
UN REINVENTION RESEARCH GROUP



Authority Without Consensus

Reviving the convening authority of the United Nations

Georgios Kostakos

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Abstract

Major powers and frustrated coalitions are creating parallel governance frameworks outside the established multilateral system founded on the United Nations (UN) Charter. This paper examines how the UN can engage predictably and productively with such frameworks, be they regional or cross-regional, reclaiming de facto if not de jure its central role in global governance by reviving its convening authority. The paper also proposes a mechanism, convened as needed, to coordinate global responses to major human security challenges, with participation from state and non-state actors. Such innovations that do not require UN Charter amendment could help reposition the UN at the centre of global governance and restore its relevance, legitimacy, and impact. To achieve that, though, the support of key actors, including middle and small powers, as well as a proactive UN Secretary-General and an engaged global public would be required.

The UN as perennial constitutional framework for global governance

For eight decades, the United Nations and the 'UN system' of associated funds, programmes and specialised agencies have occupied a unique place at the centre of global governance arrangements. This legal, institutional, and operational framework has been built around the UN Charter, the de facto constitutional document of the post-World War II international order. Even if occasionally in the breach, the Charter's core tenets have been the standard against which the conduct of international affairs has been measured since 1945: no threat or use of force [1] and no aggression,[2] peaceful resolution of disputes, and cooperation for shared prosperity, social progress, and human rights.

By design and through its record, although both far from perfect, the UN has acquired the status of a uniquely legitimate global governance forum, and has provided a framework for international affairs and multilateral cooperation. In the 21st century, though, the post-World War II universal organisation has lost a significant part of its shine and relevance. Even if the UN Charter's principles remain aspirationally valid and are still paid lip service to, they are often de facto distorted and used to justify all kinds of unilateral actions. Moreover, the role and effectiveness of the United Nations are questioned in all three major 'pillars' of its activity, namely peace and security, development, and human rights, as well as its humanitarian work. This can be traced back to increasingly diverging interests among major states and renewed interstate wars, multidimensional risks like climate change and pandemics, emerging powerful non-state actors especially from the private sector, rapid and largely unregulated technological advances including in artificial intelligence (AI) and biotechnology, as well as dysfunctional intergovernmental bodies and processes (notably an often deadlocked UN Security Council), weak leadership and lack of unifying vision by national leaders and the UN Secretary-General.

With the multilateral centre significantly weakened, the powerful feel free to pick from among other governance frameworks that exist in parallel to the UN, or they just create new 'coalitions of the willing', to advance their goals and legitimise their actions. The following sections examine how the UN could engage these actors through its convening authority, and the conditions for success.

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[1] The Charter recognises the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs (Article 51), and provides for Security Council enforcement action under Chapter VII. Self-defence is subject to necessity and proportionality, and measures taken must be reported immediately to the Security Council. See United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, June 26, 1945, arts. 2(4), 39–42 and 51, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text; International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries", 2001, commentary to article 21, paras. 1 and 6, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.

[2] On aggression see Mark Simonoff, "Restoring Constraint on Aggression", forthcoming in the Toda Peace Institute and Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation "Reinventing the United Nations" series.

Mapping institutional connections

State groupings, within or outside UN structures, need not contradict the Charter or challenge UN authority. In fact, Chapter VIII of the Charter expressly encourages the peaceful settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or agencies, while Article 53 requires Security Council authorisation for enforcement action under such arrangements. References to the UN are common in the founding documents of several non-UN entities, such as the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), and even more security-focused organisations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).[3] These organisations are thus embedded in the post-World War II global governance framework built around the UN and its Charter, as presented in the previous section. Furthermore, partnerships established between the UN and these organisations foresee the holding of regular consultations at intergovernmental or secretariat level, supported in several cases by permanent delegations or liaison offices.[4]

