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

# Prevention as a Core UN System Function

## From commitments to capability

Sigrid Gruener & Henrik Hammargren

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

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# Abstract

Prevention is central to the United Nations' Charter purpose, reform agendas and normative commitments, yet it remains fragmented as an operational practice. This paper argues that the UN lacks a coherent system function that connects analysis, political judgement, financing, national ownership, regional engagement, and deployable support for prevention. It distinguishes prevention as an objective, prevention as a capability, and prevention as a system function and uses this distinction to explain why prevention often remains everybody's obligation but nobody's responsibility.

The paper recognises the Security Council's distinct Charter role while arguing that a wider UN prevention offer is needed to support Member States directly and to assist the Council when it draws on the system. Such an offer should be nationally owned, politically accompanied, grounded in country-level engagement, regionally connected, financially supported, and reinforced by deployable Expertise on Demand. The Peacebuilding Commission, Resident Coordinator system, Peacebuilding Fund, human rights mechanisms, regional arrangements, development system, and international financial institutions all provide important building blocks, but their value for prevention is contingent upon being organised through a clearer operating logic.

The paper also underscores the urgency of securing prevention financing that is flexible, adaptive, and risk-tolerant in the context of shrinking official development assistance. Its central recommendation is that the 10th Secretary-General should make prevention a defining system objective and present a practical UN prevention offer that Member States can recognise, request, and use.[1]

# 1. Introduction: the UN prevention paradox

Prevention is central to the United Nations' (UN) purpose as reflected in the Charter's emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes, international cooperation, human rights, social progress, and the maintenance of international peace and security.[2] Yet the UN is still judged by its inability to prevent armed conflict.

The starting point is political: prevention depends on Member States' choices to uphold the UN Charter and on the willingness of actors to act before risks escalate. The UN's institutional challenge is not the absence of prevention commitments, policies, or instruments. The UN has many prevention-relevant capacities. The Secretary-General can exercise good offices and preventive diplomacy. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) provides political analysis, mediation support, and channels for engagement. The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) can convene Member States and partners, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) can provide catalytic support, and the Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office (PBPSO) plays a system-bridging role.[3] Resident Coordinators (RCs) and UN Country Teams (UNCTs) connect national priorities, development planning, and UN support. Human rights mechanisms can identify exclusion, discrimination, and abuse, including grave and systematic violations, that signal risks of grievance and escalation. Regional organisations, UN regional capacities, and international financial institutions (IFIs) also shape the prevention environment. But these elements are not organised into a sufficiently coherent system function.

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[1] This paper draws on a forthcoming publication by the authors for the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation on prevention as a UN system function.

[2] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, 26 June 1945, especially the Preamble and Articles 1, 2(7), 33–38, 52–56 and 99.

[3] The Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office (PBPSO), established in 2026 under the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, combines the former Peacebuilding Support Office with capacities for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, security sector reform, and justice and corrections. See United Nations Peacebuilding and Peace Support, announcement of the establishment of PBPSO, 13 January 2026. UN announcement

This creates a paradox. Prevention is broadly accepted as a political objective but uneven in operational practice. Member States endorse prevention in speeches and resolutions, but this is not consistently translated into institutional responsibility, financing, political backing, or deployable support. As prevention has become everybody's obligation, it has too often become nobody's responsibility.

This paper is structured around three dimensions: **prevention as an objective**, the shared aspiration to act before risks escalate; **prevention as a capability**, the ability to identify risks, mobilise actors, align financing and respond before escalation; and **prevention as a system function**, an organised approach across the UN system that makes prevention usable. It focuses on prevention of armed conflict and conflict-related violence, with particular attention to UN support for nationally-led efforts, looking beyond crisis response to how the UN system can identify risks, support dialogue, align financing, and accompany national and regional efforts.

The paper's focus is the onset, escalation, and continuation of intra-state conflict and violence including those with cross-border or regional manifestations. In interstate aggression or major geopolitical confrontation, the offer is relevant through analysis, good offices, human rights engagement, diplomacy, and confidence-building. Enforcement and collective security require other Charter-based instruments.

