

# What is next for the UN Peacebuilding Architecture?

A Dialogue on the Implementation of  
the 2025 PBAR Resolutions

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*Discussion paper*

March 2026  
New York



## Executive Summary

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The 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR), concluded through twin resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on 26 November 2025 (S/RES/2805-A/RES/80/11), represents a significant milestone in advancing the UN's approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace. The resolutions place renewed emphasis on strengthening the Peacebuilding Commission (hereafter, the Commission) and ensuring that its work translates into tangible impact at the field level.

The resolutions were the result of an extensive and participatory process. The central challenge now lies in their effective implementation. Early discussions among Member States, including through formal and informal dialogues, have underscored the need to identify practical, actionable pathways for operationalising the resolutions.

Against this backdrop, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation and Interpeace convened a one-day expert-level workshop on 2 March 2026 in New York. Building on engagement with Member States through the Foundation's ongoing activities and drawing on inputs from the PBAR process, the workshop brought together Member State experts and select civil society actors engaged in regional consultations and expert interviews during the informal phase of the PBAR. The discussions focused on how to strengthen the Commission's role across its three core functions—advisory, convening, and bridging—while ensuring alignment with national peacebuilding priorities and enhancing the effectiveness and impact of the Commission.

The workshop was held as part of a broader continuum of efforts to generate momentum around PBAR implementation. The Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office (PBPSO) is preparing a matrix outlining action points from the 2025 resolutions to assist Member States in identifying priority areas for implementation and to facilitate structured follow-up. The Annual Peacebuilding Week, as mandated by the 2025 resolutions, is being planned as a regular opportunity for collective reflection, stocktaking, and exchange on progress in implementing the resolutions.

Held under Chatham House Rule, the workshop aimed to enable reflective dialogue on emergent thinking among Member States and partners and to capture actionable insights from participants to inform ongoing intergovernmental processes. This discussion paper, based on inputs and analysis generated during the workshop is intended to support upcoming engagements of the Peacebuilding Commission, including its informal retreat and related discussions on strengthening its working methods and impact.

# Recommendations at a Glance

The following recommendations are elaborated in the main body of the document.

01 Strengthening the Commission across its three Core Functions		
<p><b>1.1 Adequate Capacity within the PBC Secretariat</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increase voluntary funding for the PBC Secretariat (within PBPSO).</li> <li>Establish independent advisory support to strengthen analytical capacity.</li> </ul>	<p><b>1.2 Effective Communication of the Commission's Value Proposition</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clearly articulate how engagement with the Commission has contributed to advancing national peacebuilding efforts.</li> <li>Promote the Commission's work within regional groups and across the UN System.</li> <li>Develop structured follow-up mechanisms to sustain engagement.</li> </ul>	<p><b>1.3 Continued Evolution of the Role of the Commission's Vice-Chairs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clarify the responsibilities of the Commission's Vice-Chairs.</li> <li>Introduce transition notes from one Vice-Chair to another to ensure continuity and learning.</li> </ul>
<p><b>1.4 Periodic Reviews of the Commission's Annual Programme of Work</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Align planning with predictable UN processes.</li> <li>Hold periodic reviews and expert discussions on working methods.</li> </ul>	<p><b>1.5 Enhancing Access for Coordinated Civil Society Expertise</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advance dialogue on enabling more coordinated diverse civil society input from the regional and country level.</li> <li>Establish structured, sustained civil society engagement frameworks with the Commission.</li> </ul>	

02 Strengthening the Advisory Role of the Peacebuilding Commission	
<p><b>2.1 Clarity on the Purpose of the Commission's Advice</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Define objectives, audience, and expected impact of advice.</li> <li>Focus advice on articulating the Commission's comparative advantage within the broader UN system.</li> <li>Prioritise select thematic/country areas for sustained long-term engagement.</li> <li>Focus on recurring agenda items, including mandate renewals.</li> <li>Strengthen feedback loops from recipient intergovernmental bodies.</li> <li>Prioritise advisory contributions from diverse stakeholders across intergovernmental processes, including the UNGA, ECOSOC, C-34, and QCPR.</li> </ul>	<p><b>2.2 Enhancing the Quality of the Commission's Advice</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Build a knowledge repository and improve access to past insights.</li> <li>Draw on and integrate diverse field-based inputs (e.g., UNCTs, civil society) during preparation of advice.</li> <li>Complement formal advice with informal dialogues and expert briefings.</li> <li>Strengthen collaboration between the PBC and UNSC Secretariats.</li> <li>Articulate the type of inputs sought from civil society and UN field presences.</li> </ul>
<p><b>2.3 Improving the Timeliness of the Commission's Advice</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focus advice on predictable processes (mandate renewals, transitions).</li> <li>Improve coordination with the UNSC's Member States to anticipate requests.</li> </ul>	<p><b>2.4 Improving Follow-Up from the Provision of the Commission's Advice</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establish clear tracking mechanisms and responsibilities.</li> <li>Enhance PBPSO capacity or assign follow-up roles to Member States.</li> <li>Engage field actors to translate advice into operational impact.</li> </ul>

