharing good practices among Member States and mobilizing political and financial support for national prevention, sustaining peace and peacebuilding efforts, in particular to avoid possible relapse into conflict, in accordance with the Commission's mandate.
- (b) Make greater use of the Commission to support Member States progress their nationally-owned and -led peacebuilding, sustaining peace and prevention efforts, and strengthen the Commission's advisory, bridging and convening role, and encourage the Commission to consult with civil society, nongovernmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate, in line with the Commission's mandate.
- (c) Establish more systematic and strategic partnerships between the Commission and international, regional and sub-regional organizations, including the international financial institutions, to strengthen peacebuilding and sustaining peace efforts and to mobilize financing for sustaining peace and to help align national development, peacebuilding and prevention approaches.
- (d) Ensure the Commission plays a vital support role to countries during and after the transition of a peace operation, in cooperation with the Security Council and supported by United Nations Country Teams, upon the request of the country concerned.

## **Annex 7.**

### **The 2018 SG Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace**

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Full text of A/72/707-S/2018/43:

<https://docs.un.org/en/a/72/707>

49. In the resolutions, I was requested to provide options on increasing, restructuring and better prioritizing funding dedicated to United Nations peacebuilding activities, including through assessed and voluntary contributions, for the consideration of Member States. The options are set out below:

(a) Voluntary resources. A number of Headquarters-level trust funds in the Secretariat are inactive and unutilized. To support the financing of the Peacebuilding Fund, I call upon donors to agree to allocate the remaining balance of any Headquarters-level trust fund inactive for two years or more to the Fund;

(b) Assessed contributions. These would provide higher predictability and sustainability of funding for peacebuilding and reduce the costs of voluntary resource mobilization. It is important to note that the use of assessed contributions would send a powerful signal regarding the commitment of all Member States to peacebuilding and sustaining peace;

(c) Assessed contributions during mission drawdowns. Mission transitions and drawdowns represent some of the most critical periods and the time during which investments in sustaining peace made by national authorities and their international partners over the years can be either sustained or lost in a matter of months. After a drawdown, United Nations country teams commonly face a 'financial cliff' in support for peacebuilding activities. In the case of Liberia, the financial estimate in support of the peacebuilding plan is \$65 million per year for two years, or approximately 55 per cent per year of the final full-year budget of UNMIL in the amount of \$116.95 million. In recognition of the imperative of well-managed and appropriately resourced transitions, I call upon the principal contributors to peacekeeping budgets to voluntarily commit the equivalent of 15 per cent of the final full-year budget of a closing peacekeeping mission, to be contributed to peacebuilding activities through existing projects or the country-level pooled fund managed by the resident coordinator office, each year for a period of two years following the end of the mission's mandate;

(d) Unspent assessed contributions. Peacekeeping missions are sometimes left with unencumbered balances at the end of the financial period. At the end of the 2015/16 period, the balance amounted to \$279 million, which was credited to Member States as unspent funds. I call upon Member States to voluntarily commit unspent peacekeeping budget funds to the Peacebuilding Fund;

(e) Assessed contributions for the Peacebuilding Fund. In its report, the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture recommended that the General Assembly consider steps to ensure that core funding representing \$100 million or an approximate and symbolic 1 per cent of the value (whichever is higher) of the total United Nations budgets for peace operations (peacekeeping and special political missions together) be provided to the Fund annually from assessed contributions under the United Nations budget. The assessed contributions should be provided in a way that ensures necessary oversight without undermining the Fund's comparative advantage as a fast, unearmarked, flexible and pre-positioned pooled fund working under terms of reference approved by the General Assembly. I call upon Member States to consider the allocation of assessed contributions to the value of \$100 million or a symbolic 1 per cent of the total annual cost of peace operations to the Fund;

(f) Re-investing savings from assessed budgets. When the overall financial requirements for peacekeeping operations decrease, some of the variance should be reinvested in peacebuilding. In years when the total approved resources for

peacekeeping operations are less than those of the previous year, I call upon Member States to agree to be assessed the equivalent of 15 per cent of the total variance in the approved resources to finance the Peacebuilding Fund;

(g) Diversifying available resources. I am exploring the possibility of innovative financing solutions for peacebuilding, including contributions by individuals, foundations and faith-based organizations, bonds, levy and tax-based revenue generation, corporate partnership and blended finance. There are already several promising examples, which include social impact bonds to pay for rehabilitation centres in Mali, corporate partnerships for sustaining peace in Nigeria and South Sudan, and crowdfunded peacebuilding initiatives.