## 2. Prevention, the Security Council and the wider UN system

Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and peaceful settlement remains central to the UN's preventive purpose. Recent Security Council deliberations, including resolution 2788 (2025), confirm that prevention remains part of the Council's agenda and underline the need to connect Chapter VI tools more effectively with mediation, fact-finding, regional arrangements, inclusion, and wider UN system support.[4] Where situations threaten international peace and security, the Council may also authorise binding or coercive measures under Chapter VII.

This policy brief recognises the Security Council's distinct Charter role and asks: how can the wider UN system organise prevention support in ways that assist Member States directly and support the Council when it draws on the system? A credible UN prevention function should distinguish between three dimensions:

- **Council-led prevention:** actions by the Security Council, including peaceful settlement, requests for briefings, tools under Articles 33 and 34, Chapter VI engagement, Chapter VIII regional arrangements and, where required, Chapter VII measures.
- **Council-enabled prevention:** situations in which the Council requests, encourages, or draws on the Secretary-General, the PBC, regional organisations, mediation support, human rights analysis, RCs, UNCTs, financing partners, and specialised expertise.
- **UN system-led prevention support:** non-coercive support provided through existing UN mandates and capacities to nationally owned efforts where Council authorisation is not required.

Separately, Article 99 of the UN Charter gives the Secretary-General independent authority to bring matters that may threaten international peace and security to the Security Council's attention; its exercise does not depend on a government request.

[4] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2788 (2025), S/RES/2788 (2025), 22 July 2025; United Nations, "As Secretary-General Urges Security Council Members to 'Lead by Example', Delegates Call for Greater Use of UN Diplomatic Toolbox to Peacefully Settle Disputes," SC/16420, 23 July 2026.

A UN prevention offer is most likely to be accepted when framed as support to Member States in fulfilling existing responsibilities: identifying risks, strengthening institutions, sustaining dialogue, mobilising financing, and managing contestation before options narrow. Framed around nationally defined priorities and institutional resilience, prevention has a stronger political foundation. Prevention perceived as external judgement, assigning labels such as fragile, unstable, conflict-prone, or failing is likely to be considered stigmatising and resisted.

National ownership is essential, but wider than government ownership. Sustainable prevention depends on relationships between state and citizens, among political actors, between communities, across generations, and between institutions and populations. Where appropriate, prevention support should enable engagement with local authorities, civil society, women, young people, traditional and religious leaders, private sector actors, and other stakeholders.

The principle that prevention should be offered rather than imposed applies most clearly to non-coercive UN system support for nationally owned efforts and contexts where the government is not deliberately and directly perpetrating violence against and in conflict with its own population. It should not be read as a general rule for all UN preventive action. The Charter recognises circumstances in which stronger measures may be required.[5] Enforcement action under Chapter VII, including UN sanctions, requires Security Council authorisation. The UN prevention offer should therefore support Member States and assist the Council when it draws on the system. It would remain relevant even if the Council were functioning effectively, since Council action depends on wider system capabilities for analysis, mediation, regional engagement, financing, and country-level follow-through.

# 3. Prevention gaps in UN action

Prevention is often lost where UN institutional handovers should produce holistic support. The UN has demonstrated coherence within humanitarian-development arrangements, particularly where leadership, planning frameworks, and pooled financing align. The more persistent challenge is to connect these arrangements with political and human rights analysis, peacebuilding finance, diplomacy, and nationally owned priorities, addressing the following gaps:

- The link from analysis to response remains weak. The UN system has become better at identifying risks, but warning signs do not automatically translate into political attention, financing, dialogue support, or operational follow-through. Political sensitivities, institutional incentives, and uncertainty over responsibility can all impede the move from analysis to preventive support.
- The gap between headquarters and country-level persists. Headquarters may hold political, human rights, mediation, peacebuilding, or regional expertise, but prevention ultimately depends on country-level trust and judgement. RCs and UNCTs are often best placed to understand national priorities and maintain relationships with governments and other actors, yet may lack political backing, specialist expertise, or flexible financing.
- The disconnect between national ownership and international support remains. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was an important initiative but did not produce a shift in financing for peacebuilding and prevention.[6] National prevention strategies and related approaches can translate broad commitments into priorities, responsibilities and implementation pathways, while providing a politically acceptable entry point for UN support. Experience with national action plans on women, peace and security (WPS) and small arms control shows that such plans can build visibility and ownership, but may remain stand-alone documents unless linked to financing, implementation responsibilities, reporting, and political accompaniment. [7]

[5] United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, especially Chapters VI, VII and VIII, and Articles 2(7), 33–38, 52–54 and 99.