## 03 Strengthening the Convening Role of the Peacebuilding Commission

### 3.1 Clarifying Objectives of the Commission's Convenings

- Define clear objectives and expected outputs in advance.
- Prioritise sustained engagement over ad hoc meetings.
- Focus on areas with proven value (e.g., national prevention strategies).
- Adapt a longer-term and sustained approach to engagement, particularly in country-specific contexts.
- Regularly reflect on how the outcomes of convenings are carried forward, including clarifying who is responsible for tracking their impact.

### 3.2 Supporting Effective and Meaningful Engagement of Diverse Peacebuilding Stakeholders

#### Civil Society

- Clarify expectations and strengthen structured participation mechanisms.
- Ensure political support for and better integration of inputs from diverse civil society stakeholders, including I/NGOs, peacebuilders, academics, and scholars.

#### IFIs and RDBs

- Enhance incentives for IFIs and RDBs to engage (e.g., use the PBF to de-risk investments).
- Strengthen alignment and synergies drawing on the UN-IFI Partnership Facility and Member State diplomacy.

#### Regional Organisations

- Expand systematic engagement and replicate good practices (e.g., AU cooperation and field visits) across other contexts.
- Systematically engage regional organisations from diverse regions in the work of the Commission.

#### Private Sector

- Strengthen engagement with Resident Coordinators (RCs), who are well-positioned to facilitate such engagement at the country level.
- Develop strategies for engagement, including research on risks and opportunities.

#### UN Field Presences

- Increase engagement with RCs, Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs), and field leadership in Commission meetings.
- Increase direct engagement with RCs and PDAs during their annual retreats.

## 04 Strengthening the Bridging Role of the Peacebuilding Commission

### 4.1 Addressing Siloes within the UN System

- Improve internal coordination within Member States' missions.
- Use Peacebuilding Week as a platform for system-wide alignment and encourage Member States' proactive participation in its design.

### 4.2 Focusing on Support for Countries Undergoing Transitions

- Increase engagement with transition contexts, despite political sensitivities.
- Encourage that UNSC mandates request engagement with the Commission.
- Clearly communicate the PBC's value proposition, including prevention-focused support.

# Overarching Considerations for the Peacebuilding Commission

*Three strategic directions should guide implementation:*

<b>01</b>	<b>Country-Level Impact</b>	The Commission must more clearly demonstrate tangible results in specific contexts. This requires improved monitoring, documentation, and analysis of its contributions across all three core functions.
<b>02</b>	<b>Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement</b>	Effective peacebuilding depends on meaningful engagement of the Commission with regional organisations, IFIs, civil society, and the private sector, aligned with national priorities.
<b>03</b>	<b>Integrated Approaches to Conflict</b>	The Commission should promote responses that address root causes and interconnected challenges (e.g., criminal, political and gender-based violence, terrorism, etc.), moving beyond narrow security frameworks.

There are several overarching considerations for Member States to keep in focus when advancing implementation of the 2025 resolutions:

First, the resolutions underscore the importance of strengthening **the impact of the Commission's work at the field level**, including by ensuring that its outcomes are traceable and demonstrable in specific country contexts. This refers to the Commission's three core functions: advisory, bridging, and convening. Since its establishment in 2005, numerous countries have benefited from the Commission's support. The Commission has contributed to supporting critical transitions, as illustrated by the examples of Liberia and The Gambia. In others, it has provided a platform for countries to present their priorities and challenges, thereby catalysing various forms of support from a broad range of peacebuilding stakeholders, as seen in the case of Papua New Guinea. However, such positive examples remain insufficiently documented and analysed, in part because assessing causation and impact requires significant analytical capacity. This summary report presents a set of recommendations aimed at strengthening the measurement and analysis of the Commission's impact across its three core functions, as outlined below.

Second, the resolutions also place strong emphasis on inclusivity, recognising that effective peacebuilding requires **the meaningful engagement on equal terms of a wide range of stakeholders**. Partnerships with relevant actors, including regional and subregional organisations, international financial institutions, and diverse civil society actors, including local peacebuilding organisations, research and scholarly institutions, and, where appropriate, the private sector, among others, are critical in support of nationally led peacebuilding priorities. To fulfil its mandate, the Commission needs partnerships and active participation of other stakeholders in a complementary and strategic manner. This document provides specific recommendations on how the Commission can realistically engage diverse peacebuilding stakeholders with impact.