Cooperation between the UN and individual regional and other organisations appears as an item on the agendas of and is the subject of debates at the UN General Assembly and the Security Council.[5] Moreover, the UN has on occasion authorised operations led by such organisations, including NATO-led operations in the Western Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya,[6] and joint peacekeeping operations with the AU.[7] An overview of UN cooperation with regional and cross-regional organisations is provided in the UN Secretary-General's biennial report on the subject.[8]

Even ad hoc groups, which have no treaty base and rely primarily on their rotating country presidency for support, notably the Group of Seven (G7), the Group of Twenty (G20) and BRICS (named for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, though its membership has expanded), operate in the context of the global constitutional order defined by the UN Charter. That can be inferred not only from the overarching framework of international law but also from the references such groups make to the UN in their high-level declarations

[3] See, inter alia, Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (July 11, 2000), https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf; SECOND (2) of the ASEAN Declaration ("The Bangkok Declaration", August 8, 1967), https://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20140117154159.pdf; Articles 130u(3), J.1(2) and J.5 of the Treaty on European Union ("The Maastricht Treaty", February 7, 1992), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT; the Preamble and Articles 1, 5, 7 and 12 of the North Atlantic Treaty (April 4, 1949), https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/1949/04/04/the-north-atlantic-treaty; and the Preamble to the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (June 7, 2002), https://eng.sectsco.org/images/07e8/0c/14/1625960.pdf.

[4] E.g. annual joint consultative meeting between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, and the Secretary-General's regular participation in AU and EU heads of state and government meetings; for more see the UN website's "Regional Organisations" page, https://www.unmissions.org/en/dppa/regional-organizations.

[5] See, for example, Item 128 entitled "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organisations" in United Nations General Assembly, Provisional agenda of the eighty-first regular session of the General Assembly, UN Document A/81/150, July 10, 2026, https://docs.un.org/en/A/81/150 and Security Council Report list of "Interaction with Regional and other International Organisations", https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/interaction-with-regional-and-other-international-organisations/.

[6] See NATO, "Relations with the United Nations", https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/relations-with-the-united-nations.

[7] See, for example, African Union, "AU and UN Reaffirm Partnership for Peace, Security and Sustainable Development", press release, November 13, 2025, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20251113/au-and-un-reaffirm-partnership-peace-security-and-sustainable-development.

[8] See Report of the Secretary-General, "Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and other organizations", UN Document A/79/302-S/2024/600, August 8, 2024, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4061951?v=pdf.

or decisions.[9] Summit meetings of these bodies often invite the UN Secretary-General or the heads of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, the Bretton Woods Institutions, which are also formally part of the UN system.[10] From the UN side, periodic high-level meetings were convened already in the 1990s by the UN Secretary-General with the executive heads of regional and other organisations, with a focus on conflict prevention.[11] Regular meetings continue to bring together mediation experts from the UN and key regional, sub-regional and other organisations.[12]

From cooperation to authoritative convening, reviewing, and mandating

As explained in the previous section, cooperation arrangements of varying intensity and depth already connect the UN with regional and other organisations. How can such arrangements have more effect in the real world, and how can they be expanded to include less institutionalised groups like the G20, BRICS and G7?

Rather than being considered as antagonistic to the UN, these groups can be seen as caucus groups of UN member states promoting legitimate interests that their members share in a regional or cross-regional context. Even powerful regional and cross-regional groups stand to benefit from such an approach that allows for a closer institutional association with the UN, in view of the latter's universal recognition and multidimensional legitimacy that no other entity can replicate. In more practical terms, pursuing a peace or other operation with a UN authorisation, rather than through a unilateral or coalition-of-the-willing decision, can reduce political and reputational risks for these groups and their members, while shared UN personnel and support may lower costs.[13]

The question that naturally follows is whether cooperation between the UN and these caucus groups can be put on a firmer footing and made to serve more clearly the universal objectives of the world body. Reporting to the UN on their activities, something that takes place regularly for regional bodies but not yet for the less institutionalised cross-regional ones, is a good way of ensuring transparency and reducing suspicions that other states and groups may hold. The UN, through its competent bodies, has the legal, political, and moral basis to introduce a dialogue on such reporting, review compliance with the UN Charter provisions, explore