50. The United Nations mobilizes more than \$250 million annually from corporate partners and is engaging with the private sector on setting investment guidelines and on a wide range of other issues through the United Nations Global Compact. I welcome recent initiatives to strengthen partnerships for peacebuilding. In 2017, the fourth Business for Peace annual conference was held in Colombia. Colombia will become a test case for blended finance, using grant money to unleash commercial financing for peacebuilding. In Liberia, companies supported the project design and financially contributed to an initiative to mitigate concession-related conflicts. I encourage the United Nations system to further develop partnerships with the private sector and the investment community to strengthen the peacebuilding impact of companies, set conflict-sensitive investment guidelines and explore potential contributions to United Nations peacebuilding activities. This should be undertaken in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework.

51. To support this ongoing work, the Peacebuilding Fund, working closely with the United Nations Sustainable Development Group, will assume a strategic resource mobilization role for predictable and sustained financing for peacebuilding. This would include exploring opportunities for contributions from the private sector through traditional means, as well as considering partnerships and innovative financing methods. This capacity will work in coordination with the proposed United Nations development system innovative funding lab. The Fund will explore the possibility of establishing a web-based donation mechanism, the use of crowdfunding websites and establishing partnerships with companies to mobilize voluntary levies on products or services.

52. I also encourage Member States to explore innovative means of financing peacebuilding activities, including through the issuance of social impact bonds in peacebuilding, the voluntary implementation of a tax on the trade in (specific) arms, or the donation of fines imposed on defence industry corporations to United Nations peacebuilding activities.

## **Annex 8.**

### **The 2022 SG Report on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace**

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Full text of A/76/668-S/2022/66:

<https://docs.un.org/en/S/2022/66>

41. Several options to ensure sufficient peacebuilding funding have been presented as part of the 2018, 2019 and 2020 reports on peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Acknowledging that sustaining peace is a shared responsibility and peacebuilding a long-term process, more efforts are required to ensure adequate, sustainable and timely investments in prevention and peacebuilding.

Voluntary contributions:

42. Some progress has been made on the options. First, the Secretary-General called for a “quantum leap” in contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund (\$500 million annually) through unearmarked and multi-year commitments. Voluntary contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund almost doubled to \$370 million and approvals more than doubled to \$564 million in the period 2017–2019. The Peacebuilding Fund remains, however, largely dependent on a few donors and demand for Peacebuilding Fund funding outpaces its ability to respond.

43. Second, it was proposed that Member States voluntarily commit the equivalent of 15 per cent of the final full-year budget of a closing peacekeeping mission to peacebuilding activities each year for a period of two years following the end of a mission mandate, which is one way to address the financial cliff often seen after a mission has ended. In the case of UNAMID, using the 2019/20 budget as the “final full-year budget” (\$514.5 million), 15 per cent is equal to \$77.2 million per year for two years. No Member State has implemented this recommendation yet.

44. Third, the Secretary-General asked donors to commit to spending at least 20 per cent of ODA on peacebuilding priorities in conflict settings. Only 10 Development Assistance Committee members meet this target (one third of all members). Finally, limited progress has been made concerning the call for Member States to voluntarily commit unspent peacekeeping budget funds to the Peacebuilding Fund.

Assessed contributions:

45. The Secretary-General proposed (a) ensuring that missions have sufficient programmatic funding to support mandated peacebuilding activities, with the Peacebuilding Fund and missions working closely on operationalizing programmes during mission transitions; and (b) assessed funding for the Peacebuilding Fund. Assessed contributions provide higher predictability and sustainability of funding and would send a powerful signal regarding the universal commitment of Member States to peacebuilding and sustaining peace, as part of the organization’s core mandate. Details of this proposal are contained in a separate report (A/76/732).