Third, the resolutions provide an important opportunity to strengthen the Commission's appeal to Member States that approach **peacebuilding beyond a purely security-focused lens**, and that may be seeking support in addressing the underlying drivers and root causes of conflict in its diverse understandings. The resolutions underscore the potential for the Commission to play a central role in supporting countries in the development, implementation and evaluation of national prevention priorities or strategies. The Commission could incentivise more comprehensive and integrated

approaches to sustaining peace and the prevention of violence, including by addressing the structural factors that can contribute to instability. The resolutions also create an opening to reassess how conflict dynamics are framed, recognising the diverse phases and typologies of conflict as non-uniform, and requiring diversified strategies, based on multi-causal “conflict analyses”, and input to the Commission from diverse sources. This could enable Member States to seek support in addressing interconnected challenges such as human, drugs and arms trafficking, the recruitment by armed groups, transnational organised crime, terrorism, and violent extremism, which increasingly intersect with peacebuilding and development efforts.

## 1. Strengthening the Commission across its three Core Functions

The workshop discussions highlighted that to adequately implement the 2025 resolutions, the Commission could benefit from actions to strengthen its institutional capacity and ways of working, including in the following areas:

### 1.1 Adequate Capacity within the PBC Secretariat

Adequate capacity within the PBC Secretariat is a practical necessity for the effective functioning of the Commission and its ability to implement the 2025 resolutions. Given the regular rotation of personnel within Member States’ permanent missions, the Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office (PBPSO), which hosts the PBC Secretariat, plays a critical role in maintaining institutional memory and continuity in the Commission’s work, as well as supporting impact evaluation. In this capacity, it also plays an important role in how the work of the Commission is prepared, facilitated, and carried forward.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Consideration could be given to supporting the PBC Secretariat through *voluntary contributions*, in light of the ongoing structural changes within the UN system connected to UN80 reforms and the persistent constraints in funding for the UN Secretariat.
- Member States of the Commission could establish *an independent advisory body within the Commission*, including support from diverse civil society partners, to complement existing capacities and reduce reliance on the PBC Secretariat alone, while strengthening the analytical support available to the Commission.

## 1.2 Effective Communication of the Commission's Value Proposition

The Commission's value proposition should be more clearly articulated and effectively demonstrated both within and beyond the UN system. The proactive and strategic engagement of a broad range of peacebuilding stakeholders, coupled with clear incentives for Member States' participation, is essential for the Commission to effectively fulfil its mandate. To achieve this, an enhanced understanding of the Commission's activities, comparative advantage, and relevance by all critical peacebuilding stakeholders is particularly important. It should be acknowledged that, for many countries, a key incentive for engagement with the Commission is the potential for financial support. However, the Commission must not be perceived solely as a funding mechanism but rather recognised as a platform that can also provide political support, strategic guidance, reciprocal learning, and advisory engagement. Strengthening awareness of the Commission's broader roles should be a shared responsibility among Member States, UN intergovernmental bodies (e.g., the Security Council, ECOSOC), and other stakeholders.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Countries that have previously benefited from the Commission's support could *clearly articulate and share* how such engagement has contributed to advancing their national peacebuilding efforts, including through reciprocal learning and non-adversarial collaboration.
- Members of the Commission could also *promote the Commission's work within their respective regional groups* (e.g., Brazil's engagement with GRULAC and Japan's efforts to engage ASEAN).
- The Chair of the Commission could further *strengthen engagement across the UN system*, including more regular interaction with other intergovernmental bodies, as well as with the Development Cooperation Office (DCO) and the DPPA-UNDP Joint Programme that could facilitate participation in annual retreats organised for Resident Coordinators and Peace and Development Advisors.
- The establishment of *more structured follow-up and impact evaluation mechanisms* with the support of the PBC Secretariat could help incentivise Member States' engagement by ensuring greater continuity and predictability in the Commission's support for their peacebuilding and prevention efforts.

### 1.3 Continued Evolution of the Role of Commission’s Vice-Chairs

The Commission’s Vice-Chair positions were established to strengthen the effectiveness, coherence, visibility and continuity of the Commission’s work. The process of identifying thematic and geographic areas for Vice-Chairs to take initiative and demonstrate leadership has been initiated by the current Chair. If effectively operationalised, the Vice-Chairs could further contribute to sustaining momentum in the Commission’s activities and reinforce continuity in its engagement with Member States and other peacebuilding stakeholders.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Member States should continue their efforts to *articulate the responsibilities* of the Commission’s Vice-Chairs under the leadership and overall direction of the Chair, including by strengthening their outreach and engagement functions in support of the Commission’s work.
- When leaving their roles, the Commission’s Vice-Chairs could consider *writing a transition note* with an adequate assessment of good practices and lessons learned for the next Vice-Chairs to promote learning and continuous evolution of this function within the Commission.