[9] See, for example, numerous references to the UN in the latest G20 Leaders' Declaration under the G20 South African Presidency (Johannesburg, November 22, 2025), https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2025/251122-declaration.html and the BRICS New Delhi Declaration entitled *Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability* (September 12, 2026) https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/brics-new-delhi-declaration-building-for-resilience-innovation-cooperation-and-sustainability-september-12-2026/; but only one reference to the UN in the most recent G7 Leaders' *Declaration on Mutually Beneficial International Partnerships* (Évian, June 16–17, 2026) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/g54db2fr/leader-s-declaration-on-mutually-beneficial-partnerships.pdf.

[10] The UN Secretary-General participated in the aforementioned G20 and BRICS summits, while the IMF Managing Director and the World Bank President participated in the G20 summit. Executive heads of other UN system entities are occasionally invited to lower-level, ministerial or expert meetings of the G7, G20 and BRICS. On their place in the UN system, see International Monetary Fund, "Agreement with the United Nations", 1947, https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781451972511/ch009.xml; United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, "World Bank Group", https://research.un.org/en/docs/unsystem/worldbank.

[11] See, for example, Transcript of Press Conference of Secretary-General Kofi Annan, UN Document SG/SM/6656, July 29, 1998, https://press.un.org/en/1998/19980729.sgsm6656.html.

[12] See United Nations Peacemaker, "Regional Organizations", Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, https://peacemaker.un.org/en/networks/regional-organizations.

[13] See António Guterres, "Peacekeeping is cost effective, but must adapt to new reality", United Nations, May 30, 2017, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/news/peacekeeping-is-cost-effective-but-must-adapt-to-new-reality.

synergies on issues of shared concern, and agree specific assignments or, where the competent UN organ has the requisite authority, issue mandates (see earlier references to NATO and AU). Of course, caution should be exercised to avoid the UN's rubber-stamping of decisions taken elsewhere or legitimising untested and over-ambitious external bodies, like the US-led Board of Peace.[14]

Reviewing the work of regional organisations and cross-regional groups to ensure compliance with the UN Charter provisions neither entails nor justifies intervention in an organisation's or group's inner workings or in its delivering for its constituency. Such a review would provide political scrutiny that should respect organisational independence and the principle of subsidiarity. The latter foresees that an action should be carried out by the authorities closest to the citizens that would benefit from that action, starting from the local level and moving to higher levels only if there would demonstrably be significant value to be added by that move.[15]

In addition to the dialogue between the UN and regional and cross-regional organisations at the intergovernmental level, there should be regular interactions between the UN Secretary-General and the chief executives of the respective regional and cross-regional organisations, not least to coordinate implementation of common understandings reached at the intergovernmental level. This in fact responds to the 'encouragement' the UN Secretary-General received from world leaders at the Summit of the Future, in September 2024, "to convene regular high-level meetings with relevant regional organizations to discuss matters pertaining to peace operations, peacebuilding and conflicts."[16] These meetings could focus on ensuring the implementation of shared projects and mandates issued through the intergovernmental dialogue presented above, and could also include representatives of less institutionalised fora, probably from their rotating presidencies. To contain costs, such meetings could alternate between in-person and online formats.

Conflict prevention could be a standard item on the agenda of such meetings, with the network of regional organisations and other groups feeding into an 'Article 99 hotline' that could be launched by the UN Secretary-General in support of the office's mandate to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."[17] Existing UN Secretariat meetings with regional and cross-regional organisations and other state groups could thus become more inclusive and systematic, drawing on and expanding the UN system's internal coordination practices through the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), which at its highest level is chaired by the UN Secretary-General as primus inter pares and promotes policy coherence and coordination across the UN system.[18]

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[14] See UN Security Council resolution 2803 (2025), November 17, 2025, which endorses the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict and welcomes the establishment of a Board of Peace, https://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2803/, and the Board of Peace Charter that claims a reach well beyond Gaza, https://boardofpeace.org/charter.