48. The Secretary-General has encouraged Member States to explore innovative means of financing peacebuilding activities, including through public-private partnerships, which could include contributions by individuals, foundations and faith-based organizations, social impact or peace bonds, micro-levies, tax-based revenue generation, corporate partnership and blended finance. Some of these innovative financing mechanisms are designed to benefit conflict-affected countries directly. Exploring these options offers additional opportunities but is not a substitute for voluntary or assessed contributions. Several Governments are supporting initiatives to explore innovative ways to apply blended finance approaches in peacebuilding contexts to generate impact, which requires deepening the understanding of the potential risks and opportunities; leveraging national development plans, domestic investors and domestic finance

with public resources to support these initiatives; and bringing these options to scale. This has to be in line with conflict-sensitive principles in support of national ownership and involve local actors, including women and youth. The United Nations is a facilitator, bringing expertise, contextual knowledge, presence on the ground and financial structuring capabilities, leveraging greater alignment and acceleration.

49. The role of private sector actors in peacebuilding can include financing, partnerships, direct engagement in negotiation or peacebuilding, advocacy, respect for labour rights, protection of civilians, private donations towards peacebuilding from companies, foundations or individuals, corporate social responsibility initiatives and stronger risk mitigation. By investing in conflict-affected areas and contributing to economic growth, reconstruction and creating decent jobs, private sector actors can directly address the drivers of conflict through enhanced social cohesion. The private sector, through employers' and business members' organizations, with workers' organizations, promotes respect for labour rights and social dialogue in conflict affected situations and contributes to participatory democratic reconstruction processes and good governance. By conducting Enhanced Human Rights Due Diligence in accordance with the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, companies can prevent their operations from fuelling conflict.

55. Beyond financing, there is a need to mobilize broader capacities for prevention and peacebuilding within the United Nations system and among partners. Financial resources need to be accompanied by strengthened human resources at the local, regional, national and international levels to work on prevention and peacebuilding. They should be easily deployable and include a spectrum of expertise to provide technical accompaniment to national and local actors managing conflict. Investments need to be made in capacity-building and human resource development, such as the recently established academy on prevention, nexus and stabilization initiated by UNDP. There is also a need to allocate more resources for analysis, data gathering and impact measurement to ensure that action is impactful and timely.

56. Domestic resources are critical for building national capacities for prevention and peacebuilding. Development actors along with international financial institutions and development finance institutions have a supporting role to play in this area. With sufficient human resources and capacity, development actors could work more with partners and government agencies, for example by supporting the mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding in government or other partners' programmes, impacting on peacebuilding priorities beyond their own programmes.



This report traces key developments in the United Nations peacebuilding work over the past two decades, with a particular focus on the Peacebuilding Commission. It highlights critical recommendations that have emerged to strengthen this unique intergovernmental body and is intended as a contribution to the 2025 review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBAR).

It presents ten forward-looking areas for change aimed at enhancing effectiveness of UN Peacebuilding. Exploring the Peacebuilding Commission's evolution, challenges, and opportunities, the report synthesises insights drawn from official documentation of the work of the Commission, from academic research, and from international and national civil society organisations, as well as UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes.

The report also serves as a resource for policymakers and practitioners seeking a deeper understanding of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture — its origins, evolution, and linkages to other processes and entities. It aims to inform and inspire engagement in the long-term efforts required, locally, regionally, and globally, to build and sustain peace.

**Sigrid Gruener** is Deputy Executive Director and Programme Director at the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation with a focus on peacebuilding. She has over 25 years of experience working as a practitioner, trainer, and researcher in the field of development, peacebuilding, and conflict transformation. Prior to joining the Foundation, Sigrid Gruener worked with diverse civil society organisations and as an implementing partner to the UN in Iraq, Jordan, Timor Leste, Panama, and the United States. She holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and a bachelor's degree from American University's School of International Service in Washington D.C in the United States.

**Henrik Hammargren** is an international policy expert and the former Executive Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, with over 30 years of experience in international development cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and peacebuilding. He has held leadership, managerial, and advisory roles in bi- and multilateral development cooperation, working with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, and the Swedish government. Areas of expertise include multilateral and bilateral development cooperation and humanitarian aid, with a particular emphasis on peacebuilding and statebuilding. Hammargren has over ten years of in-country experience in Africa and Southeast Asia, primarily in conflict and post-conflict settings.