[6] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States*, DCD/DAC/INCAF(2011)4, 2011. See also Sarah Hearn, *Independent Review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* (NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2016).

[7] See, for example, Caitlin Hamilton, Nyibeny Naam and Laura J. Shepherd, *Twenty Years of Women, Peace and Security National Action Plans: Analysis and Lessons Learned* (University of Sydney, 2020).

- The mismatch between short-term financing and prevention's long-term needs continues. Limited projects and crisis response are prioritised while effective prevention calls for flexible support, long-term engagement, and tolerance for uncertainty. Many risks are also transboundary and require analysis and engagement that connect national, sub-regional, and regional levels. Where financing remains disconnected from regional engagement and country-level support, prevention becomes fragmented even when individual activities are relevant.

Transitions from peace operations to longer-term UN engagement present a related challenge. Nepal shows why the end of a political mission should not be treated as the end of prevention responsibility: political accompaniment, dialogue support, constitutional follow-through, peacebuilding finance, and development planning may all remain necessary.[8] The Gambia in 2016–17 illustrates a different pattern, where regional diplomacy, Security Council attention, UN good offices, and political pressure aligned during crisis.[9] In the case of Liberia, research indicates that the absence of a coherent development cooperation policy during its transition weakened the management of external support, while meaningful ownership beyond central government remained limited.[10]

These examples should not be read as a simplified distinction between success and failure. Prevention outcomes are difficult to measure, and the absence of escalation rarely proves that an intervention was decisive. The purpose is diagnostic: to identify where analysis, political judgement, financing, national ownership, regional engagement, and operational support connected, and where they remained dispersed. The gaps illustrate why prevention requires a system function able to connect existing capacities differently.

# 4. Lessons from initiatives and reform

The UN prevention agenda has evolved through reforms and initiatives that build on the Charter. Peacekeeping, good offices, preventive diplomacy, human rights mechanisms, the Peacebuilding Architecture, the 2030 Agenda, Sustaining Peace, the New Agenda for Peace, the Pact for the Future, and the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review have broadened prevention and made it a shared responsibility.[11]

Some developments tried to move prevention from aspiration towards concrete responsibility and system practice. The establishment of the Office on Genocide Prevention and the adoption of the responsibility to protect (R2P) were important institutional and normative steps: R2P affirmed states' responsibility to protect populations from atrocity crimes and the international community's responsibility to assist and, where

[8] Sebastian von Einsiedel, *What Works in UN Resident Coordinator-Led Conflict Prevention: Lessons from the Field (United Nations University Centre for Policy Research*, June 2018). UNU publication. This also builds on ongoing research by the authors for a case study on Nepal as a contribution to a forthcoming policy brief by the International Peace Institute.

[9] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2337 (2017), S/RES/2337 (2017), 19 January 2017. See also Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall, *Conflict Averted Without Anyone Firing a Shot: Subregional, Multilateral Action Helps Prevent Atrocities in The Gambia* (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, April 2017).

[10] Niels Keijzer, Stephan Klingebiel and Fabian Scholtes, "Promoting Ownership in a 'Post-Aid Effectiveness' World: Evidence from Rwanda and Liberia," *Development Policy Review* 38, suppl. 1 (2020): O32–O49. doi:10.1111/dpr.12469.