### 1.4 Periodic Reviews of the Annual Programme of Work

The Commission’s Annual Programme of Work would benefit from periodic review and refinement throughout the year. At present, the Programme of Work can at times be overly reactive, shaped by ad hoc requests and shifting priorities, which limits opportunities for strategic planning and sustained engagement. This can result in compressed timelines for preparation, uneven participation by stakeholders, and limited continuity between meetings, thereby reducing the overall impact of the Commission’s deliberations. In addition, insufficient alignment with other intergovernmental processes and key UN system milestones may constrain the Commission’s ability to provide timely and relevant inputs, including in its advisory role. A detailed and predictable Programme of Work with regular and defined monitoring and evaluation mechanisms is essential to ensure effective preparation, coordination, and follow-up by Member States, as well as timely advice and input by other stakeholders.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- *Annual engagements that are known at the outset of each year*—such as the annual debate on Women, Peace and Security, mandate renewals by the UNSC, Peacebuilding Week, the CSO–UN Dialogue on Peacebuilding, and sessions of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34)—could be systematically integrated into the Commission’s planning process.
- Greater consideration could be given to how the Programme of Work can *enhance the overall impact of the Commission’s activities*, including through reflection on its working methods and modalities of engagement. The convening of regular expert-level discussions on working

methods could provide a useful mechanism for sustained reflection and continuous improvement of the Commission's practices.

## 1.5 Enhancing Access for Coordinated Civil Society Expertise

The Commission, including through a Vice-Chair, could encourage more coordinated and diverse civil society input to be more readily accessible to the Commission. This could ensure that their knowledge, research and field-based expertise systematically informs the Commission's deliberations and supports reciprocal learning. At present, the Core Group for the CSO–UN Dialogue on Peacebuilding plays an important role in facilitating the nomination of civil society briefers for the Commission's meetings and in bringing diverse expertise from different country contexts to the attention of the Commission's Member States through the annual CSO–UN Dialogue on Peacebuilding. The New York Peacebuilding Group (NYPG) can also provide a complementary platform for timely, New York-based exchanges with Member States and other stakeholders. The current modalities for civil society organising could include a broader scope of civil society expertise without access to the spaces in New York. There remains scope for Member States of the Commission to more proactively communicate the range of expertise sought or required, and to identify practical modalities through which Member States could access and draw upon this expertise in support of the Commission's work.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Member States of the Commission should continue and deepen the dialogue with civil society representatives about modalities and needs to further strengthen coordinated and accessible contributions by diverse civil society to the work of the Commission. In building on consultations for the PBAR and follow-up on its implementation (including preparations for Peacebuilding Week), civil society could work with the Commission in a structured and sustained manner, including through its Chair and Vice-Chairs, to periodically review and refine a mutually beneficial framework for engagement.

As Member States consider options for strengthening the Commission, it will be important to pursue an approach based on **incremental progress**. This includes clearly identifying priorities that can be advanced in the short term, while also articulating longer-term objectives for the Commission's strengthening. At the same time, efforts should seek to sustain and build upon practices and modalities that have proven effective, ensuring that existing strengths of the Commission are preserved while gradually enhancing its overall impact and effectiveness.

## 2. Strengthening the Advisory Role of the Peacebuilding Commission

The Commission is mandated to provide non-binding advice to several principal UN organs, including the General Assembly (UNGA), the Security Council (UNSC), and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and, where appropriate, directly to Member States (S/RES/1645–A/RES/60/180). However, the advice often comes too early or too late, with no explicit mechanisms for follow-up. Strengthening the evidence base of the Commission’s advice can also be difficult, particularly where inputs from external partners and stakeholders are not consistently integrated into intergovernmental deliberations. The possibility for strengthening the advice, as called for in the 2025 resolutions (OP2), largely depends on enhancing the relevance, timeliness, and continuity of its advice. The workshop discussions highlighted the following priorities for action:

### 2.1 Clarity of the Purpose of the Commission’s Advice

The Commission’s Member States could more clearly articulate what the Commission is trying to achieve with its advice. In practice, when requests for advice originate from bodies such as the UNSC or UNGA, these organs often have specific expectations regarding the issues to be addressed. Advice that does not sufficiently respond to these expectations may therefore receive limited attention. However, considering the potential impact at the outset of the development of the advice could contribute to making it more strategic and outcome-oriented. It is also important to note that, given the breadth of issues addressed by UN intergovernmental bodies, the Commission may not be in a position to provide strategic advice on all matters under consideration. Therefore, the focus and longer-term engagement on a specific set of issues is essential for impact.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Prior to providing advice, Member States of the Commission could *reflect more strategically on the intended objectives of the advice and its primary audience*, to ensure that its impact can be more clearly traced and that it contributes to continued learning and improvement in the Commission’s work.
- The advice could be more *clearly framed to reflect the Commission’s comparative advantage and added value* within the broader UN system, including the longer-term perspective required for peacebuilding and sustaining peace as reflected in the formation, review and drawdown of peace operation mandates (OP 2(d)).
- Member States could consider further narrowing and *prioritising specific thematic or country-specific areas for the Commission’s advice* to allow for building expertise and strengthening the quality and relevance of its advice over time. The experience of the CAR has been referenced as a positive example, where sustained engagement by the Commission has contributed to improving the quality and responsiveness of the advice over time.

- To allow for adequate preparation, Member States of the Commission could *focus on recurring agenda items*, including mandate renewals and thematic debates, where the timelines for engagement are generally predictable and allow for more systematic preparation.
- Intergovernmental bodies receiving the Commission’s advice could provide *more systematic feedback on its usefulness and relevance*, thereby enabling the Commission to refine and strengthen its advisory contributions over time.
- The Commission could consider prioritising its advisory contributions *across intergovernmental processes* in the UNGA, ECOSOC, C-34, and the QCPR. Such advice could draw on independent research, expertise, and analysis to support the quality of the advice offered by the Commission.

## 2.2 Enhancing the Quality of the Commission’s Advice

Enhancing the quality of the Commission’s advice could further strengthen its overall value and relevance, while recognising the inherent limitations associated with the consensus-based nature of intergovernmental processes through which such advice is developed. Two considerations are particularly relevant in this regard:

First, the notion of “quality” in the context of advice is not self-evident and may vary depending on the perspective of those assessing it. For intergovernmental bodies, the quality of advice is often linked to its practical usability in ongoing deliberations and decision-making processes. For national governments, the value of such advice may lie in the extent to which it accurately reflects country-specific realities and priorities, thereby serving as an entry point for continued engagement in multilateral processes, as well as to support research and evidence-based deliberations. For civil society actors, the advice may function as a reference point for accountability and advocacy in peacebuilding efforts at the field level.

Second, diverse expectations also shape the type of information that stakeholders seek to see reflected in the Commission’s advice. There is growing interest in ensuring that such advice reflects a broader range of perspectives and sources of knowledge, including insights from the field and practitioner-based learning. Workshop participants shared proposals to consider annexing additional analytical inputs to the Commission’s advice, including contributions from the UN Peacebuilding Contact Group, UN Country Teams (UNCTs) and Resident Coordinators (RCs), as well as civil society. At the same time, participants warned that the systematic inclusion of such diverse perspectives may face political sensitivities, as some Member States of the Commission may have reservations about incorporating externally generated analysis into intergovernmental products.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Member States of the Commission could consider developing *a repository of knowledge* over time that would enable the Commission to draw upon accumulated expertise when providing advice. This could start with improving the navigation of the Commission’s documents online,

and later include a more detailed database of resources, a roster or network of briefers, and serve as a source of institutional memory. Emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, could also be explored to help compile and synthesise evidence from the field level.

- The Commission's mandate includes engaging with a broad range of actors involved in peacebuilding. This provision could be utilised prior to the development of the Commission's advice to ensure that Member States are *informed early by a diversity of perspectives*, including from UN field presences and civil society.
- *Informal platforms for communicating the Commission's advice* could complement the written product. Informal Interactive Dialogues (IIDs) could serve as a useful modality, potentially facilitated by a Member State acting as an informal coordinator between the Commission and the relevant intergovernmental body.
- Expert-level meetings of the Commission could include *briefings from external experts*, including civil society practitioners, scholars and researchers, universities, and think tanks, in order to support Member States in strengthening their thematic understanding and analytical capacity.
- *The PBC and UNSC Secretariats could strengthen their collaboration* to ensure that the timelines for the provision of advice are more predictable and that the expectations regarding the scope and purpose of such advice are clearly communicated.
- Member States of the Commission could more clearly *articulate the type of inputs they seek from civil society and UN field presences* in order to ensure that such contributions can effectively inform the development of the Commission's advice.