[15] See "The principle of subsidiarity", Factsheets of the European Union, European Parliament, May 2026, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/erpl-app-public/factsheets/pdf/en/FTU_1.2.2.pdf and Félicité Djilo and Paul-Simon Handy, "Unscrambling subsidiarity in the African Union: from competition to collaboration", Africa Report 37 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, December 2021), https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/AR-37-Rev.pdf.

[16] Action 21(f) of *The Pact for the Future*, UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/79/1, September 22, 2024, https://www.un.org/pact-for-the-future/en/action-21f. See also Eugene Chen, "Collective Security Beyond the Security Council", forthcoming in the Toda Peace Institute and Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation "Reinventing the United Nations" series.

[17] *Charter of the United Nations*, Article 99. On prevention see Sigrid Gruener and Henrik Hammargren, "Prevention as a Core UN System Function", forthcoming in the Toda Peace Institute and Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation "Reinventing the United Nations" series.

[18] See United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, https://unsceb.org/.

Convening the world for human security emergencies

Climate change, food and water shortages, and pandemics present serious challenges to human security that can escalate to global emergencies threatening the lives and livelihoods of millions or even billions of people.[19] While tackling these challenges is part of the 2030 Agenda and the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the need for urgent action occasionally leads to calls for the UN Security Council to take responsibility and use its enforcement capacity under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to respond. In view, though, of the Council's frequent inability in recent years to reach decisions, due to the use of veto by one or the other of its permanent members, especially China, Russia, and the United States, relying on the Council alone is unlikely to be sufficient. Moreover, past attempts to introduce such items to the Council's agenda, notably climate change, have been met with political opposition, alongside disagreements over the scope of its international peace and security mandate.[20] The need remains, though, for convening the world on an urgent basis to jointly tackle major actual or imminent threats to human security.

Given the UN80 Initiative,[21] reluctance to establish new bodies and budgets, and political obstacles in the Security Council, a way forward could be to introduce a mechanism convened on an as-needed basis under the authority of the UN General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). What could be provisionally called a "Global Resilience Townhall" (GRT) could be convened as an emergency special session of the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) that meets annually at ministerial level under ECOSOC and once every four years at head of state and government level under the General Assembly. This would require an enabling General Assembly decision, with corresponding ECOSOC arrangements.[22]

Drawing on the HLPF's inclusive practice and earlier proposals,[23] a GRT would involve all UN member states, as well as other relevant stakeholders. To facilitate discussions and decisions and reduce meeting times, though, states could speak primarily through the chairs of regional or cross-regional organisations and other caucus groups that they are members of. States would retain individual participation and voting rights in this first, decision-making tier. A second tier of GRT (non-voting) participants would consist of the UN Secretary-General, the executive heads of the UN system agencies, funds and programmes directly connected to the issue to be addressed by the GRT at each specific convening, and the executive heads of the regional or cross-regional organisations and other caucus groups represented by their state chairs in the first tier.

A third tier of (non-voting) GRT participants would consist of representatives of non-state constituencies, as organised through the UN Major Groups and Other Stakeholders (MGoS) or a similar arrangement.[24] This would engage non-state actors with significant knowledge, material, or moral resources, from multinational

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[19] For a definition of 'human security' see "What is Human Security", UN Trust Fund for Human Security, https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/.

[20] For an overview of relevant actor attitudes see Sabrina B. Arias, "The UN Security Council Declined to take up Climate Change as a Security Problem. Why?", Columbia/SIPA blog, October 11, 2022, https://multilateralism.sipa.columbia.edu/news/un-security-council-declined-take-climate-change-security-problem-why.

[21] See United Nations, "UN80 Initiative", https://www.un.org/un80-initiative/en.

[22] United Nations General Assembly, "Format and Organizational Aspects of the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development," A/RES/67/290, July 9, 2013, https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/67/290. See also United Nations, "High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development," https://hlpf.un.org/. The emergency format proposed here would require a further intergovernmental decision.