[11] United Nations, "Our Common Agenda Policy Brief 9: A New Agenda for Peace", July 2023; United Nations General Assembly, *Pact for the Future*, A/RES/79/1, 22 September 2024; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 80/11, A/RES/80/11, 26 November 2025; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2805 (2025), S/RES/2805 (2025), 26 November 2025.

necessary, act through the UN.[12] Yet after Libya and the contested implementation of Security Council resolution 1973, many Member States became more cautious about doctrines associated with coercive action, regime change, or externally driven outcomes.[13]

The Human Rights Up Front initiative emerged after the UN's failure to act effectively during the final stages of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka and sought to treat serious human rights violations as system-wide warning signs.[14] The UN Operations and Crisis Centre (UNOCC) and the Regional Monthly Review process (RMR) similarly have sought to strengthen system-wide awareness, information-sharing and senior-level connectivity. The creation of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) in 2017 and the subsequent launch of the Counter-Terrorism Compact (2018) were framed as a step towards enhancing coordination and coherence in the work of the UN system on preventing and countering terrorism and the underlying spread of violent extremism. The 2018 UN-World Bank study *Pathways for Peace* was groundbreaking but lacked sufficient follow-up.

These initiatives have shown both the necessity and the limits of alert mechanisms and normative commitments when they are not connected to responsibility, financing, political backing and country-level follow-through. Three lessons are particularly pertinent for a practical UN prevention offer:

### 4.1 The Peacebuilding Commission has underused prevention potential

The PBC occupies a distinctive UN position. It convenes Member States, national authorities, the UN system, regional organisations, IFIs, and other partners; sustains attention beyond crisis; and provides a voluntary platform for Member States seeking support.[15] Grounded in national ownership, it can offer visibility, partnership, and accompaniment without the stigma often associated with the Security Council.

Although created primarily for post-conflict peacebuilding and preventing relapse, the PBC's role has evolved through the Sustaining Peace resolutions (2016) and subsequent reviews.[16] This broadened its potential as a platform for prevention before escalation, where Member States seek assistance and national priorities guide engagement. Yet Member State engagement with the PBC remains uneven, its advisory relationship with the Security Council underused, and its links to RCs, UNCTs, financing instruments, regional organisations, and IFIs incomplete. Its value lies in serving as the global political platform for voluntary, nationally-owned prevention engagement, linked to country-level follow-through, financing, and deployable expertise. As secretariat to the PBC, PBPSO plays a critical role in strengthening coherence between the UN’s development, human rights, and peace and security pillars.

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[12] United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, paras. 138–139; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), S/RES/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011; Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, “Responsibility while Protecting: Elements for the Development and Promotion of a Concept,” A/66/551–S/2011/701, 11 November 2011.

[13] See, for example, Simon Adams, *Libya and the Responsibility to Protect* (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 5 October 2012).

[14] For a brief history of Human Rights Up Front and its evolution, see Danica Damplo and Rodrigo Saad, *Policy or Aspiration: Shedding Light on the Current Status of the UN’s Human Rights Up Front Initiative* (Universal Rights Group, October 2019). On Sri Lanka, see United Nations Secretary-General, “Statement of the Secretary-General on Internal Review Panel Report on Sri Lanka,” 14 November 2012.

[15] United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 60/180, A/RES/60/180, 20 December 2005; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1645 (2005), S/RES/1645 (2005), 20 December 2005; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1646 (2005), S/RES/1646 (2005), 20 December 2005.

[16] Advisory Group of Experts, *The Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*, A/69/968–S/2015/490, 30 June 2015; United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 70/262, A/RES/70/262, 27 April 2016; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2282 (2016), S/RES/2282 (2016), 27 April 2016.

### 4.2 The Resident Coordinator system has reach but lacks full support

The RC system is the UN's most important country-level organising platform for prevention, especially where there is no peace operation or special political mission. RCs and UNCTs are close to national authorities, development planning, institutional reform, and social dynamics, and can identify risks across governance, exclusion, economic stress, human rights concerns, displacement, climate pressures, or declining public trust.

Development system reform created new opportunities for integrated country-level engagement.[17] The Common Country Analysis and Cooperation Framework connect risk analysis, national priorities, programming, and partnerships, but cannot substitute for political judgement, human rights analysis, mediation support, flexible financing, or deployable expertise. Prevention is not consistently embedded in expectations of the RC function, planning, financing decisions, or access to specialist support. In sensitive contexts, RCs may face accusations of mandate creep, host-state pressure, disinformation risks, or threats to staff security without clear system backing.