### 2.3 Improving the Timeliness of the Commission's Advice

The timeliness of the Commission's advice is critical for impact, yet it remains a significant challenge for Member States. Within the UNSC, requests for advice from the Peacebuilding Commission are typically initiated by the UNSC President, whose presidency rotates monthly. This limited timeframe can significantly affect the period available for the Commission to solicit input, prepare and deliver its advice. In practice, Member States are often able to convene only one expert-level meeting and have approximately two weeks to negotiate the text of the advice. Such compressed timelines are generally insufficient for the development of substantive and well-considered recommendations.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Member States of the Commission could consider focusing and prioritising the provision of advice to intergovernmental bodies in relation to *predictable processes and milestones*, including mandate renewals and transitions.
- With *effective cooperation between Member States of the Commission and the UNSC*, the priorities and planned initiatives of upcoming Council presidencies could be identified in

advance, thereby enabling the Commission to anticipate requests for advice and prepare more timely and relevant contributions.

## 2.4 Improving Follow-Up from the Provision of the Commission's Advice

Proper follow-up, including documentation and strategic evaluation after the provision of advice, remains a key weakness of the current system and requires improvement, as also recognised in the 2025 resolutions (OP 1d). At present, there is no dedicated mechanism to systematically track follow-up to the Commission's advice. As a result, it remains unclear to what extent the advice has influenced the outcomes of the deliberations or processes to which it was intended to contribute. Strengthening follow-up mechanisms and developing more concrete and trackable recommendations could therefore enhance the transparency, accountability, and overall impact of the Commission's advisory role.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Member States could consider outlining more clearly what *follow-up to the Commission's advice* should entail, including mechanisms to assess both the uptake of the advice by relevant intergovernmental bodies and its potential impact at the country level.
- Member States of the Commission could clarify which actors hold *primary responsibility for following up on the Commission's advice*. Should this expectation rest with PBPSO, additional capacity may be required to support follow-up, learning, and knowledge management. Alternatively, follow-up could be led by Member States of the Commission themselves, including through the engagement of Vice-Chairs or informal coordinators.
- UN field presences and civil society could support more *action-oriented follow-up* when they are informed of the Commission's advice. Their awareness of the recommendations could help translate the Commission's advice into practical engagement at the country level.

## 3. Strengthening the Convening Role of the Peacebuilding Commission

The Commission brings together a wide range of actors involved in peacebuilding in order to promote dialogue, coordination, and collective action in support of sustaining peace. This includes Member States, national authorities, UN entities, international and regional organisations, international financial institutions, civil society, women's and youth groups, and other relevant stakeholders, to share information, develop recommendations, and promote more coherent peacebuilding strategies (A/RES/70/262–S/RES/2282). The 2025 resolutions encourage the Commission to enhance its impact by strengthening coordination and engagement among stakeholders across the UN system and at the country level, including through a more structured and predictable programme of work. The workshop discussions highlighted the following priorities for action:

### 3.1 Clarifying Objectives of the Commission's Convenings

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The objectives of the Commission's convenings could be more strategically defined in order to enhance their effectiveness and impact. Member States recognise that the Commission's meetings serve a variety of purposes. In country-specific discussions, Member States often seek to mobilise political and financial support, while also fostering greater coherence and continuity among the efforts of diverse peacebuilding partners. At the same time, the outcomes of the Commission's meetings are often not clearly articulated, making follow-up nearly impossible. This challenge is particularly evident in the case of thematic meetings, where discussions can be rich in substance but are not always translated into concrete outcomes or sustained engagement.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Commission could *build on what works and clearly identify innovative and impactful approaches*. Conversations on national prevention strategies represent a thematic area in which the Commission's engagement has great potential to be particularly valuable, inspiring many Member States to reflect on their own approaches to prevention.
- The Commission could seek to avoid episodic convenings and instead prioritise areas where *regular and sustained engagement* can be maintained over time. Such an approach would enable the Commission to deepen its understanding of specific peacebuilding challenges, foster continuity in dialogue among stakeholders, and generate more tangible impact.
- Prior to convening meetings, Member States of the Commission could consider *strategically reflecting with relevant stakeholders on the design and preparation of the discussions*, including strategic consultations with the concerned national governments to clarify the objectives of the convening, identify expectations, and explore opportunities for meaningful follow-up.
- There is a need for further *reflection on how the outcomes of the Commission's convenings are carried forward*, including clarifying who is responsible for tracking their impact, who assumes responsibility for advancing the actions discussed, and how the outcomes translate into concrete implementation.
- Convening for impact requires *a longer-term and sustained approach to engagement*, particularly in country-specific contexts, where it is generally more feasible to trace the outcomes and potential impacts of the Commission's work.

### 3.2 Supporting Effective and Meaningful Engagement of Diverse Peacebuilding Stakeholders

The Commission's convenings could benefit from a stronger focus on the effective and meaningful engagement of diverse peacebuilding stakeholders. The availability of broader evidence and data to inform the Commission's deliberations can increase the likelihood that its convenings will contribute to tangible impact at the field level, while also strengthening the analytical foundation of the Commission's advice.