[23] See Secretary-General Guterres's proposal for an "Emergency Platform" in "Our Common Agenda, Policy Brief 2: Strengthening the international response to complex global shocks – an Emergency Platform", UN Document A/77/CRP.1/Add.1, February 15, 2023, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4004914?v=pdf and a proposal by the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS) for the establishment of a "Global Resilience Council", as per the dedicated web page https://www.foggs.org/grc-global-resilience-council/.

[24] See United Nations, "Major Groups and Other Stakeholders", High-level Political Forum 2025, https://hlpf.un.org/2025/major-groups-and-other-stakeholders-mgos.

corporations to philanthropic foundations, civil society organisations and activists, religious groups, scientific associations, indigenous groups, parliamentarians, and local authorities. Participation in discussions and the formulation of decisions could strengthen stakeholders' ownership and commitment to implementation.

The HLPF meeting as the GRT would not replace the intergovernmental bodies with direct responsibility for policy-making on the threat to human security under consideration each time. It would rather support those bodies in ensuring implementation of their mandates, including the governing bodies of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for climate action (SDG 13), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for food security (SDG 2), and the World Health Organization (WHO) for health emergencies (SDG 3). Thus, specific issues would be elevated to the GRT by the relevant specialised body, following persistent difficulties in the implementation of their respective decisions and in view of the need for action to be taken by a range of intergovernmental bodies and other stakeholders.

A three-quarters majority of participating states present and voting could be proposed for GRT political recommendations, subject to agreed modalities consistent with the Charter. This would avoid a consensus requirement without altering the voting rules of the General Assembly or ECOSOC. Such recommendations would not themselves impose legal obligations on states or other bodies. Implementation would be monitored by the HLPF, the General Assembly and ECOSOC. They could request support from the Security Council, Bretton Woods Institutions, regional and cross-regional organisations, each acting within its own mandate. At a minimum, a GRT convening could give renewed prominence and political impetus to a global threat requiring urgent attention.[25]

GRT convening, secretariat support and funding would use HLPF arrangements as adapted by the competent bodies, potentially replacing a regular HLPF session while preserving essential SDG review functions. Given the urgency of climate action, a first GRT 'test' session could be convened in 2027 on the issue of climate action. Alternatively, or additionally, a session could soon be convened on the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence and the risks it may pose to human security. The formal request for convening a GRT on climate action could come from the thirty-first UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP31) in Antalya, Türkiye, in November 2026, while states participating in the second session of the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance, scheduled for May 2027 in New York, could bring forward the request for an AI-focused GRT.[26]

[25] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, arts. 10–14, 18, 24–25, 62–64 and 67, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text. Article 18 sets the General Assembly's voting thresholds, and Article 67 provides for decisions in ECOSOC by a majority of members present and voting. The proposed three-quarters threshold concerns GRT political recommendations; it would not amend these Charter provisions or confer enforcement authority.

[26] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, "UN Climate Change Conference – Antalya, November 2026", November 9–20, 2026, https://unfccc.int/cop31; United Nations, Global Dialogue on AI Governance, "FAQ", https://www.un.org/global-dialogue-ai-governance/en/faq. The latter lists the second annual Dialogue for May 3–4, 2027, in New York. The proposal here is for participating UN member states to advance a request, rather than for the Dialogue itself to exercise an assumed decision-making power.

Enabling the UN of the future

Bringing caucus groups such as the G20, BRICS and G7 closer to the UN, making cooperation with regional intergovernmental bodies more focused and strategic, and convening all relevant stakeholders to address human security emergencies, would increase the UN's relevance and effectiveness vis-à-vis the major global challenges of today. This requires sustained backing from UN member states across continents and groups. Major powers might be reluctant to allow the UN to regain centre-stage and potentially reduce their freedom of action through such initiatives. Looking at the actual needs and demands of their own people, though, and wanting to avoid being singled out as spoilers, even China, Russia, and the United States may be ready to tolerate such innovative steps.[27]