The RC is the designated representative of the Secretary-General at the country level with the responsibility to lead UNCTs and ensure system-wide country-level accountability. According to the job description, “S/he brings to the role an appreciation of the breadth of assets of the United Nations in the service of sustaining peace.”[18] While this implies a role across development, human rights, and peace and security concerns, the job description remains ambiguous on this, describing responsibilities to “address national needs, priorities and sustainable development challenges to advance the 2030 Agenda and to advocate for action and acceleration on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).” While RCs should not become political envoys by default, their role is to organise UN support around nationally owned priorities, connect analysis to planning, engage counterparts, identify financing needs, and request expertise, with stronger links to the PBC, PBF, regional actors, IFIs, and Expertise on Demand. In that, RCs should be supported to act across the three pillars and the connection of RCs to DPPA at headquarters should be strengthened.

### 4.3 Financing rewards response more than prevention

Prevention requires timely, flexible, and adaptive financing, and greater donor risk tolerance. It often involves dialogue, trust-building, institutional accompaniment, inclusive planning, social cohesion, risk analysis, and national strategy processes whose results are difficult to attribute. Success may mean that violence did not occur, institutions did not collapse, or tensions did not escalate.

The challenge is no longer only how to finance prevention when resources are available but poorly aligned. It is how to organise prevention in the wake of the rapid contraction of official development assistance (ODA) from members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), when donor risk tolerance is declining and competition for flexible resources is more acute.[19] The UN system must show how prevention financing can be prioritised, pooled, aligned with national priorities, and connected to wider investment decisions.

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[17] United Nations General Assembly, *Repositioning of the United Nations Development System in the Context of the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review of Operational Activities for Development of the United Nations System*, A/RES/72/279, 31 May 2018; United Nations Sustainable Development Group, *United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework Guidance*, June 2019.

[18] United Nations Sustainable Development Group, *Management and Accountability Framework of the UN Development and Resident Coordinator System* (2019, updated September 2021). The RC job description is contained in Annex 1.

[19] OECD, “A Historic Decline in Foreign Aid: Preliminary 2025 ODA Data,” 9 April 2026. OECD data; OECD, “ODA Projections for 2026 and the Near-Term: Implications for Vulnerable Countries and Sectors”, OECD Policy Briefs, no. 59 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2026). doi:10.1787/d7c74fa2-en.

Current incentives favour visible outputs, short cycles, sectoral delivery, and response to visible crisis. Funding is easier to mobilise after deterioration, while prevention requires support before risks command attention. The PBF has shown the value of flexible and catalytic financing, and pooled funds can encourage joint analysis and programming when aligned with national priorities and RC leadership. But neither can align the wider system alone. Prevention financing remains fragmented across donor preferences, agency mandates, project cycles, and reporting requirements.

IFIs are relevant but should be treated carefully as they are not prevention actors in the same way as UN political, peacebuilding, or human rights entities. Yet economic shocks, debt pressures, unemployment, inequality, service delivery gaps, and fiscal stress can interact with political and social risks. Where these pressures are nationally identified priorities, IFIs should be engaged within their mandates as part of a wider financing and investment conversation.[20] Financing should not be determined during implementation; rather, it is a condition for prevention to become operational.

# 5. A UN prevention offer: organising existing capacities

Prevention requires coordinated political, development, human rights, humanitarian, regional, and financing support, working with national institutions and other partners. The task is to systematise existing capacities into a usable prevention offer that answers practical questions: what support is available; who brings the system together; how analysis connects to political accompaniment, regional engagement, and financing; how expertise is mobilised; and how follow-through is sustained. The offer should be organised around six connected functions.

First, the PBC should serve as the global political and convening platform, providing voluntary engagement, political accompaniment, partner mobilisation, peer learning, and attention to nationally owned priorities while respecting the Security Council's responsibilities and the PBC's role in supporting the Council.