### 3.2.1 Civil Society Engagement with the Commission

There are several challenges to civil society engagement with the Commission. While international think tanks and research institutions are often perceived as knowledge holders that can present perspectives from civil society in a format that is more readily usable for the Commission's deliberations, some Member States have raised concerns regarding the representativeness of civil society actors. At the same time, civil society, especially those outside of New York, often face difficulties in tracking the Commission's work, in part due to limited awareness of its activities. Opportunities for engagement are also sometimes constrained by short notice for requests for input. Clarifying expectations could help ensure more structured and effective engagement between the Commission and civil society stakeholders.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Both Member States and civil society could benefit from *a clearer understanding of the expectations, modalities, and potential impact* of their partnership within the framework of the Commission's work.
- *Political support of Member States* is essential to fully realise the potential of engagement with civil society in strengthening the impact of the Commission's work. Croatia, in its current role as the focal point for civil society engagement with the Commission, could support the development of more predictable and structured modalities for engagement.

### 3.2.2 Engagement of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Regional Development Banks (RDBs)

IFIs and RDBs can play a critical role in ensuring sustained financial support, long-term development investments, and macroeconomic stabilisation, which often extend beyond the capacities of the UN system alone. An existing example of good practice is the support provided to Papua New Guinea by the World Bank, following the PBF's catalytic investment in the development of a national prevention strategy. Additional examples include the peacebuilding realignment in the Central African Republic in 2024, as well as the ongoing efforts in Chad and Mauritania to align World Bank and UN programming.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Commission could *incentivise IFIs and RDBs to engage* more actively in peacebuilding by leveraging the catalytic function of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), which can help de-risk investments and encourage investments from additional financial actors.
- PBPSO could *track the evolving strategies of IFIs and RDBs* to identify relevant country contexts and good practices that could further incentivise their engagement with the Commission.
- Member States could further support relationship-building between the Commission and IFIs/RDBs, including through *bilateral and multilateral engagement with these institutions*.

During field visits, Member States of the Commission could consider meeting with representatives of IFIs and RDBs to build trust, exchange perspectives, and identify areas of common interest.

### 3.2.3 Engagement of Regional Organisations with the Commission

Their proximity to conflict situations and longstanding political relationships with Member States enable regional organisations to provide context-specific analysis and facilitate regional ownership of peacebuilding efforts.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- The good practice of the annual meeting between the Commission and the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, as well as field visits such as those recently made to the Central African Republic (CAR) and Côte d’Ivoire, should be *sustained and expanded to other contexts*.
- Member States of the Commission could *systematically engage regional organisations from their respective regions* in the work of the Commission. Efforts such as Brazil’s engagement of the OAS and Inter-American Development Bank, and Japan’s initiatives to engage ASEAN and the Asian Development Bank, should be sustained and expanded.

### 3.2.4 Engagement of the Private Sector with the Commission

Engagement between the Commission and the private sector is increasingly recognised as critical because sustainable peace requires economic stability, inclusive development, and long-term investment—areas in which businesses play a central role. However, there is insufficient engagement to date, in part due to political sensitivities.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Commission could *strengthen its engagement with Resident Coordinators (RCs)* to foster greater interaction with the private sector, as RCs are well-positioned to facilitate such engagement at the country level, including in the context of the implementation of the UN Global Compact.
- Member States could consider commissioning *independent research on strategies for engaging with the private sector* in support of peacebuilding efforts, exploring effective modalities for partnership, while also examining potential risks and approaches to “de-risking” investments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

### 3.2.5 Engagement of UN Field Presences with the Commission

UN Country Teams (UNCTs) and RCs could provide the Commission with direct insight into country-level dynamics and the implementation of peacebuilding efforts on the ground, as they engage with PBF projects, national governments, civil society, and other field-level actors. Such partnerships are

critical for ensuring that the Commission’s deliberations are informed by field-based perspectives and that its support remains responsive to country-specific realities.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- Member States of the Commission could *encourage RCs to brief the Commission*, rather than higher-level representatives, on developments in their respective country contexts. In cases where an RC is unable to deliver a full briefing, they could still be made available for interactive exchanges or question-and-answer sessions.
- The Chair of the Commission could consider *briefing the annual RC retreat* in order to enhance awareness among RCs of the Commission’s priorities and planned engagements. A similar approach could also be applied to the retreats of Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs).
- The Commission could play a role in *strengthening institutional support for the UNDP-DPPA Joint Program* and the work of the PDAs, including by raising awareness among Member States of the value of their engagement in advancing conflict prevention and sustaining peace at the country level.