A catalytic role could be played by *middle powers* from the Global South and the Global North. The incentive is clear, in the words of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney: "the *middle powers* must act together, because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu."[28] They should not ask for permission from the major powers,[29] but should go ahead and do what they can, from acting as two-way conduits between the UN and the non-UN bodies and caucus groups they participate in, to lending political support and resources to advancing innovative ideas for reinventing the UN, like those presented in this paper. Nor should one underestimate the potential influence of *small powers*, when they decide to act with determination in the UN context, whether individually, as Vanuatu has done on climate [30] and Liechtenstein on General Assembly scrutiny of Security Council vetoes,[31] or together, as in the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Forum of Small States (FOSS).[32]

Ideally, middle and small powers would join forces with a proactive UN Secretary-General, as has been the case in the past.[33] From Article 99's political mandate, the office's moral authority and convening capacity, to commanding the resources of the UN Secretariat, and connecting to the broader UN system and associated organisations and groups, the UN Secretary-General has a lot to offer, if not paralysed by major power intimidation or lack of imagination. A combination of middle and small powers with a proactive Secretary-General could provide the inclusive vision and principled leadership needed to shape the UN of the future, especially if supported by a broader popular movement that puts pressure on political leaders globally, regionally, and nationally.

[27] See, for example, Stephen Schlesinger, "Trump Will Never Leave the UN", *PassBlue*, August 10, 2026, https://passblue.com/2026/08/10/trump-will-never-leave-the-un/.

[28] See "Special Address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada" (speech, World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, January 20, 2026), https://www.weforum.org/stories/forum-institutional/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/.

[29] See also Daryl Swanepoel, "Middle Powers must Stop Waiting for Permission", *Katoikos.world*, August 11, 2026, https://katoikos.world/analysis/middle-powers-must-stop-waiting-for-permission.html.

[30] See "UN Adopts landmark Climate resolution backing ICJ opinion led by Vanuatu", *Pasifika Environews*, May 21, 2026, https://pasifika.news/2026/05/un-adopts-landmark-climate-resolution-backing-icj-opinion-led-by-vanuatu/.

[31] See Maria Luisa Gambale, "The UN Veto Initiative 'Hits a Nerve': Q/A With Liechtenstein", *PassBlue*, September 12, 2024, https://passblue.com/2024/09/12/the-un-veto-initiative-hits-a-nerve-q-a-with-liechtensteins-diplomat/.

[32] See Alliance of Small Island States, https://aosis.org/ and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore, "Small States", https://www.mfa.gov.sg/about-mfa/international-issues/small-states/.

[33] Examples include cooperation between Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester Pearson of Canada in developing UN peacekeeping, Secretary-General U Thant's work with Non-Aligned Movement countries during the Cold War, and the constructive role of Nordic countries at the UN over successive decades.

Recommendations

Establish, through the General Assembly and ECOSOC, a regular dialogue between the UN and cross-regional caucus groups, notably the G20, G7 and BRICS, building on reporting arrangements with regional organisations, and use it to review consistency with the UN Charter, identify synergies and agree tasks within the competent bodies' mandates.

Convene, as UN Secretary-General and in line with Action 21(f) of the *Pact for the Future*, regular meetings with the executive heads of regional and cross-regional organisations, with conflict prevention as a standing item and feeding into an Article 99 early-warning hotline.

Authorise, through the General Assembly and ECOSOC, the convening of a Global Resilience Townhall as an emergency special session of the High-level Political Forum to address major threats to human security, with agreed voting modalities for political recommendations and meaningful non-voting participation by non-state constituencies.

Request, as the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties at COP31 and as UN member states participating in the Global Dialogue on AI Governance at its second session, the first Global Resilience Townhall convenings on climate action and on artificial intelligence respectively.

Monitor implementation of Global Resilience Townhall recommendations through the High-level Political Forum, reporting to the General Assembly and ECOSOC.

Commit, as middle and small powers, to act as two-way conduits between the UN and the caucus groups they belong to, and to lend political support and resources to reviving the UN's convening authority.

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