Second, national prevention strategies and related nationally-led approaches should provide the political foundation. Such strategies are relevant in all country contexts and do not need to follow any given format or prescriptive framework.[21] The function matters more than terminology: identifying risks, priorities, responsibilities, financing needs, and forms of international support, building on existing capacities.

Third, the RC system should serve as the country-level organising platform, connecting national priorities, risk analysis, development planning, UN programming, and partner engagement. RCs need clearer expectations, political backing, analytical support, flexible financing, and specialised expertise, including human rights mechanisms and warning capacities.

Fourth, regional arrangements should provide the interface for cross-border and transboundary conflict and risks with regional effects: displacement, organised crime, arms flows, climate insecurity, food and energy shocks, resource pressures, borderland violence, and regionalised political crises. Regional and sub-regional organisations, UN regional commissions, UN regional and multi-country offices, regional development banks, and neighbouring RCs should be connected around shared risks.

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[20] United Nations and World Bank, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018).

[21] The evidence-based *Policy Guidance for Effective National Prevention Strategies* (June 2026), presented by the NYU Center on International Cooperation, can serve as a valuable resource in this endeavour.

Fifth, financing and investment should be aligned with prevention priorities. Prevention cannot become operational if financing arrives after escalation, remains locked into narrow project categories, or fragments as ODA contracts. Pooled funds, including the PBF, bilateral donor financing, Cooperation Framework financing strategies, and IFI support should be connected to nationally owned prevention priorities. Financing should enable and contribute to adaptive programming, joint analysis, inclusive dialogue, and sustained institutional support.

Sixth, Expertise on Demand should provide deployable prevention support. The UN has relevant capacities: mediation support, Peace and Development Advisers, human rights expertise, peacebuilding finance mechanisms, development programming, governance support, and regional analysis. These capacities are dispersed across the UN system and are not always available in the right place, at the right time, or in the right combination. Expertise on Demand could make existing capacity and knowledge easier to mobilise for nationally-led priorities, RC and UNCT needs, PBC accompaniment, or regional prevention efforts, without creating a new institution.

A Member State developing a national approach could be supported by the RC and UNCT, accompanied by the PBC, connected to regional actors, linked to financing, and assisted by deployable expertise. Such an offer would not guarantee successful prevention but would make existing capacities more accessible and reduce fragmentation.

# 6. Policy recommendations

The recommendations translate this prevention offer into an agenda for immediate action.

1. **Define prevention as a system objective and adopt a UN prevention offer**: The 10th Secretary-General should make prevention a defining system objective and present a clear offer setting out what the UN can provide, how support can be requested, who brings it together, how it can be financed, and how follow-through is sustained.

2. **Anchor the prevention offer in nationally-led priorities and PBC accompaniment**: Member States should be encouraged to use national prevention strategies or similar nationally-led approaches to define priorities that guide UN support. In eligible countries, PBF support should be linked to such strategies. The PBC should be used as a voluntary platform for presenting priorities, mobilising partners, engaging financing actors, drawing lessons, and assessing progress.

3. **Organise delivery at country and regional levels with deployable system functions**: The Secretary-General, Member States and relevant UN entities should organise the offer through RC leadership at country level, regional arrangements including cross-border prevention, and Expertise on Demand as flexible deployable support. RCs should be equipped with political backing, financing access, and expertise to bring UNCTs together around nationally owned priorities. The supporting role of the Development Cooperation Office (DCO) in prevention should be articulated. Regional analysis and expertise of regional organisations, regional commissions, and regional and multi-country UN offices should be more systematically consulted and factored into prevention initiatives at all levels.

4. **Align prevention capabilities**: Member States, donors, and UN entities should align financing, analysis, and learning with prevention priorities. The PBC, with DPPA and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), including PBPSO, DCO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and others, should help develop context-sensitive indicators assessing whether support was timely, coherent, nationally owned, inclusive, financed, and adapted as conditions changed.

These recommendations move from affirming prevention to deciding how it can be organised, requested, financed, delivered, and assessed. Prevention as a UN system function offers a practical way to help Member States manage risks before escalation makes choices harder and costlier.

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