## 4. Strengthening the Bridging Role of the Peacebuilding Commission

The bridging role of the Commission entails connecting different actors, institutions, and policy domains involved in peacebuilding to promote coherence and greater coordination across the UN system and among diverse peacebuilding stakeholders to sustain attention to countries emerging from or at risk of conflict, and advance linkages between peace and security, development, and humanitarian pillars of the UN system (S/RES/1645–A/RES/60/180; S/RES/2282–A/RES/70/262; S/RES/2805–A/RES/80/11). Through this bridging function, the Commission helps ensure that peacebuilding efforts are better aligned across institutional boundaries and that political, development, and financial support are mobilised in a more coherent and sustained manner. However, the Commission faces significant political and bureaucratic constraints in trying to connect different intergovernmental and institutional tracks. The workshop discussions highlighted the following priorities for action:

### 4.1 Addressing Siloes within the UN System

The Commission’s potential to address siloes within the UN System remains underutilised. In particular, a persistent divide continues to exist between peacebuilding and development, in part due to the limited and sporadic engagement between the Commission and ECOSOC. At the same time, the gap between the Commission and the Human Rights Council (HRC) remains even more pronounced, partly reflecting reservations among some Member States of the Commission regarding engagement with human rights experts. These institutional divides are further reinforced by internal fragmentation within Member States’ missions, where experts covering peace and security, development, and human rights often work in parallel with limited interaction.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- Member States could strengthen *internal coordination among relevant experts within their own missions* to promote more coherent engagement on peacebuilding across different intergovernmental processes. Improved coordination could help ensure that peacebuilding perspectives are more effectively reflected in development-related discussions, including the QCPR and ECOSOC's oversight of the UN development system.
- PBPSO could actively involve Member States as well as relevant parts of the UN system in *the planning and design of the Annual Peacebuilding Week*. The Annual Peacebuilding Week could serve as a space to convene regular exchanges with other intergovernmental bodies, thereby fostering greater coherence and dialogue across the UN system on peacebuilding and sustaining peace.

## 4.2 Focusing on Support for Countries Undergoing Transitions

Countries undergoing transitions could particularly benefit from the support and engagement of the Commission, as such countries often have significant need for financial and political support, as well as learning from the experiences and lessons of other contexts. However, in practice, countries experiencing transitions have often expressed wariness or disinterest in the Commission's engagement. Political sensitivities, concerns about national ownership, and evolving conflict dynamics frequently make it difficult to entice such contexts to seek the Commission's support. As a result, countries such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or South Sudan—which face important transition-related challenges—do not benefit from the Commission's mechanisms, despite the potential value that its platform could provide.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- The UNSC could consider incorporating references in relevant mandates that *request engagement of transitioning states with the Commission*, as part of broader efforts to support peacebuilding and sustaining peace during periods of transition.
- The Commission could more *clearly articulate the types of support it can offer* to countries undergoing transition, including by highlighting well-documented examples of good practice where the Commission has successfully contributed to supporting transitions. Member States could also consider reframing transition support through a prevention lens, including by promoting national prevention strategies as a possible entry point.

## About the Workshop Organisers

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### **Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation**

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation is a non-governmental organisation established in 1962 in memory of the second UN Secretary-General, which aims to advance dialogue and policy for sustainable development and peace. Based in Uppsala, Sweden, the Foundation has been supporting the UN Peacebuilding Architecture since 2013 through annual retreats for the Commission, expert roundtables, regional consultations, policy briefs, and thematic papers.

**Uppsala, Sweden**

[www.daghammarskjold.se](http://www.daghammarskjold.se)

### **Interpeace**

Interpeace is an international peacebuilding organisation created within the United Nations in 1994 and later established as an independent non-governmental organisation, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, which aims to prevent violence and build lasting peace by supporting locally led peacebuilding and strengthening international peacebuilding practice. Interpeace has contributed to the UN Peacebuilding Architecture through its global policy engagements, including as inaugural civil society co-chair of the CSO–UN Dialogue on Peacebuilding and through regional and Geneva consultations contributing to the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review.

**Geneva, Switzerland**

[www.interpeace.org](http://www.interpeace.org)

This discussion paper presents key insights from an expert-level dialogue on implementing the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review (PBAR) resolutions.

It explores practical pathways to strengthen the Peacebuilding Commission across its advisory, convening, and bridging roles, with a focus on field-level impact, inclusive partnerships, and integrated approaches to conflict prevention.

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### KEY AREAS OF FOCUS INCLUDE:



Strengthening institutional capacity and working methods



Enhancing the quality and impact of advisory functions



Expanding meaningful stakeholder engagement



Bridging gaps across the UN system



Supporting countries in transition



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Foundation**

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